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Abstract 
The increasing internationalisation and integration of global economic activity 
has meant that the way nations seek to manage and accommodate such 
external imperatives is a critical determinant of national economic welfare. 
There has, however, been a notable variety of responses to these ubiquitous 
forces. In Australia, neoliberal ideas came to exert a powerful ideational 
influence over policy-makers during the 1980s as they attempted to reposition 
'Australia' in response to the exigencies of external competition. 
This thesis will argue that Australian policy makers' commitment to neoliberal 
ideas meant that policy was constructed within a limited set of theoretical 
parameters, which were unable to take account of the specific corporate and 
governmental practices of major trading partners. The thesis analyses the utility 
and effect of neoliberal ideas on the conduct of Australia's international 
economic relations, with particular reference to Japan. Japan is Australia's 
principal trading partner, an important potential source of investment capital, 
and the dominant economic actor in a region with which Australian policy­
makers seek greater 'integration'. This important economic relationship 
provides an appropriate case study with which to test the efficacy of the 
neoliberal model and the assumptions that inform it. 
It will be demonstrated that some of the central concepts and assumptions of 
neo-classical theory, which are central to the discourse of neoliberalism, bear 
little resemblance to commercial practices in the region of which Australia is a 
part. In the course of this study, it will be argued that the dominance of 
neoliberal ideas may be best understood by considering their discursive 
influence, particularly as this was reinforced by an influential group of 
academics and government officials. The theoretical assumptions of these 
ideas will be examined, and the preconditions that rendered them attractive at a 
specific historical juncture detailed. It will be suggested that neoliberal ideas 
informed a specific political rationality which had discernible effects on a range 
of policy issues in Australia, but which was especially evident in the area of 
external economic policy. 
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Introduction 
Capitalism, it might be supposed, is everywhere and at all times much the 
same. By definition, of course, this observation must be at least partially 
accurate. The qualities that distinguish the capitalist system - market-oriented 
commodity production, private ownership of the means of production, the 
selling of labour power, and individualistic, acquisitive behaviour - are 
necessarily present in any set of economic arrangements and relationships 
dubbed capitalist. Yet what is noteworthy and surprising about capitalism in the 
contemporary global political economy 1 (GPE) is the continuing degree of 
variation within nations on these central themes. Ironically, the apparent demise 
of capitalism's only serious modern rival, central planning, has served to 
highlight rather than erase the ways different nations have approached the 
problem of national economic management. Moreover, there are, as we shall 
see, substantial grounds for thinking that different forms of capitalist 
organization may confer particular advantages on economic actors located 
within particular nations. 
The potentially crucial role of national governments in determining the basis 
upon which national economic spaces 2 are integrated into the wider GPE has 
spawned a voluminous literature. The state of 'the state' and the impact of 
transnational economic forces on national governments have become major 
objects of scholarly interest and debate, much of which will be drawn upon in 
subsequent chapters. In what follows, however, I will not be principally 
concerned with mapping and measuring the decline of the nation state or 
governmental authority. Rather, a central intention of this thesis will be to 
consider the differences in policy responses to what are the seemingly 
ubiquitous imperatives of global competition. Why is it that some countries have 
adopted market-conforming policies, for example, while others have favoured 
initiatives that are more akin to nee-mercantilism? Specifically, how·did a 
1 I have employed this term in preference to the possibly more customary 'international political 
economy' because, as we shall see, the status of the nation state and the inter-national system 
of states are becoming increasingly contested. Moreover, as Gill observes, financial systems 
and production processes 'are increasingly planetary in scope'. See: Gill, S (1992) 'Economic 
Globalization and the Internationalization of Authority: Limits and Contradictions' ,  Geoforum, 23 
(3): 276. 
2 This rather clumsy formulation is preferred to the more customary and euphonious 'national 
economy' because this latter term is itself increasingly problematic in the wake of the 
internationalisation of economic activity. Quite simply, it is no longer clear what the 'national 
economy is any longer, or where its boundaries may be drawn. 
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particular set of ideas - known as 'economic rationalism' in Australia, but more 
generally as neoliberalism - come to exert such a powerful influence on the 
conduct of economic policy in Australia? Moreover, what has been their impact 
on the content and direction of government policy? 
This latter question informs the second major concern of this thesis: what has 
been the effect of a neoliberal policy framework on the conduct of Australia's 
international economic relations? Rather than attempting to deal· with all of 
Australia's manifold relationships I shall focus principally on the bilateral 
relationship with Japan. There are several reasons for focusing on the bilateral 
relationship with Japan in particular. Firstly, Japan is Australia's largest trading 
partner and a significant source of foreign investment. Secondly, Japan is the 
dominant regional actor in an increasingly 'tri-polar' economic world. Thirdly, 
Japan provides a useful 'counterfactual' for the Australian experience: not only 
is there nothing inevitable or 'natural' about a preference for nee-liberal policies, 
but Japan demonstrates the potential for different economic trajectories and 
outcomes under state-led capitalist development. 
The central argument of this thesis, which emerges from a consideration of the 
Australia-Japan relationship, is this: Australian policy-makers' commitment to 
neoliberal ideas meant that policy itself was constructed within a limited set of 
theoretical parameters; policy was consequently unable to take account of the 
specific corporate and governmental practices of major trading partners. This 
theoretical difficulty was particularly evident in relationships like that with Japan, 
where market mechanisms were not necessarily predominant determinants of 
economic activity. One of the major intentions of this thesis will be to draw 
attention to the manner in which neoliberal ideas discursively defined and 
delimited the problematic of international economic policy. Moreover, in what 
follows it will be demonstrated that the central concepts and assumptions of 
neo-classical economics, which were an integral part of the overall neoliberal 
approach, bore little resemblance to commercial practices in the region of which 
Australia is a part. Yet such ideas have been, as we shall see, instrumental in 
redefining the style and objects of government in Australia since the 1980s. 
Initially, however, consideration will be given to the state of the contemporary 
GPE, and some of the more important theoretical contributions that have 
attempted to make sense of it. For the sake of convenience, discussion is 
divided between broadly defined political and economic areas. While this is an 
inherently artificial distinction, it helps to structure what otherwise threatens to 
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become an unwieldy exercise. Chapter 1, therefore, pays particular attention 
to changes in the production process, the increasing mobility and power of 
financial capital, and the critical role of the transnational corporation (TNC) as 
an organiser of global production - in fact, the more overtly economic aspects of 
the GPE. Subsequently, the relationship of these structures and processes to 
political entities like national governments and increasingly important 
transnational organisations is reviewed. The overall intention of this chapter is 
to delineate the ubiquitous forces and structures that constrain all governments 
to some degree in an increasingly integrated international economic system. 
One might intuitively expect that such powerful and apparently irresistible 
international forces would mean that individual governments had little scope for 
policy autonomy. There is, indeed, a good deal of evidence to suggest that 
national sovereignty has been diminished and that the purview of governments 
is increasingly circumscribed. But what is most remarkable in the contemporary 
GPE is the continuing variations in the policy rationales of different nations. 
Chapter 2 begins the process of attempting to account for some of these 
differences. The intention here is to consider the impact of particular ideas and 
their influence on the scope and content of subsequent policy. It will be 
suggested that at different times within different nations distinct 'political 
rationalities' exert a powerful ideational influence within policy-making elites, 
which may come to determine the content and direction of subsequent policy. 
The political rationality that has been most influential in Australia since the 
1980s has been one that drew much of its theoretical inspiration from neo­
classical economics. Consequently this chapter closely examines the manner in 
which a distinctive neoliberal political rationality came to exert an ideational 
dominance, its epistemological predicates, and its subsequent development as 
a distinctive mode of governance. 
Chapter 3 pays more attention to the specific causes that underpinned 
neoliberalism's rise in Australia. While part of neoliberalism's influence was 
discursively achieved, as the previous chapter argued, there were also 
important contingent political and economic circumstances - especially the 
manner in which many economic entities in Australia were integrated into the 
wider GPE- which made neoliberal ideas increasingly attractive. These are 
given extensive consideration as they not only help explain the alignment of 
political forces sympathetic to more deregulatory policies, but they largely 
determine and circumscribe the manner in which Australian based enterprises 
might interact with international economic partners like Japan. This chapter will 
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also illustrate the impact of the neoliberal political rationality outlined earlier on 
Labor's economic and social policies. It will be suggested that a combination of 
political practices designed to achieve the specific goals of international 
economic reorientation and national reconstruction intersected with expert 
discourses that claimed to have the technical solutions to Australia's perceived 
problems, a process that reflected and reinforced the influence of neoliberal 
ideas. One of the keys to explaining the influence of neoliberal policies in 
Australia during the 1980s, I shall suggest, is the productive intersection of a 
reform-minded government bent on re-structuring and revitalising the 
'Australian economy' with a bureaucracy steeped in an increasingly 
technocratically defined competence. 
The perceived need tor change and dissatisfaction with 'traditional' tools of 
macro-economic intervention provided the preconditions in which neoliberal 
ideas were able to gain ground amongst elite policy-makers. Chapter 4, 
therefore, takes a closer look at some of the more important individuals that 
championed neoliberal ideas in Australia. It will be suggested that an influential 
'epistemic community' played an important role in promoting a specific set of 
policy initiatives designed to provide a rationale and framework tor the conduct 
of Australia's external economic policies. Close attention will be paid to the 
work of two academics in particular - Peter Drysdale and Ross Garnaut - as 
they have played a large part in determining the direction of Australia's overall 
foreign economic policy in general, and that with Japan in particular. As part of 
this process, the theoretical assumptions and propositions evident in their work 
will be subjected to rigorous scrutiny and compared with other interpretations of 
the Asian economies about which they claim authoritative knowledge. 
In this regard, Japan provides an important measure against which to judge the 
theoretical utility of the neo-classical paradigm that informs Drysdale and 
Garnaut's work. Chapter 5 is, therefore, dedicated to a detailed analysis of the 
Japanese political economy. Initially, Japan's post-war development is 
examined, especially the distinctive government-business relations that 
promoted its remarkable growth, before moving on to consider the equally 
noteworthy corporate structures which have been integral to economic 
expansion in Japan. Not only does this provide a case study with which to test 
the explanatory efficacy of the neo-classical model, it gives a detailed picture of 
the Japanese economic entities and actors with which Australian-based firms 
and policy-makers must deal. It will be suggested that the neo-classical model's 
lack of historical and national specificity provides an inadequate basis on which 
5 
to comprehend the highly distinctive practices that characterise the Japanese 
political economy. 
The potential efficacy of a more expansive theoretical approach than that 
provided by the neo-classical paradigm is also apparent in a regional context. It 
is a major contention of this thesis that the production strategies of the 
Japanese TNCs, which are the most tangible manifestation of the bilateral 
relationship from an Australian perspective, can only be understood within a 
regional or even a global framework. Attempting to account for the behaviour of 
such firms and their position within individual nations is not possible without a 
wider frame of reference. For this reason chapter 6 is taken up with a detailed 
examination of regional production networks and strategies. The intention here 
is to situate the investment and production strategies of Japanese TNCs within 
the overall context of the region of which Australia is a part. It will be suggested 
that only this level of complexity and specificity - something conspicuously 
neglected by more orthodox neo-classical accounts - can account for the way 
economic entities based in Australia are integrated into such strategies. 
Furthermore, it will be demonstrated that - in contradistinction to the claims of 
the neoliberal model - Japanese capital may be encouraged to invest precisely 
where market forces are either constrained, or where contingent 'distortions' 
make such locations more attractive. 
In chapter 7 attention is given to the specific Australia-Japan bilateral 
relationship in the light of the above. The historical linkages between Japan and 
Australia are considered, and a close examination of the nature of Japanese 
involvement in the areas of manufacturing, real estate, resources and banking 
is undertaken. The intention here will be to measure the effectiveness of the 
neoliberal policy paradigm in transforming the bilateral relationship with Japan. 
It will be suggested that despite deregulatory initiatives and the opening up of 
the 'Australian economy' to market forces, there has not been a significant 
increase in general manufacturing investment of the sort anticipated by the 
architects of neoliberal reform. On the contrary, the pattern of Japanese 
involvement in Australia has followed, not surprisingly perhaps, a Japanese 
logic that has seen little noteworthy change from an established pattern of using 
Australia as predominantly a commodity supplier. Where there has been a 
significant change it has been in areas like real estate, where deregulation in 
both countries has facilitated the movement of potentially destabilising and 
speculative flows of financial capital. Despite the restructuring and relocation of 
large sections of Japan's manufacturing base, it is generally moving to 
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consolidate the tightly integrated production networks to Australia's north, rather 
than Australia itself. 
Finally, chapter 8 presents tour case studies which in their different ways 
illustrate the specifics of the Australia-Japan economic relationship, and raise 
doubts about the adequacy and utility of the neoliberal paradigm both 
theoretically, and by implication as a basis tor policy. Chapter 9 is the 
conclusion which draws together the implications of the above. In this regard, 
attention will be drawn to the discursive authority of the neoliberal model and its 
impact on the conduct of Australia's external economic relations. It wil l  be 
suggested that the there are substantial grounds tor questioning the efficacy of 
the neoliberal model both theoretically and as a basis tor policy. However, 
whatever the relative merits of neoliberal ideas, thinking of them as part of a 
specific political rationality can, I will argue, help explain both the content and 
style of government in Australia since the 1980s. 
Overall, therefore, this thesis will argue that the neoliberal assumptions inherent 
in Australian policy-making contain serious theoretical - and by implication -
pragmatic shortcomings. While the scope for autonomous policy construction 
may be increasingly circumscribed by developments in the global political 
economy, national policy-making elites still play a crucially important role in 
determining the form and content of economic activity that occurs within 
national borders. This thesis will demonstrate that adherence to a 
predominantly neoliberal policy paradigm in Australia meant that policymakers 
and advisers were often unable to comprehend either the activities of important 
regional economic actors like Japanese multinationals, or the strategies of their 
political counterparts in institutions like the Japanese bureaucracy, much less 
produce policies that might transform the broader bilateral relationship of which 
such actors were a crucial part. Consequently, the bilateral relationship with 
Japan has not been transformed by the Hawke-Keating governments' policies 
of economic opening and domestic reform. If the desiderata of economic policy 
in Australia is a more 'balanced' relationship wi.th countries like Japan, in which 
Australia is not just a source of commodity exports and a target tor speculative 
capital flows, then this thesis clearly reveals that only a paradigm that 
recognises the specificities of individual bilateral relations, and which develops 
policies accordingly is likely to deliver the sort of outcomes policy-makers 
desire. 
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Chapter 1 - The Global Political Economy 
Paradoxically, change has been one of the few constant features of the post­
war global political economy (GPE). While politicians, in conjunction with 
administrative agencies, have attempted to respond to change in ways that may 
seem familiar - particularly where such responses are couched in a discourse 
predicated upon a calculus of national economic advantage - the ability of 
national political actors to act, and the tools with which they seek to implement 
policy, are greatly altered. The increased integration of international economic 
activity has circumscribed and constrained the possible modes of intervention 
available to policy makers: intervention has become both more complex 
practically, and distinctly less fashionable politically. However, it is important to 
situate the process of national economic policy construction within a global 
context. The internationalisation of production means that national governments 
are involved in direct competition to attract increasingly mobile, wealth-creating 
investment capital and the jobs which it can generate. The interaction between 
national and international spheres is a significant determinant of both domestic 
and external political-economic modes of governance. 
This first chapter will highlight some of the more important developments in the 
GPE and address some of the questions such changes raise. In particular: what 
are the implications for national economic management of changes in the way 
financial and productive capital circulate within the GPE? What role and impact 
have transnational corporations (TNC) played in the inter-nationalisation of 
economic activities? How have such changes affected individual nation states? 
Moreover, what effect has the increasingly important trans-nationalisation of 
political issues and the possible erosion of national sovereignty had on national 
governments, especially their ability to manage 'national' economies? Indeed, is 
the idea of a national economy any longer a useful one? Answers to such 
questions- albeit provisional ones - drawn from current theoretical debates 
provide an important backdrop against which to comprehend the activities of 
national policy-makers as they attempt to adjust to international economic 
change and the particular challenges presented by individual bilateral relations. 
The relationship between political activity and economic change is obviously 
complex and it is possible to approach it from a number of perspectives. 
Indeed, one of the central contentions of this thesis is that only by drawing on 
different paradigms and bodies of knowledge is it possible to develop some 
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understanding of these linkages. Consequently, this chapter will begin by 
attempting to describe the most important changes that have emerged in the 
contemporary GPE. 1 Crucial here is an understanding of developments in the 
production process itself and the critical role TNCs have played. Although 
much of the literature that seeks to explicate TNC development is theoretically 
rather narrow and 'managerial' it is, nevertheless, an important foundation upon 
which subsequent layers of socio-political complexity can be overlayed and 
comprehended. Following this discussion of the largely economic dimensions of 
the GPE, more overtly political changes will be considered. This division is 
obviously somewhat artificial and arbitrary as by definition no simple distinction 
exists in a political-economy perspective. However, such a conceptualisation 
may help to highlight and disentangle some of the more salient aspects of the 
GPE. 
Before attempting a detailed description of the changing GPE a few preliminary 
observations may help orientate subsequent discussion. At the risk of striking a 
slightly portentous note, it is necessary to say something about space and time. 
Capitalism has been characterised by not only the short-term vicissitudes of 
'business cycles' but also, it is contended, by more fundamental historical 
'waves' of rapid expansion followed by stagnation.2 While it may not be possible 
or helpful to attempt an extrapolation directly from apparent past economic 
regularities, it is useful to distinguish the current epoch from its predecessors. 
Following Mandel, therefore, it is helpful to refer to the current era as 'late' 
capitalism. 3 Although Mandel was clearly wrong about some aspects of 
contemporary development (the inevitable strengthening of states and the role 
of 'permanent arms economies' being two examples), he did draw attention to 
other factors - the centralisation and concentration of capital, the growth of the 
service sector, and especially the role of TNCs as the determinant and 
dominant organisational form of capital - that distinguish contemporary 
capitalism from earlier forms. TNCs have been responsible for the 
reorganisation of production on an increasingly global scale, a process which 
1 Constraints of space mean that no attempt will be made to systematically detail all of the 
important changes in the post-World War 2 period. However, for a useful overview of the 
changes that have underpinned the shift from Keynesianism to more market-oriented policies 
and the economic crises that promoted such a shift, see: Glyn, A et al (1990) 'The Rise and fall 
of the Golden Age' , in Marglin, S & Schor, J (eds) The Golden Age of Capitalism: Reinterpreting 
the Postwar Experience, Clarendon Press, Oxford: 39-119. 
2 For a review of the 'wave theory' debate see: Goldstein, J (1988) Long Cycles: Prosperity and 
War in the Modern Age, Yale University Press, New Haven. 
3 Mandel, E (1978) Late Capitalism, Verso, London. 
9 
has had profound effects on the 'spatia-temporal construction of social life', 4 
producing specific contemporary modes of spatial restructuring and integration 
into the GPE. 
Many of these issues may be subsumed under the rubric of 'globalisation'. 
Although imprecise, it draws attention to a range of factors associated with the 
internationalisation of economic and political relationships; it is with the former 
that this section principally deals. Even at this stage, however, it is important to 
recognise the dialectical interplay at work between the political and economic 
spheres. Clearly some of the major contemporary issues with which national 
economic managers have attempted to deal - the implications of massively 
increased movements of financial capital, for example - have had their genesis 
in developments that have been as much technological as political. Certainly an 
international movement toward neoliberal, deregulatory policies may have 
facilitated this process, but it was not an exclusively political process. Cox's 
observations are helpful here: 
Global perestroika, more euphemistically called 'globalization', is not the consequence of 
a conscious decision of political leadership. It is the result of structural changes in 
capitalism, in the actions of many people, corporate bodies, and states, that cumulatively 
produce new relationships and patterns of behaviour. The project of global perestrioka is 
less the conscious will of an identifiable group than the latent consequence of these 
structural changes.5 
It is obviously important, then, to distinguish some of the 'structural changes' 
that both enable and delimit particular economic and political possibilities. For 
the sake of convenience it is useful to distinguish between developments in the 
areas of capital and the production process itself. 
International Economics 
One of the most significant developments in the contemporary GPE has been 
the increased scale, mobility and significance of 'financial' capital. Although this 
term is often used rather loosely, it is important to be clear about its form. In this 
context, Marxian-derived models of international economic integration are 
particularly useful. Bryan reminds us of the importance of recognising the 
dialectical relation that exists between money and the production of 
4 Soja, E W (1989} Postmodern Geographies: The Reassertion of Space in Critical Social 
Theory, Verso, London: 127. 
5 Cox, R W (1992} "Global Perestroika', The Socialist Register: 26. 
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commodities: money is the mobile expression of value that permits and 
promotes the international restructuring of productive activities.6 'Financial 
capital', then, refers to the social process by which money is transformed into 
productive capital. Where money is concentrated in large agglomerations 
(institutional investors, for example) its controllers are able to exert a 
dominance over productive capital and determine and facilitate its (possibly 
global) location. Profitability is, of course, the sine qua non of this process and 
the major determinant of where productive activity in the GPE will be located. 
Non-Marxist commentators have also tried to comprehend these changes. 
Drucker, for example, suggests that one of the defining characteristics of the 
new GPE is the increasing dichotomy between the 'real' economy of goods and 
services and, what he called the 'symbol' economy of money, credit and 
capital.? Not only has finance capital ceased to be intimately linked to the 
production of commodities, it has become a commodity itself. The volume of 
transactions on global capital markets dwarf those associated with trade. 
Foreign exchange transactions, for example, now exceed $900 billion per day. 8 
More significantly tor the purposes of this essay, the sheer volume of capital 
available to financial markets means they are able to exercise enormous power 
over national governments, to the extent that completely autonomous national 
monetary policy becomes unsustainable. 9 As a consequence, mutual fund 
managers, controlling the collective assets of individual pensioners and 
investors may become the most significant actors in international finance. If the 
trend toward exerting their potential influence over corporate boards continues 
it may have large implications for the organisation and operation of individual 
capitalist enterprises - especially in the West - and raise important questions 
about how best to theorise such developments. 1 o 
It should be stressed, however, that there is a technological as well as a 
political basis to many of these developments. Cheap, powerful computers 
were an essential part of both increased capital mobility, and the development 
of increasingly exotic and complex financial instruments - derivatives, for 
example. 11 Capital markets throughout the world are becoming more deeply 
6 Bryan, D (1985) 'Finance Capital: A Mechanism for Restructuring', Journal of Australian 
Political Economy, 18: 30-9. 
7 Drucker, Peter F (1986) "The Changed World Economy", Foreign Affairs: Spring: 783. 
8 Crook, Clive (1992) " Fear of Finance", The Economist, Sept.19th, : 9. 
9 McCathie, A (1993) 'End of the ERM E ra', Financial Review, August 3rd: 1 &12. 
10 The Economist (1994) 'Corporate Governance: The I nvisible Band', Oct 8th: 84. 
11 Freeman, A (1993) 'A Survey of International Banking', The Economist, April1 Oth. 
1 1 
integrated through mechanisms like 'swap markets', which have the effect of 
equalising global interest rates. The emergence of institutions like the 
Euromarket , and the shift from national stock exchange floor to computer 
screen trading, are bringing about an 'end of geography', claims O'Brien, and 
posing enormous challenges to would-be regulators. 12 Whether such 
mechanisms increase or decrease volatility and risk is less important, at this 
juncture, than is the possibility that discrete technocratic discourses have 
emerged in concert with this type of infrastructural change. As we shall see in 
subsequent chapters, much of the discursive power of what may be termed a 
neolibera113 and increasingly technocratic discourse, stems from the often 
explicit suggestion that it most accurately reflects irresistible market-enhancing 
forces that are fuelled, in part, by ideologically neutral technological change. 
One of the most notable expressions of the growth and increased mobility of 
finance capital has been the emergence of global banking, to a point where 
some observers suggest it is 'the most pervasive force in the international 
economy'. 14 This process has been assisted by a general international trend 
toward the deregulation of national economic spaces, something that has even 
extended, as we shall see, to Japan. However, it is important to remember that 
it is not the institutions that create international financial mobility, they simply 
administer it. 15 Quite why governments choose to enhance money mobility will 
be one of the recurring concerns of this thesis. Suffice to note at present that 
governments which pursue deregulatory policies are not so much de- regulating 
as re- regulating: that is, a different set of market-promoting regulations that 
favour particular interests replace previous modes of regulation; government 
supervision and legitimation is indispensable for either. 16 
For the purposes of this essay the rapid emergence and increasing power of 
global finance is a crucially important constraint on national policy-making 
autonomy. 17 Indeed, financial capital has become such a powerful, market-
12 O'Brien, R (1992) Global Financial Integration: The End of Geography, AliA, London: 44-51. 
13 Here 'neoliberalism' is taken to refer to a broadly coherent discourse that privileges market 
mechanisms as the most effective determinants of economic outcomes. A number of 
assumptions about the appropriate role of government and the behaviour of individuals are 
implicit in this view - assumptions that will be considered in greater detail in subsequent 
chapters. 
14 Daly, M T & Logan, M I (1989) The Brittle Rim: Finance, Business and the Pacific Region, 
Penguin: 88. 
15 Bryan, D (1985) 'Finance Capital: A Mechanism for Restructuring': 38 
16 Cerny, P (1991) 'The Limits of Deregulation: Transnational I nterpenetration and Policy 
Change', European Journal of Political Research, 19: 173-96. 
17 Not only is national economic policy compromised by the possibilities opened up for 
arbitrage via mobile capital, but voluntarily entered international financial management regimes 
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conforming influence on national governments that Andrews suggests that it 
should be considered as a distinctive 'structure' of the contemporary GPE.18 
Certainly, as we shall see in later chapters, it is possible for actors within the 
bureaucracy, government, as well as national and international economic 
interests to further the liberalisation process by actively promoting and lobbying 
for increased deregulation. However, the point to recognise here is that, as 
Cerny observes, deregulation is essentially 'a response to the inadequacy of 
... nationally based regulatory systems to deal with the new 
Internationalization of finance'. 19 Faced with an apparent inability - or 
unwillingness - to control or regulate international financial movements, 
governments are, Cerny suggests, increasingly subscribing to an 'embedded 
financial orthodoxy',2 0  which defines the 'appropriate' role of government. 
Failure to adhere to this implicit consensus may lead to a concomitant failure to 
attract footloose financial capital. States, therefore, have been the willing 
instruments in their own relative decline, constructing structures of financial 
governance that enhanced the power and freedom of market actors through 
increased liberalisation and a rejection of possible enhanced control. 2 1  
An important effect of the trend toward increasingly deregulatory policies, 
however, was that it induced a greater degree of systemic instability and 
volatility. A series of crucial decisions - or, as Strange argues, non-decisions -
from the early 1970s onwards, reduced the regulatory influence of governments 
and gave greater power to financial markets and institutions. 2 2  The floating of 
exchange rates, the move from a gold standard, and the rapid growth of the 
Euromarkets all made the construction of predictable, autonomous national 
economic policy more problematic. An entire industry emerged centred on huge 
further constrain individual governments. See: Webb, M (1991) ' International economic 
structures, government interests, and international coordination of macroeconomic adjustment 
polices', International Organization, 45 (3}: 309-42. 
18 Andrews, D (1994) 'Capital Mobility and State Autonomy: Toward a Structural Theory of 
International Monetary Relations', International Studies Quarterly, 38: 197-8. 
19 Cerny, P (1993} 'The deregulation and re-regulation of financial markets in a more open 
world, in Cerny, P (ed) Finance and World Politics: markets, Regimes and States in the Post­
hegemonic Era, Edward Elgar, Aldershot: 55. 
2 ° Cerny, P (1993} 'The deregulation and re-regulation of financial markets' : 67. 
2 1 Helleiner, E (1995) 'Explaining the globalization of financial markets: bring states back in', 
Review of International Political Economy, 2 (2): 316. It should be noted, however, that some 
observers have argued that financial authorities were not enthusiastic about abolishing the 
capital-control regime of the post-war period - regulatory change was forced on them by explicit 
political pressure from the TNCs and international financial intermediaries that benefited from 
such changes and from the latter's increased capacity to circumvent such controls in any case. 
See: Goodman, J & Pauly, L (1993) 'The Obsolescence of Capital Controls? Economic 
management in an Age of Global markets', World Politics, 46 (1): 52-82. 
2 2  Strange, S (1986) Casino Capitalism, Basil Blackwell: Chapter 2. 
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international flows of money, an industry which, as even the pro-market 
Economist conceded, 'thrives upon volatility and risk . . .  markets are most 
profitable when they are most volatile'. 2 3 Unsettling change was not confined to 
finance, however. The production process, and the role played by labour have 
been similarly transformed. 
Production and Labour 
The particular paradigmatic prism through which the GPE is considered 
determines the importance production is accorded. For Marxists, of course, the 
form of production will define the economic system and the social relations 
associated with it. 2 4 The intention at this stage is merely to describe some of 
the most important changes without drawing any definitive conclusions about 
their possible implications. The underlying assumption, however, will be that 
while production is a critically important determinant of a range of social and 
political outcomes it is not possible to unproblematically 'read off' specific social 
relations, class forms or cultural manifestations simply on the basis of 
underpinning economic structures. The subsequent discussion will , therefore, 
primarily consider changes to both the production process itself and the 
growing importance and influence of the TNCs that direct it, without devoting 
great attention to wider social effects of these processes. 
Frobel, Heinrichs, and Kreye's seminal contribution drew attention to the 
internationalisation of the production process which, they argue, permitted the 
development of a New International Division of Labour (NIDL), and represented 
a 'qualitatively new set of preconditions for the expansion and accumulation of 
capital'. 2 5 They suggested three essential preconditions underpinned this 
development: firstly, the development of a global labour pool that successfully 
competed with workers in the developed, core countries. Secondly, 
technological advances in transport and communications that overcame the 
'tyranny of distance'. Thirdly, the production process itself was transformed 
through developments in technology and labour organisation, allowing it to be 
disaggregated into elementary units that might be performed by relatively 
unskilled labour. However, the suggestion that new areas of industrial 
development occur solely in response to the 'needs' or 'logic' of the 'capitalist 
2 3  Ziegler, D (1990) 'A Survey of International Capital Markets', The Economist, July 21: 27. 
2 4  For the seminal statement of this position, see: Braverman, H (197 4) Labor and Monopoly 
Capital: The Degradation of Work in the Twentieth Century, Monthly Review Press, New York. 
2 5  Frobel, F., Heinrichs, J., & Kreye, 0., (1978) "The New International Development of 
Labour", Social Science Information, 17 (1) 123-142. 
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world economy' is excessively reductionist and neglects important social and 
economic differences. As Jenkins points out, it is not possible to identify any 
single pattern of incorporation into international production processes that has 
characterised industrial development in the peripheral nations. 2 6 Despite these 
shortcomings Frobel et al highlighted the increasingly global and qualitatively 
different nature of production, as well as the importance of developing 
theoretical models that might explain it. 
Theorisation and description are, however, complicated by what Sassen calls 
the 'complex duality' of the simultaneous spatial dispersion of production in 
combination with enhanced global integration. 27 The two are linked, however; 
territorial dispersal of production necessitates increasingly effective methods of 
control and coordination. Sassen argues that 'global cities' have come to 
occupy crucial roles in the provision of key services, especially in the finance 
industry, which she considers to have replaced the manufacturing sector in 
importance: as long as globa l manufacturing flourishes, national service 
sectors can also prosper. Certainly, as Cohen and Zysman argued, 
'manufacturing matters', 2 8 but perhaps not in the same way for all nations. 
Hong Kong's dominant service sector indicates that manufacturing may not be 
essential within national borders - control over or integration with neighbouring 
or even dispersed production locations may sustain living standards. 2 9  
Manufacturing is still significantly different and critically important for one 
reason above all others, however: it is possible to raise productivity, and 
therefore living standards, more easily in manufacturing than in any other 
economic sector. Raising the productivity of the service sector will be the crucial 
issue in the next century, Drucker argues, and the key to relative national 
prosperity. 3 o  
In The Work of Na tions Robert Reich argues that three major forms of work are 
emerging: routine production work (repetitive, low skill production line work); 'in 
person' work (low skill, face-to-face service jobs); and symbolic-analytic 
2 6 Jenkins, Rhys (1984) "Divisions Over the International Division of labour", Capital and Class, 
22, Spring, 28-55. 
27 Sassen, S (1991) The Global City: New York, London, Tokyo, Princeton University Press: 3. 
2 8 Cohen, S and Zysman, J (1987) Manufacturing Matters: The Myth of the Post-Industrial 
Economy, Basic Books, New York. 
2 9 Hong Kong may be atypical but 75% of its labour force is engaged in service sector jobs, 
making it necessary to qualify overly simplistic claims about clear links between manufacturing 
and living standards. See: ' I ts Already 1997 in Hong Kong', The Economist, Dec 18th, 1993: 26-
8. 
3 0 Drucker, P (1993) 'Productivity - Key to the Future', Dialogue, No 101: 25-31. 
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services. 3 1 The latter are intellectual, problem solving jobs which have no limit 
to their potential earning capacity as they add value and are connected to the 
global, rather than the 'national' economy. Both production and 'in person' jobs 
may be threatened by low-wage immigrant labour, while production jobs can 
be exported. The net effect of these latter trends is to drive wage levels down. 3 2 
The most conspicuous trend within labour markets across the globe has been 
the polarisation of incomes between those with scarce, high value-adding skills 
and those in low-skill occupations, a phenomenon that is not confined to the 
service or manufacturing sectors, and which has appeared not only within 
national borders, but within individual cities. 3 3  One of the most crucial issues tor 
policy-makers in the future will be devising strategies that promote highly paid 
jobs within national borders, a major focus of debate between interventionist 
and market-based models. 
Fordism and Flexible Production 
A great deal of recent discussion has focused on the macro implications of 
technical and organisational changes in the production process. In short, does 
the contemporary era represent an historical transformation of production 
processes akin to the emergence of mass production or 'Fordism'? Piore and 
Sabel, for example, argue that human economic development represented a 
'gigantic, centuries old collective experiment in productive organisation', 3 4 in 
which the choices people made in the past determine the present mode of 
production. Occasional moments in history exist when it is possible to choose a 
particular path of development - once a path is chosen it assumes a 
retrospective 'naturalness' which obscures the importance of the actual 
decisions people made. In support of this thesis they cite the historical 
development of Fordism, from its slightly fortuitous origin as the chosen solution 
to problems of production, to its subsequent adoption as the interventionist 
state rationale that underpinned the development of mass markets and the 
resolution of over-production problems. Now they suggest, human society is 
poised on the brink of a 'second industrial divide'. 
3 1 Reich, Robert A., (19 91) The Work of Nations: Preparing Ourselves tor 21st-Century 
Capitalism, New York: Vintage Books. 
3 2 In the US, for example, wages in a whole range of traditional blue collar occupations have 
declined, a situation exacerbated by 25% of jobs being part-time, and the increasing 
feminisation of the labour force with its associated lower pay rates. See: Hammonds, K (1994) 
'The New World of Work', Business Week, Oct 17th: 42-9. 
3 3  Sassen, S (1988) The Mobility of Labour and Capital: A Study in International Investment 
and Labour Flow, Cambridge University Press. 
3 4 Piore, Michael J., & Sabel, Charles F., (1984) The Second Industrial Divide: Possibilities tor 
Prosperity, Basic Books, p 4. 
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Fordism became the dominant mode of production, it is suggested, because it 
succeed in solving the problem of organising economic life, particularly the 
imbalance between supply and demand, through the development of mass 
consumption. 3 5 There is a large assumption implicit here about the capacity of 
'the state' or a 'ruling class' to control and determine such large-scale economic 
forces and outcomes. 3 6 Even if it is accepted that western governments were 
able to engineer an 'historic compromise' over production and distribution 
questions,· the breakdown or decline of Fordism threatens to undermine the 
foundations of that social consensus. Fordism has become untenable, it is 
argued, because: productivity growth declined; wage rises became de-linked 
from productivity; markets became saturated; Keynesian-based policies 
seemed ineffective; structural overcapacity became apparent; quality control 
and organisation amongst firms was poor; wage competition from Asia 
increased; state bureaucracies became sclerotic and subject to fiscal crises. 37 
This list could usefully be extended by noting the importance of declining US 
'hegemony', an issue considered below. 
More immediately pertinent here, however, is the possible social and economic 
implications that changes in the basis of production may have. Roobeek, for 
example, contends that the new technologies - microelectronics, biotechnology 
and new materials - that characterise 'post-Fordist' or 'flexible production' 
regimes, will accelerate Fordism's demise as they undermine both the 
technological and the social basis of Fordism.3 8 Lash and Urry suggest that 
we are witnessing the 'end of organised capitalism', which entails a diminution 
of state regulation, 3 9 a decline of class-based politics and a decentralisation of 
both capital and social relations. Certainly they are right to stress the evolving 
nature of social relations, but the disorganising effects of change on capitalist 
enterprise are less clear - many corporations are distinguished by an 
intensification of organisational power that internationalisation necessitates. 
What Lash and Urry do usefully emphasise is the way in which the spatial 
3 5 Lipietz, Alain (1987} Mirages and Miracles: The Crises of Global Fordism, Verso, London:36. 
3 6 This assumption underpins the approach of Marxist-inspired 'regulation theorists'. For a 
comprehensive overview of regulation theory see: Jessop, Bob (1990} "Regulation Theories in 
Retrospect and Prospect", Economy and Society, 19, 153-216. 
37 Roobeek, A (1987} 'The Crisis in Fordism and the Rise of a New Technological Paradigm, 
Futures, April: 129-54. 
3 8 Roobeek, A (1987} 'The Crisis in Fordism': 142. 
3 9 Cerny's suggestion, noted above, that 'deregulation' is, in fact, a from of re-regulation, - ie, 
not necessarily less, but different regulation - seems a more useful one, however. 
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division of labour is becoming a process internal to the dominant non-state 
actors in the GPE: transnational corporations. 4 0 
Transnational Corporations 
TNCs are both the principal motor driving global economic restructuring as well 
as a catalyst for major social change. It is essential, therefore, to indicate the 
scope and nature of their activities as it is often in its dealings with TNCs that 
state economic policy succeeds or founders. An examination of the 
contemporary organisation of TNCs provides the basis for testing not only the 
efficacy of individual government policy, but also for assessing the credibility of 
some of the grander claims about epochal change in production systems. 
Dunning's definition of a TNC - although he prefers the term 'multinational 
enterprise' (MNE) - is a useful place to start this discussion, as it draws 
attention to recent developments in its operational logic: 
From behaving largely as a confederation of loosely knit foreign affiliates, designed 
primarily to serve the parent company with natural resources or local markets with 
manufactured products and services, to its maturation over the past 15 years as a 
controller of a group of integrated value adding activities in several countries, the MNE is 
now increasingly assuming the role of an orchestrator of production and transactions 
within a cluster or network, of cross border internal and external relationships, which may 
or may not involve equity investment, but which are intended to serve its global 
interests. 4 1 
The simplest way in which to demonstrate the power and significance of TNCs 
is to quote some pertinent statistics: TNCs control about one third of the world's 
private sector assets; the accumulated stock of foreign direct investment (FDI) 
had reached $2 trillion by 1992; the largest 100 TNCs accounted for $280 
billion of FDI in 1990. 4 2 Clearly, TNCs are extremely significant actors in the 
GPE, far more so than many individual nations. Crucially, it is FDI, rather than 
trade that is the major force behind international economic integration, a 
process that has been facilitated by open financial markets and cross-border 
equity investments. 4 3 It is important to realise, however, that this is not a simple 
4 0 Lash, S & Urry, J (1987) The End of Organised Capitalism, The University of Wisconsin 
Press: 90. 
4 1 Dunning, J H (1988) Explaining International Production, Unwin Hyman: 327. 
4 2 UNCTD (1993) World Investment Report 1993: Transnational Corporations and Integrated 
International Production, United Nations, New York: 1&2. 
4 3  It is, however, important to recognise the dialectical relationship between the 
internationalisation of economic activity and the sorts of domestic policies it generates. The shift 
toward trade liberalization was promoted and entrenched by the increasingly transnational 
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process of 'globalisation' - investment patterns reveal home country influences 
and regional concentrations; most TNCs are regional rather than 'global'. 44 Only 
specific inter-national or even bilateral studies can reveal the complexity of 
these linkages and strategies. 
Given the weight of capital controlled by TNCs, their investment patterns have 
large effects within the GPE. One of the most conspicuous and, particularly 
from the perspective of orthodox economics, 45 unexpected investment trends 
has been the intensification of economic links between mature industrial 
economies. A distinctive tri-polar investment pattern has emerged, 
incorporating the US, the European Community (EC) and Japan, which 
accounts for 80 per cent of world investment stocks and flows, as well as half of 
global trade. 46 Significantly, during the 1980s Japan became the largest source 
of global FDI, thanks largely to domestic deregulation and a desire to 
circumvent rising US protectionism. Although intra-Triad' investment 
represented about 40 per cent of global inward investment stock in 1980, 47 this 
may prove to be its high-water mark, particularly as Japanese industry 
restructures and relocates into its immediate region, a process considered in 
more detail in chapter 6. 
The sudden emergence of industrial centres outside the Triad has shifted trade 
and investment patterns and cast doubt on the utility of core-periphery models 
of GPE structure. 48 Other developments have equally discomforted both 
Marxist and neo-classical economists. Firstly, and observations about the 
dominance of the Triad in global investment flows notwithstanding, within East 
production strategies of TNCs, a situation which meant that even during periods of economic 
crisis there was less possibility that national governments would revert to protectionist policies 
in the face of powerful lobby groups with international interests and commitments. Milner, H 
(1988} Resisting Protectionism: Global Industries and the Politics of International Trade, 
Princeton University Press, Princeton: Chapter 2. 
44 The Economist (1993} 'A Survey of Multinationals', 27th March: 12. Some observers have 
suggested that regions will become progressively more important, ultimately supplanting the 
nation state. While this may be somewhat fanciful, it does draw attention to the complexity of 
the International production process and its potential local impact. As we shall see in chapter 6, 
Australia's regional situation is an important determinant of its general international integration. 
See: Ohmae, K (1995} The End of the Nation State: The Rise of Regional Economies, The Free 
Press, New York. 
45 According to economic models the utilise notions of 'comparative advantage', nations might 
be expected to trade and invest more with countries that have dissimilar endowments. The 
epistemological foundations of neo-classical/neo-liberal economics are considered in more 
detail in Chapter 2. 
4 6 UNCTD (1991) World Investment Report 199 1: The Triad in Foreign Direct Investment, 
United Nations, New York: 31. 
47 UNCTD (1991) World Investment Report 199 1: 36. 
48 The most sophisticated elaboration of this position remains: Wallerstein, I ( 1979) The 
Capitalist World Economy, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 
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Asia it is important to recognise the importance of  the newly industrialising 
economies (NI Es) as sources of intra-regional investment, something which 
presents particular theoretical challenges for dependency and world systems 
theorists. 4 9 Moreover, much of the current economic development, especially in 
the Japan-Australia region, is being led by small and medium sized TNCs, 
rather than the oligopolistic giants that much Marxist theory predicted. Similarly, 
the penchant for intra-industry, to say nothing of intra-firm 'trade' that 
characterises contemporary trade patterns is incommensurable with notions of 
comparative advantage. 5 o It is also important to realise that it is not simply 
manufacturing that is the focus for increased investment flows. The global trend 
toward financial deregulation has led to an enormous increase in service­
oriented investment, particularly by the Japanese. 5 1 The non-tradability of many 
service industries coupled with mobility-enhancing technological developments 
have fuelled this change. 
The nature of contemporary products has imposed specific constraints on firms, 
and by extension, governments. Some forms of product development have 
become so expensive and/or risky that it is difficult for individual companies to 
undertake them alone - the aerospace industry is an extreme example of this, 
but it is equal ly applicable to automotive and other capital-intensive products. 
Consequently, one of the most important factors fuelling international economic 
integration has been the rapid increase of strategic partnerships between 
companies either through a networking process or an alliance. 5 2 Either way, it 
represents an important alternative and supplement to more conventional forms 
of FDI, and makes the idea of easily identifiable 'national champions' 
increasingly dubious. Constructing policies designed to advantage 'national' 
companies will become increasingly problematic as companies merge; control 
may become spatially dispersed, and the ownership of individual companies 
becomes increasingly international through the activities of huge pension and 
insurance funds. 
4 9 Urata, S ( 1 993) ' Changing Patterns of Direct Investment and the Implications for Trade and 
Development' ,  in Bergsten, F & Noland, M (eds) Pacific Dynamism and the International 
System, Institute for International Economics , Washington: 275-96. 
5 0 Dicken, P ( 1 992) Global Shift: The Internationalization of Economic Activity, 2nd Edition: 49-
51 . 
5 1 U N CTD (1 993) World Investment Report 1993: : 77-85.  The significance of this development 
is considered in greater detail in chapters 5 and 6. 
5 2 Michalet, C ( 1 9 9 1 ) ' Strategic Partnerships and the Changing Internationalization Process ' ,  in 
Strategic Partnerships and the World Economy , Mytelka, L (wd) Pinter Publishers, London: 35-
50. 
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One danger that must be avoided when considering TNCs is the tendency to 
discuss them in essentialist terms. There is no single pattern of organising 
transnational production processes. As Dicken notes, there are simultaneous 
trends toward increased specialisation/fragmentation and 
routinization/standardization on the one hand, coupled with increased flexibility 
and niche production on the other. 53 The strategy adopted by TNCs will be 
largely constrained by the nature of the product. A focus on production can 
provide an important corrective to some of the more improbable claims about 
the impact of any post-Fordist mode of production. 54 For example, the 
emerging markets in areas outside the Triad that TNCs are keen to capture are 
likely to be initially based on mass production and consumption. Even in 
mature industrial economies, the degree to which production shifts from mass 
to more flexible or small scale systems of production needs to be assessed on 
a national and sectoral basis, rather than subsumed under generalised models. 
This is not to deny the possibility of important social and political effects flowing 
from TNC restructuring, rather it is to emphasise the need for greater specificity 
in delineating national-international links. 
The Circuits of Capital 
One particularly useful model which allows the operations of TNCs to be more 
specifically grounded and differentiated has emerged from within Marxist­
oriented scholarship. The circuits of capital model provides a method of 
mapping and comprehending crucial national-international economic 
connections and the implicit constraints they may place on policy-makers. 
One of the model's key insights - developed by Bryan in particular - and the 
basis of much that follows, is that capital does not move as production; that is, it 
is money (in the form of loans and investment) that moves from one location to 
another. 55 Although Bryan has a tendency to reify capital as the embodiment of 
an 'underlying logic' and to minimise the activities of human actors as a 
consequence, his extension of Marx's original circuits of capital model provides 
an important conceptual tool with which to consider national-international 
53 Dicken, P (1992) Global Shift: 118. 
54 The f lexible spec ia l isat ion paradig m  has spawned a dist inctive and often Utop ian l i terature , 
general ly predicated on too general ised an app l icat ion of the concept, and an unwarranted 
opt im ism about the possible distribut ion of potent ia l  benefits. See: Hirst , P & Zei t l in ,  J (1991) 
'Fl exibl e spec ial izat i on ve rsus post-Fordism: theory , evidence and po l icy imp l i cations' , Economy 
and Society, 20 (1) :1-56. 
55 Bryan, R (1987) 'The State and the lnte rnat ional isat ion of Cap ital: An Approach to Analysis', 
Journal of Contemporary Asia, 17 (3): 259. 
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articulation and indicate the potential constraints within which policy-makers 
must operate. Bryan identifies four circuits of capital: national; global; 
investment-constrained; market-constrained. 56 
Bryan's model has been adapted and elaborated by Fagan and Webber, whose 
diagrammatic representation is reproduced below. The model provides a way of 
comprehending the manner in which Marx's original circuits of capital operate in 
a global process. In the original Marxian conception capital is initially involved 
in a circuit of production, which results in commodity production for sale to 
realise profit. The process of turning commodities into profits is the trade circuit, 
which in turn permits the redeployment of the profits in an investment 
Table 1 
Circuits of Capital and Links with the Global Economy 
INTERNATIONAL CIRCUIT OF LINKS WITH 
CAPITAL GLOBAL 
DIVISION Production Trade Investment ECONOMY 
National 
Investment-
constrained 
Market­
constrained 
Global 
N 
N 
N 
(G) 
N 
(G) 
N == National G== Global 
Source: Fagan & Webber57 
N 
G 
N 
G 
N 
N 
G 
G 
Import Competition; 
competition from TNCs; 
global finance, technology 
licences 
Imports/exports; 
competition 
from TNCs; global finance 
technology, licences 
TNC branch plants; import 
competition; global finance 
technology, licences 
TNC branch plants; imports/ 
exports; global finance 
technology. R&D 
circuit. Bryan's model and its subsequent adaptations allow Marx's original 
conception to be integrated into the contemporary GPE, and illustrates the 
manner in which individual enterprises are articulated with the international 
economy. 
56 Bryan, R (1987} 'The State and the lnternationalisation of Capital': 263. 
57 Fagan, R H & Webber, M (1994) Global Restructuring: The Australian Experience, Oxford 
University Press, Melbourne: 45. 
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In Table 1 individual companies operating in the 'national' circuit raise capital, 
invest and trade mainly within the space delimited by their 'home' nation state. 
Global companies, however, are constrained only by the necessity that some 
part of production must occur within a national space - the realisation of profit 
and the reinvestment of capital will  be determined by the prevailing conditions 
of international profitability. Money capital produced via commodity production 
within a particular nation is internationally mobile and not bound to national 
economic spaces. The role played by individual TNC subsidiaries within global 
production networks wil l  be determined by their role in and mode of integration 
with the global economy, rather than on the basis of their nationality. 
Government policy frameworks within national economic spaces, particularly in 
relation to labour laws, interest and taxation rates, plus the size of the domestic 
market and quality of infrastructure will  be, therefore, important determinants of 
TNC operations. 
Bryan suggests that the 'investment constrained' circuit of capital is a 'hybrid' of 
the global and national circuits, in that the companies mainly produce and 
reinvest locally, but sell their output in international markets. Government 
assistance may make continued production within a home base attractive, 
despite having otherwise achieved the conditions for international expansion. 
'Market constrained' companies, by contrast, raise capital and reinvest profits 
internationally, but generally sell their products into the markets where 
production occurs. Subsidiaries of TNCs attempting to circumvent tariff barriers 
are examples of market constrained operations. 58 
What Bryan's analysis provides is a way of comprehending the manner in which 
individual companies are integrated into the GPE. As he suggests, this schema 
is an advance over the previous capital fractions model predicated on a 
distinction between industrial, commercial and bank capital, given that such 
discrete categorisations are less sustainable as a result of the concentration 
and centralisation of capital. 59 Despite this, the distinction between financial 
and industrial capital retains some theoretical utility at the macro level as it is 
broadly indicative of what may be mutually incompatible attitudes toward 
deregulation, for instance. Certainly, individual enterprises may embody 
elements of both spheres, but it is also possible that a company predominantly 
58 At t h is stage no attempt w i l l  be made to map the overtly  po l i t ical  d imensions of th is  p rocess -
espec ia l ly  the barga ining between TNCs and host governments - wh ich h ave a s ignif icant 
i mpact on outcomes. The intent ion here is mere ly to p rovide a basic mode l u pon wh ich 
subsequent layers of  po l it ica l  complexity may be over layed in late r chapters. 
59 Bryan , R (1987) 'The  State and the lnte rnat ional isat ion of Capital ':268. 
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involved in long-term manufacturing for export may be less enthusiastic about 
deregulated and volatile foreign exchange markets, for example, than a 
financial institution that might profit from such a situation. 
Similarly, Bryan is right to argue that the distinction between 'national' and 
'foreign' capital is increasingly a meaningless and arbitrary category, and that 
the mode of integration into the international economy is the most telling guide 
to economic interest. However, it does not follow from this that 'capital' is either 
homogenous or that it is impossible to discern different forms of economic 
integration and development within nations. As we shall see in the case of 
Japan, it is possible to suggest that a distinctly different operational logic 
influences the activities of 'Japanese' companies. To gain a fuller picture of the 
manner in which national economic spaces are integrated with the global 
economy it is necessary to consider the wider political context in which such 
economic outcomes are mediated. States may be less powerful, but they 
remain important. Indeed, the state may be have a potentially more important 
role to play in determining the overall attractiveness of that national economic 
space as a potential investment location. 
International Politics 
The artificiality in, and difficulty of, attempts to maintain the political and 
economic realms as discrete entities is especially apparent in relations between 
TNCs and host governments. Not only does this relationship have a large 
possible impact on the fiscal position of individual states, but it has the potential 
to effect their relative autonomy, power, and domestic political relations. 
Similarly, domestic political actors - especially from powerful nations - have the 
potential to shape the international structures of governance that are 
increasingly important determinants of the behaviour both states and firms. 
These are issues, especially at the theoretical level, that are taken up in 
subsequent chapters, but a few preliminary observations are in order here to 
further comprehension of what follows. 
It has already been observed that national policy-making autonomy has been 
constrained by the increased power of financial markets, especially the 
increased mobility of financial capital itself. Not only does this enhance the 
relative power of capital over labour within national economic spaces, but it has 
the potential to produce new political divisions between producers of tradeable 
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and non-tradeable goods, and between capitalists with mobile assets and those 
with fixed investments. 60 The integrity and utility of 'the state' as both a 
conceptual tool and as an instrument of political action is being undermined, 
raising profound questions about democratic representation and the continuing 
congruence of sovereign states and discretely delimited areas of national 
political power: populations of individual nations are subject to international 
decisions over which they have no control and which are decided in power 
centres external to individual states. 61 New cooperative configurations are 
being fostered by the transformation of production and communication, 
permitting the emergence of 'new global players' representing new centres of 
power, sometimes, but not necessarily involving nation states. 62 As we shall 
see, state sovereignty is being eroded by force of circumstance 
Since its emergence and consolidation during the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries in its distinctively modern form, the nation state has been considered 
as a 
political organisation that has the capacity, within a delimited territory or territories, to 
make laws and effectively sanction their upkeep; exert a monopoly over the disposal of 
the means of violence; control basic policies relating to the internal political or 
administrative form of government; and dispose of the fruits of a national economy that 
are the basis of its revenue. 63 
There is much in Giddens' formulation that remains useful. However, the 
accelerating globalisation of economic - and increasingly political - activity, 
means that our conception of the state needs elaboration. Giddens certainly 
captures important aspects of the state apparatus, but gives little indication of 
the type of government - be it liberal democratic, corporatist, fascist etc - that 
may exist at any given time.64 More fundamentally, such a depiction gives little 
indication of the impact of the globalisation process on state capacities. 
60 Frieden ,  J (1991) ' Invested Interests: The Politics of N ation al Economic Policies in a World of 
Global Finance', International Organization, 45 (4) : 425-51. 
61 Held, D (1991) 'Democracy, the Nation-State and the G lobal System', Economy and Society, 
20 (2) : 160. 
62 Morss, E (1991) 'The N ew Global Players: How They Compete and Collaborate', World 
Development, 19 (1 ): 55-61. 
63 Giddens, Anthony (1985) The Nation State and Violence, Cambridge: Polity Press. 
p 282. 
64 For a useful introduction to these questions, see: Hewison ,  K et al (1993) ' Introduction: 
Changing forms of state power in Southeast Asia', in Hewison ,  K. , Robiso n ,  R & Rodan ,  G 
(eds) Southeast Asia in the 1990s: Authoritarianism, democracy and capitalism, Allen & Unwin : 
2-8. 
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Theories of the State 
There is now a vast literature - particularly within Marxist-oriented scholarship -
that attempts to illuminate the relationship between 'capital' and 'the state'. This 
is too large a subject to review here, but it is worth noting that some of the more 
sophisticated attempts to map this relationship have moved toward more 
discursively conceived conceptual categories. 65 Bob Jessop, for example, has 
suggested that state theory must include considerations of the 'discourses' 
which unify political systems and which make the practice of government 
possible. The organisation of discrete bureaucratic and governmental structures 
into a relatively coherent institutional ensemble is dependent upon the 
emergence of the concept of the sovereign state, the extent of the state's 
influence being determined by and reproduced through specific discourses and 
projects. Attempting to theorise abstractly without reference to the specificity of 
governmental practices 'is bound to lead to formalism and essentialism'. 66 He 
cautions that : 
Rather  than t ry ing  to def ine the co re of the state i n  a priori terms, we need to exp l o re 
h ow its boundaries a re establ ished t h rough  specif ic p ract ices with i n  and outside the  state 
. . .  as an i nst itut iona l  ensemble the state does not (and can not) exercise power: i t  is not 
a rea l  subject . . .  i ts powers ( in  the p l u ral) are activated t h rough  the agency of defi n ite 
po l i t ical  fo rces in specif ic conjunctu res. It is not the state that acts: i t  i s  a lways specif ic 
sets of po l it ic ians and state offic ia ls l ocated i n  specif ic parts of the state system. 67 
Jessop provides a useful corrective to some of the more totalising varieties of 
Marxist thought. Moreover, he points the way forward to a possible synthesis 
between more sophisticated Marxist thinkers and other models which offer 
more elaborated conceptions of the process of government and the application 
of power. 
At a more concrete level, a good deal of recent Marxist-derived debate has 
revolved around the changing relationship between national governments and 
the representatives of international capital, particularly regarding the relative 
distribution of power. Radice, for example, contends that 'the capitalist world 
economy is now so thoroughly integrated across national boundaries that an 
autonomous national capitalist strategy is no longer possible'. 68 Like many 
generalisations, this assertion has a certain intuitive appeal; clearly national 
65 The importance of d iscou rse wi l l  be considered i n  the next chapter. 
66 Jessop ,  B (1990) State Theory: Putting the Capitalist State in its Place, Pol ity P ress, 
Cambr idge: 349. 
67 Jessop ,  B (1990) State Theory: 366/7. 
68 Radice ,  H (1984) 'The Nat iona l  Economy: A Keynesian Myth?' , Capital & Class, N o  22: 113. 
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governments were forced to take account of a range of international factors that 
impinged upon policy with an immediacy previously unknown. Yet the nation 
state continues to be the politically delimited space within which capital 
accumulation occurs, and which provides a crucial socio-political arena within 
which TNCs might locate and operate. 59 A more balanced account suggests 
that relations between TNCs and the state varied from the 'collusive' to the 
'rivalrous', depending on specific circumstances and the degree of mutual 
dependence or need. 70 
Although much of the above provides a useful indication of some of the more 
salient features of the developing state-capital relationship, they are of less 
value when trying to understand the global basis of the capital accumulation 
process. While the idea of 'the state' retains a good deal of theoretical utility as 
a shorthand way of indicating persistent agglomerations of institutional forms 
intersecting with particular social relationships, it can also lead to misleading 
reifications that obscure the international nature of contemporary capital 
accumulation. The increased mobility of capital means that an individual 
'national' economic spatial analysis must be supplemented with and formulated 
in relation to a global one. Such a perspective allows us to grasp the 
importance of Hirst and Thompson's point: a more integrated, internationalised 
economy is producing new and distinctive forms of governance. Consequently: 
Governance - that is ,  the contro l  of an activity by some means such that a range of 
desi red outcomes is attai ned - is ... not just the p rovince of the state. Rather ,  it is a 
function  that can be performed by a wide variety of publ ic  and pr ivate ,  state and non­
state ,  nationa l  and i nternat iona l ,  i nst i tut ions and p ractices. 71 
As we shall see, national governments are increasingly bound up in extra­
territorial agreements, overseen by influential, state-less institutions like the 
World Bank, all of which play an important role in determining the political 
framework within which capitalism evolves. 
The contemporary, and increasingly internationalised global political system is 
one in which the orthodox realist conception of discrete and sovereign states 
seems both problematic and anachronistic72: intense patterns of inter-national 
69 Pooley ,  S (1991) 'The State Rules,  OK? The Cont i n u i n g  Po l i t ical Economy of Nat ion States' , 
Capital & Class, No 43: 65-82. 
70 P ite l is ,  C (1991) 'beyond the Nat ion State?: The Transnat iona l  Fi rm and the N at iona l  State' ,  
Capital & Class, N o  43: 131-52. 
71 Hi rst ,  P & Thompso n ,  G (1995) 'G lobal izat ion and the futu re of the nat ion  state ' ,  Economy 
and Society, 24 (3) : 422. 
72 Held, D & McG rew, A (1993) 'G lobal izat ion and the Libe ral Democrati c  State ' ,  Government 
and Opposition, 28 (2):261-85. 
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interaction and the pursuit of common goals, combined with the growing 
influence of transnational non-government mechanisms mean that the process 
of governing is one that is more reliant on 'a system of rule that is as dependent 
on inter-subjective meanings as on formally sanctioned constitutions and 
charters'. 73 The manner in which particular discourses come to occupy a 
dominant position in these processes will be taken up in more detail in the next 
chapter. The point to note here is that while the state has become more 
'permeable' and its authority compromised and rendered more contingent at the 
international level, it has not become either impotent or irrelevant. On the 
contrary, the mobility of capital and the internationalisation of social relations 
has meant that the state has become a potentially crucial variable in 
determining the relative attractiveness of potential national investment locations 
for transnational corporations. 74 Indeed, 'competition' - often defined by 
powerful private sector actors - has become central to the discourse of national 
economic adjustment and a critical determinant of the 'appropriate' role and 
form of both the state and the type of economic regime it underpins.75 
As such the state remains the critical mediating structure between internal and 
external economic spaces, and the author of the specific policies by which 
individual states attempt to adjust to global contingencies, the success of which 
are dependent upon a combination of structural constraints and policy 
choices.76 
TNC-Government Relations 
One of the increasingly important determinants of national integration with the 
wider GPE and crucial sites of state intermediation is the relationship between 
individual governments and TNCs. Much of the literature dealing with TNC 
strategy and evolution has been confined to factors internal to the TNC itself: 
the importance of market power, the internalisation of markets, and the 
73 Rosenau , J (1992) 'Governance , O rder ,  and Change in Wor ld Po l it i cs ' ,  i n  Rosenau , J & 
Czempie l ,  E (eds) Governance without Government: Order and Change in World Politics, 
Cambridge U n ivers ity P ress:4. 
74 Hol loway, J (1994) 'G lobal Capital and the Nat ion State ' ,  Capital and Class, Spri ng: 23-49. 
75 Drache , D & G e rt ler ,  M (1991) 'The Wor ld Economy and the N at ion State: The New 
Internat iona l  O rder' ,  i n  Drache , D & Gert le r ,  M (eds) The New Era in Global Competition: State 
Policy and Market Power, MeG i l l-Queen's U n ivers ity P ress,  Montreal: 9. 
76 Ikenberry ,  G J (1986) 'The State and Strateg ies of Internat iona l  Adjustment ' ,  World Politics, 
N o  1, October:53-77. 
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exploitation of ownership advantages. 77 While all these considerations are 
important and have been usefully synthesised, 78 they neglect a critically 
important external dimension that may exert a crucial influence on TNC 
strategy: the role of host governments. The potential importance of TNCs in 
determining national living standards, the type and availability of jobs within 
nations, and the pattern of domestic investment, has been increasingly 
recognised by host governments, as has the need to provide 'attractive 
investment climates'. In an era when international production is more important 
than international trade, individual governments that fail to attract productive 
TNC investment risk presiding over declining living standards and the export of 
highly paid jobs. The result has been, according to Stopford and Strange, the 
emergence of a new process of bargaining between governments and 
companies, in which global competition means that 'events are conditioned 
more by an emerging managerial technocracy than by traditional means of 
state power'. 79 
There has been a growing recognition of a crucial link between national and 
TNC competitive advantage. It is suggested that specific policies - the provision 
by government of education/training and infrastructure, as well the 
development of competitive industrial 'clusters', for example - may 
simultaneously advantage nations and TNCs.80 This process has culminated, 
Cerny suggests, in the emergence of the 'competition state' which attempts to 
use specific forms of government intervention to 'marketize' the state itself in an 
increasingly open international system in order to provide a competitive 
advantage for nationally based industrial and financial entities.81 Similarly, 
Dunning argues that individual government policies affect the potential 
profitability of firms, resulting in international competition between firms and 
governments; a situation in which, despite deregulation and liberalisation, 'the 
77 For a usefu l  review of the majo r theo retical posit ions ,  see :  Cantwe l l ,  J (1991) 'A Su rvey of 
Theor ies of Internationa l  P rod ucti on ' ,  i n  P ite l is ,  C N & Sugden, R (1991) The Nature of the 
Transnational Firm, Rout ledge ,  London :  16-63. 
78 Du n n i ng 's  'eclectic parad igm '  is the most soph ist icated attempt to do th is. Signif icant ly ,  
Du n n i n g  suggests that much modern theory assumes 'market fai l u re' . See :  Dun n i n g ,  J H 
(1988) Explaining International Production, U nwin Hyman: 42-59. 
79 Stopfo rd , J & Strange ,  S (1991) Rival States, Rival Firms: Competition tor World Market 
Shares, Cambridge U nive rs ity P ress , Cambridge :22. 
80 Porter ,  M (1990) The Competitive Advantage of Nations, MacMi l lan P ress , London. 
81 Cerny,  P (1990) The Changing Architecture of Politics: Structure, Agency, and the Future of 
the State, Sage,  London :  241. 
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role of national Governments is becoming more, rather than less, critical'. 82 
Dunning concluded that: 
the question of whethe r  o r  not, i n  a g lobal economy,  Gove rnments shou ld p lay a ro le  i n  
affecting  o rgan izat ion o f  the resources and capab i l i t ies with i n  the i r  ju risdict ions is  no  
l onge r  an app rop riate one to  ask. The  relevant quest ions now are h ow much and what 
kind of government i nvo lvement the re shou ld be. 83 
The important point to emerge from this discussion and from much of the 
contemporary TNC literature is that theoretical explanations of contemporary 
economic activity that fail to consider the interaction between governments and 
TNCs are seriously inadequate. Not only do a range of government policies -
particularly the provision of education and infrastructure, but also the more 
subtle effects of 'harmonious' industrial relations environments - impinge on the 
potential competitiveness of firms,84 but the existence of a conducive policy 
environment is a much more critical influence on TNC investment policy than 
are laissez faire economic policies. 85 None of this should be taken as 
necessarily advocating particular policies; the intention here is merely to 
indicate the environment in which the major force - TNC capital - for global 
restructuring operates. It is important to keep some of these operational 
constraints and influences in mind when considering the efficacy of government 
policies and the developmental trajectories of individual nations. 
Inter-state Relations 
To complete the description of the environment in which national economic 
policy is constructed, it is important to consider some of the more significant 
international political developments in the post-war period. The impact of many 
of these changes is not confined to the international system within which states 
are situated, but dialectically interacts with domestic politics and effects the 
activities of TNCs within the national economic space. There are important 
epistemological difficulties associated with much of the international relations 
theory, particularly its 'realist' variant, which addresses inter-state and systemic 
82 Dun n i n g ,  J H (1992) 'The G lobal Economy,  Domestic G overnance , Strateg ies and 
Transnational Corporatio n :  Interact ions and Po l icy Impl ications' , Transnational Corporations, 1 
(3) : 22. 
83 Du n n i n g ,  J H (1992) 'The G lobal Economy' : 34. 
84 The World Bank (1993) The East Asian Miracle: Economic Growth and Public Policy, Oxford 
U n iversity P ress, New York. 
85 U N  Centre on TNCs (1992) The Determinants of Foreign Direct Investment: A Survey of the 
Evidence, U n ited Nat ions,  New York:  53-55. 
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developments within the GPE. 86 However, no outline of the post-war period can 
neglect the crucial post-war role of the US and the accompanying debate over 
'hegemony'. 
The US was central in establishing the institutional and normative environment 
that subsequently exerted a powerful influence on the economic policies of 
individual nations. While there is no doubt that the US was militarily and 
economically the pre-eminent nation after World War 2, Ikenberry suggests that 
the Bretton Woods meeting which effectively defined the post-war international 
order was a 'fluid moment in history' in which 'economic experts' influenced the 
nascent political structures by mobilising supporting coalitions.87 The 
international 'Keynesian consensus' was initially a response to technical 
questions of effective economic management, around which political coalitions 
formed. 88 While this consensus has broken down it is significant that some of 
the institutional innovations it spawned - the International Monetary Fund (IMF), 
the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT) and the World Bank (WB) 
- not only endure, but have become an increasingly influential generators and 
enforcers of particular international norms and practices.89 As we shall see, this 
is an important and often neglected part of any explanation of the adoption of 
particular policy paradigms within nations. 
What Ruggie calls 'embedded liberalism' helpfully encapsulates the 
culmination of these developments. Ruggie suggests that political authority 
derived from the fusing of power and 'legitimate social purpose' was projected 
into the international system in support of specific purposes. In the postwar 
period this process resulted in a specific policy approach combining 
multilateralism and domestic interventionism. 90 Ruggie argues that while 
particular international economic regimes do not determine economic 
transactions, they do play a 'mediating role', encouraging economic relations 
congruent with dominant liberal norms. Importantly, 'regime makers' are able to 
86 See, fo r example :  G eorge ,  J im (1994) Discourses of Global Politics: A Critical (Re) 
Introduction to International Relations, Lynne Rienner  P ub l ishe rs,  Bou lde r . .  
87 Ikenbe rry ,  G J (1992) 'A Wor ld Economy Resto red: Expert Consensus and the Ang lo ­
Ame rican Postwar Settlement' , International Organization, 46  (1 ) : 289-321. 
88 Hal l ,  P (1989} The Political Power of Ideas: Keynesianism Across Nations, Princeton 
University Press, P ri nceton :  366. 
89 Pau ly, L W (1994) "P romoting  a G lobal Economy: The N ormative Rol e  of the IMF", i n  
Stubbs, R & U nderh i l l ,  G (eds) Political Economy and the Changing Global Order, Macmi l lan , 
Londo n :  204-215; P h i l l i ps ,  R (1983) 'The Ro le of the IMF i n  the Post-Bretton Woods E ra' , 
Review of Radical Economics, Vol XV, N o  2: 59-81. 
90 Rug g ie ,  J G (1982} ' Inte rnational Reg imes, Transact ions,  and Change :  Embedded 
Libe ralism in the Postwar Economic Order' , International Organization, 36 (2}: 382 & 393. 
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externalise the costs of economic adjustment onto 'regime takers'. The limits of 
such a policy were revealed by the US policy of 'benign neglect' toward its own 
currency during the late 1960s. The collapse of the Bretton Woods system of 
managed exchange rates was triggered, in part, by US attempts to exploit the 
advantage offered by its role as reserve currency. Gilpin attributes the resultant 
decline of international economic cooperation during the '70s to an absence of 
American political leadership.91 To see why this is important it is necessary to 
say something about hegemonic stability theory. 
Hegemonic Stability and Structural Power 
If hegemonic stability theory amounted to little more than the observation that 
some countries are more powerful than others, and that they will attempt to use 
this power to pursue national interests, there would be little reason to explore 
it. (Although, it might be observed in passing, even this relatively trite claim is 
not, as we shall see, one that is generally incorporated into the idealised 
abstractions that constitute neo-classical economics). While the appropriation of 
'hegemony' by international relations theorists from Marxist writers is not 
without its problems, it does draw attention to important aspects of inter-state 
relations that impinge on domestic policy-making. 
Kindleberger's pioneering study of the Great Depression argued that: 
... the i nternat ional economic and monetary system needs leadersh ip ,  a count ry wh ich 
is prepared, consciously or unconsciously, under some system of ru l es that i t  has 
i nternal ised, to set standards of conduct fo r othe r  cou ntr ies; and to seek to get oth e rs to 
fo l low them ... 92 
It was the failure of the US to pick up Britain's leadership mantle between the 
First and Second World Wars, Kindleberger suggested, that led to economic 
collapse. Between 1873-1913 Britain had played a decisive role in underwriting 
the open international trading system, crucially providing counter-cyclical 
lending and countering recessionary tendencies. The United States was the 
only country that might have replaced Britain, but its isolationist stance made it 
reluctant to do so until 1936. Since 1945 US economic and military power, 
coupled with the inculcation of 'standards of conduct' underpinned the 
91 G i l p i n ,  R(1987) The Political Economy of International Relations, P ri nceton U n iversity P ress ,  
P ri nceton :149. 
92 Ki ndleberge r, C harles P . , (1973) The World in Depression 1929-1939, U n ive rsity of 
Cal ifo rn ia:28. 
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development of a liberal international economic order. As Higgott notes, despite 
the different normative positions taken by competing radical and liberal 
paradigms, there is general agreement that hegemonic periods foster more 
open trading regimes,93 although as we saw earlier, this may have as much to 
do with the internationalisation of production and subsequent political pressure 
from TNCs,94 as it does with a desire by a powerful nation to provide an 
international public good. 
An important contemporary debate revolves around estimations of US decline. 
Influential here has been Kennedy's suggestion that the US is suffering from 
'imperial overstretch', and will be increasingly unable to maintain its hegemonic 
commitments. 95 In contrast, Nye continues a tradition of uncritical 
triumphalism and normative certainty that considers the US position as not only 
still paramount, but replete with an historical moral obligation to further liberal­
democracy and economics.96 More measured and helpful for the purposes of 
this essay, are Strange's attempts to quantify and elaborate the basis of 
hegemonic power, allowing not only its possible diminution to be gauged, but 
also providing a map with which to chart the possible impact of hegemons on 
their satellites. 
Strange elaborates the bases and forms of power between nations. Firstly, she 
separates 'relational' and 'structural' power. Relational power is associated 
more with the 'high politics' of international state systems and diplomacy, and is 
the power to get another nation to do what it would not do otherwise. Structural 
power 
is the power to shape and determine the structu res of the g lobal po l it i cal economy wit h i n  
wh ich  other states, the i r  po l i t ical i nsti tut ions, the i r  economic  enterp rises and  (not least) 
the i r  sc ient ists and othe r  p rofessional people have to operate . .. [ it] confers the power to 
decide how th ings sha l l  be done ,  the power to shape f rameworks wit h i n  which states 
relate to each other ,  relate to peop le ,  or re late to co rpo rate enterprises. 97 
Strange distinguishes four sources of structural power: security, production, 
finance, and knowledge. Using this fourfold schema Strange argues that the 
US is stil l  the preponderant world power and that its supposed decline has been 
93 Higgott , R ('1989) 'The  Evolving  World Economy: Some Alternative Security Quest ions ' ,  
Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defence, No 51, AN U ,  Canberra: 3'1. 
94 Mi lner ,  H ('1988) Resisting Protectionism. 
95 Kennedy, Paul  (1988) The Rise and Fall of Great Powers: Economic Change and Military 
Conflict from 1500 to 2000, Fontana P ress, London :  666. 
96 Nye , J (1990) Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power, Basic Books, N ew 
York. 
97 Strange ,  S (1994) States and Markets, Second Edit i on ,  P i nter  Publ ishe rs,  Londo n :  24-5. 
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greatly overstated. 98 Certainly, there can be little doubt that the US is unrivalled 
militarily, but Strange draws attention to other less obvious sources of inter­
national leverage. We have already seen the influence of TNCs on patterns of 
production in the world economy; American multi-nationals remain the largest 
single national TNC presence, accounting for 27 of the largest 100, as well as 
one third of global foreign assets. 99 A common interaction between state 
policies and market trends accounts for the growth of TNCs and international 
production, but US domestic policies are able to exert a disproportionate 
influence on the GPE, Strange argues, as a result of its combination of 
structural advantages. 
Crucial here is the financial structure, which refers to credit arrangements and 
the determinants of foreign currency relativities. The power to create credit 
(principally enjoyed by governments and banks) and the ability to determine 
currency values (the prerogative of governments and markets) are critical 
determinants of national economic well-being.1 00 The endemic financial 
instability of the post 1970s period has resulted from the 'misuse' of American 
hegemonic power, rather than its decline, argues Strange.1 o1 When the US 
decided to deregulate its domestic banking sector, this not only heightened 
market volatility, but obliged other - less powerful - nations to follow suit, or 
risk 'their' banks being competitively disadvantaged. It was financial power, 
argues Cerny, and the concomitant ability to shape the global financial system, 
that was at the heart of US hegemony in the post-war period.1 o2 Furthermore, 
the recognition by US officials that they could finance budget deficits by 
exploiting America's position as a safe haven for footloose international capital 
not only made neoliberal policies more attractive, but means they may be 
structurally embedded and therefore more difficult to supplant.103 
What Strange calls the 'knowledge structure' is an underrated aspect of national 
power. The knowledge structure 'determines what knowledge is discovered, 
how it is stored, and who communicates it by what means to whom and on what 
98 Strange ,  S (1987) 'The Persistent Myth of Lost Hegemony' , International Organization, 41 (4) 
551-74. 
99 U N CTD (1993) World Investment Report 1993: : 23. 
1 00 Strange ,  S (1994) States and Markets, : 90. 
1 01 Strange ,  S (1994) States and Markets:104. 
1 02 Cerny, P (1993) 'American Decl i ne  and the emergence of embedded f i nancia l  o rthodoxy' , i n  
Cerny, P (ed) Finance and World Politics: markets, Regimes and States in the Post-hegemonic 
Era, Edward E lgar ,  Alders hot: 155-85. 
1 03 Hel le i ne r, E (1995) 'G reat Transfo rmations: A Po lanyian Perspective on  the Contemporary 
G l obal F inancial O rder' , Studies in Political Economy, 48: 153. 
34 
terms•. 1 04 Technological changes have had the effect of further concentrating 
power in one state; Strange argues large TNCs headquartered in the US 
reinforce its position as a research centre. Additionally, its critical importance as 
a market mean that TNCs based in other nations are compelled to establish a 
presence in the US. Certainly, it seems clear that there is an important link 
between what Hilpert calls 'techno-scientific progress' and more general 'socio­
economic development'. 1 05 While some of these terms are contestable, what is 
more certain is the potential economic importance of a national presence in 
key emerging technologies. Strange's analysis, however, overemphasises the 
importance of the US here, and understates what Hilpert and others are keen 
to stress: the potentially crucial role of an interventionist state in enhancing 
national technological capacities. Hart, for example, argues that state-societal 
arrangements determine the way in which technological innovations are 
diffused within national economies, and cites the rise of Japanese industry as 
a successful example of this. 1 06 What is certain is that, if Drucker is right in 
suggesting that knowledge will be the crucial factor of production in the next 
century, 1 07 then economic well--being will be dependent upon policies that 
ensure a national presence in key technologies and forms of knowledge. 
Japanese and Australian policy-makers' attitudes to industrial development -
taken up in subsequent chapters - provide an instructive comparative case 
study. 
What Strange's model provides is a useful adjunct to and basis for hegemonic 
stability theory. It provides some way of grounding what may otherwise become 
an overly abstract and epistemologically dubious discussion. Some idea of the 
policy constraints that effect smaller nations may be gleaned by examining the 
larger international structures in which they are conducted. Importantly, Strange 
draws attention to a range of factors that are often neglected by analyses of 
both liberal and radical persuasions. The idea of hegemonic power may also 
be useful as a corrective to excessive idealisation. For example, the willingness 
on the part of the US to shift the burden of economic adjustment onto other 
nations and exploit its hegemonic position, rather than selflessly providing 
international 'public goods', has introduced a major element of uncertainty and 
volatility into the GPE. This is especially problematic for economic policies that 
104 s 
105 
�
range, S (1994) States and Markets: :121. 
S 
Hil pe� •. U (1991) 'The State ,  Science and Techno-Industrial Innovation ' ,  in Hil pe rt ,  U (ed) 
1Jate Policies and Techno-Industria/Innovation, Routledge : 14. w,6 Hart , J A (1992) Rival Capitalists: International Competitiveness in the US, Japan, and 
10
�stern Europe, Cornel l  U nive rsity: 280-92. 
Drucker ,  P (1993) Post-Capitalist Society, Harper  Business , New York: C hapters 1 & 10. 
35 
pay little attention to such inconvenient 'externalities', despite convincing 
evidence and argument to suggest that hegemons have an incentive to exploit 
their positions.1 08 
Even if US power is diminished and its ability to impose its will on other nations 
is constrained, it remains critical in defining and maintaining the international 
regime within which smaller states must operate and construct policy. 
Importantly, international cooperation may provide not only a broad framework 
of rules, institutions and agreements within which international economic 
interaction may be conducted, but provide a crucial venue in which 'learning' 
may occur; specific norms are inculcated and particular modes of economic 
regulation collectively adopted.1 °9 Even if individual nations are not directly 
involved in such processes, the parameters within which they must operate are 
defined by such cooperation and learning by the major powers. The institutions 
which oversee and regulate international economic activity promote a 'set of 
normative preferences for market solutions to economic problems, national 
economic openness, non-discrimination between nationals and foreigners, and 
multinational approaches to common economic challenges.' 1 1 o These issues 
will be taken up in subsequent chapters with particular reference to Australia 
and Japan, as well as to consideration of the specifically theoretical questions 
they raise. For now, consideration should be given to a final school of thought 
that wil l  help complete an overall framework in which the international political 
economy - especially the ideational framework within which it operates - may be 
considered. 
The Neo-Gramscians 
Gramsci's ideas provide an important basis for innovative contemporary 
theorisation which attempts to link the political with the economic, and the 
structural with the discursive. One of Gramsci's important innovations was the 
'historical bloc', especially as a source of potential 'counter-hegemonic' ideas. 
Gill and Law suggest that historic blocs involve: 
1 08 Conybeare , John  (1987) Trade Wars: The Theory and Practice of International Commercial 
Rivalry, New Yo rk :  Co l umbia U nive rsity P ress: 200. As we shal l see in subsequent chapters ,  
his has particu lar ly serious impl ications fo r nations l ike Australia that have p laced g reat reliance 
on the possibility of enco u raging the deve lopment of free trade regimes. 
1 09 Putnam, R & Bayne ,  N (1987) Hanging Together: Cooperation and Conflict in the Seven 
Power Summits, Sage P ublications: Chapte r 11. 
1 1 0 Pau ly ,  L W (1994) ' P ro moting a G lobal Economy; The No rmative Ro le  of the Inte rnational 
Monetary Fund', in Political Economy and the Changing Global Order, Macmil lan , Stubbs, R & 
Underhil l ,  G (eds) London : 204. 
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a u n i ty betwee n  objective and subjective forces i n  a g iven h istorical situat ion . . .  a 
con g ruence o r  f i t  between p reva i l ing ideas and conceptions of the society and the forces 
of p roduct ion embodied in po l it ical parties, trade unions and associat ions. The h isto ric 
b loc is g iven cohesion by hegemon ic ideology, or a f ramework of thought wh ich gives it  
identity and conscio usness . . .  [ it] is the p roduct of consc ious po l i t ical activity, and is not 
simply accidenta l ,  si nce it  imp l i es the reso l ut ion of potential or actual conf l icts betwee n  
t h e  fo rces o f  p roduct ion and t h e  re lations o f  p roduction  .111 
This conception, although continuing to emphasise the importance of the 
material conditions, acknowledges the contested nature of political and 
economic discourse. True, Law and Gill are keen to retain the idea that 
'hegemonic ideology' is intended to resolve structural contradictions, but the 
form hegemonic discourse takes is unpredictable and contested. 
Robert Cox's Production, Power and World Order: Social Forces in the Making 
of History is perhaps the most ambitious and sophisticated attempt to integrate 
many important insights derived from broadly radical scholarship and relate 
them to the contemporary GPE. 112 Although working in an essentially Marxist 
tradition the forms taken by classes or the state are neither inevitable nor 
necessary. While the relationship may be dialectical, however, the paramount 
direction of causality is from state to mode of production, as the latter has been 
more 'shaped by the state than shaping of it'. 113 
It is in the area of inter-state relations, and the manner in which states mediate 
between domestic and international spheres that Cox has made what is 
arguably his most significant contribution. Utilising Gramsci's notion of the 
historic bloc, Cox attempts to demonstrate how class forces coalesced and 
emerged historically in order to secure the basis tor successive modes of 
accumulation and production. Yet the form taken by the state is not determined 
solely by internal class pressures, but simultaneously by the 'permissiveness of 
the world order'. 114 The hegemonic position of the dominant power of a specific 
era will constrain the political and economic options open to less powerful 
states, allowing the hegemon to impose a particular form of international 
economic order, as van der Pijl suggests the US did in the post-war era.115 
Ultimately this process leads to what Cox describes as the 'internationalizing of 
the state', in which the nation state 'becomes part of a larger and more complex 
111 G i l l ,  S & Law, D (1988) The Global Political Economy: Perspectives, Problems and Policies, 
Harvester Wheatsheaf ,  New York: 64. 
112 Robert Cox (1987) Production, Power and World Order: Social Forces in the Making of 
History, Co lumbia U n iversity P ress, New York .. 
113 Robert Cox (1987) Production, Power and World Order: 5. 
114 Robert Cox (1987) Production, Power and World Order: 148. 
115 van der P ijl , K (1984) The Making of an Atlantic Ruling Class, Verso , London. 
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political structure that is the counterpart to international production'. 1 1 6 The net 
effect of these developments is to transform the state into a 'transmission belt 
from the global to the national economy', 1 1 7  in a process which involves the 
regulation of the world economy by transnational bodies and the inculcation of 
specific norms which further the process of international governance without 
government. 
International regimes, suggests Cox, are defined by the norms or rules 
accepted by states to manage common concerns.1 1 s Cox sees the formation of 
specific regimes as reflecting the interests and ideology of elites, which are 
becoming increasingly global in nature. Other scholars have attempted to give 
more substance to and extend this idea.1 1 9 Gill, for example, has argued that 
the activities of the Trilateral Commission foster shared norms, concepts, and 
elite networks that exert a powerful influence on national economic policy­
makers and, in fact, mirror the development of an embryonic civil society.1 2o In 
this manner, it has been suggested, it is possible to account for neoliberalism 
as the dominant ideology of the 1980s, especially as it reflected changes in the 
US's domestic and international agenda.1 21 More generally, it is contended that 
neoliberalism reflects the interests of 'transnational circulating capital' in 
general.1 22 
While the neo-Gramscian formulation is an important attempt to map the 
transnational forces and structures that constrain individual national policy­
makers, it is not without difficulties. Panitch rightly draws attention to the 'top-
1 1 6  Robert Cox (1987) Production, Power and World Order: 253. 
1 1 7  Robert Cox (1992) 'G lobal Perestro ika' , The Socialist Register: 31. 
1 1 8  Robe rt Cox (1992) "Mu lt i late ra l ism and Wor ld Order' ,  Review of International Studies, 18: 
178. 
1 1 9 It shou ld  be noted that not all these contributions stem from an overtly Marxist o r  neo­
G ramscian perspective. Kapste i n ,  fo r example ,  has demonstrated the importance an emergent 
'ep istemic commu n ity' amongst central bankers, wh ich has p layed an impo rtant ro le in 
stab i l ising the i nte rnational  banking  system th rough  a n ew regu latory order. The ro le  of 
ep istemic commun it ies is  taken up  i n  subsequent chapters. The th i ng  to recogn ise he re is the 
importance shared unde rstand i ngs of  'p roblems' and the manner  i n  which they may determi ne 
the economic and po l it ical architectu re of an i nc reasin g ly g lobal system. See :  Kapste i n ,  E 
(1992) 'Between  power and pu rpose: central bankers and the po l i tics of regu latory 
convergence' , International Organization, 46 (1) 265-87. 
1 20 G i l l ,  S (1990) "Th e  C hang ing  Hegemony of Internat ional Capi tal : Tr i late ral ism and G l obal 
Order ,  in Rapkin ,  D (ed) World Leadership and Hegemony, Lynne  Reine r: 119-46. 
1 21 Carfuny ,  A (1990) 'A G ramscian Concept of Decl i n i ng Hegemony: Stages of US power and 
the Evo l ution  of Inte rnat ional Economic Relations' ,  i n  Rapk in ,  D (ed) World Leadership and 
Hegemony, Lynne  Rei n e r: 114. 
1 22 Overbeek, H & van de r  P ij l , K (1993) 'Restructu r ing Cap ital and Restructu r ing  Hegemony: 
Nee-l iberal ism and the U nmaki ng of the Post-war O rde r' ,  i n  Ove rbeek, H (ed) Restructuring 
Hegemony in the Global Political Economy: The Rise of Transnational Neo-Liberalism', 
Routledge ,  London : 13. 
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down' nature of the Coxian model, which fails to resolve the 'antimony' 
between a centralised supranational management structure on the one hand 
and the anarchic effects of unregulated financial capital on the other.1 23 What 
the neo-Gramscian model does provide, however, is some way of linking large 
scale international regime change to developments in the organisation of 
production processes and their concomitant social relations at the international 
and national levels. Importantly, Cox draws attention to the specifically 
Gramscian usage of hegemony, which is not simple dominance, but the 
inculcation of specific values and ways of 'doing and thinking' which reflect the 
interests of a dominant state or states.1 24 Such theorisation provides a useful 
basis with which to consider the role of dominant discourses within the GPE. 1 2s 
These issues will be explored more closely is subsequent chapters. What is 
important to note here is that there was an international climate of opinion - and 
a hegemonic power, albeit a diminished one - that were generally supportive of 
and actively pursuing specific deregulatory economic polices, a situation that 
left smaller nations with little option but to follow suit or risk handing US 
financial institutions a significant competitive advantage and see a further 
concentration of financial activity in Northern American centres.1 26 
Reinforcing the external pressures for conformity in some states were historical 
patterns that predisposed them toward particular economic regimes. Thurow 
suggests that there are two distinct forms of capitalism emerging: the Anglo­
American, market-based variety versus a communitarian Japanese-German 
type.1 27 Cox prefers to label them as 'hyper-liberal' and 'state-capitalist', 1 28 but 
whatever they are called it is possible to distinguish between two distinctive 
approaches to economic policy-making and the appropriate role of the state. 
1 23 Panitch , L (1994) ' G lobalisation and the State', The Socialist Register: Between Globalism 
and Nationalism, Miliband, R & Panitch ,  L (eds) , Merlin P ress: 71-4. 
1 24 Cox, R (1992) 'Towards a Post-Hegemonic Conceptualization  of World Orde r: Ref lections 
on the Re levancy of Ibn Khaldu n ' ,  in Rosenau , J & Czempie l ,  E (eds) Governance Without 
Government: Order and Change in World Politics, Cambridge  U nive rsity Press, Cambridge: 
140. 
1 25 It shou ld be noted that an alternative interp retation by Liberal theo rists attributes this to a 
p rocess of 'bandwagoning ' ,  in which individual g overnments emu late supposedly successfu l  
po l icies, rather  than  overt ly c lass fo rces. Ikenberry, G J (1990) 'The International Sp read of  
P rivatization Po licies: Inducements, Learning ,  and "Pol icy Bandwagoning"' ,  in Su leiman , E & 
Waterbu ry, J (eds) The Political Economy of Public Sector Reform and Privatisation, Westview 
P ress, Bou lde r: 88-110. 
1 26 Strange ,  S (1994) States and Markets : 110. 
1 27 Thu row, L (1992) Head to Head: the Coming Economic Battle Among Japan, Europe & 
America, Al len  & U nwin , St Leonard's: 32. 
1 28 Cox, R (1993) 'Structu ral Issues of Global Governance: Imp l ications fo r Eu rope ' ,  in 
Gramsci, Historical Materialism and International Relations, Gil l ,  S (ed) , Cambridge U niversity 
P ress, Cambridge: 267-72. 
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Clearly Australia and Japan fall into different camps. While this has fortuitous 
implications as far as theoretical explication is concerned, as we shall see, it 
has generated a good deal of misunderstanding in Australian policy-making 
circles. What is also of great significance for our purposes is the manner in 
which, especially in the Anglo-American economies, policies associated with 
free markets appear to becoming the uncontested basis of national policy­
making. This process is being entrenched by what Gill calls a discourse of the 
'new constitutionalism', in which a legal or constitutional framework which 
'insulate[s] substantially the new economic institutions from popular scrutiny or 
democratic accountability'. 1 29 
As we shall see in the next chapter, however, the discursive effects of new 
political and economic discourses render the sorts of overt political 
interventions Gill alludes to less necessary. The authoritative nature of 
contemporary economic discourse renders alternative positions and paradigms 
increasingly implausible, if not unthinkable. This is where a focus on discourse 
can provide an especially useful adjunct to perspectives like the above. 
Conclusion 
The most significant implication of the 'globalisation process' for this preliminary 
discussion is just that: it is global. The external circumstances that confront 
national policy-makers are increasingly similar and ubiquitous. The problems 
confronting domestic governments, predictably enough, reveal common 
characteristics. The most immediate and powerful of these are the increased 
scale and mobility of financial capital and the reorganisation of production on a 
transnational basis. The enhanced power and mobility of financial capital, 
especially in tandem with a trend toward deregulatory international regimes, 
has meant that autonomous government policy that is significantly out of step 
with prevailing norms is difficult to implement and liable to be undermined by 
the power of financial markets. Similarly, the autonomy of individual nation 
states has been eroded by the necessity of attracting international TNC 
investment - or risk being left out of wealth-creating international production 
networks. Finally, cooperation between states has attempted to impose specific 
forms of international modes of governance - the current global trend toward 
trade and investment liberalisation is perhaps the most outstanding example of 
1 29 G i l l ,  S (1992) 'The Emerg i ng  Wo rld O rder  and E u ropean Change :  The Po l i t ical  Economy of 
E u ropean U n ion ' ,  The Socialist Register. 165. 
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this - within which individual states must operate, and which smaller states 
have little option but to accept. 
However, this is not to suggest that either nation states are redundant or that 
national economic policy is simply reactive and undifferentiated. Clearly, the 
two nations at the centre of this study - Australia and Japan - demonstrate that 
decidedly different approaches to economic management and development are 
possible. True, there has been some convergence of late, but whether this is 
inevitable, or the result of the (possibly transitory) dominance of a hegemon 
inclined toward neoliberalism is something that needs to be explored in more 
detail later. What is important to recognise, however, is that although economic 
forces have become increasingly internationalised, and have unleashed broadly 
similar effects and potentials, the economic policy responses of individual 
nations have shown a good deal of variation: there is no single inevitable 
response to the globalisation process. Explaining the divergence of approach 
and the effects that flow from specific policy .choices will be the major task of 
subsequent chapters. 
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Chapter 2: Neoliberal Governance 
Many of the qualities that defined the nascent GPE were, by definition, 
international and increasingly ubiquitous. National governments were 
confronted by new and pressing challenges of national economic adjustment as 
they attempted to integrate national economic spaces into the emerging 
international economic order on the most favourable terms possible. The most 
appropriate outcomes may have been relatively uncontroversial - ensuring that 
the most valuable forms of economic activity occurred within national borders, 
for example - but the methods that might have most efficaciously achieved this 
were less so. As subsequent chapters on the specific developmental and 
adjustment experiences of Australia and Japan will demonstrate, there was no 
simple and uncontested 'correct' policy prescription available to policy-makers. 
The suitability of potential policy paradigms owed a good deal to contingent 
national circumstance, especially the traditions of government and the relative 
influence of key domestic actors. These are important factors that will be 
delineated in subsequent chapters. 
And yet what is most striking about the Australian experience, especially in the 
area of policy-making that impinged on the conduct of its international economic 
relations, is the influence a particular discourse or set of ideas that was 
subsumed under the rubric of 'economic rationalism' in Australia, or 
neoliberalism more generally. Indeed, such was the enthusiasm for and 
influence of neoliberal ideas in determining Australia's trade and investment 
policies that such ideas were often depicted as if they were somehow the 
unchallengeable, 'correct' response to the problem of Australia's adjustment to 
the unfolding imperatives of regional and global economic development. This 
chapter, therefore, will consider some of the more important theoretical 
assumptions of the neoliberal model. In this regard, attention will be paid to the 
neo-classical economic ideas that are central to the larger discourse of 
economic rationalism. 
The overarching intention of this chapter, however, will be to provide a 
theoretical framework with which to understand how neoliberal ideas came to 
exert an ideational hegemony in Australia, an influence which eventually came 
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to inform a distinctive and novel mode of neoliberal governance.1 In the next 
chapter I shall detail some of the policy initiatives that flowed from this 
emergent ideational paradigm and style of government, as well as some of the 
specific political pressures that made it appear increasingly attractive to policy­
makers. What I want to suggest in this chapter is that the style and content of 
government that emerged under successive Labor governments in Australia 
since the 1980s may most usefully be understood as flowing from a specific 
neoliberal 'political rationality'. As we shall see, such a formulation draws 
attention to the nexus of ideas and assumptions about the nature of economic 
'reality' that underpinned government policies. The erosion of state authority 
and the adjurations of small government advocates notwithstanding, national 
governments are still critical determinants of the manner in which national 
economic spaces are incorporated into the wider GPE. This makes the 
particular ideas that provide the theoretical rationale and inspiration for such 
interventions worthy of detailed attention. 
In this context particular attention will be paid to the economic theory that 
informed the neoliberal political rationality. Central in this regard are the 
assumptions and methodology of neo-classical economics. These will be 
explicated and analysed. The intention here will be twofold: Firstly, the links 
between neo-classical theory and its implications for policy will be made 
clearer. Secondly, the important discursive effects of the neoliberal paradigm 
will be emphasised. It will be suggested that an increasingly technocratic, 
expertly articulated discourse predicated upon neo-classical economics 
achieved an ideational hegemony amongst key policy-making elites, which 
effectively marginalised alternatives and helped insulate political leaders from 
potential criticism by presenting such ideas as neutral responses to technical 
questions. The detail of this process will be supplied in other chapters; this 
chapter will concentrate on theoretical issues, and attempt to develop a 
1 To help illuminate the particular implications of the term 'neoliberal' intended here, Cox 
usefully distinguishes between nineteenth century liberal states and contemporary neo-liberal 
states. The distinction hinges on the greater role of government in the contemporary era, which 
not only involves an expanded ambit of operation, but which perforce obliges more extensive 
forms of 'intervention'. As we shall see, it is not so much a lack of intervention that 
characterises neoliberalism, as a specific, market-oriented regulatory regime, underpinned by 
government authority. [Cox, Robert W (1987) Production, Power and World Order: Social 
Forces in the Making of History , Columbia University Press, New York: 220] Similarly, the idea 
of 'governance' is, as Rosenau suggests, 'a more encompassing phenomenon than 
government'. Crucially, it is dependent on the maintenance of order and legitimation as much 
through inter-subjective meanings as it is through formally sanctioned constitutions. See, 
Rosenau, J (1992) 'Governance, Order, and Change in World Politics', in Rosenau, J & 
Czempiel, E (eds) Governance without Government: Order and Change in World Politics, 
Cambridge University Press: 4. 
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framework within which the influence of specific ideas and the discursive power 
of a particular political rationality can be more fully appreciated. 
But let me be clear at the outset what this chapter intends. I shall not argue 
that such novel theoretical innovations alone can explain either the influence of 
neoliberalism or the conduct of government policy in Australia since the early 
1 980s. What I will suggest is that when combined with more conventional and 
detailed analyses of the economic and political constraints that influence policy­
making (such as the Marxist variants drawn on in chapter 1 ), considering the 
ideational framework within which policy is produced as a specific political 
rationality can provide an important adjunct to more established political­
economy explanations. Such a theoretical orientation can help illuminate a 
relatively neglected aspect of policy-construction: the discursive influence of 
ideational paradigms. What such an approach illustrates is the manner in 
which particular discourses effectively demarcate the sorts of objects that are 
deemed appropriate for government intervention and attention. Moreover, such 
discourses delineate the manner in which this may be most 'efficiently' 
achieved. 
Neoliberalism as a Political Rationality 
The main intention of this chapter, then, is to introduce concepts that can help 
illuminate the process whereby a specific intellectual framework or ideational 
paradigm exerts an influence on the style and objects of government. 
Ultimately, as we shall see, the logic of particular ideas can mean that they not 
only delimit what are deemed to be appropriate arenas of government activity in 
the macro areas of principal concern to this thesis - economic relations, policy 
and the like - but such ideas may also be applied to micro areas, revolving 
around the conduct of individual life. The influence of neoliberal ideas has 
meant that there has been a notable shift in the focus of government activity 
from increasingly proscribed Keynesian-style macro interventions,2 to a micro 
focus directed toward the encouragement of a more 'competitive' or 
'enterprising' labour force, especially where this can be achieved at the level of 
2 In this context the contemporary dominance of the neoliberal political rationality may be 
usefully contrasted with the Keynesian orthodoxy it supplanted. In the Foucauldian-derived 
schema, Keynesian ideas may be thought of as another, distinctive political rationality which 
effectively demarcated a different role and methodology for governments - a role that flowed 
from and was predicated upon a specific discourse that assumed an ideational dominance at a 
particular historical juncture. See: Ikenberry, G J (1992) 'A world economy restored: expert 
consensus and the Anglo-American postwar settlement', International Organization, 46 (1 ) :289-
321. 
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the individual. These are issues that will be explored at an empirical level in 
subsequent chapters. 
This shift of emphasis on the part of government from the macro to the micro, 
and from the overtly 'interventionist' to more subtle attempts to inculcate 
specific attitudes in the population, I shall suggest, reflects the logic of neo­
classical ideas and raises important theoretical questions, particularly about 
'the state'. 3 Among the more useful theoretical innovations that have 
attempted to theorise apparent changes in the practices of governments has 
been a tradition that draws directly or indirectly on the work of Michel Foucault. 
For Foucault government is an 'art' which relies on a range of tactics and 
techniques, institution? and know.ledges t9 achieve particular ends. 4 Foucault's 
notion of 'governmentality' draws our attention to the manner in which 
government practices attempt to shape social and economic activity. That is, it 
provides a way of thinking about the intersection that occurs between what 
Dean calls the 'practices of the self' and the 'practices of government'. 5 
Importantly, however, the 'happiness' of the people is not so much a rhetorical 
token, but major instrument of governmental control and state strength, and 
central to the 'political arithmetic' with which the state calculates the 
effectiveness of its strategies and tactics.6 The micro-physics of power and its 
constituting impact on the self are linked to the macro strategies of the state, 
providing a theoretical space in which to consider the problematic of 
3 The role, form and activity of 'the state' has, of course, been one of the staples of political 
theory. Recent Marxist-derived theorisation especially has generated important insights about 
the way national governments operate, especially in the contemporary GPE. Some of this 
literature was explicitly drawn on in chapter 1, and it is an important underpinning to the 
analysis of subsequent chapters. Similarly, there is much to be gleaned from 'post-modern' 
conceptions of political and social formations. At this stage, however, constraints of space 
mean that it is impossible to do little other than acknowledge its significance without treating 
such ideas exhaustively. From the Marxist tradition, see: Clarke, Simon (1991) The State 
Debate, MacMillan, London; Giddens, Anthony (1985) The Nation State and Violence, Polity 
Press, Cambridge; Jessop, B (1990) State Theory: Putting the Capitalist State in its Place, 
Polity, Cambridge. Although the term 'post-modern' is not a terribly useful one, it is a helpful 
shorthand indication of a range of important theorisation. See, for example: Bertens, H (1995) 
The Idea of the Postmodern: A History, Routledge, London; Best, S & Kellner, D (1991) 
Postmodern Theory: Critical Interrogations, Macmillan; Smart, B (1992) Modern Conditions, 
Postmodern Controversies, Routledge, London. For a useful discussion of the distinctive 
qualities of a possible Foucauldian approach to 'the state', see: Mitchell, T (1991) 'The Limits of 
the State: Beyond Statist Approaches and Their Critics', American Political Science Review , 85 
(1 ) : 77-96. 
4 Foucault, M (1991) 'Govern mentality', in Burchell, G et al (eds) The Foucault Effect: Studies in 
Governmentality, Harvester Wheatsheaf, London: 87-104. 
5 Dean, M (1994) Critical and Effective Histories: Foucault's Methods and Historical Sociology, 
Routledge, London: 17 4. 
6 Foucault, M (1988) 'The Political Technology of Individuals', in Technologies of the Self, in 
Martin, L., Gutman H & Hutton, P (eds) University of Massachusetts Press, Amherst: 158. 
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government and its relation to the social. Rather than a theory of the state, 
however, Foucault analyses the operation of governmental power as varieties 
of techniques, strategies and practices, imbued with specific 'rationalities'. 
Considering neoliberalism as a specific political rationality provides a way 
comprehending both its content and operationalisation. 
Political Rationality 
A political rationality, Rose and Miller argue, has 'discernible regularities' 
allowing us to distinguish one from another, and to meaningfully identify 
important and distinctive qualities. Firstly, they suggest, a political rationality 
has a moral form, which demarcates the appropriate realms and tasks for 
different authorities in areas like politics, religion or education. Secondly, 
political rationalities have an epistemological character, drawing on a specific 
conception of the objects to be governed. Thirdly, they are articulated in a 
particular idiom; language provides' a kind of .intellectual machinery or 
apparatus for rendering reality thinkable in such a way that it is amenable to 
political deliberations'. 7 It is the latter two aspects of Rose and Miller's schema 
that are especially pertinent for this discussion: the implicit epistemological 
assumptions of the neoliberal model - especially as they are derived from neo­
classical economics - and their articulation as a distinctive discourse are 
important adjuncts to any explanation of the content and style of government in 
Australia in the 1 980s and beyond. 
It is the discursive aspects of a political rationality that are especially important 
here: particular discourses provide the epistemological and normative premises 
upon which subsequent government initiatives and policies are predicated. It is 
in this context that neoliberalism assumes its most important discursive aspect. 
Although there are, as we shall see, grounds to question both the neoliberal 
paradigm's claims to political and epistemological neutrality, it is important to 
recognise at this juncture that many of its assumptions continue to implicitly 
inform approaches to policy formulation. As subsequent chapters will 
demonstrate, such an orientation on the part of the Australian government has 
produced an increasingly distinctive style of governance, one which favours 
particular forms of 'intervention', often at a micro rather than at a macro level. 
7 Rose, N & Miller, P (1992) 'Political power beyond the state: problematics of government', 
British Journal of Sociology, 43 (2): 179. 
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The idea of a political rationality is, then, a useful way of thinking about the 
nexus between specific ideational frameworks and the epistemological 
assumptions that are implicit within them. Furthermore, it offers a way of 
comprehending the manner in which these ideas are discursively manifested. 
Before considering the specific theoretical paradigm that is central to the 
discourse of neoliberalism - neo-classical economics - it is important to consider 
the nature of discourses in general and the way they are distinguished and 
operate. For particular discourses are central components of an overarching 
political rationality: such discourses effectively delimit the operationalised 
problematic of a particular rationality. As Rose and Miller note: "In a very real 
sense, 'the economy' is brought into being by economic theories themselves, 
which define and individuate a set of characteristics, laws and processes . . .  "8 
Foucault is again useful in understanding the operation of specific discourses, 
although his self-conscious rejection of a systematised theoretical position and 
a willingness to abandon or modify previously articulated positions makes this 
process problematic. However, it is possible to trace the evolution of his thought 
and extract elements that may illuminate issues with which we are concerned. 
The episteme, for example, refers to the 'condition of possibility' of discourse 
in a specific period, and in particular to those specific a priori rules of formation 
that permit a discourse to function at any time; it allows some issues to be 
spoken of at particular junctures but not others. 9 There is a notable resonance 
with Kuhn's notion of a paradigm here. However, the Foucauldian approach 
seems more useful, especially when considering a discipline like economics; 
whereas there is greater consensus about core concepts and the possibility of 
empirical verification in scientific disciplines, in economics ideational dominance 
is reliant on discourse to a much greater extent. Indeed, economic ideas have -
protestations to the contrary notwithstanding - inescapable political effects 
when operationalised, which makes their universal adoption and acceptance 
more problematic than is the case with the less political ideas of the harder 
sciences. 10 Moreover, as a subsequent consideration of the Japanese case will 
demonstrate, economic ideas have had less success gaining universal 
acceptance than has 'western' science, demonstrating the importance of 
contingent political and even cultural factors. 
8 Rose, N & Miller, P (1992) 'Political power beyond the state': 182. 
9 McNay, L (1994) Foucault: A Critical Introduction, Polity Press, Cambridge: 52. 
1 O Kuhn, T (1970) The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Second Edition, University of 
Chicago Press: especially chapters 9 & 10. 
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As we shall see, Foucault's conception of an episteme has been an important, 
although generally unacknowledged, influence on the subsequent development 
of theorisation revolving around the notion of 'epistemic communities'. 
Epistemic communities have been, I shall suggest, instrumental in championing 
specific ideas and policy orientations amongst policy-makers at both a national 
and a regional level - a phenomena explored in greater detail in chapter 4. 
What is important to acknowledge at this stage is that at both the national and 
transnational levels, as Higgott observes, it is the manifestation of specific ideas 
at a discursive level, imbued with 'the vocabulary of positivism, methodological 
individualism, and free trade economics' that is increasingly defining the 
ideational framework within which appropriate government activities are 
delimited.1 1  Developing a clearer idea of the manner in which the ideas that 
inform a specific political rationality come to exercise such a discursive 
authority, even hegemony, is clearly important. Foucault is again helpful in this 
regard. 
Discourse Theory 
Foucault is not just concerned with linguistics or questions of semantics, but 
with the way in which institutional and material circumstances determine the 
content and form of discourses. Crucially, it is the celebrated nexus between 
power and knowledge - embodied in discourse - that Foucault wants to expose: 
in every society the production of discourse is at once controlled, selected, organised 
and redistributed by a certain number of procedures whose role is to ward ott its powers 
and dangers, to gain mastery over its chance events, to evade its ponderous, formidable 
materiality ...  discourse is not simply that which translates struggles or systems of 
domination, but it is the thing tor which and by which there is struggle, discourse is the 
power which is to be seized.12 
In this important passage Foucault draws attention to the importance that the 
dominant discourses of an historical period have in determining what can be 
said or even thought, and the manner in which alternative discourses can be 
marginalised as unbelievable or unknown. Validation as 'truth' occurs through 
the aegis of a dominant 'discipline' - economics or medicine, for example -
which sanctions and approves specific propositions by inscribing them within a 
'certain type of theoretical horizon'.1 3 
1 1  Higgott, R (1993) 'Economic Cooperation: Theoretical Opportunities and Practical 
Constraints', The Pacific Review, 6 (2): 113. 
12 Foucault, M ((1981) 'The Order of Discourse', in Young, R (ed) Untying the Text: A Post­
Structuralist Reader, Routledge, London:52. 
1 3 Foucault, M ((1981) 'The Order of Discourse': 60. 
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Discourse remains a central focus of analysis as a manifestation of the crucial 
link between power and knowledge. Foucault wants to draw attention to the 
mechanisms of power which are inseparable from and dialectically related to 
knowledge: 
the exercise of power creates and causes to emerge new objects of knowledge and 
accumulates new bodies of information. One can understand nothing about economic 
science if one does not know how power and economic power are exercised in everyday 
life . . .  It is not possible for power to be exercised without knowledge, it is impossible for 
knowledge not to engender power .14 
Foucault suggests that power should be analysed as something that circulates 
and 'functions in the form of a chain'.1 5 Rather than being solely negative and 
repressive, Foucault contends that 'power produces; it produces reality; it 
produces domains of objects and rituals of truth'.16 Foucault is suggesting a 
malleable and undetermined model of human consciousness, and one that 
might be shaped by specific 'technologies' or practices. To comprehend this 
process, analysis of the application of power must start from the micro level and 
ascend, rather than focusing on macro-structures. 
Specific discourses, then, have the potential to define and delimit objects of 
concern and interest upon which governmental policy, practices and power may 
be brought to bear.1 7 Individual disciplines like economics play a crucial role in 
legitimating and articulating the manner in which the objects of policy are 
approached and subjected to particular forms of management. Exclusion from 
the dominant discourse effectively marginalises and renders impotent 
alternative or competing positions. For our purposes, however, what is most 
pertinent in the Foucauldian approach is captured in the ideational framework 
Hall calls a 'policy paradigm': 
policymakers customarily work within a framework of ideas and standards that specifies 
not only the goals of policy and the kind of instruments that can be used to attain them, 
but also the very nature of the problems they are meant to be addressing. Like a Gestalt, 
this framework is embedded in the very terminology through which policymakers 
1 4 Foucault, M (1980) 'Prison Talk', in Power/Knowledge: Selected lnteNiews and Other 
Writings 1972-1977, Gordon C (ed), Pantheon Books, New York: 51/2. 
1 5 Foucault, M (1980) 'Two Lectures', Power/Knowledge :i98. 
16 Foucault, M (1977) Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, Penguin Books: 194. 
1 7 There is clearly an important resonance with the Gramscian notion of 'hegemony' here. The 
Foucaultian conception draws attention to the role of practices and techniques of government in 
the constitution of individual subjectivity, rather than utilising the more contested concepts of 
'the state' or 'ideology' that figure prominently in many Marxist accounts. For a useful discussion 
of the similarities between Gramscian and Foucaultian accounts, see: Smart, B (1986) 'The 
Politics of Truth and the Problem of Hegemony', in Hoy, D (ed) Foucault: A Critical Reader, 
Blackwell, Oxford: 157-73. 
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communicate about their work, and it is influential precisely because so much of it is 
taken for granted and unamenable to scrutiny as a whole .1 8 
It is precisely the 'taken for granted' aspects of contemporary economic 
discourse, or what Bourdieu referred to as our socially determined 'common 
sense' understandings of 'reality' that are so powerful in determining that reality, 
and which require unpacking if we are to understand their influence.19 It is 
appropriate, therefore, to consider some of the more important claims and 
assumptions that underpin neoliberalism, many of which have their foundation 
in neo-classical economics. 
Neoliberal Theory 
What is often called 'economic rationalism' in Australia is more generally known 
as neoliberalism in North America and Europe. Here the two terms will be used 
interchangeably as a shorthand way of indicating a relatively distinct and 
coherent set of assumptions and ideas about the way economic life does and, 
indeed, ought to operate, a perspective that owes a large and discernible 
theoretical debt to neo-classical economics. In this section some of the major 
theoretical and epistemological assumptions of the neoliberal model will be 
outlined. Initially, it is important to acknowledge that there are a variety of 
positions and thinkers subsumed under the rhetoric of neoliberalism, and that 
much of the criticism of such positions has verged on caricature.20 There is 
enough common ground in orthodox, mainstream economic thought, however, 
to allow us to talk meaningfully and interchangeably of a dominant economically 
rational or neoliberal model, which draws its theoretical inspiration form neo­
classical economics. But what is significant here is not the minutiae of the neo­
classical model or the claims it makes - although these are important and worth 
separate consideration - rather, what is equally important is the 
methodological approach that imbues what Heilbroner characterises as 
mainstream economics; an approach shot-through with the implicit and explicit 
1 8 Hall, P (1993) 'Policy paradigms, Social Learning, and the State: The Case of Economic 
Policymaking in Britain', Comparative Politics, 25 (3) :  279. 
1 9 Bourdieu, P (1991) Language and Symbolic Power, Polity Press: 236. 
2° For an overview of some of the more important contributions to the Australian debate, see: 
King, S & Lloyd, P (eds, 1993) Economic Rationalism: Dead End or Way Forward?, Allen & 
Unwin, Sydney; Ventilla, P et al (eds, 1992) Markets, Morale and Manifestations, Institute for 
Science and Technology Policy, Murdoch University; Carroll, J & Manne, R (eds, 1992) 
Shutdown: The Failure of Economic Rationalism and How to Rescue Australia, Text Publishing 
Co, Melbourne; James, C et al (eds, 1993) A Defence of Economic Rationalism, Allen & Unwin, 
Sydney. 
50 
suppositions of neo-classicism, which culminates in a 'formalist analysis' that is 
both ahistorical and determinant of a limited range of problematics.21 
The neo-classical paradigm's neglect of historical specificity is a significant 
weakness, the implications of which will be drawn out in subsequent empirical 
chapters. For now, the importance of the mainstream methodological approach 
merits emphasis. Central here, as McCloskey observes, is an inherent 
commitment on the part of economists to the tenets of modernism: there is a 
continuing faith in the ability of the scientific method to provide the researcher 
with access to objective 'reality'.22 Importantly, there is little recognition or 
acknowledgment of the long-standing and widely accepted view that 
knowledge and human understanding are socially constructed.23 This notion is 
concisely captured by Rorty's claim that: 
Truth cannot be out there - cannot exist independently of the human mind - because 
sentences cannot so exist, or be out there. The world is out there, but descriptions of the 
world are not. Only descriptions of the world can be true or false. The world on its own -
unaided by the describing activities of human beings - cannot. 24 
Yet it is significant that far from suffering the epistemological uncertainty that 
has been one of the defining characteristics of contemporary intellectual 
endeavour in both the 'soft' and 'hard' sciences, a good deal of economics has 
been devoted to revealing what Ross Garnaut - a leading figure in determining 
the direction and content of Australia's international economic policy - calls 'the 
simple truths' that come from the study of economics and history.25 This is not 
simply a regrettable methodological shortcoming. Rather, it is a position which 
generates distinctive 'ideological' effects.26 
For Heilbroner, such effects are ideological because they depict economic 
activities in 'terms that ignore or conceal the sociopolitical structure whence 
21 Heilbroner, R (1990) 'Analysis and Vision in the History of Modern Economic Thought', 
Journal of Economic Literature, XXVIII: 1107. 
22 McCloskey, D (1985) The Rhetoric of Economics, The University of Wisconsin Press: 
chapter 1, passim. 
23 Berger, P & Luckman, T (1971) The Social Construction of Reality: A treatise on the 
Sociology of Knowledge, Penguin Books, London. 
24 Rorty, R (1989) Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 
25 Garnaut, R (1990) 'The Market and the State in Economic Development: Some Questions 
from East Asia and Australia', The 1990 Shann Memorial Lecture, The University of Western 
Australia: 24. 
26 I have generally employed the term 'discourse' in preference to 'ideology' as the former 
carries less implicit baggage than the latter and captures some of the less overtly political, 
contingent effects of discursive practices. For a useful discussion on the differences see: 
Purvis, T & Hunt, A (1993) 'Discourse, ideology, discourse, ideology, discourse, ideology . . .  ',
British Journal of Sociology, 44 (3). 
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they spring and which they serve'.27 Moreover, Heilbroner contends, the 
satisfactoriness of the market mechanism - the central and preferred 
organisational principle in mainstream economics - 'is determined mainly from 
the vantage point of the regime that depends on it'.28 In other words, the 
discursive power of the dominant paradigm confers a retrospective legitimacy 
through a tendentious definition of 'efficiency'. To see how this process works, 
it is necessary to look more closely at the mainstream model and its neo­
classical foundations. 
The Neo-Classical Influence 
Let me begin with a caveat: It is not being suggested here that neo-classical 
economic ideas were the sole influence on policy-making in Australia during the 
1980s. What I am suggesting is that neo-classical assumptions were the - albeit 
often unacknowledged or unarticulated - theoretical underpinning that informed 
the dominant approach to the problem of national economic management, and 
which were central to the neoliberal political rationality. Although it should be 
stressed such ideas were also, in fact, (as we shall see in chapters 4 and 5), 
often explicitly spelled out by influential academic government advisers and 
consequently played an important role in delimiting and defining the objects and 
style of government economic policy. Generally, neo-classical ideas formed the 
theoretical bedrock that underpinned the dominant world view in Australia's 
'official family', or the key bureaucratic departments which were instrumental in 
setting policy direction under Labor.29 It is important, therefore, to examine the 
specifics of this highly influential neo-classical model and some of its critical 
methodological and theoretical assumptions. 
One of the most significant effects of neo-classical ideas is derived from the 
model's initial theoretical orientation. As De Vroey reminds us, one of the critical 
differences between paradigms is not so much that they provide different 
answers to the same puzzles, but that they ask fundamentally different 
questions. 30 The transition from classical to neo-classical economics is 
illustrative of the importance of this insight. The different methodological and 
27 Heilbroner, R (1990) 'Economics as Ideology', in Samuels, W (ed) Economics as a 
Discourse: An Analysis of the Language of Economists, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Boston: 
107. 
28 Heilbroner, R (1990) 'Economics as Ideology': 110. 
29 Toohey, B (1994) Tumbling Dice: The Story of Modern Economic Policy, Heinemann, 
Melbourne: 150. 
30 De Vroey, M (1975) 'The Transition form Classical to Neoclassical Economics: A Scientific 
Revolution', Journal of Economic Issues, Vol IX (3) :  418. 
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theoretical assumptions of the neo-classical paradigm meant that many of the 
issues that had been central to the classical model were marginalised or 
ignored. This was not simply a question of intellectual preference or the 
superiority of one model over another. The 'marginalist revolution' that was 
central to the neo-classical paradigm effectively eliminated the highly political 
and potentially contentious issues of class and the source of value as 
theoretical issues. The focus of theoretical attention was shifted from production 
to exchange and from capital to prices. This meant that the inherently 
antagonistic relationship between capital and labour - and the comfort given to 
an active socialist movement in Europe in the nineteenth century by a Ricardian 
analysis - was effectively neutralised. 
From its inception, therefore, the neo-classical model has had crucial, though 
generally unacknowledged political effects. This potential is reinforced by two 
key methodological assumptions: firstly, it is assumed that 'the economy' is an 
analytically distinct unit, separable from political or cultural considerations, and 
understandable with reference to its own internal mechanisms; secondly, it is 
assumed that individuals act 'rationally' in order to maximise personal utility.31 
From this initial position, neo-classical economics posits a larger self-regulating 
market-based model, which efficiently coordinates the organisation and 
distribution of commodities, including capital and labour, according to the 
inexorable logic of supply and demand. Unless 'externalities' obstruct the 
smooth operation of market forces this system will naturally move toward 
economic equilibrium and the optimal utilisation of resources. The cumulative 
effect and intention of this essentialist, ahistorical and abstracted rationalist 
model is, as Block suggests, to "naturalize" the economy - that is, 'to treat 
economic arrangements that have a specific history and content as timeless 
products of the need to economize scarce resources'.32 In this manner, 
economic policy-making becomes a form of dispassionate technical discussion 
and, as we shall see, amenable to the remedial interventions of appropriately 
qualified 'experts'. 
Significantly, the attempt to render the theoretical claims and assumptions of 
neo-classicism as objective or neutral renditions of reality has characterised 
the paradigm from its inception. As Hunt observed, the founding fathers (they 
were all men) of the neo-classical school - Jevons, Menger and Walras -
31 Block, F (1990) Postindustrial Possibilities: A Critique of Economic Discourse, University of 
California Press: 21/2. 
32 Block, F (1990) Postindustrial Possibilities: 26. 
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despite being caught up in the nineteenth century's revolutionary 
reconstruction of capitalism, followed the individualistic, utilitarian perspective of 
Say, Senior and Bastiat, and developed the central concepts of the utility theory 
of value and general equilibrium theory.33 Elaborating the notion of declining 
marginal utility may have been an ingenious extension of earlier positions but 
did little to explain the monumental economic change of which they were a part. 
Certainly Walras' theory of general equilibrium was a novel innovation, but it 
was achieved by virtually ignoring the manner in which commodities were 
actually produced, focusing instead on the less contentious sphere of 
circulation or exchange. This not only allowed the construction of a self­
regulating model of economic activity based on rational utility maximisation, but 
allowed Walras (and subsequent followers) to ignore the inconvenient fact of 
unequally distributed resources and life-chances when the model was 
activated. The Walrasian approach was, moreover, important in reinforcing the 
'scientific' pretensions of neo-classical economics and the claims that its 
advocates' could detect or propound economic laws that transcended political 
or moral questions.34 
Walras suggested that it was possible to distinguish a realm of 'pure' economics 
as opposed to applied or social economics. Given such distinctions, Walras 
used mathematics to demonstrate the conditions necessary for general 
equilibrium in a market economy. The significance of the neo-classical model's 
approach for our purposes is the central role marginal analysis attributes to the 
market in determining the most 'efficient' allocation of scarce resources. This in 
turn makes even larger claims and assumptions about the behaviour of human 
beings: it was assumed that producers and consumers 'naturally' behave in 
ways designed to maximise satisfaction or profits.35 As we shall see in chapter 
5, it is simply not possible to assume that profitability is the sole or even over­
riding criterion of corporate behaviour, especially in countries like Japan. For 
the moment, however, it is the assumption about individual acquisitive 
behaviour that is of significance here. 
33 Hunt, E (1979) A History of Economic Thought: A Critical Perspective, Wadsworth 
Publishing, California: Chapter 11. 
34 Zamagni, S (1987) Microeconomic Theory: An Introduction, Basil Blackwell, Oxford:34-6. 
35 Deane, P (1978) The Evolution of Economic Ideas, Cambridge University Press: chapters 7 
&8. 
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Neo-classical Assumptions 
The neo-classical model's theoretical premises effectively removed the 
collective nature of human social and productive activities from its frame of 
reference. The concept that underpins this approach - methodological 
individualism - is predicated upon the assumption that all statements about 
groups or larger social collectivities are ultimately reducible to statements about 
the individuals that compose those groups. A focus on individuals, be they 
citizens or firms, has had important consequences at a theoretical and policy 
level. On the one hand, the individual has become the focus of more specifically 
targeted government interventions designed to encourage greater productivity 
and an increased congruence with the 'logic' of market mechanisms and 
demands. Simultaneously, the theoretical assumptions of neo-classical 
economists continue to inform basic suppositions about important economic 
actors like firms. Marshall, for example, extended Walras' equilibrium analysis 
by positing a 'representative firm' that was central to an industry-wide 
equilibrium model of production.36 As we shall see in subsequent chapters, 
however, such abstractions bear little resemblance to the specific historical 
experiences of firms - and not just in Japan. 
What is important to recognise about the neo-classical conception and the 
neoliberal policies it informs are not simply the assumptions its advocates make 
about the necessity and appropriateness of market mechanisms as the central 
organisational principle of economic life, but the conceptions of government 
that flow from it: 
For economic rationalists greater efficiency is a sacred goal. Increased competition and 
the unlocking of market forces are the key means to obtain it. Economic rationalists are 
highly suspicious of government intervention. They believe the central aim of policy 
should be the establishment of a framework in which the efficacy of market forces is 
maximised and hence where resources can allocated as efficiently as possible. Policies 
should therefore concentrate on improving the dissemination of information, improving 
the mobility of labour and other resources, discouraging restrictive practices and ... 
trying to encourage as competitive a system as possible .. .To the extent that the private 
sector operates less than optimally, a major reason is the plethora of government 
regulations that hamper its efficiency.37 
The neo-classical model, then, is predicated upon the assumption that market 
forces are inherently efficient and that governments should not interfere with 
their operation but should, on the contrary, construct policies that enhance their 
36 Deane, P (1978) The Evolution of Economic Ideas : 112. 
37 Whitwell, G (1993) 'Economic ideas and economic policy: the rise of economic rationalism in 
Australia', Australian Economic History Review, XXXIII, No 2: 10. 
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influence and allow the inherent dynamism of capitalism to be unleashed. In 
short, the economically rationalist or neoliberal model suggests that 'in settling 
matters of resource allocation, imperfect markets are better than imperfect 
states'. 38 The form of governmental action sanctioned by such logic is, 
therefore market conforming rather than 'distorting', and predicated upon the 
assumption this will allow the inherent rationality of the market mechanism to 
achieve an optimal allocation of resources. There is, however, little recognition 
in the neo-classical model that either the rationality it assumes and champions 
is a discursive social construct rather than 'natural', or that 'markets' are the 
product of and reliant on specific configurations of social relations, and legal 
and political structures. 39 More fundamentally, there is little acknowledgment of 
the inherent irrationality of markets themselves.4o 
Yet, despite these shortcomings, the epistemological assumptions and 
normative assertions that inform such market-oriented policies for individual 
nations are extended to the realm of international trade and investment. The 
implications of a policy position predicated on notions of 'comparative 
advantage' and idealised versions of international economic activity will be 
considered in greater detail in subsequent chapters, where the general position 
of Australia in the GPE and the specifics of theoretical orientations toward 
Japan are considered. At present, it is worth re-emphasising that there is 
nothing 'natural' or inevitable about privileging market mechanisms within policy 
paradigms. This will become more apparent when we consider the distinctive 
organisational rationale of corporate capital based in Japan and the specific 
policy framework that has encouraged its development and expansion in 
chapter 5. Certainly, the ability of a comparatively small economic and political 
actor like Australia to resist various international pressures or autonomously 
affect its external trading environment may have been limited. But what needs 
to be stressed here is the socially determined and contingent nature of the 
neoliberal paradigm; its application is not somehow an inevitable or technically 
correct response to the problems of contemporary structural adjustment. It is, in 
38 Colclough, C (1991) 'Structuralism versus Nee-liberalism: An Introduction', in Colclough, C & 
Manor, J (eds), States or Markets? Neo-/iberalism and the Development Policy Debate, 
Clarendon Press, Oxford: 7. 
39 Given the mainstream economic preference tor market mechanism, the role of government 
is generally restricted to maintaining the social stability within which markets can function and 
correcting 'market failure'. See: Samuelson, P & Nordhaus, W (1989) Economics, Thirteenth 
Edition, McGraw-Hill Book Company, New York: chapter 3, passim. 
40 Bauman, Z (1987) Legislators and Interpreters: On Modernity, Post-Modernity and 
Intellectuals, Polity Press, Cambridge: 187. 
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fact, an inherently political exercise, and the result of consciously pursued 
policy options, albeit constrained ones. 
1 shall suggest below that the inherently political nature of the neoliberal project 
is partly disguised by its depiction as a technical response to the demands of 
economic management and, as such, the legitimate concern of particular forms 
of expertise. Before this, however, it is important to subject the neoliberal model 
to a more thoroughgoing critique. 
Neoliberalism: A Critique 
There are, then, key assumptions that distinguish the neo-classical model and 
the sort of neoliberal political rationality it informs. This is most immediately 
apparent in the assumptions neo-classical economists make about 'human 
nature' - that individuals are acquisitive, utility maximising agents possessed of 
the ability to make informed decisions and choices in pursuit of individual 
happiness. Marxist scholars have, of course, drawn attention to the inherent 
implausibility of a model that assumes equality of life chances.41 What is most 
worthy of note here, however, is the normative assumption that markets 
produce both economic and social harmony in a self-regulating system that 
tends toward equilibrium. Historical change is not only inexplicable in such a 
model, it is generally not even considered. This is nowhere clearer than in the 
historical evolution of 'the market' itself. 
The contingent nature of the market is demonstrated most forcefully in the 
work of Karl Polanyi. Polanyi's seminal genealogy of the rise of laissez faire 
economics in the nineteenth century, provides both an exemplar of the art of 
historical investigation and an important counterfactual with which to consider 
neoliberalism's contemporary renaissance. Not only does the rise and fall of 
market-oriented, deregulatory economic policies indicate the contingent nature 
of economic discourse, it also raises significant doubts about claims as to the 
'naturalness' or 'inevitability' of neoliberal solutions to the problem of economic 
organisation. Part of the power and influence of rationalist discourse is derived 
from the assertion that some forms of economic policy more closely reflect and 
harmonise with the inherent 'nature' of capitalism; the latter's latent dynamism 
will be most effectively realised by policies that allow its unencumbered 
expression. What Polanyi's historiography reveals, however, is that 
41 See, for example: Miliband, R (1991) Divided Societies: Class Struggle in Contemporary 
Capitalism, Oxford University Press, Oxford. 
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the emergence of national markets was in no way the result of the gradual and 
spontaneous emancipation of the economic sphere from governmental control. On the 
contrary, the market has been the outcome of a conscious and often violent intervention 
on the part of government which imposed the market organisation on society for 
noneconomic ends. 42 [Emphasis added] 
Ironically, then, the rise of laissez faire economics in Britain coincided with 
great increases in planning and intervention by the state in pursuit of 
Benthamite utility and happiness. Similarly, the contemporary fashion for 
'deregulation' is, in tact, a misnomer, in that such policies amount to forms of rEr 
regulation, rather than dErregulation: government intervenes to change the 
structures within which capitalism operates, inevitably advantaging some 
sectors over others.43 Yet the discursive power of economic rationalism can 
render such effects less obvious, if not invisible. This naturalisation of what is 
essentially a political process is achieved in part methodologically. This is why 
an analysis of the discursive power of the neoliberal discourse merits attention: 
not only has this discourse formed an integral and crucial part of the political 
rationality that has informed the practices of government in Australia, it has 
been instrumental in legitimising processes that are congruent with such a 
methodology while simultaneously marginalising others. 
As a final element of the critique of neoliberalism or economic rationalism, 
something needs to be said about an implicit, yet discursively powerful aspect 
of this discourse: the notion of rationality itself. Max Weber is, of course, the 
principal source of western notions of rationality. His distinction between formal 
( a  quantitative calculation of the technically possible) and substantive 
(calculation linked to social values or norms) remains important.44 Clearly this 
provides one possible way of considering the normative neutrality claimed by 
some advocates economic rationalism, as opposed to the political application of 
policies derived from such a discourse. But it is necessary to recognise the 
artificiality of this process, however useful. It is not possible to separate the 
substantive and the formal as if they were distinct spheres: once theory is 
applied it inevitably confronts social contingency, which recursively delimits and 
defines the realm of the technically possible. More fundamentally, as Hindess 
points out, it is important to avoid relapsing into a priori assumptions about 
42 Polanyi, K (1957) The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our 
Time, Beacon Press, Boston: 250. 
43 Cerny, P (1991) ' The Limits of Deregulation: Transnational Interpenetration and Policy 
Change', European Journal of Political Research, 19: 173-96. 
44 Weber, M (1978) Economy and Society, Volume 1, University of California Press, Berkeley: 
85. 
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intrinsic human rationality which neglect the discursive constitution of rationality 
itself as an abstract possibility.45 
One of the distinctive qualities of industrial capitalism, for Weber, is rationality; 
one of the fundamental characteristics of rationality is its calculability.46 This 
calculability is fundamental to both the organisation of modern production 
processes, as well as to the legal and administrative/bureaucratic environment 
in which economic activity occurs. Bureaucratic structures are rational partly 
because of their impersonal formalism, but also because they are reliant on 
knowledge in the form of specialised technical expertise: 'bureaucracy, in short, 
invites technocracy'. 47 However, while a degree of rationality may be an 
inevitable concomitant of and prerequisite for complex organisational structures 
and practices, this is not necessarily the unqualified boon its advocates claim. 
Weber recognised that formal rationality in no way guaranteed its substantive 
counterpart. As Brubaker observed: 
Choosing what means to employ, given a fixed and unambiguous end, is a technical 
problem; choosing what ends to pursue and what means to employ, given a stock of 
resources, is an economic problem. 48 
This antagonism between formal and substantive rationality places a 
fundamental tension and conflict at the heart of modernity: the demands of an 
economic system with the market as its central organising principle necessarily 
excludes and marginalises counter-discourses based on interventionist, 
collectivist or egalitarian principles; discourses which may, in fact, have 
potentially plausible alternatives to the problem of economic management over 
which neoliberalism exercises authoritative suzerainty. 
45 Hindess, B (1987) 'Rationality and the Characterization of Modern Society, in Max Weber, 
Rationality and Modernity, Lash, S & Whimster, S (eds), Allen & Unwin, London: 149. 
46 Sayer, D (1991) Capitalism & Modernity: An Excursus on Marx and Weber, Routledge, 
London: 96. Sayer draws attention to the resonance between the rationality inherent in 
capitalism and the institutional preconditions posited by neo-classical economics, something 
that helps explain the air of inevitability and certainty that accompanies some of the more 
technocratic, apolitical discourses emerging from mainstream economics - ibid: 97/8. The way 
in which such apparently politically neutral, technocratic discourses can serve to create a 
powerful, normative ideational framework can be seen in the World Bank's 'structural 
adjustment' policies for developing economies. See: Williams, D & Young, T (1994) 
'Governance, the World Bank and Liberal Theory', Political Studies, XLII: 84-1 00; Leftwhich, A 
(1994) 'Governance, the State and the Politics of Development', Development and Change, Vol 
25: 363-86. 
47 Brubaker, R (1984) The Limits of Rationality: An Essay on the Social and Moral Thought of 
Max Weber, Allen & Unwin, London: 22. 
48 Brubaker, R (1984) ibid: 56. 
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At one level, then, the discourse of economic rationalism seeks to overcome 
this tension by marginalising alternative or oppositional positions and 
presenting itself as the most technically competent response to a series of 
calculable problems subsumed under the rubric of 'the economy'. At another 
level, however, this discourse seeks to resonate with and act upon 
contemporary social formations and identities and render them more amenable 
to the type of rationality it embodies. Homo economicus is not just an ideal type 
or convenient theoretical abstraction upon which to base regimes of calculation, 
but a social desiderata toward which specific technologies and discourses 
attempt to guide an objectified populous. At the intersection of economic 
discourse and political practice lies the possibility of producing a more 
enterprising and 'efficient' population capable of playing a specific role in the 
economic and social restructuring of the nation - something that, as we shall 
see below, plays an increasingly important part in contemporary governmental 
practices in Australia. However, this is a more opaque process as a result of the 
expertly articulated and 'naturalising' quality of neoliberal discourse. This 
process is more discernible, however, when the intersection between economic 
theory and political practice is considered. 
The Political Effects of Neoliberalism 
One of the most important sources of the power of neoliberal discourse resides 
in its ability to neutralise what might otherwise might be taken as overtly 
political. This is achieved, in part, by rendering every aspect of human activity 
as potential objects of calculation and consequently expert management. In 
this context the contribution of Gary Becker is an important and useful example 
of the manner in which the epistemological premises of the neo-classical model 
may be applied to any area of human existence. Whether such an approach 
provides useful insights or is readily applicable is less important here, than is 
the realisation that there is an assumption that such a methodology is both 
appropriate and may ultimately form the basis policy. This possibility is 
rendered more plausible by Becker's status as a Nobel Prize-winning 
economist, something that enhances the discursive ideational legitimation of 
the particular forms of economic discourse he champions. 
Becker first achieved recognition for his work on 'human capital' which 
suggested that individuals 'invested' in their own education after making rational 
calculations about the likely benefits to be derived from such effort a:nd 
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expense. Women, for example, invest less as they spend less time in the 
workforce preferring to be 'housewives' instead. 49 It hardly needs to be said that 
a complex array of other social variables might explain women's non­
participation and/or subordinate position in the workforce. Yet Becker has 
subsequently managed to apply these highly dubious, nee-classically-derived, 
theoretical assumptions to the family and marriage. While many Marxists might 
agree that 'the market' has had some effect in shaping social relations and 
encouraging the development of nuclear families, Becker's position is that the 
familial division of labour is the result of rationally calculating utility maximisers 
coming together to co-operatively maximise household output. Becker attempts 
to extend this argument to the institution of marriage, where he suggests 
individuals will maximise utility via the development of 'an efficient marriage 
market [that] develops "shadow" prices to guide participants to marriages that 
will maximise their expected well-being'.50 'Efficiency' is maintained in the 
marriage market via 'assortative mating': 
an efficient marriage market usually has positive assortative mating, where high-quality 
men are matched with high-quality women and low-quality men with low-quality women 
. . . An efficient market also tends to maximise the aggregate output of household 
commodities, so that no person can improve his marriage without making others worse 
off.51 
Now the connection between marriage markets, 'assortative mating' and the 
construction of economic policy may not be immediately clear. The significance 
of Becker's work here is that it illustrates the manner in which the neo-classical 
approach can be extended and applied to all areas of social life. The 
significance of this for the purposes of this essay is twofold. Firstly, the 
assumptions of the neo-classical model and its ability to explain complex social 
reality are clearly limited as the examples above demonstrate. Central to the 
neo-classical model is the conception of the utility maximising, rationally 
calculating and sovereign individual. Even as a convenient heuristic device, 
however, this depiction has serious shortcomings. Clearly individuals do not 
have perfect information with which to arrive at rational decisions, even 
supposing that such decisions were arrived at in this manner. Secondly, the 
seriousness with which such analyses are greeted suggest that they are part of 
a mutually-reinforcing process of ideational legitimation. This is the most 
important implication of Becker's work: that is, the systematic attempt to render 
every aspect of human life the object of specific modes of calculation. As Rajan 
49 Becker, G (1975) Human Capital: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, with Special 
Reference to Education, Second Edition, The University of Chicago Press: 74. 
50 Becker, G (1991) A Treatise on the Family, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass: 81. 
51 Becker, G (1991) A Treatise on the Family :108. 
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notes, an analysis of Becker's sort 'meshes with and interpenetrates other 
discursive formations such as psychiatry to produce and reproduce "rational" 
individuals who are fit/unfit to occupy subject positions in contemporary 
society'. 52 
Furthermore, the pages of mathematical calculations that fill Becker's books 
attempt to give a mantle of scientific epistemological certainty and authority to 
what are little more than untestable assertions and thinly disguised normative 
prescriptions. It should also be noted that the mathematical modelling with 
which Becker seeks to invest his work with a patina of scientism is also 
seriously misleading on two grounds: not only has mainstream scientific 
discourse moved on from the certainties of Newtonian physics to the 
uncertainty of quantum mechanics, but the latter may also be a more 
appropriate methodology for economics as well as physics. 53 As we shall see in 
chapter 4, the equilibrium models that dominate neo-classical models simply do 
not reflect the historical, empirical experience of contemporary economic reality. 
The connection between the economic and political spheres which neo­
classical economics attempts to keep separate is, however, more overtly 
revealed in the emergence of public choice theory, which is the political 
expression of the market-centred economic paradigm. Homo economicus, the 
egoistic rational utility maximiser, remains the central figure in public choice 
theory, a conception that has inevitable policy implications: The market, rather 
than the state or other constraining, collectivist social constructions, is the best 
determinant of questions of distribution. Despite an obvious intellectual debt 
here to the writing of conservative economic and political theorists like Hayek 
and Nozick, advocates of public choice theory are often at pains to stress the 
'scientific' and objective nature of their analysis and prescriptions. 54 Injunctions 
as to the necessity of 'slimming the state', reducing welfare payments, 
encouraging the privatisation of publicly-owned assets, and generally 
enhancing the influence and power of 'market forces' are presented as value­
free technical responses to the imperatives of economic efficiency and well­
being. But, as Self reminds us, the market system is not 'a spontaneous 
52 Rajan, R (1992) 'Pathological Rationality/Rational Pathologies', Alternatives, 17: 340. 
53 Ormerod, P (1994) The Death of Economics, Faber and Faber, London: especially chapters 
5 & 7. 
54 Self, P (1993) Government By the Market? The Politics of Public Choice, Macmillan, London: 
58. 
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system of voluntary exchanges governed by objective economic laws, but . . .  a 
political system'. 55 
Yet in their different ways, Becker and public choice theorists suggest that 
economic life is governed by objective market forces both at the macro level 
and at the level of the individual. This is not simply a heuristic conceit, but 
central to the formation of self-identity. To obtain the most efficient return on 
investment it is crucial that these beneficent forces are allowed to operate in an 
untrammelled manner. This is not a political issue, but simply a question of 
developing the most technically efficient policy settings with which to facilitate 
the expression of the capitalist dynamic. It is central to the logic of economic 
rationalism, therefore, that the general population can be brought to understand 
this logic and play its part in ensuring optimal outcomes, which will benefit both 
themselves and the nation. It is in this context that the idea of neoliberalism as 
a specific political rationality is especially useful in helping to comprehend the 
origins and forms of governmental practices under Labor since the 1980s. 
There is one final aspect of contemporary modes of neoliberal governance in 
Australia that merits particular attention; one which forms an important part of 
an understanding of both the ideational hegemony of the neoliberal political 
rationality and in its operationalisation as policy: the increasing importance of 
and reliance on expertise. 
Expertise 
Expertise is an important aspect of the emergent style and content of 
government in Australia for two principal reasons. Firstly, particular forms of 
expertise provide the technical capacity and competence for new and specific 
forms of 'intervention' by governments, particularly at the micro level. Secondly, 
the depiction of potentially contentious issues as technical problems, 
susceptible to expert forms of resolution and management, helps insulate the 
instigators of such policies from potential sources of opposition. Where specific 
economic initiatives can be presented by an influential academic elite, a unified 
media and key policy-makers as the only 'rational' responses to the imperatives 
of relentless international competition, for example, it is increasingly difficult for 
opponents to object, let alone have such objections articulated as part of 
mainstream debate. It is in this latter context that expertise is especially 
55 Self, P (1993) Government By the Market? :203. 
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germane to the concerns of this thesis. As we shall see, the particular 
difficulties associated with national economic management in Australia (detailed 
in chapter 3), meant that at a time of perceived crisis Australian policy-makers, 
paid greater attention to authoritative economic advisers and commentators 
claiming expert understanding of such problems. 
However, it needs to be acknowledged that the idea of an evermore elaborate 
division of labour leading to a greater reliance on specialisation is not, of 
course, as Weber and Durkheim amongst others demonstrate, a new one. 56 
The potential effects of the pervasive and subtle influence of increasing 
complexity and rationality in contemporary societies have been further 
developed by contemporary theorists. Habermas has drawn attention to the 
important connection between the 'purposive-rational logic' that underpinned 
technological development and the emergence of new social values: 'technical 
progress . . .  is largely determined by social interests that arise spontaneously 
from the compulsion to reproduce social life'. 57 Simply sustaining complex 
industrial societies, it seemed, involved an ever greater reliance on specific 
forms of expertise. As a consequence, government itself seemed to revolve 
around 'technical' questions accessible to expert resolution. The result was to 
further de-politicise aspects of government activities which were increasingly 
measured against and legitimated by a calculus of technical, managerial 
competence. Ultimately, for Habermas, the 'reified models of the sciences' 
become part of individual consciousness in the 'life-world', a situation which, he 
suggests, inevitably collapses the distinction between the motivation for action 
and its technical accomplishment. 58 
There are large questions here about the relationship between social 
development, especially its economic and technological aspects, and 
consequent forms of human consciousness. Plainly, these lie outside the ambit 
of this thesis. Of more particular interest here is the manner in which an 
increasingly technocratic, expert-based approach to governing, especially in 
broadly defined economic areas, intersects with specific policy objectives. Two 
aspects of this process are especially pertinent here: the discursively 
marginalising impact of 'expert' discourse; and the greater possibilities opened 
up for specific forms of intervention at the macro and micro levels conferred by 
56 Giddens, A (1971) Capitalism and Modern Theory: An Analysis of the Writings of Marx , 
Durkheim and Weber, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 
57 Habermas, J (1971) Toward a Rational Society: Student Protest, Science and Politics, 
Heinemann: London, pp 72/3. 
58 Habermas, J (1971) Toward a Rational Society, p 113. 
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increased levels of technical competence. Such developments help to explain, 1 
am suggesting, both the increased authority and seeming inevitability of 
contemporary forms of macro economic management, as well as the 
development of programs intended to encourage greater 'enterprise' and 
'flexibility' in the population as a whole. Both of these developments reflected 
and entrenched the dominance of a neoliberal political rationality in Australia 
since the 1980s. While a reliance on expertise in complex societies is, 
therefore, ubiquitous and inescapable - clearly, Keynesian economists, for 
example, are also experts - there is a particular resonance between 
neoliberalism, its epistemological and normative assumptions, and the potential 
of associated technocratic discourses to both insulate policy-makers from 
political fall-out and legitimate consequent policy initiatives as technically 
necessary. 
The Political Implications of Expertise 
A greater reliance on expertise may be, therefore, as Fischer suggests, a 
central component of a 'deep-seated transformation of the very form and 
content of advanced industrial society itself' in which technocrats play a crucial 
role in providing specialist knowledge, but it is the potential of such experts to 
shield policy-making elites from the possible political consequences of their 
actions that is of particular interest here. 59 Unpalatable reforms may be 
presented as the inescapable, 'correct' responses to particular problems. 
Practical policy-making may gain a good deal of discursive legitimation where 
the 'solutions' to the problem of economic management are seen as essentially 
technical; this is especially so where the prevailing economic discourse 
sanctions such an approach. Indeed, such a situation may reinforce both the 
position of government and the authority of specific forms of economic 
discourse, for it is here that a technocratic methodology premised on 
'scientific' knowledge may present itself as the non-ideological application of 
instrumentally rational techniques. 5o Where the measure of successful 
government is predominantly its ability to manage the economy and thus 
national living standards, economic experts - or specialist discourses with 
claims to influence such outcomes - are central to the strategic calculations of 
political elites. Privileging specific discourses or ideas as the central organising 
59 Fischer, F (1990) Technocracy and the Politics of Expertise, Sage Publications: California, 
pp 13 & 29. 
6° Cento, M (1993) 'The New Leviathan: The Dynamics and Limits of Technocracy', Theory and 
Society, 22, pp 312-4. 
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principles of economic life inevitably increases the autonomy and influence of 
those experts that are associated with or actively champion such ideas. Indeed, 
as Haggard and Kaufman point out, particular ideas may form the focal point 
around which new coalitions of interests coalesce. 51 
As chapters 3 and 4 will demonstrate, this is a suggestion with a good deal of 
relevance to the situation in Australian since the 1980s: there was an important 
intersection between a reform-minded government, influential members of the 
academic community, and elements of the bureaucracy. The common 
denominator around which these interests coalesced was a shared belief in the 
potential efficacy of neoliberal policies in addressing Australia's perceived 
economic problems. Although the adoption of neoliberal policies was not 
inevitable, once such a policy framework was taken up it was nurtured and 
legitimated by a specific, expertly articulated discourse which in turn gained 
greater authority following its adoption by political elites.62 Economic policy in 
particular became the subject of an evermore specialised and technocratic 
debate, in which policy-makers increasingly found themselves dependent on 
specific forms of expertise, something which worked to entrench the position of 
an influential group of advisers oriented toward neoliberal policies. These are 
issues that are detailed in subsequent chapters. The point to emphasise here is 
that the increasing dominance of neoliberal experts within the policy-making 
process had two important effects: on the one hand it 'naturalised' policy by 
marginalising alternatives; on the other it changed the manner of government 
intervention in keeping with its market-conforming logic. 
The role played by specific forms of expertise is not confined to acting as a 
source of legitimation or policy innovation. Increasingly neoliberally-oriented 
expertise is being brought to bear on the population at large, as individuals are 
encouraged to optimise their productive potential. In part this reflects a general 
contemporary reliance on a range of specialist knowledges that play an 
important role in what Giddens has called 'the reflexive project of the self'; 63 
individuals have greater recourse to a range of expert advice (psycho-therapy, 
'self-help', and the like), in the self-conscious construction of identity and 
61 Haggard, S & Kaufman, R (1992) ' Introduction: Institutions and Economic Adjustment', in 
Haggard, S & Kaufman, R (eds) The Politics of Economic Adjustment: International Constraints, 
Distributive Conflicts, and the State, Princeton University Press, Princeton: 37. 
62 Once neoliberal polices were implemented this made any return to Keynesian-style polices 
increasingly problematic. Reforms enhanced the power of financial markets which in turn made 
the tools of macro-economic management less reliable and policies themselves subject to the 
veto of the markets. 
63 Giddens, A (1990) The Consequences of Modernity, Polity Press, Cambridge. 
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'lifestyle'. New forms of professional expertise and 'life-style engineering' can 
transmit 'modern functional rationality' throughout every part of the life-world. 64 
More specifically, a range of expertly-guided practices may be directed toward 
the general population in order to constitute a more 'enterprising' population, a 
strategy that flows directly from the neoliberal emphasis on the individual as the 
cornerstone of economic development. 
Rose argues that this process is especially evident in Britain as a result of the 
systematic inculcation of new social values and the attempt to create an 
'enterprise culture' of which an 'enterprising self' is the cornerstone: 
the forms of political reason that yearn for an enterprise culture accord a vital political 
value to a certain image of the self. And this image of the 'enterprising self' is so potent 
because it is not the idiosyncratic obsession of the right of the political spectrum. On the 
contrary, it resonates with basic presuppositions concerning the contemporary self that 
are widely distributed in our present, presuppositions that are embodied in the very 
language that we use to make persons thinkable ... the presupposition of the 
autonomous, choosing, free self as the value, ideal and objective underpinning and 
legitimating political activity imbues the political mentalities of the modern West . . . 65 
Whether the enterprising self is actually 'free' is an interesting question, but 
one that is both impossible and unnecessary to answer. The important point is, 
as Rose suggests, that the idea of informed autonomy is the underpinning 
assumption upon which a particular economic discourse is predicated; it seeks 
to act upon objects on that basis. As we shall see in the next chapter, it is an 
idea that is beginning to exert a discernible influence on the content of public 
policy in Australia. 
The increasing uses of expertise at the macro and micro level can be thought of 
as particular techniques of government in which the notions of individual 
freedom and happiness, in combination with a calculating rationality exemplify 
and inform a specific style of governing. The congruence between this style of 
governmental practice and the logic of economic rationalism, Rose argues, 
culminates in a new formula of 'advanced liberal' rule, in which governance 
occurs through the regulated choices of individuals. 66 In this context, experts 
64 Kellner, H & Berger, P (1992) 'Life-style Engineering: Some Theoretical Reflections', in 
Kellner, H & Heuberger, F (eds) Hidden Technocrats: The New Class and New Capitalism, 
Transaction Publishers, New Brunswick: 4. 
65 Rose, N (1992) 'Governing the Enterprising Self', in The Values of the Enterprise Culture: 
The Moral Debate, Heelas, P & Morris, P (eds), Routledge, London: 141/2. 
66 Rose, N (1993) 'Government, Authority and Expertise in Advanced Liberalism', Economy 
and Society, 22 (3) , p 285. Rose's formulation owes a conspicuous debt to Foucault's notion of 
'governmentality', or the ensemble of institutions, procedures, tactics and government 
apparatuses that allows the administration of a specific form of power. Central to this 
conception is the idea of government as an 'art', which evolved concomitantly with the 
emergence of the population and the economy as distinct concepts, the objects of 
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are 'detached' from the immediate process of political rule and their authority is 
bound-up with the rationality of market mechanisms. Expertise serves to 
distance the political and economic spheres, insulating the former and 
rendering the latter the object of apolitical 'technical' discourses. The process 
of governance is, therefore, indirect and mediated by expertise; and yet it is an 
attempt to find 'a way of linking the values of economic productivity, political 
democracy and personal contentment into a single theoretico-practical 
matrix.'67 
The appeal and influence of the discourse of economic rationalism, therefore, 
can be explained in large part by the intersection of the important trends 
delineated above. It as a discourse dependent on and, to an increasing extent, 
legitimated by a specific and currently dominant form of expertise. As such, it is 
a discourse which seeks to depict its object of management - the economy -
as amenable to neutral, technical solutions that are produced by specific forms 
of knowledge. Economic rationalism itself is presented as a discrete, self­
referential body of knowledge which encompasses particular techniques that 
may be applied to the problem of economic governance. Its supposed 
rationality may absolve governments from the potentially negative implications 
of individual policies which are presented as the only 'rational' solutions to 
problems with potentially negative social impacts. Or, to paraphrase one of 
neoliberalism's most ardent champions, Margaret Thatcher, 'there is no 
alternative'. More specifically, as Block observes, 'the special potency of 
economic theory is that it gives business arguments that appear to lie outside of 
politics and that preclude, in advance, political responses'.68 
Moreover, at a more fundamental level, the increased focus on a policy 
paradigm that limits the range of possible 'legitimate' government interventions 
resonates with shifts in the structure of the GPE outlined in the previous 
chapter. Where government control of the nominally national economy has 
been rendered more problematic at the level of macro management and less 
attractive as a result of the dominance of neoliberal ideas in the Anglo­
American economies, then policy-makers may devote more attention to other 
objects. As Cerny notes, one of the most significant and widespread results of 
governmental management, and the target of particular policies. See, Foucault, M (1991) 
'Governmentality', in Burchell, G & Gordon, C (eds) The Foucault Effect: Studies in 
Governmenta/ity, Harvester Wheatsheaf: London, pp 87-104. 
67 Miller, P & Rose, N (1993) 'Governing Economic Life', Gane, M & Johnson, T (eds) 
Foucault's New Domains, Routledge: London, p 97. 
68 Block, F (1986) 'Political choice and the multiple "logics" of capital', Theory and Society, 15: 
187. 
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the 'globalisation' process has been the priority given to education and training 
over more conventional economic policy initiatives. 69 In the schemata outlined 
here, the macro interventionism associated with the increasingly discredited 
political rationality of Keynesianism has been supplanted by a more market­
driven neoliberal one. Contemporary neoliberal policy is bent on 'getting the 
fundamentals right'. In other words, putting into place the sort of technical policy 
requirements about which there is consensus amongst the influential coterie of 
experts steeped in the theoretical assumptions of neoclassical economics. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has attempted to suggest how a particular set of ideas came to 
exert a powerful influence on the conduct of economic life in Australia over the 
last decade or so. In this context, the neo-classical economic ideas which are 
so central to economic rationalism may most usefully be thought of as part of a 
specific, neoliberal political rationality. When articulated as a distinctive 
discourse, these ideas largely demarcated both the legitimate role and 
approach of governments to the problem of governing in Australia since the 
1980s. This is not to suggest that there have been not important deviations 
from the neoliberal ideal. Clearly, as we shall see in the next chapter, there 
have. Nevertheless, the discursive influence of neoliberal ideas goes some way 
to explaining the, somewhat surprising, embrace and application of market­
conforming policies by a Labor party that had previously been associated more 
with Keynesian style interventionism and insular nationalism. Moreover, it 
provides a useful way of comprehending the uniformity of opinion that 
characterises contemporary Australian politics, especially in the area of 
economic policy. 70 
There are, of course, a range of other important political and economic forces 
which made a neoliberal political rationality both more attractive and powerful. 
This sort of contingency and historical specificity, which much neo-classical 
theory lacks, is detailed in subsequent chapters. But a discursive focus centred 
69 Cerny, P (1995) 'Globalization and the changing logic of collective action', International 
Organization, 49 (4): 611. 
70 At one level the convergence of the Right and Left in politics is a widespread phenomena, 
seemingly driven by both the end of Cold War ideological rivalries and the globalisation process 
itself. In the absence of systemic crisis this seems likely to entrench orthodox interpretations of 
economic activity and the general political rationality of which it is a part. See: Giddens, A 
(1994) Beyond Left and Right: The Future of Politics, Polity Press, Cambridge: chapter 10. It 
might be noted that for Marxists liberal-democratic politics have always been something of a 
sham, in that the essential nature of the system remains unaltered. See, for example: Miliband, 
R Socialism for a Sceptical Age, Polity Press, Cambridge: 26. 
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on a specific political rationality can provide an important adjunct to such 
explanations and help illuminate the influence of particular ideas on the policy­
making environment. As we shall see, this ideational influence helps explain the 
subsequent course of many government initiatives, especially in the areas in 
which government might still - by the precepts of the neoliberal model - claim a 
legitimate role for intervention. The bureaucratic reforms and increasingly 
important attempts to influence individual productivity detailed in the next 
chapter may be understood as flowing from such ideas. 
At a more fundamental and pervasive level, thinking of the economic initiatives 
of successive Labor governments as flowing from a neoliberal political 
rationality provides us with a way of comprehending an increasingly important 
and common task of government: enhancing the 'competitiveness' of national 
labour forces and thus their potential attractiveness to footloose international 
capital. One of the distinctive qualities of the late-capitalist period is the 
emergence of the individual as something to be. shaped and developed 
according to the precepts of a range of social influences, advertising and the 
promotion of desirable 'lifestyles' being the most obvious. At a more general 
level the role of the expert has assumed an increasing importance in guiding 
the construction of self. It is in this context that homo economicus assumes a 
particular significance. The sovereign, rational, utility maximising individual of 
neo-classical economics may not be an accurate representation of the 
'postmodern condition', but it has sufficient resonance to provide a mediating 
link between the self and the state and, moreover, a template upon which to 
construct policies for shaping individuals along more economically productive 
lines. 
Deciding whether the sorts of governmental or expert discourses that flow from 
and inform such predicates are 'ideological' is contentious. Is Becker's 
depiction of the family 'ideological', or simply the unpersuasive application of an 
implausible methodology to an inappropriate subject? The dominance of neo­
classical economics certainly provides opportunities for ideological effects -
claims to theoretical neutrality notwithstanding. One way around this potential 
impasse is to consider economic models as specific technical discourses, 
before attempting to map any political effects that their implementation as policy 
may have. Clearly, even the establishment of some form of socialism, for 
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example, requires solving some 'technical' issues revolving around questions 
of distribution, ownership, incentive and the like. 71 
It is important, however, as this chapter has attempted to demonstrate, to 
remember that this is an inherently artificial process: there is no privileged 
'objective' position from which to judge the correctness or even truthfulness of 
competing policy initiatives. The absence of epistemological certainty is 
compounded by inevitable contingency: the implementation of any policy will 
have inescapable political effects and implications, rendering claims to 
neutrality highly dubious if not self-serving. Suggesting , as Krugman does, that 
it is possible to distinguish between expert academic practitioners of technical 
economic discourses and what he rather dismissively labels as 'policy 
entrepreneurs', who are actively involved in the policy-making process, serves 
to perpetuate a wholly artificial distinction.72 In this context, Keynes' celebrated 
· observation about the influence of economic ideas on subsequent policy­
makers is an apposite one.73 Clearly 'academic' ideas have often influenced the 
shape of policy; it is not necessary for academics to actively champion their 
ideas for them to have an impact. Although, as we shall see, what is noteworthy 
about the Australian experience has been the activism of academic economists 
in promoting their ideas and the receptiveness and accessibility of policy­
makers. 
This serves to remind us again that the discourse of neoliberalism and the 
policy prescriptions that flow form it are not politically neutral. On the contrary, 
privileging market mechanisms and policies of deregulation or non-intervention 
inevitably advantages some interests over others. The implications and 
specifics of this process will be drawn out in subsequent chapters. The point to 
note here is the manner in which a neoliberal political rationality, with its 
inherent, expertly conferred authority has helped shape what Grinspun and 
Kreklewich call the 'conditioning framework' within which policy formulation 
71 For a discussion of the sort of 'technical' problems establishing socialism entails see: 
Roemer, J (1992) 'Can There Be Socialism after Communism?' Politics & Society, 20 (3): 261-
76. 
72 Noted American economist, Paul Krugman, distinguishes between professional economists 
who dispassionately attempt to wrestle with technical economic problems, and 'policy 
entrepreneurs' who try to 'peddle' theoretically unsustainable and opportunistic policies to 
politicians. See: Krugman, P (1994) Peddling Prosperity: Economic Sense and Nonsense in the 
Age of Diminished Expectations, W W Norton & Company, New York: 7-14. 
73 Keynes suggested that: 'the ideas of economists and philosophers, both when they are right 
and when they are wrong, are more powerful that is commonly understood. Indeed, the world is 
ruled by little else. Practical men, who believe themselves to be quite exempt from intellectual 
influences, are usually the slaves of some defunct economist'. Keynes, J M (1989) The 
Collected Writings of John Maynard Keynes: Volume VII, Macmillan, London:383. 
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occurs. 74 Moreover, the dominance of a neoliberal ideas in Australia since the 
1980s has not only marginalised alternative discourses, it has made major 
deviations form the market-based ideal less plausible. Indeed, the critical 
insight conferred by a Foucauldian-derived approach is that dominant 
discourses effectively render aspects of existence 'thinkable and calculable',75 
In a word, alternatives become if not literally 'unthinkable', then so implausible 
as not to influence the politics of national economic life. 
In subsequent chapters it will be demonstrated that in Australia an important 
nexus developed between advocates of specific economic ideas and a newly­
installed Labor government; a government that was keen to establish its 
economic bona fides and orthodoxy, while simultaneously restructuring and 
reorienting the entire economy. The neoliberal agenda appeared to offer a way 
in which to both accomplish the macro internationalisation of the economy while 
simultaneously encouraging the development of a more enterprising workforce 
through a discourse increasingly predicated on notions of 'efficiency' and 
'competitiveness'. 
For our purposes what is important to recognise is that an approach to the 
conduct of national economic life that increasingly emphasised micro rather 
than macro interventions created a climate in which external economic relations 
could be largely left to themselves and the supposedly benign influence of 
market forces. 'Sound' economic policy involved getting the market-conforming 
'fundamentals' right. Where government activism occurred, it would be directed 
toward encouraging Australia's trading partners to follow its example through 
the attempted export of a political rationality predicated upon the nostrums of 
neo-classical economics. The overall impact of this policy and its 
appropriateness in the case of Australia-Japan relations in particular will be the 
focus of subsequent chapters. First, however, a more detailed examination of 
the structure and dynamics of the Australian political economy is merited, as it 
was the perceived shortcomings of Australia's economic position that the 
neoliberal model was intended to address. 
74 Grinspun, R & Kreklewich, R (1994) 'Consolidating Neoliberal Reforms: " Free Trade" as a 
Conditioning Framework', Studies in Political Economy, 43: 33-61. 
75 Miller, P & Rose, N (1993) 'Governing Economic Life':??. 
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Chapter 3: The Rise of Neoliberalism in Australia 
The various theoretical positions considered in the preceding chapters have, in 
different ways, provided some important conceptual tools with which to consider 
the influences and constraints that impinge on policy-making. While there is a 
good deal in these models that may be supposed to be universal, it is crucial 
not to lose a sense of the contingency of national circumstances. The two 
nations that are the principle concern of this thesis demonstrate that widely 
divergent policy responses and developmental trajectories are possible, even 
amongst developed industrial economies. Clearly, the idea of 'industrialised' or 
'developed' economies only conveys the most general outlines of economic 
structures, practices and discourses within nations. It will be the task of this 
chapter to provide a detailed analysis of the particular circumstances that 
pertained in Australia. 
Although the major focus in this chapter will be development under Labor 
governments during the 1980s, it is difficult to make sense of this period and 
the policies it gave rise to without considering the broader historical milieu. A 
range of specific social, political and geographic factors were significant 
determinants of and constraints on policy options within Australia. In a similar 
fashion, it is important to indicate the nature of Australia's domestic economy 
and its articulation with the external GPE: the nature of Australia's historical 
integration into the global economy established structural pre-conditions within 
which subsequent policy operated. The type of industries that dominate 
national economic spaces and the nature of the enterprises that pursue them 
may be building blocks or millstones - either way, they can define and 
constrain the options for policy-makers. The dialectic between political forces 
and economic structures clearly defines the contours within which specific 
patterns of national adjustment occur, patterns which are more distinctive at 
moments of crisis or radical change.1 
Having established the circumstances with which Labor governments had to 
deal, consideration will be given to the nature of their response. A crucial factor 
here, it will be argued, was the ALP leadership, and its desire to establish itself 
1 For more detailed and influential cross country examinations of these processes see: 
Gourevitch, P (1986) Politics in Hard Times: Comparative Responses to International Economic 
Crises, Cornell University Press; Katzenstein, P (1985) Small States in World Markets: 
Industrial Policy in Europe, Cornell University Press. 
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as economically competent. While there were specific international and 
domestic influences which served to define the limits to policy, it will be 
demonstrated how Labor's policy program assumed an ever greater 
technocratic and managerial tenor. Policy was increasingly informed by 
particular forms of expert discourses which sought to redefine national goals 
along economically rational lines. This process has been manifest in the 
restructuring of the bureaucracy, the professionalisation of the Labor Party, and 
a general attempt to link other major objects of government policy - the 
economy, education, the unions and social policy - to a calculus of economic 
rationality. Indeed, the productive intersection between reformist Labor 
governments and a bureaucracy imbued with a technocratically defined 
competence is an important part of any explanation of neoliberalism's rise. It is 
against this background that Australia's integration with Asia in general and its 
relationship with Japan in particular must be seen. 
The Historical Backdrop 
The contemporary nature of Australia's economic structures cannot be 
adequately understood without some reference to its singular developmental 
trajectory. Certainly, the experience of British colonisation is not unique, but 
Australia's 'peripheral' role assumed a particular form that distinguished it from 
other outposts of Empire; one that continues to exert an important influence, 
albeit a declining one. It is not possible to canvass all of these issues 
adequately here, but some of the more salient aspects of this legacy may be 
briefly noted. 
Importantly, Australia's early history established a pattern of dependency on 
foreign capital that persists.2 Not only did this place constraints on the type and 
amount of development that occurred, but the development that did occur 
followed the predictable imperial formulae of reflecting the interests of the 'core' 
rather than the colony. Clearly, world systems theory is still useful for 
understanding the macro structures within which the colonial relationship 
unfolded.3 As a consequence of this developmental pattern the mining and 
2 Butlin, N G (1976) Investment in Australian Economic Development 1861-1900, ANU, 
Canberra. 
3 Wallerstein's structural reading of world economic development is especially strong in its 
depiction of colonial economic development. It is far less convincing, however, in attempting to 
explain contemporary international economic relations where a national focus is no longer so 
useful or unproblematic, and where 'peripheral' development is clearly occurring and not 
entirely dependent on the 'core'. See: Wallerstein, Immanuel (1982) "The Rise and Future 
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pastoral sectors rapidly became important sectors of the economy, and 
increasingly important centres of political power. Another important pattern was 
also established early: Australia has been and remains extremely vulnerable to 
rapid changes in the value of its primary produce exports. Nineteenth century 
Australia was, therefore, dependent on Britain for capital, labour and markets. 
Federation may have been instrumental in overcoming internal trade barriers 
and establishing a single domestic market, but it also bequeathed an awkward 
two-tier system of government that continues to present particular problems for 
policy makers. Despite these important internal political realignments and 
developments, the central fact of Australian economic life remained: Australian 
prosperity over the last 150 years has been determined by international 
economic conditions.4 This is a situation that has remained essentially 
unaltered despite an historical decline in the importance of the agricultural and 
mining sectors. Agriculture declined from over 19% of GOP in 1900 to 5.4% in 
1980; mining fell from 10.3% to 6.5% in the same period. Manufacturing, on the 
other hand, increased from 12.1% in 1900 to 20.6% in 1980, after peaking at 
28% in 1955/6.5 These bald figures conceal an important story - especially the 
fluctuating fortunes and significance of manufacturing - that will be developed 
more fully in what follows. 
The development of a manufacturing capacity in Australia was given a 
significant boost by the two World Wars. Australia's geographic isolation 
induced a degree of self-reliance which led to the establishment of a 
protectionist regime in the post World War I period. To draw on our earlier 
taxonomy outlined in chapter 1 , a good deal of emerging Australian industry 
operated exclusively in a national circuit of capital, and was therefore more 
reliant on government sponsored tariff protection and labour policies to ensure 
the preconditions of profitability, especially where the possibility of enjoying 
economies of scale was limited. 6 A pattern of government intervention and 
'protection all round' was established, which in addition to tariff-protected 
manufacturing fostered a regulated agriculture sector, and labour markets 
Demise of the World Capitalist System: Concepts for Comparative Analysis", in Introduction to 
the Sociology of 'Developing Societies'", H. Alavi & T. Shan in (eds), London: Macmillan. 
4 Maclean, I (1989) 'Growth in a Small Open Economy: An Historical View', in Chapman, B (ed) 
Australian Economic Growth, ANU, Canberra: 7/8. 
5 Maddock, R & McClean, I (1987) 'The Australian Economy in the Very Long Run', in 
Maddock, R & McClean, I (eds) The Australian Economy in the Long Run, Cambridge 
University Press, New York:19. 
6 Boehm, E A (1988) Twentieth Century Economic Development in Australia, Second Edition, 
Longman Cheshire, Melbourne: 186-200. 
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controlled by an arbitration system. A complex and inter-locking system of 
'domestic defence' was established, which provided a mechanism with which to 
absorb the sort of external shocks to which the small Australian political­
economy was especially susceptible.? 
The reconstruction period after World War II provides an instructive comparison 
with contemporary policy positions. It is important to stress that the operational 
rationale that determined the activities of government and its bureaucratic 
apparatus was predicated upon an explicit concern with social as well as 
economic issues: full employment and the 'improvement of the physical and 
social environment' were the guiding lights of post-war policy. 8 The 
transnational influence of Keynesian ideas and the desire to actively create a 
more equitable and prosperous social order helped create the preconditions for 
the 'long boom'. The ability of government to plan and implement policy was 
facilitated by the centralisation of Federal authority. However, the success of 
post-war reconstruction and the emergence of new and potentially lucrative 
consumer markets led to an influx of foreign capital and the acquisition of 
Australian domiciled companies by transnationals.9 Additionally, what Bell calls 
a 'pattern of benign neglect' was established by government towards 
manufacturing: although the macro settings of protected markets encouraged 
the development of an indigenous industrial capacity predicated upon an 
import substitution strategy, at the micro level there was no government 
assistance, guidance or encouragement of international competitiveness, 
resulting in an insular and inefficient manufacturing sector ill-prepared to 
compete with increasing international competition.1o 
Australian Economic Structures 
Before considering the course of the debate over protectionism in particular and 
economic policy in general within the bureaucracy, it is important to note the 
effects of post-World War II policy on the structure of the Australian economy 
and industry. The higher levels of foreign ownership noted above became an 
increasing source of concern, especially amongst observers on the Left, as 
7 Castles, F (1988} Australian Public Policy and Economic Vulnerability: A Comparative and 
Historical Perspective, Allen & Unwin, Sydney: 93. 
8 Coombs, H C (1981) Trial Balance: Issues of My Working Life, Sun Papermac, Melbourne: 
27. 
9 Butlin, N., Barnard, A & Pincus, J (1982} Government and Capitalism, Allen & Unwin Sydney: 
112. 
10 Bell, S (1993} Australian Manufacturing and the State: The Politics of Industry Policy in the 
Post-War Era, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge: 15/16. 
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fears were expressed about the possible diminution of Australia's autonomy 
and ability to determine its own economic destiny.11 Less nationalistic, more 
sophisticated contemporary analyses emerging from the Marxist paradigm have 
stressed the difficulty of attempting to establish national economic identity 
given the often opportunistic nature of company location and central control, 
especially when combined with the footloose, transnational nature of capital 
flows. 12 These are important suggestions that require empirical verification. An 
examination of Australia's contemp�rary industrial structure may illuminate 
some of these issues. 
Certainly the development of the car industry, for example, would suggest that 
'foreign' transnationals were able to exert a good deal of pressure on the 
Australian government to secure favourable terms for investment.13 The lack of 
a coherent long-term strategy on the part of government - other than 
encouraging investment behind tariff walls - led to an industry designed to 
service the burgeoning domestic market rather. than external ones.14 Car 
production became small-scale and inefficient, with an excess of models and 
manufacturers. The specifics of the automotive industry as part of the bilateral 
Australia-Japan relationship are considered in greater detail as a case study in 
chapter 8 .  Suffice to say here that the vehicle industry's fragmented character -
exacerbated by inter-state rivalries and competing subsidies - is indicative of a 
broader structural malaise within Australia. Australia was initially cushioned 
from the effects of a moribund manufacturing sector by the 'mineral boom' of 
the 1960s, which had the effect of encouraging import penetration, but which 
eventually revealed the inadequacy of Australian competitiveness, particularly 
when compared to that of the NIEs of East Asia. 
The speculative boom in the resource sector graphically demonstrated how 
Australia's economic destiny was increasingly bound up with and determined by 
the wider GPE. The massive inflow of money into the Australian mining industry 
was triggered by an international restructuring of capital seeking to overcome 
declining rates of profit in Europe and North America.15 While this movement 
11 Crough, G & Wheelwright, T (1982) Australia: A Client State, Penguin Books, Melbourne. 12 Bryan, Dick (1990) "The Balance of Payments: Financial of Analytical Constraint?", 
Economic Papers, 9 (3) ; (1983) "Xenophobia or Theory Phobia: Economic Nationalism and the 
Question of Foreign Investment', Australian Outlook, 37 (2) . 
13 Renwick, N (1988) Australia and the Multinationals: A Study of Power and Bargaining in the 
1980s, Canberra Studies in World Affairs No 24, ANU, Canberra: 71/2. 
14 Ewer, P., Higgins, W & Stevens, A (1987) Unions and the Future of Australian 
Manufacturing, Allen & Unwin, Sydney: 16/17. 
15 Bryan, R (1988) 'After the Long Boom: The Mining Industry and Capital Restructuring', 
Journal of Australian Political Economy, 22: 14-26. 
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was initially led by productive capital investment, it was quickly dominated by 
footloose, speculative capital in search of short-term profitability. Australian­
based capital was, however, slow to restructure and consequently failed to 
secure optimum positions in the mining industry. Moreover, when 'Australian' 
capital did belatedly join the global process of internationalisation, they did so 
from the mining, rather than the manufacturing sector, consequently only 
producing simply transformed mineral products and exacerbating Australia's 
elaborately transformed manufactures (ETM) deficit. All of which left the 
manufacturing sector starved of investment, in an apparent confirmation of the 
'Gregory effect', which suggested that mineral discovery and exploitation could 
significantly distort economic development in Australia. 16 The importance of the 
mineral sector meant that the subsequent decline in Australia's terms of trade 
exerted further fiscal pressure and circumscribed the options available to policy­
makers. 
The mineral boom was encouraged, in part, by an expectation of ever-rising 
demand from Australia's northern neighbours. The nascent dynamism of 
Australia's neighbours also fuelled one of the most important developments of 
the postwar era: the intensification and expansion of trade interactions, 
especially in manufactured goods. Australia, by contrast, experienced an actual 
decline in its share of world exports from 2.92% in 1950, to 1.14% in 1986. 
Additionally, and contrary to global trends, manufactures' share of Australian 
exports from 1970 to 1989 remained static (after dipping notably in the middle 
of this period).17 The rural sector declined in significance in line with global 
trends, but this was offset by increases in mining and services exports rather 
than manufacturing. So rather than taking part in the phenomenal growth of 
global intra-industry trade, Australia became, in fact, increasingly marginalised 
in the GPE - other than as an attractive potential market or as the supplier of 
primary produce. Although a shift occurred in the direction of Australia's trade -
especially away from Britain - towards East Asia, it is noteworthy that the new 
markets were not based on the export of ETMs (New Zealand and the US 
remained the largest markets for these) but of resource products and simply 
transformed manufactures (STMs).18 
16 Gregory, R G (1976) 'Some Implications of the Growth of the Mineral Sector', The Australian 
Journal of Agricultural Economics, 20 (2): 71-91. 
1? Pinkstone, B (1992) Global Connections: A History of Exports and the Australian Economy, 
AGPS, Canberra: Tables 49 & 59. 
18 Pinkstone, B (1992) Global Connections: Tables 60 & 61. 
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Australia's failure to take part in the expansion of global trade is, in large part, 
attributable to the structure of domestic industry. Australia's major 
manufacturing companies are generally located in less-traded sectors of the 
economy - they are low volume exporters not because of a lack of 
competitiveness, but because there are few large scale Australian-based 
companies in industries that generate exports.19 Australia is unusual in that its 
predominant indigenous company form is the 'multi-domestic'. Rather than 
being involved in the production of highly tradeable and valuable goods such as 
consumer electronics, Australian manufacturers are concentrated in areas of 
lower value and/or durability, such as building products or food. Consequently, 
overseas expansion generally takes the form of establishing a foreign 
subsidiary to service local markets, rather than exporting from Australia.20 
Australia's key structural weakness, then, is a lack of strong 'strategic' 
exporting firms competing internationally in complex factor goods production, 
something attributed to: a lack of demand for innovative products within 
Australia; a lack of 'clusters' of mutually supportive manufacturers; restrictions 
imposed by foreign parent companies; small neighbouring markets; and a 
tendency for the few firms that do succeed in exporting ETMs to migrate to 
major markets.21 
The significance of the ownership question becomes more apparent here. 
Australia has some of the highest levels of foreign ownership in the world.22 As 
we saw in chapter 1, the TNCs that determine the spatial distribution of 
productive activities are driven by an increasingly global logic. There is the 
distinct possibility that Australian operations will be simply distribution networks 
or not fully integrated into the more complex, high value-added aspects of 
production. As we shall see in the Japanese case, nationality is still an 
important influence on company behaviour in some countries. Yet the situation 
in Australia demonstrates just how complex this question is: even those 
companies that might be considered to be unproblematically 'Australian' are 
increasingly driven by and respond to international rather than domestic 
considerations. Elders IXL, for example, used its base in the food industry to 
19 Yetton, P., Davis, J & Swan, P (1992) Going International: Export Myths and Strategic 
Realities , Australian Manufacturing Council, Melbourne: vi. 20 Craig, J & Yetton, P (1994) 'Australia's International Firms: Contributions and Prospects', in 
Marsh, I (ed) Australian Business in the Asia Pacific Region: The case for Strategic Industry 
Policy, Longman Professional, Melbourne:32-66. 
21 Pappas Carter Evans and Koopffelesis (1990) The Global Challenge: Australian 
Manufacturing in the 1990s, Australian Manufacturing Council, Melbourne: Chapter 7. 22 Safarian, A (1993) Multinational Enterprise and Public Policy: A Study of the Industrial 
Countries , Edward Elgar: Chapter 6. 
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provide a cash flow to launch internationalisation strategies and relocate into 
northern hemisphere markets. Increasingly, profits have been generated by 
financial transactions and services rather than the sale of actual goods onto 
world markets. 23 The move toward financial rather than productive activities has 
been encouraged by the ease with which funds may be raised internationally.24 
More subtly, as we have seen, such a restructuring has been facilitated and 
encouraged by the sort of ubiquitous regulatory changes that financial interests 
have promoted. Moreover, Elders involvement in the defence of B HP from a 
hostile takeover in the 1980s illustrates how integration into global circuits of 
capital can determine corporate strategies - BHP was forced to rationalise its 
Australian operations to fund its own internationalisation and fend off corporate 
predators with access to international capital.25 
While the difficulties B HP faced were, in part, attributable to policy initiatives of 
· the current administration, they are also indicative of the specific historically­
generated economic preconditions that confronted Labor when it assumed 
office in 1983. The internationalisation of economic activity was, by definition, 
something that affected nations around the world. Australia, however, faced 
particular adjustment problems which were determined by its inherited 
economic structure, especially the way companies operating within Australia 
were articulated with the external GPE. Market-constrained subsidiaries of 
'foreign' TNCs and indigenous multi-domestics were constraints on the 
development of truly global enterprises operating out of Australia. Other 
problems Labor faced were to some extent perennial Australian ones - how to 
broaden the nation's economic profile, reduce resource dependency, address 
increasing debt levels, encourage macro-economic stability and reduce 
23 Fagan, R & Rich, D (1990) ' Industrial Restructuring in the Australian Food Industry: 
Corporate Strategy and the Global Economy', in Hayter, R & Wilde, P (eds) Industrial 
Transformation and Challenge in Australia and Canada, Carleton University Press, Ottawa: 
175-194. It is also important to recognise that global corporate strategies are critical in 
determining the role of Australian-based economic activities in the eyes of 'foreign' TNCs. The 
food industry has been widely touted as a potential high growth export from Australia but it is 
significant that the recent failure of Pacific Dunlop's internationally oriented food division was 
caused by a combination of poor management and the global strategy of overseas-based TNCs 
keen to acquire local brand names and increase market power, rather than use Australia as an 
export base. Again, only a global focus allows recognition of this logic. See: Pritchard, B (1995) 
'Foreign Ownership in Australian Food Processing: The 1995 Sale of the Pacific Dunlop Food 
Division', Journal of Australian Political Economy, No 36: 26-47. 
24 The growth of mergers and acquisitions that characterised much corporate activity during the 
1980s and which underpinned the restructuring and rationalisation of companies in Australia 
was driven by easily available financial capital. One consequence of this expansion of lending 
was to leave many companies burdened with unsustainable debt levels, leaving them open to 
possible collapse or takeover. See: Pritchard, B (1994) 'Finance Capital as an Engine of 
Restructuring: The 1980's Merger Wave, Journal of Australian Political Economy, No 33: 1-20. 
25 Fagan, R & Webber, M (1994) Global Restructuring: The Australian Experience, Oxford 
University Press, Melbourne: 101-8. 
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unemployment. What was novel in the 1980s was the new political discourse 
that accompanied policy-making. To see how this developed it is necessary to 
examine both the apparatus of government and some of the political figures 
that dominated it. 
The Politics of Structural Adjustment 
When Labor won office in 1983, therefore, it was confronted by long-term 
problems specific to Australia: the broad legacy of colonialism, which had 
'distorted' development and skewed trade and investment patterns away from 
the immediate region; a resultant economic structure that was highly dependent 
on natural resources and primary products - the value of which was continually 
undermined by deteriorations in Australia's terms of trade; and an 
uncompetitive, insular manufacturing sector that was increasingly marginalised 
within the GPE. The Fraser government (1976-83) bequeathed a more 
immediate legacy of rising unemployment, inflation hovering around 10%, and -
possibly most significant in the long run - a radical shift in Australia's external 
accounts: the 'resources boom' of 1979-8 1 encouraged huge capital inflows 
and a concomitant currency appreciation, which further undermined the 
competitiveness of Australia's manufacturing sector.26 The consequence was 
the entrenchment of Australia's dependency on foreign capital, large current 
account deficits and the beginnings of a huge foreign debt. 
These difficulties were compounded by broader problems, some specific to 
Australia, some more widespread. A generalised fiscal crisis of the state and a 
perception of governmental overload created an international climate 
antithetical to large government. 27 Growing unemployment during the 1970s 
and a series of financial shocks, most conspicuously in the shape of successive 
oil crises conspired to make the process of governing (especially its financial 
aspects) increasingly problematic. Australia's discomfort was made increasingly 
acute by the dawning realisation that not only were its traditional ties to Europe 
unravelling but that its immediate neighbours to the north were both an 
emerging centre of competition and an increasingly unflattering source of 
economic comparison. Much later 'Asia' would become the central motif of 
Labor's pervasive agenda of economic reconstruction and reform. Initially, 
26 Davis, K (1989) 'Managing the Economy', in Head, B & Prentice, A (eds) From Fraser to 
Hawke: Australian Public Policy in the 1980s, Longman Cheshire, Melbourne: 77/8. 
27 O'Connor, J (1973) The Fiscal Crisis of the State, St Martin's Press, New York; Offe, C 
(1984) Contradictions of the Welfare State, Hutchinson, London. 
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Labor's focus was essentially national; it could never be accused, however, of 
being entirely immodest in its ambitions. 
Labor's response to the challenge of economic reform and management 
cannot be understood, however, without reference to its own history and the 
rise of a new generation of party leaders. Perhaps the most abiding influence 
on the newly-elected government was its concern to distance itself from the 
problematic legacy of the Whitlam era. The Dismissal and the subsequent 
depiction by many in the media of the Whitlam government as economically 
irresponsible, not to say naive, meant that Hawke and his new Treasurer, 
Keating, were at pains to depict themselves as 'responsible' economic 
managers. M addox argues that the 1975 constitutional crisis transformed the 
ALP and marked a radical departure from party traditions, so that: 
Whatever social reforms it now promotes take shape in quite a different context. They 
are no longer part of a vision of an integral, mutually supportive and culturally enriched 
society. Reforms must now be 'targeted' to electorally responsive groups laid out on the 
map of political pragmatism; reforms must be entirely subordinated to the imperatives of 
economic management. 28 
Significantly, it would be the increasingly influential financial markets,29 rather 
than 'traditional Labor voters' that would be the arbiters of Labor's policies. The 
structural power of global financial capital encouraged the creation of policies 
that enhanced the position of that sector at the expense of the declining 
manufacturing sector.3o 
Yet it was not inevitable that the centrepiece of the early Hawke administration ­
financial deregulation - needed to be pursued as early or with as much 
enthusiasm as it was. Although the conventional wisdom has it that 
deregulation of the financial markets was ultimately inevitable, 31 (especially, as 
we saw in chapter 1, in the wake of increasing US liberalisation), Hawke and 
Keating were notable and early champions of this development. Simply 
suggesting that 'Australia' was responding to widespread structural 
28 Maddox, G (1989} The Hawke Government and Labor Tradition, Penguin Books, Melbourne: 
65. 
29 Stuchbury argues that at various times following the float of the dollar government economic 
policy was 'held hostage' by the foreign exchange markets as currency volatility undermined 
Labor's plans: Stuchbury, M ((1990} ;Macroeconomic Policy', in Jennet, C & Stewart, R (eds} 
Hawke and Australian Public Policy, Macmillan, Melbourne: 60. 
30 Halevi, J & Kriesler, P (1993} 'Structural Change and Economic Growth', in Mahony, G (ed) 
The Australian Economy Under Labor, Allen & Unwin: 12. 
31 See, for example: Emy, H & Hughes, 0 (1991) Australian Politics: Realities in Conflict, 
Second Edition, Macmillan, Melbourne: Chapter 1. Pauly, in contrast argues that the timing and 
decision to deregulate were 'distinctly Australian' and not inevitable. See: Pauly, L (1987} 
Foreign Banks in Australia: The Politics of Deregulation, Australian Professional Publications:2 
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developments within the GPE neglects the uniquely parochial aspects of this 
process, and begs the question of why other nations (Japan, for example) did 
not respond with similar policies. 
Important in this regard was the recognition by influential sections of the 
Australian trade union movement that the exercise of industrial strength might 
generate short term gains, but that in an increasingly internationalised economy 
it might also initiate capital flight. The Amalgamated Metal Workers' Union 
(AMWSU) in a series of influential pamphlets paved the way for the sorts of 
collaborative approaches to national economic management that would 
ultimately find expression in the Accord. The steady loss of jobs in the 
manufacturing sector from the 1970s onward was a critical constraint on 
potential sources of opposition within the union movement.32 Moreover, the 
decline in manufacturing jobs appeared to confirm the need for a radical re­
thinking of economic strategies - a re-think that would make for an easier 
acceptance of the new Labor policy paradigm. 33 
While the historical traumas endured by the political and industrial wings of the 
labour movement may have prepared the ground for the subsequent embrace 
of 'pragmatism', it is also important to recognise Hawke and Keating's personal 
affinity with the new approach to policy. At one level Hawke's move to 
Thatcherite deregulatory policies is readily explicable. Hawke's principal 
economic adviser, Ross Garnaut, was an influential advocate of floating the 
dollar in particular and of the salutary effects of market forces in general. 
Although Hawke claims to have been a convert to the supposed benefits of 
deregulation prior to Garnaut's appointment, 34 Kelly's suggestion that 
Garnaut's influence on Hawke was 'never remotely matched by any subsequent 
economic adviser' is a telling one that sheds light on the direction of 
subsequent Labor policy.35 Significantly, Hawke was anointed leader not for his 
visionary qualities (there had been quite enough of that under Whitlam), but for 
his pragmatism and electoral appeal - the ALP was interested primarily in 
32 Beilharz, P (1994) Transforming Labor: Labor Tradition and the Labor Decade in Australia, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge: chapter 4. 
33 While the decline of manufacturing employment was a global phenomenon, it has been 
particularly acute in Australia, with an estimated 70,000 jobs being lost in the manufacturing 
sector between 1976-1990. Many of the jobs which replaced them were in the service sector 
and/or part time - something which further eroded union influence and thus a potential source of 
opposition to the neoliberal policy framework. See: Gregory, R G (1993) 'Aspects of Australian 
and US living Standards: the Disappointing Decades 1970-1990', Economic Record, March: 61-
76. 
34 Personal interview. 
35 Kelly, P (1992) The End of Certainty: The Story of the 1980s, Allen & Unwin: Sydney: 58. 
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winning power and was prepared to sacrifice its incumbent leader to do so. 36 
Hawke's major contribution to government - 'consensus' - would serve an 
important ideational function and reflected his government's pragmatic 
approach to the management of Australian economic life: the national 
economic space and the actors within it might be organised to work 
cooperatively and efficiently in the interests of the nation.37 
Some commentators have suggested that Hawke's consensus politics and the 
establishment of various tri-partite bodies within the Australian political 
economy amounts to a form of corporatism. sa However, this was never an 
accurate assessment given the continuing autonomy of capital within the 
relationship, and the ineffectual and cosmetic role played by the tri-partite 
forums. 39 However, the Accord process became a template for subsequent 
Labor approaches to the reform process: the position of private capital and 
'management's right to manage' remained unchallenged; instead, attention was 
directed toward the discursive constitution of more appropriate social and 
economic structures. The themes of 'competitiveness', 'efficiency' and 
'flexibility' rapidly became part of the market-derived lexicon of national 
restructuring. 40 
Hawke's background in union politics provided crucial skills and contacts which 
were subsequently applied in the practice and technique of government. 
Keating's background in ALP politics provided him with a similarly 
comprehensive understanding of and ability to manipulate the structures of 
political power. Keating's description of himself as 'the type for public life, a 
public policy person'41 is revealing: part of the attraction of office is undoubtedly 
the process of governing, or the formal over the substantive. Keating's 
incumbency as Treasurer in particular is marked by a technocratic approach to 
policy-making and a belief in his ability to move the right 'economic ·levers' in 
the pursuit of optimum outcomes. The Treasury under the conservative 
36 Kelly, P (1985) The Hawke Ascendancy, Angus & Robertson, Sydney: Chapter 12. 
37 Keating, P (1983) 'Speech to the National Economic Summit, Commonwealth Record 1 1 -17: 
464-70 . 
38 Gerritsen R (1986) 'The necessity of "Corporatism": The Case of the Hawke Labor 
Government', Politics, 2 1  ( 1 ):45-54. 
39 Stewart, R (1985) 'The Politics of the Accord: Does Corporatism Explain It? ', Politics, 20 
(1 ):26-35. 
40 Campbell, I ( 1 993) 'Labour market flexibility in Australia: Enhancing management 
prerogative? ', Labour & Industry, 5 (3): 1-32. What is most notable here, as Campbell notes, is 
organised labour's acquiescence in this process - the lack of a 'natural' opposition facilitating 
the ALP leadership's deregulatory agenda. 
41 Cumming, F (1991) Mates: Five Champions of the Labor Right, Allen & Unwin, Sydney: 326 . 
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stewardship of John Stone was a place in which the inexperienced Keating felt 
surprisingly at ease: 
For Keating the Stone treasury was magic. Here were experts, true experts, people who 
knew the economy like the NSW right knew politics and spoke with the same conviction. 
These advisers were technicians and believers, and Keating learned the jargon and he 
moved into their world. 42 
The discourse of economics was the lingua franca of this new world, which 
conferred authority on its users, and effectively demarcated the contours of the 
possible. The management of the economy for Keating was and is essentially a 
problem of technique, and as such susceptible to specific forms of expert 
management. 'Practical' industry policies, according to Keating, are 'not based 
on ideology', but are simply politically neutral technical solutions to the problem 
of generating economic growth - the panacea for all economic ills. 43 Of course, 
in the event that the economically orthodox, technocratic policy paradigm 
delivered what was expected of it there would be a clear political pay-off - an 
important consideration for a consummate po-litical operator like Keating. It was 
the expectation that such gains were only achievable by overhauling the 
machinery of government that led to the simultaneous reconstruction of the ALP 
itself. 
The ALP leadership's technocratic approach to policy-making was, therefore, 
mirrored in the transformation of its political base. Jaensch argues that the ALP 
has been transformed from an 'expressive' party that reflects the interests of a 
particular sector of society to a 'responsive' party with no clear sectoral support 
or allegiance.44 The ALP has become less 'ideological' and concerned to 
develop a 'catch-all' appeal, argues Jaensch, with little acknowledgment or 
articulation of the importance of traditional 'class' concerns in the party's history 
or contemporary platform; maintaining political power is the raison d'etre of the 
Party and its leadership. The transformation of the ALP was mirrored in the 
bureaucracy, which was to be similarly re-cast in the interests of greater 
efficiency and the more effective application of political power. 
42 Kelly, P (1992) The End of Certainty: 69. 
43 Keating, P (1993) Investing in the Nation, AGPS, Canberra: 58. 
44 Jaensch, D (1989) The Hawke-Keating Hijack: The ALP in Transition, Allen & Unwin, 
_ Sydney: 17. 
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Bureaucratic Structures and Expertise 
One of the keys to explaining the influence of neoliberal policies in Australia 
during the 1980s, I shall suggest, is the productive intersection of a reform­
minded government bent on re-structuring and revitalising the 'Australian 
economy' with a bureaucracy steeped in an increasingly technocratically 
defined competence. While the Labor government undoubtedly exerted a 
powerful reformist pressure on the public sector, there was also an important 
contrary vector of influence running from bureaucracy to government. Gruen 
and Grattan, for example, argue that Treasury saw the opportunity of moulding 
the inexperienced Keating to its own views and therefore expanding the 
influence of the entire department.45 It is important, therefore, to identify some 
of the more important changes and debates that occurred within the 
bureaucracy both before and after the Labor government's accession. 
One of the most important initial factors to recognise, as Jones reminds us, is 
that bureaucratic structures vary across countries -far from being the neutral 
and impartial instruments of government policy depicted in abstract economic 
theory, they have institutional memories and rationales that distinguish one 
nation, and even one department from another. 46 In Australia, Jones argues, 
the 'British tradition' has bequeathed a pervasive set of 'liberalist values' which 
have been particularly influential on Treasury, despite Australia not possessing 
an indigenous financial sector of comparable scale to benefit from such values. 
This kind of specificity is an important corrective to both undifferentiated notions 
of 'the state' and 'the bureaucracy', and to suggestions that policies simply 
reflect the internationalisation of 'class forces' or structures of production. 
Certainly, these factors are important, but they need to be complemented by a 
more differentiated and detailed depiction of the elements involved. The 
necessity of such an approach is clearly revealed in the internal machinations 
of bureaucratic politics. 
The dominance of economic rationalism within the bureaucracy in Australia has 
been neither complete nor inevitable. The contested and contingent nature of 
bureaucratic attitudes to major policy initiatives is illustrated in the debates 
surrounding tariff policy. The Industry Assistance Commission (lAC) became an 
45 Gruen, F & Grattan, M (1993) Managing Government: Labor's Achievements and Failures, 
Longman Cheshire, Melbourne:52. 
46 Jones, E (1991) 'Economists the State and the Capitalist Dynamic', Working Papers in 
Economics, No 155, University of Sydney: 18/9. 
86 
important critic of protectionism and an influential advocate of market 
mechanisms, undermining the rationale for tariffs, which had been the central 
pillar of McEwenite 'protection all round' in the 60s. The lAC played a critical 
role in changing the ruling ideational orthodoxy: markets were the best 
determinants of investment; government intervention produced only 
inefficiencies, distorted incentives and thus outcomes, and undermined the 
entrepreneurial spirit central to the capitalist dynamic. 47 The lAC's position 
within the bureaucracy was not unchallenged by other departments jealous of 
its influence on policy-makers, but the authority of its judgements and 
recommendations was reinforced by the systematic recruitment from the 
burgeoning ranks of professional economic expertise. Importantly, the 
complexity of economic policy-making meant that it was increasingly only 
discussed and formulated by 'those with the ability to understand and converse 
about economic principles in a professional way'. 48 
The structure of the bureaucracy itself tended to marginalise those departments 
that favoured a more interventionist line. During the 1970s those departments 
concerned with industry were less organisationally coherent, and therefore 
exerted a diminished influence on government, a situation that was 
exacerbated by the manufacturing sector's own lack of unity and political 
effectiveness.49 Australia's international economic integration was gaining 
momentum, favouring financial and mining interests at the expense of 
manufacturers, something government policy did little to change. The neglect of 
manufacturing is more comprehensible, however, given the emergence of the 
new economic orthodoxy within the most influential state departments. 
The rise to prominence of the Department of Treasury has mirrored and driven 
the increased reliance on market mechanisms in government policy. During the 
1950s and '60s the interventionist Department of Trade had been a significant 
influence on government, but its power waned under Gorton, leaving the 
Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet (PM&C) as Treasury's only serious 
rivals. Again, it is important to stress that a good deal of Treasury's authority is 
derived from its perceived professional expertise through the assiduous 
recruitment of economics graduates. so The generational shift from the 
47 Glezer, L (1982) Tariff Politics: Australian Policy making 1960-1980, Melbourne University 
Press, Melbourbe:121-4. 
48 Warhurst, J (1982) Jobs or Dogma? The Industries Assistance Commission and Australian 
Politics, University of Queensland Press:229. 
49 Bell, S (1993) Australian Manufacturing and the State: 116-26. 
50 Whitwell, G ( 1986) The Treasury Line, Allen & Unwin, Sydney: Chapter 1. 
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Keynesian-inspired policies of the post-war period to the nee-classically­
derived policies of the 1970s and on, meant that there was a concomitant shift 
in the theoretical position of government: government intervention in the 
economy was undesirable a priori . While the move from Keynesian policies 
was part of an international trend, and the difficulties of the Whitlam era further 
undermined confidence in the wisdom of the state, what distinguishes the 
Australian Treasury is the fervent and combative way in which it approached its 
role: convinced of the rectitude of its own position Treasury has played a crucial 
proselytising role in shaping not only government policy, but also the wider 
discourse within Australian society.51 
Bureaucratic Reform 
The most celebrated (and/or reviled) examination of the influence of economic 
rationalism on the bureaucracy in Australia has been by Michael Pusey.52 
Although Pusey's work has been subjected to some often well-merited 
criticism, 53 it remains an important attempt to explain and gauge what is a 
significant development in both the structure and operation of government. 
What is important to recognise is the increasing trend from substantive to 
formal rationality within the bureaucracy, from what Pusey calls the 'nation­
building state' to one concerned with narrower questions of managerial 
efficiency and economic rationality. Pusey attributes much of the attraction of 
economic rationalism within the bureaucracy to the social backgrounds and 
political affiliation of its members. But given that elite bureaucratic decision­
makers have always tended to be drawn from such backgrounds this would not 
seem to be such a crucial consideration. What is of greater significance is the 
ideational change within both the bureaucracy and government: the 
management of the economy by both the PM&C and Treasury, and within key 
factions of the Labor Party was increasingly seen as a technical problem that 
51 Whitwell, G (1990} 'The Triumph of Economic Rationalism: The Treasury and the market 
Economy', Australian Journal of Public Administration, 49 (2}: 124-40. 
52 Pusey, M (1991) Economic Rationalism in Canberra: A Nation building State Changes Its 
Mind, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 
53 Blandy, R (1992) 'Multiple Schizophrenia: Economic Rationalism and Its Critics', Australian 
Quarterly, Autumn: 101-6. One of the most glaring shortcomings of the Pusey thesis is the lack 
of consideration of national and international structural pressures, particularly those interests 
that encouraged pro-market reform. Even more pertinent tor the purposes of this essay is 
Burchell's critique, which suggests that Pusey is guilty of privileging 'society' in the same 
manner in which he vilifies economists and their narrow interpretation of the economic. It is 
more useful, Burchell contends, to think of neo-liberalism as a particular mode of government 
reflecting a specific 'hybridisation' of the social and economic spheres. See: Burchell, D (1994) 
Economic Government & Social Science: The Economic Rationalism Debate, Cultural Paper 
No 1, Griffith University, Queensland. 
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might be most effectively addressed by applying the techniques and the logic of 
the private, rather than the public sector. 54 
In this regard particular recognition should be given to the role of the powerful 
Right-wing faction in the New South Wales Labor Party branch. 'The Wran 
Model' became the exemplar of political pragmatism in pursuit of electoral 
success, with policy-making concentrated in a small leadership group of 
technocrats. 55 The electoral success of the Wran government reinforced the 
influence of the New South Wales Right, of which Paul Keating was the most 
conspicuous product. The triumph of this more instrumentalist and technocratic 
approach to government made the Federal adoption of neoliberal policies less 
problematic than it might otherwise have been. Indeed, the experience of the 
Wran government seemed to indicate that the abandonment of 'traditional' 
Labor practices in favour of an increasingly professional approach was a pre­
requisite of both electoral success and efficient management. Crucially, the 
more orthodox and 'pragmatic' policy paradigm pursued by Hawke and Keating 
was given support and impetus by the tightly organised Right wing faction 
within the Party.56 
This reformist zeal was also applied to the public sector and manifest in the 
desire to place the state apparatus on a more 'efficient' and quasi-commercial 
basis was evident in the Hawke-Keating governments' public service reforms. 
An important effect of what Yeatman calls the 'cultural revolution' in the 
bureaucracy that the shift to managerialism entailed, was the increased focus 
on leadership and technique at the expense of content. 57 'Scientific 
management' techniques were applied by 'technical experts'; the departmental 
reforms and reorganisations undertaken by Labor were intended to concentrate 
bureaucratic power and allow its application to specific objects or 'problems'. 
Central to Labor's approach, according to Keating, was the 'philosophic belief' 
that 'the expertise of the public service needs to be explicitly and deliberately 
brought to bear on policy matters'.58 The Industry Commission was an 
important influence on government policy, Keating was suggesting, because it 
was perceived to have expert knowledge of micro-economic reform. 
54 Pusey, M (1991) Economic Rationalism in Canberra: 153-5. 
55 Maddox, G (1989) The Hawke Government and Labor Tradition : 72/3. 
56 Jaensch, D (1989) The Hawke-Keating Hijack : chapters 7 & 8. 
57 Yeatman, A (1990) Bureaucrats, Technocrats, Femocrats: Essays on the Contemporary 
Australian State , Allen & Unwin, Sydney:13. 
58 Keating, P (1991) 'The Challenge of Public Policy in Australia', Canberra Journal of Public 
Administration, No 65: 18. 
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But it is important to recognise that once a solution has been 'discovered' by 
acknowledged experts 'it becomes increasingly difficult for other actors either to 
challenge such a proposal, or to generate alternatives'.59 Once a particular 
policy line is in place and legitimated with the authority of expertise, it becomes 
increasingly difficult to alter course or even perceive the necessity for such a 
change of direction. Networks of experts reinforce specific ideational agendas 
to form technocratic 'power blocs', suggests Considine, which in turn become 
important mechanisms for the propagation of what are perceived to be 
appropriate forms of knowledge and technique. 60 In the Australian case, this 
helped entrench the market-conforming discourse emanating from Labor's right 
wing. As Yeatman points out, this technocratic approach to economic questions 
reinforced a general government emphasis on problem solving and formal 
rationality that fosters technically-minded public servants who are 'likely to 
accept the appearance of "the" economic order as a natural order, that is, one 
that must take the form it does because they [$iC] reflect the nature of things'.61 
When this is reinforced by an ideational orthodoxy actively promoted by elite 
policy-makers, not only within the bureaucracy but also in government and 
academia, then the dominance of economic rationalism becomes easier to 
comprehend. More immediately, as Coleman and Skogstad note, 'Australia's 
corporatist reconstruction of policy networks played an important role in building 
a consensus for its neoliberalist strategy'. 62 
Central to Labor's reform of the public service was an intention to judge the 
bureaucracy on 'results, outcomes and performance', 63 and to make it a more 
effective instrument in the implementation of economic structural adjustment. 64 
The new emphasis on managerialism was structurally embedded in the 
bureaucracy with the establishment of the Senior Executive Service (SES), a 
senior administrative elite whose primary merit and attraction to government 
resided in its managerial capacity and technical expertise, skills that might be 
applied to any problem or area regardless of the values and issues specific to a 
59 Considine, M (1994) Public Policy: A Radical Approach, Macmillan, Melbourne:196. 
60 Considine, M (1994) Public Policy: 215. 
61 Yeatman, A (1990) Bureaucrats, Technocrats, Femocrats: 32. 
62 Coleman, W & Skogstad, G (1995) 'Neo-Liberalism, Policy Networks, and Policy Change: 
Agricultural Policy Reform in Australia and Canada', Australian Journal of Political Science, 30 
(2): 259. 
63 Keating, P (1993) 'Performance and Accountability in the Public Service', Canberra Journal 
of Public Administration, No 75: 1-7. 
64 Hawke, R (1989) 'Challenges in Public Administration', Australian Journal of Public 
Administration, 48 (1 ) : 7-14. 
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portfolio.65 Pusey stresses that one of the intentions of the reforms was to avoid 
the possibility that managers might be 'captured' by the interests they were 
intended to serve - mobility in the service lessened this possibility and also 
enhanced the influence of the increasingly powerful central agencies (PM&C, 
Treasury and Finance), whose members experienced rapid promotion through 
the ranks. 66 The reforms reinforced the importance of the central agencies by 
giving them a coordinating budgetary and review function over other agencies; 
to maintain their diminished positions the latter had to adopt the language and 
guise of economic rationality and conform to the normative precepts and 
framework of neoclassical economics. 
Although the increased authority and influence of the central agencies (and the 
consequent dominance of the discourse of economic rationalism) was perhaps 
the most significant consequence of Labor's reforms, other aspects of 
bureaucratic reorganisation are especially germane to questions of trade and 
investment. The creation of 'mega department$' in pursuit of efficiency gains 
had a lasting impact on the conduct of economic policy. A conspicuous casualty 
of the reforms was the Department of Trade, which in 1987 was merged with 
Foreign Affairs to form the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT). As 
Jones observes, Trade's demise was due largely to the primacy given to market 
mechanisms in economic policy; its decline also enhanced the authority of 
Treasury by removing an alternative source and form of policy advice.67 
Consequently, the multilateral approach to trade favoured by the non­
interventionist central agencies and Foreign Affairs replaced Trade's 
preference for bilateralism. More fundamentally, Higgott and Nossal suggest, 
this 'external manifestation of the economic rationalist impulse' represented a 
process of 'learning', self-consciously copying a European exemplar in an 
attempt to concentrate governmental resources on increasingly critical 
economic issues. 58 The diminution of a bilateral capacity and understanding 
within the bureaucracy generally was exacerbated by the allocation of trade 
policy within DFAT to the Economic and Trade Development Division, whose 
approach was largely indistinguishable from Treasury's. When combined with a 
general lack of interest in trade matters within DFAT, and an lack of 
65 Yeatman, A (1990) Bureaucrats, Technocrats, Femocrats: 9. 
66 Pusey, M (1991) Economic Rationalism in Canberra: 117-21. 
67 Jones, E (1991) 'Bureaucratic Politics and Economic Policy: The Evolution of Trade Policy in 
the 1970s and 1980s', unpublished paper delivered to the 20th Conference of Economists, 
Economics Society of Australia and New Zealand, Hobart, Sept 20th. 
68 Higgott, R & Nossal, K (1993) 'Policy Convergence and Bureaucratic Learning: Trade and 
Foreign Affairs', in Weller, P et al (eds) Reforming the Public Service: Lessons From Recent 
Experience, MacMillan, Melbourne: 157. 
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coordination of trade policies within the various divisions, policy became 
'fragmented and lacking in focus'.69 
The Labor administration, then, left an indelible impression on the public 
service. The bureaucracy became a more responsive instrument of political will 
and a crucial part of the government's attempt to implement its reformist 
agenda. But the bureaucracy also exerted an important influence on its political 
masters. Treasury, tor example, undoubtedly had a significant impact on 
Keating, and thus the general tenor and direction of Labor's reformist impulse. It 
might be more appropriate to describe the relationship between government 
and bureaucracy as one characterised by a good deal of mutual reinforcement: 
values were discursively (re-)constituted through ideational teed-back loops 
which gained much of their legitimacy and authority from their perceived expert 
basis. Government was not so much about ideology (although this might still be 
harnessed to the promotion of efficiency and the creation of more enterprising 
subjects) as about the application of supposedly neutral technical solutions to 
specific objects, sites and problems. 
The actual implementation of policy, however, required accommodating the sort 
of 'rent-seekers' and 'distortions' that were such an anathema to advocates of 
economic orthodoxy. It is necessary to say something about significant 
aspects of Labor policies in the 1980s to see how such difficulties were 
negotiated and how the overall integrity of the structural adjustment process 
was maintained. 
Policy Implementation 
Labor, then, was influenced both by its own history and the ambitions of a new 
generation of leaders, and by the apparent expertise and ideational hegemony 
of the bureaucracy's central agencies. The move toward neoliberal policies was 
not, as we have seen, confined to Australia, but part of a wider international 
trend. Certainly the loss of confidence in the ability of Keynesian policies to 
respond to and cope with large scale social and economic change was 
widespread, 70 but it took specific forms within different countries. The policies 
69 Stokes, G (1994) 'Towards a National Trade Strategy', Australian Quarterly, 66 (1 ):77. 
70 In this context Leaver makes the important observation that Keating's 'Banana Republic' 
speech in which he suggested that 'Australia' faced economic crisis, was a decisive turning 
point in the conduct of Labor's economic reforms, shifting the emphasis back to the conduct 
international relations and the attempt to promote international trade liberalization. This greatly 
enhanced the influence of a pro-market Australian 'epistemic community' - something that is 
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that emerged within national boundaries also showed a possibly surprising 
degree of variation. This was certainly true of Australia, where the Hawke 
government produced a novel array of policies which, while owing their 
inspiration and impetus to international factors, reflected and accommodated 
parochial concerns. 
A major constraint on the Labor leadership's ability to implement wholesale 
market-based reform was (and to a lesser extent, still is), its relationship with 
the union movement. Part of Hawke's initial attraction as leader was his ability 
to unify Labor's industrial and political wings. Hawke's novel contribution -
consensus - would be the leitmotif of the incoming administration and the 
philosophical inspiration of the Accord. But as Stilwell points out, the Accord 
was initially a bi-partite agreement between the ALP and the Australian Council 
of Trade Unions (ACTU), conceived in opposition, free of the constraints of 
office and with no guarantee of business support.71 The ACTU expected to 
benefit from rising employment levels, the maintenance of living standards and 
the possibility of influencing the conduct and shape of government policy. It 
might be observed in passing that none of these has been effectively achieved -
living standards for ordinary wage earners have generally fallen,72 
unemployment has fluctuated but 'ratcheted up', 73 while the bodies established 
to enable ACTU participation in policy-making have had little impact.74 But what 
is of most significance here is that the ACTU leadership has accepted the 
rationale (and even the language) of Labor's reformist structural adjustment 
package: not only must the nation be awoken from its insular complacency by 
the invigorating winds of international competition, but the workforce must play 
its part in ensuring that 'Australia' becomes 'internationally competitive'.75 
The entire raison detre of the union movement has been effectively called into 
question by Labor's economic agenda. Having accepted the discourse of 
taken up in more detail in the next chapter. See: Leaver, R (1995) 'The evolution of an Asia 
Pacific policy community in Australia', The Pacific Review, 8 (1 ): 183. 
71 Stilwell, F (1986) The Accord and Beyond: The Political Economy of the Labour 
Government, Pluto Press, Leichhardt:11. 
72 Stilwell, F (1993) Economic Inequality: Who Gets What in Australia, Pluto Press, Leichhardt. 
73 Langmore, J & Quiggin, J (1994) Work for All: Full Employment in the Nineties, Melbourne 
University Press, Melbourne: 23. 
74 Stewart, R G (1985) 'The Politics of the Accord: Does Corporatism Explain It? ', Politics, 20 
(1 ). 
75 It is important to recognise, however, that it is not nations but firms that are 'internationally 
competitive'. As Bryan notes, the discourse of 'competitiveness' tends to act as a disciplinary 
force over labour, instituting 'a global contest between national working classes'. Bryan, D 
(1995) ' International Competitiveness: national and Class Agendas', Journal of Australian 
Political Economy, No 35: 21. 
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economic pragmatism, restructuring and the necessity of acting 'responsibly' in 
a competitive international economic environment, the union movement finds 
itself conspiring to undermine its own collective organisational basis. 76 The 
acceptance of enterprise bargaining by the union movement is indicative of the 
manner in which the neoliberal discourse of deregulation in the interests of 
possible productivity and/or competitiveness gains has been accepted as 
legitimate by the ACTU - despite the fact that there have been few tangible 
benefits of this process.77 True, the steady decline of union membership makes 
organised labour less powerful, but what is most striking is the way in which the 
ACTU has embraced the rationale and discourse of a structural adjustment 
process predicated upon economic growth. Suggesting, as Singleton does,78 
that this amounts to the 'professionalisation' of the union movement tells us 
little, other than how widespread is the acceptance and influence of the 
dominant economic discourse and its implicit values. What is more pertinent 
here is the political space ACTU cooperation allowed the government, 
permitting it to 'continually stretch the limits of the Accord relationship with what 
appears to be growing impunity'.79 
This is not to suggest that the union movement was without influence, or that 
Labor policies had an exclusively neoliberal tenor. Industry policy is a 
conspicuous example of a strategy that does not rely on market mechanisms 
alone (its specific rationale will be examined and contrasted with the neoliberal 
model in light of the Asian developmental experience in the next chapter). Yet 
industry policy under Labor is illustrative of the ambivalence that characterised 
its approach to economic management and indicative of the difficulty it had in 
reconciling competing interests. A commitment to implement some form of 
76 Ewer, P et al (1991) Politics and the Accord, Pluto Press, Leichhardt: Chapters 1 & 6 for a 
discussion of some of these issues. 
77 Davidson argues that deregulation has not increased banking sector competitiveness or  
increased potential sources of capital for productive investment. On the contrary, deregulation 
was instrumental in fuel l ing the corporate takeovers, speculative activities and general 
instability of the late '80s. Davidson, Kenneth (1992) "The Failures of Financial Deregulation in 
Austral ia", in Bel l ,  S & Wanna, J (eds) , Business-Government Relations in Australia, Harcourt 
Brace Jovanovich:221-30. Similarly, there seems l itt le doubt that deregulation has exacerbated 
the deterioration in Australia's external accounts. Heywood, K & Tamaschke, R (1991) 
'Australian Financial Deregulation and the Growth of the Foreign Debt' ,  Journal of Australian 
Political Economy, No 28. In addition, Levein argues that by voluntari ly abrogating 
responsibility for and control over bank credit, capital f lows and exchange rate levels, 
government policy autonomy is severely constrained and increasingly reliant on interest rates 
to manage the economy. Levein, Harold (1992) "Australian Economic Policy: A Critique", 
Journal of Australian Political Economy, No 29:84. 
78 Singleton, G (1990) The Accord and the Australian Labour Movement, Melbourne University 
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industry policy had been an important incentive to ensure union cooperation in 
the original Accord, 80 however, its application was inherently compromised by 
the general dominance of the deregulatory imperative. Indeed, without the 
political influence of organised labour - however compromised and muted - it is 
possible that neoliberal policies would have been implemented with even 
greater vigour that they were. 81 
One problem facing any government attempt to instigate state-sponsored 
development in Australia - even where that has appeared a desirab.le option ­
was the structural power of private capital and its implicit threat of non­
investment, especially when compounded by a reluctance on the part of Labor 
to alienate business in the post-Whitlam era.82 In addition, the historical political 
influence of manufacturing capital - the immediate potential beneficiary of 
industry policy - had declined significantly.83 Therefore, the conditions for 
government intervention were not propitious: inter-departmental conflict within 
the bureaucracy militated against the development of a coherent policy position; 
'capital' was similarly divided - small and large, as well as the more customary 
divisions between agricultural, mining and industrial. This not only undermines 
the theoretical utility of the notion of a monolithic, undifferentiated 'capitalist 
class', but illustrates the competitive and disunited nature of indigenous 
capitalism in Australia. 84 
The implementation of industry policy was, therefore, often half-hearted and 
sectoral rather than wholesale. 85 As Bell points out, the application of what he 
calls the 'new interventionism' was dependent upon the strength and influence 
of supporting coalitions of state and societal groups; in an important corrective 
to the often monolithic depictions of statist theory, Bell stresses the contingent 
and unpredictable impact of shifting alliances between state and non-state 
80 Stilwell, F (1986) The Accord and Beyond: Chapter 7. 
81 Garrett makes the point that countries with stronger, more cohesive labour organisations are 
more likely to maintain things like cross border capital controls and a commitment to social 
democracy - the embrace of neoliberalism is, he argues contingent and anything but inevitable. 
See: Garrett, G (1995) 'Capital mobility, trade, and the domestic politics of economic policy', 
International Organization, 49 (4): 657-87. 
82 McEachern, D (1991) Business Mates: The Power and Politics of the Hawke Era, Prentice 
Hall, Sydney:66/7. 
83 Bell, S (1993) Australian Manufacturing and the State: 66. 
84 Tsokhas, K (1984) A Class Apart? Businessmen and Australian Politics 1960-1980, Oxford 
University Press, Melbourne. 
85 For an overview of Australian industry policy see: Capling, A & Galligan, B (1992) Beyond 
the Protective State: the Political Economy of Australia's Manufacturing Industry Policy, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 
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actors.86 True, the structural power of manufacturing was reflected in its being 
accorded a central place in government thinking, but the precise contours of 
policy reflected the strategies of political and bureaucratic elites, rather than the 
demands of the manufacturers themselves. 87 However, despite the fluctuating 
shape of and support for industry policy, it is important to note that such policies 
have been successful in promoting Australian exports. Areas that benefited 
from the development of sectorally specific plans significantly improved their 
export performances and have been at the forefront of increased levels of 
Australian ETM exports;88 the effectiveness of these policies in the Australian 
case confirms the importance of state-business cooperation in determining 
national economic performance adumbrated in chapter 1 . 
Political Pressures 
Despite industry policy's apparent success, its implementation was problematic 
and at odds with much of Labor's economic platform. Why was it, then, that 
Labor rejected policies that appeared likely to alleviate the nation's 
manufactures deficit, ensure continued employment in the electorally-crucial 
industrial heartland, and provide the critical mass of manufacturers necessary 
to sustain future economic development? Certainly, as we have seen, a 
coherent, market-conforming (and pleasing) policy package greatly influenced 
important actors within both government and key areas of the bureaucracy; 
such policies were especially attractive when, as we shall see, further 
articulated and supported by an influential academic community. But it is 
important not to neglect specific political pressures that attempted to influence 
and direct the shape of government's policy response. 
One crucial influence was the international fashion for reduced government 
spending. As we observed in chapter 1, Australia has been a staunch member 
of the market-oriented Anglo-American economies, with an inherent disposition 
toward a liberal tradition of small government, low taxes, minimal intervention, 
and reduced government spending. In the wake of stagflation, oil crises, and a 
burgeoning social welfare budgets such ideas gained added lustre in the eyes 
86 Bell, S (1995) 'The Politics of Economic Adjustment: Explaining the Transformation of 
Industry-State Relationships in Australia', Political Studies, XLIII:22-47. 
87 Bell, S (1992) 'Structural Power in the manufacturing Sector: The Political Economy of 
Competitiveness and Investment', in Bell, S & Wanna, J (eds) Business-Government Relations 
in Australia, Harcourt Brace Janovich, Sydney:193/4. 
88 Sheehan, P., Pappas, N & Cheng, E (1994) The Rebirth of Australian Industry: Australian 
Trade in Elaborately Transformed Manufactures 1979-1993, Centre for Strategic Economic 
Studies, Victoria University: Chapters 1 & 4. 
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of many western economic policy-makers. However, there are two important 
points that should be made: firstly, as Yeatman points out, 'there is no escape 
from the principle that modern organisational complexity demands that the 
steering, regulating and directive powers of the state enter into how the 
relationships between all parts of society are articulated'.89 Quite simply, 
comparatively large states are here to stay; it is not so much a question of what 
size the state should be, but of what role it should play. Secondly, Australia's 
public sector is, in any case, much smaller than the OECD average (mainly 
attributable to Accord-induced public sector wage restraint) and not responsible 
for Australia's growing external indebtedness. 90 Despite this, Keating was at 
pains to stress Labor's commitment to 'budgetary restraint', and confirm the 
primacy of the market and the private sector in determining economic 
outcomes.91 
Explaining how state intervention and spending became so unpalatable helps to 
illustrate both the contingent nature of policy-making and the distinction 
between the neutral sense of discourse and more explicit ideological forms. At 
one level the discourse of orthodox economics suggests that government 
spending is inherently bad from a 'technical' point of view in that it 'crowds out' 
private investment, raises taxes and generally creates 'distortions' that interfere 
with market signals. More fundamentally, the argument goes, government is no 
good at 'picking winners'. These arguments will be considered more fully in 
subsequent chapters, where it will be suggested that some of Australia's 
regional neighbours have been successful precisely because they ignored such 
nostrums. What is important to recognise here, however, is the manner in which 
these economic arguments, which claimed a degree of neutrality and even 
'truth', were taken up and employed for specifically political purposes. 
An important influence of both the tenor of political discourse during the 1980s 
and the direction of subsequent policy was the rise of the 'New Right'. Although 
neither an exclusively Australian phenomenon, nor a homogenous or coherent 
political force, it is a convenient label for a variety of groups disenchanted with 
and disillusioned about the continuing efficacy of the post-war 'historic 
compromise' between capital and labour, typified by social welfarism and a 
89 Yeatman, A (1990) Bureaucrats, Technocrats, Femocrats: 37. 
90 EPAC (1990) The Size and Efficiency of the Public Sector, Council Paper No 44, AGPS. 
91 Keating, P (1985/86) 'Labor's Commitment to Smaller Government', Institute of Public Affairs 
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Keynesian orthodoxy.92 What is most pertinent here, however, is recognising 
the specific interests that were often subsumed under convenient but unspecific 
labels. Small business, Australia's rising 'entrepreneurial' class, and the mining 
sector in particular, were enthusiastic advocates of many the neoliberal 
initiatives associated with the rise of the New Right in Australia.93 
Additionally, it is important to recognise both Australia's peripheral position in 
the global scheme of things, and the historical proclivity of its dominant elites to 
import ideas from outside, especially Britain and the US.94 Coghill argues that 
'the Australian New Right' was able to borrow the monetarist orthodoxy that 
had emerged under Thatcher and Reagan to exploit specifically Australian 
circumstances: resistance to the new ideology (for such it was) was lessened 
by its 'natural' opponents being in government and therefore less able to create 
a counter hegemonic discourse.95 Coghill reminds us of the explicit political 
intentions of the discourse associated with neoliberal economic policies. 
Clearly, there was an intention to exploit the historic opportunity provided by a 
defensive trade union movement and a 'pragmatic' Labor government to 
decisively shift the balance of power in favour of the owners and/or controllers 
of capital. Indeed, Australian labour relations during the 1980s were 
characterised by a surprising reversal of the stereotypes: labour was a docile 
and co-operative Accord partner, while management became increasingly 
militant. 96 
The discursive influence of neoliberal ideas will be considered in greater detail 
in subsequent chapters. At present, it is important to re-affirm the importance of 
powerful interest groups in attempting to influence the direction and substance 
of policy - something that is acknowledged by observers from both Marxist and 
pluralist perspectives. Charles Lindblom, for example, writing from a pluralist 
92 King, D (1987) The New Right: Politics, Markets and Citizenship, Macmillan, London: 
chapter 4. 
93 Kaptein, E (1993) 'Neoliberalism and the Dismantling of Corporatism in Australia', in 
Overbeek, H (ed) Restructuring Hegemony in the Global Political Economy: The Rise of 
Transnational Neo-/iberalism in the 1980s, Routledge, London: 79-109. Kaptein specifically 
cites the example of the Shell Company of Australia which sponsored policy documents by 
'nee-liberal academics' in support of its broader championing of deregulatory policies. 
94 In this context what Marsh call a 'neo-liberal' group of think tanks have had a 'very 
substantial' impact in establishing 'the frame of discourse for key public servants and media 
commentators', publicising and popularising ideas that had their initial success in Britain and 
the US. See: Marsh, I (1991) Globalisation and Australian Think Tanks: An Evaluation of Their 
Role, and Contribution to Governance, Information Paper No 34, CEDA, Sydney: 30. 
95 Coghill, K (1987) 'Regrouping to Win Hearts and Minds', in Coghill, K (ed) The New Right's 
Australian Fantasy, Penguin, Fitzroy:117. 
96 Dabscheck, B (1987) 'New Right or Old Wrong? Ideology and Industrial Relations', The 
Journal of Industrial Relations, 29 (4):425-49. 
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perspective, acknowledged the disproportionate power of business in 
influencing governments.97 More specifically, Kaptein illustrates the capacity 
and desire of economic sectoral lobby groups to systematically influence 
government policy during the 1980s.98 Other commentators have also 
concluded that the influence of neoliberalism or economic rationalism 'derives 
from the historic balance of producer power in the Australian state: the strength 
of farming and mining interests and the comparative weakness of the collective 
organisations of manufacturers'.99 As we have seen, Australia's specific 
development trajectory has, indeed, made particular sectors of the economy 
more influential at different times, militating against the emergence of a unified 
or coherent 'business position'. What is noteworthy now, however, is that the 
sweeping reforms undertaken by the Labor government have effectively 
removed many divisive public policy issues - protectionism and arbitration, for 
example - from the national political agenda.1 oo 
A definitive judgement as to the significance of this potentially more unified 
business position is clearly premature. However, it seems likely that there will 
be less sectoral opposition to continuing the reform process, especially as the 
burden of adjustment is likely to fall increasingly upon the employees rather 
than the employers.1 o1 This seems likely to further the process of neoliberal­
inspired reform as other potential sources of resistance - nationally oriented 
manufacturers, for example - become either less influential or fall in line with the 
dominant market-oriented discourse. The role of the media in entrenching the 
hegemonic position of neoliberal ideas cannot be underestimated. As Gittins 
observes, not only do many influential economic commentators lack 'objectivity', 
but their similar educational experiences, reliance on Treasury contacts, and 
'symbiotic' relationship with financial markets mean that they have consistently 
97 Lindblom, C ( 1 977) Politics and Markets: The World's Political-Economic System s, Basic 
Books, New York. For a contemporary empirical explication of similar ideas, see: Vogel , D 
( 1 989) Fluctuating Fortunes: The Political Power of Business in America, Basic Books, New 
York. 
98 Kaptein detai ls the mining sector's attempts to promote greater deregulation of the 
'Australian economy' ,  mainly at the expense of the relatively protected manufacturing sector. 
Kaptein, E ( 1 993) 'Neoliberalism and the Dismantling of Corporatism in Australia': 9 1 /2 .  
99 Stewart, J ( 1 994) The Lie of the Level Playing Field: Indu stry Policy and Australia's Future, 
The Text Publishing Company, Melbourne: 1 76 .  
1 o o  Bel l ,  S ( 1 9 95) 'Between the Market and the State: the Role of Australian Business 
Associations in Public Policy', Comparative Politics, 28 ( 1 ) :  41 . 
1 01 In this context the acceptance by the Metal Trades Industry Association's Bert Evans of the 
apparent inevitability of tariff reductions and the supposed benefits of free trade is significant. 
For many years the MTIA has been an important source of resistance to the dominance of 
neoliberal ideas in Australian debates. See: Carney, S ( 1 9 94) 'Compromise, but not an official 
surrender' ,  The Age ,  June 27:  1 1 .  
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championed a pro-deregulatory line. 1 o2 Barring systemic crisis, therefore, a 
major shift from the prevailing, expertly sanctioned orthodoxy seems unlikely. 
Neoliberalism and the 'Big Picture' 
One of the distinguishing characteristics of the Labor administration of the 
1980s and '90s has been its willingness - even enthusiasm - for articulating its 
ideas and vision. Keating in particular has stressed the importance of 
'educating' the public and 'bringing them along' in the process of change. It is 
important to recognise the extent of the Labor leadership's ambition here: what 
has been attempted is the systematic reconstruction and reorientation of the 
Australian political-economy, a transformation of social and cultural values that 
will produce a more competitive, efficient workforce and national economy. 
Competitiveness and efficiency are the watchwords of the new regime, the 
essential prerequisites that will allow Australia and its population to flexibly 
respond to the imperatives of relentless international competition. 
While it is possible to question many of the assumptions that underpin this 
vision, its impact on the conduct of government policy cannot be doubted. Not 
only has the government attempted to transform the bureaucratic apparatus 
that delivers policy, but it has also sought to change the recipient population 
itself. In the area of education, for example, Keating has stressed the 
importance of linking education to the needs of the labour market and 
industry.103 There has been a notable shift from earlier reforms intended to 
increase access and remove inequities, to a new emphasis on 'education as an 
element of the economy'. 104 Such reforms are premised on the assumption that 
industry will be able to employ usefully such a skilled workforce, an unlikely 
prospect given the structure of Australian industry noted above. At one level, as 
Robison and Rodan observe, the government's education policy reveals the 
inadequacy of a strategy reliant on 'supply-side' improvements to which private 
102 Gittins, R (1995) 'The Role of the Media in the Formulation of Economic Policy', The 
Australian Economic Review, 4th Quarter: 5-14. It is also worth noting that Keating was 
particularly adept at manipulating a generally compliant media (especially in his years as 
Treasurer) to promote his views, threatening to cut off uncooperative journalists from the 'high 
grade drip' of information upon which their careers depended. See: Toohey, B (1994) Tumbling 
Dice: The Story of Modern Economic Policy, William Heinemann, Melbourne: 222. 
103 Keating, P (1994) Working Nation: Policies and Programs, AG PS, Canberra: chapter 4 .  
104 Bessant, B (1992) 'Managerialism, Economic Rationalism and Higher Education', in 
Marshall, N & Walsh, C (eds) Federalism and Public Policy: The Go vernance and Funding of 
Australian Higher Education, Federalism Research Centre, Canberra: 215. 
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business is under no obligation to respond.1°5 Yet at another level, government 
policy - even if it is unlikely to succeed - reveals the extent of the change being 
attempted and possibly effected. 
Contemporary government policy - particularly in the area of education, where it 
retains the authority and the will to 'intervene' - needs to be understood, in part 
at least, as an attempt to produce a new type of citizenry.106 Here the 
implications of the overarching neoliberal political rationality are especially 
apparent: the intention is not merely to confine the process of structural 
adjustment to narrow economic concerns - although policy is always ultimately 
predicated upon such issues - but to recast the population itself in the role of 
skilled, competitive and especially flexible workers.107 Indeed, the promotion of 
'competitiveness' has been one of the defining motifs of recent Labor 
government policy, principally expressed in the Hilmer Report.1oa However, this 
process has its culmination in the recent publication of the Karpin Report, 
Enterprising Nation.1 09 The managerial values and techniques that informed the 
transformation of the public sector should, the Report suggests, be applied to 
the population at large. Government should take the initiative in further gearing 
the education system to the needs of industry and the necessity of producing a 
more productive and 'entrepreneurial' population. Appropriate role models 
should be promoted through the electronic media, and the young should be 
particularly targeted so that appropriate values may be inculcated. In fact, in an 
optimal situation, the Report argues: 'The culture of enterprise would be 
threaded through the entire socialisation process'.110 
105 Robison, R & Rod an, G (1990) 'Economic Restructuring and the Reform of the Higher 
Education System', Politics, 25 (1 ):21-36. 
106 For a thoughtful and provocative review of the wider potential implications of recent 
government reforms in the area of higher education see: Hunter, I (1993) 'Personality as a 
vocation: The political rationality of the humanities', in Gane, M & Johnson, T (eds) Fouca ult's 
New Domains, Routledge, London: 153-92. 
1 07 This is where a political rationality informed by neoliberal ideas is so crucial. As the next 
chapter will demonstrate in more detail, the education process has been instrumental in 
promoting a narrow range of economic ideas as appropriate to manage Australia's economic 
transformation. 
108 Hilmer, F (1993) Na tional Competition Policy, AGPS, Canberra. For a general critique see: 
Ranald, P (1995) 'National Competition Policy', Journal of A ustralian Political Economy, No 36 
& Bryan, D: fn 67. 
109 Report of the Industry Task Force on Leadership and Management Skills (1995) 
Enterprising Nation: Renewing A ustralia 's Managers to meet the Challenges of the A sia-Pacific 
Century, AGPS, Canberra. For a more detailed critique of this position, see Beeson, M (1995) 
'Governmental as Anything', 'Arena Magazine, No 19 Oct/Nov, 1995: 24-6. 
11 O Report of the Industry Task Force on Leadership and Management Skills (1995) 
Enterprising Nation: 1 00. 
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Of course it remains to be seen how assiduously any government attempts to 
implement the Report's recommendations. Of significance here is the extent to 
which its major assumptions are in keeping with the wider economic discourse 
or political rationality of the type outlined in chapter 2. It has become the 
uncontested conventional wisdom that Australia's economic destiny lies in 'Asia' 
-the only hope of surviving in competition with the region is by placing the 
nation's economic, political and social relationships on a more competitive 
tooting. Expert economic discourse has effectively defined and delimited the 
realm of the possible and the plausible in this regard. Analysis or policy input 
that tails to acknowledge the primacy (and often, the desirability) of market 
mechanisms in making the necessary adjustment is becoming quite literally 
unthinkable. 111 Clearly, this places important constraints on possible policy 
initiatives. Not only is government intervention deemed inappropriate and 
inefficient, but the reconstructed individual is increasingly seen as the key to a 
more competitive nation and thus the focus of attention and reform. 
Conclusion 
Economic policy under Labor has been informed by a range of factors. The 
historical legacy of colonialism was an important determinant of the structure of 
the Australian economy as well as the nature and direction of its trade. 
Industrial development in Australia has been shaped by both domestic factors 
and the articulation of the national economy with the wider GPE. Domestic 
policy, especially protectionism, has also been a crucial determinant of the 
character of Australian industry: marginalisation, insularity and 
uncompetitiveness have been the unfortunate legacy of Australia's post-war 
economic development. The decline of Australia's terms of trade has meant 
that it can no longer rely on its primary industries to underwrite an inadequate 
and moribund manufacturing sector. 
Labor's task, then, was to initiate and guide the process of structural adjustment 
necessitated by perceived national decline. Revivifying the manufacturing 
sector was a crucial aspect of ameliorating the ballooning trade deficit. That 
market mechanisms in particular and neoliberalism in general came to be the 
dominant influence on the government's policy response can only be explained 
by examining a complex array of social, political, economic and ideational 
111 Muetzelfeldt, M (1992) 'Economic Rationalism in Its Social Context', in Muetzelfeldt, M (ed) 
Society State & Politics in A ustralia, Pluto Press:187. 
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forces. The international popularity of monetarism, a general fiscal crisis of the 
state, and the hegemonic influence of the US in promoting particular forms of 
policy response were all important influences on the Australian polity. More 
immediately influential, however, was the desire of a new breed of pragmatic 
Labor leaders to establish their economic bona fides with the new arbiters of 
sound policy - the international money markets. The legacy of the Whitlam era 
effectively debarred interventionism in the interests of shoring-up electoral - and 
financial centres' - support. 
While policy was dominated by the principles of economic rationalism, Labor 
also instituted sectoral industry policies. Given that commitment was 
ambivalent, and that ultimately decision-making and implementation remained 
exclusively in the hands of the private sector, policy was surprisingly effective. 
But in the more general areas of trade and investment, neoliberalism held 
sway. Economic rationalism exerted a powerful influence amongst both the 
increasingly professionalised, managerial and economically-literate 
bureaucracy, as well as on a reform-minded administration determined to 
reconstruct and reorient the national economic space and social infrastructure. 
Policy was less to do with traditional Laborist ideology, than with applying the 
appropriate economic techniques and strategies from which all would ultimately 
benefit. This was less a conspiracy of the ruling class or the minions of 
international financial capital than the enthusiastic proselytising and application 
of the converted. 
Plainly, domestic and international social and economic forces were important 
influences on government and helped define the parameters within which policy 
might be constructed. But Labor was intent on transcending narrow sectional 
concerns in the national interest - economic rationalism was taken to be a 
neutral, technical prescription for the most efficient organisation of economic 
life. What distinguished the Hawke and Keating administrations was their ability 
and desire to project the vision of economic structural adjustment into a wider 
social arena. From the expansive social rhetoric of 'consensus' to the personal 
reconstruction implicit in Enterprising Nation, Labor - generally with the 
assistance of reformed bureaucracy and the support of influential elements of 
the business class - has attempted to engineer appropriate social relations with 
which to underwrite and reinforce its program of economic reconstruction. 
Indeed, social policy predicated on a political rationality springing from the 
discourse of neoliberalism often seems to have been a substitute for more 
explicit economic interventions; an unsurprising outcome given that 
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intervention was made difficult by adherence to an ideational hegemony that 
rendered illegitimate such a role for government. 
The effects of a reliance on market mechanisms and a predilection for non­
intervention in Australia's international economic relations will be considered in 
subsequent chapters. What is important to acknowledge here is the importance 
of specific forms of discourse within the history of Labor administrations. At one 
level Labor has systematically attempted to constitute discursively appropriate 
forms of social relations though the rhetoric of consensus, competitiveness, 
flexibility and efficiency. On another level, Labor itself has been deeply 
interpellated by the discourse of economic rationalism. Despite the conspicuous 
failures of many of the policies associated with economic rationalism the 
associated discourse is now so entrenched, powerful and pervasive that 
alternatives are not so much marginalised as un-thought. 
The implications and assumptions of the discourse of neoliberalism may be 
more easily examining its emergence and effect in a more tightly defined 
context. It is to such an examination that we now turn. 
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Chapter 4. Understanding 'Asia': The Theoretical Debate 
Since the 1980s, Australian policy-makers have confronted both unique and 
universal constraints. On the one hand, the structure of the Australian 
economy in combination with contingent national political and social 
circumstances placed parochial limitations on potential policies. On the other, 
the transnational and ubiquitous economic pressures that swept over the GPE 
during the last several decades meant that Australian policy had to 
accommodate the same adjustment imperatives that impinged on other 
nations. What distinguishes the Australian response is the degree to which 
neoliberal policies - particularly in the area of trade and foreign investment -
informed policy initiatives. As we shall see in the Japanese case, despite the 
advanced industrialised nations experiencing broadly similar international 
economic pressures, there was nothing inevitable about the discursive 
dominance of pro-liberalisation policies. What this chapter will attempt to 
demonstrate is the way in which a particular set of ideas drawn from the 
neoliberal model acted as 'road maps' for Australia's international economic 
policies.1 
In Australia, as we have seen, there was a significant degree of ideational 
consensus - indeed, hegemony - about the most appropriate forms of economic 
policy with which to deal with Australia's changing economic position, especially 
as this affected the international sphere. Elements of both the political and 
bureaucratic elites were supportive of a broadly neoliberal agenda derived 
substantially from the tenets of neo-classical economics. It is time to consider in 
greater detail the substance of that model, especially as it applies to the areas 
with which this thesis seeks to deal: regional economic development and 
integration in general, and the Australia-Japan relationship in particular. The 
focus of this chapter, therefore, will be on some of the principal voices that 
articulated this model, its plausibility, and alternative depictions of both 
possible policy responses, as well as the 'Asian' nations themselves with which 
such policies were intended to deal. 
Rather than attempting to exhaustively detail the extensive literature on the 
Australia-Japan relationship and the regional economies, I shall concentrate on 
the output of two individuals that have been key figures in articulating and 
1 Goldstein, J & Keohane, R (1993) 'Ideas and Foreign Policy: An Analytical Framework', in 
Goldstein, J & Keohane, R (eds) Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions and Political 
Change, Cornell University Press, Ithaca: 3-30. 
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promoting nee-classically derived policy prescriptions for and analyses of 
regional economic relations. Ross Garnaut and Peter Drysdale have both 
written extensively on these topics and have been especially influential in 
determining the shape of Australia's contemporary trade relations. I shall 
suggest that because of their influential roles as expert advisers and 
commentators with privileged access to policymakers (especially in Garnaut's 
case) and an authoritative voice in delineating the Australia-Japan relationship 
(in Drysdale's case) they are central figures in an Australian 'epistemic 
community' of key politicians, bureaucrats, business figures, but especially 
. academics; a community which has been instrumental in promoting a range of 
policies predicated upon the primacy of market forces - policies which derived 
their theoretical legitimacy and inspiration from the supposed benefits of trade 
liberalisation. 
Consequently, I shall initially review the epistemic community concept, and 
detail some of the more influential members of the Australian variant. Next, I 
shall consider the work of Drysdale and Garnaut, their analysis and policy 
prescriptions. These will then be contrasted with other interpretations, both of 
the regional developmental experience itself, and of alternative policy 
responses with which to deal with such contingencies. Finally, I shall explore 
alternative contemporary economic theorisation that casts significant doubt on 
the epistemological validity of the neo-classical model, its continuing 
relevance, and its ability to explain contemporary economic development or 
practice. 
Epistemic Communities 
The theoretical application of the epistemic community concept has been 
pioneered in international relations theory by Peter Haas, who has suggested 
that it can help explain the process of international policy coordination. In 
essence, an epistemic community is 'a network of professionals with 
recognised expertise and competence in a particular domain and an 
authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within that domain or issue 
area'.2 In addition members have: shared normative and principled beliefs; 
shared causal beliefs which delimit problems and inform solutions; a shared 
notion of validity with which to confirm area expertise; and a common policy 
agenda to which that expertise is directed. Haas suggests that epistemic 
2 Haas, P (1992) ' Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination', 
International Organization, 46 (1 ):3. 
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communities are becoming transnational which, he contends, helps to explain 
the way in which particular ideas come to dominate the pol icy-making 
processes of international institutions. In conditions of economic uncertainty or 
increasing complexity epistemic communities may be especially influential as 
policy-makers defer to and have greater reliance on expertise. It will be 
apparent how well this concept fits with positions outlined in previous chapters: 
Australia had a perceived economic crisis; contingent circumstances fostered a 
climate conducive to neoliberal ideas both internationally and within Australia's 
policy-making elites; a specific expert discourse predicated upon neoliberal 
.ideas enhanced the authority of this model and effectively marginalised 
alternatives. 
In an Australian context Richard Higgott has employed the notion of an 
ep istemic community to explain the dominance of a trade strategy that is 
predicated upon nee-liberal foundations.3 Higgott argues that a significant 
ideational change has occurred in Australia, in which an influential nexus has 
emerged between academic and policy making elites in support of free trade 
and deregulation. The potential influence of the academic community has been 
enhanced by what Higgott considers a 'possibly unique global phenomenon' in 
which scholars and policy-makers are concentrated in Canberra.4 This 
proximity has allowed key academic supporters of the free trade agenda -
Andrew Elek, Stuart Harris, Drysdale and Garnaut - to more easily promote 
their ideas. 5 
Plainly, it is no easy task to demonstrate the existence a discourse supportive 
of a particular set of ideas and their direct application as policy - although as we 
3 Higgott, R (1992) 'Pacific Economic Cooperation and Australia: Some Questions About the 
Role of Knowledge and Learning', A ustralian Journal of International A ffairs, 46 (2):182-97. 
4 Higgott, R (1992) 'Pacific Economic Cooperation and Australia':191. 
5 Chapter 6 will demonstrate how crucial and influential an increasingly regional community of 
like-minded academics has been in promoting specific forms of economic integration and 
institutional development - initiatives which have further entrenched a particular set of ideas 
within Australia. At this stage, however, we might note that Stuart Harris is an example of an 
orthodox, pro-market economist recruited by Hawke for his particular expertise. Harris' 
position as secretary to the Department of Foreign Affairs allowed him to put into practice his 
ideas about the need combine economic and foreign policy issues into a more coherent whole -
something symbolised by the merger of Foreign Affairs and Trade. See, Cooper, A et al (1993) 
Reloca ting Middle Powers: A ustralia and Canada in a Changing World Order, Melbourne 
University Press, Melbourne: 46. Similarly, Elek is credited with giving coherence and 
substance to Hawke's initial APEC initiative while head of the economic and trade division of 
Foreign Affairs. See, Gordon, M (1994) 'APEC's great leap forward?', The Weekend A ustralian, 
November 12-13: 21. This is not to suggest that any of these figures single-handedly 
transformed the ideational framework within which Australia's economic and foreign policies 
were constructed. Rather, they are the most conspicuous and influential representatives and 
advocates of an increasingly influential policy paradigm. 
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shall see below, there are important examples of key reports which have 
exerted a clear and acknowledged influence on the construction of government 
policies. 6 What is apparent, however, is that at an historical juncture where 
there existed a desire to arrest Australia's perceived economic decline, an 
attractive and readily comprehended discursive package that promised to solve 
Australia's problems via market enhanced competitiveness attained a greater 
lustre. 7 It should also be noted that such a problem solving approach implicitly 
assumes that increasingly rational solutions to specific problems are available 
to policy-makers, 8 something critical theorists rightly contest. 9 For our 
. purposes, however, what is important is that the 'claim to truth' being 
advanced by an epistemic community - whether or not the policy prescriptions 
that flow from it are likely to lead to satisfactory outcomes - is more likely to gain 
acceptance if it is 'more persuasive to the dominant political decision makers 
that some other claim'.10 In Australia's case, as the neoliberal model become 
increasingly authoritative, the sorts of governmental reforms undertaken by 
Labor during the 1980s meant that the transmission of such ideas throughout 
networks of bureaucratic officials and policymakers was facilitated. 11 
At a more general level, an important aspect of the creation, coherence and 
influence of any putative epistemic community is its ability to transmit its 
worldview and marginalise alternatives. This may be most effectively achieved 
by dominance of the 'education industry', in which the common sense, 
conventional wisdom with its requisite techniques and norms is established. As 
we saw in the last chapter, the Labor government attempted to harness the 
6 The 'Garnaut Report' report, considered in more detail below, is the most obvious example of 
this. More generally, the rise of 'Thatcherism' in Britain demonstrates how a small group of 
political activists and academics can substantially transform the entire direction of economic 
policy-making. See: Cockett, R (1994) Thinking the Unthinkable: Think Tanks and the 
Economic Counter Revolution, 1931- 1983, Harper Collins, London. 
7 Woods makes the point that the attractiveness of economic ideas will depend partly on their 
ability to be translated into 'simple, intuitively appealing metaphors, analogies or propositions' -
something the neoliberal model's constant recourse to the key themes of competitiveness and 
flexibility has clearly had. See: Woods, N (1995) 'Economic Ideas and International Relations: 
Beyond Rational Neglect', International Studies Quarterly, 39: 173. 
8 Haas, E B (1990) 'Reason and Change in International Life: Justifying a Hypothesis', Journal 
of International Affairs, 44 (1): 209-40. 
9 Cox, R (1986) 'Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations 
Theory', in Keohane, R (1986) Neorealism and Its Critics, Columbia University Press, New 
York: 204-54. 
1 o Haas, E B (1990) When Knowledge is Po wer: Three Models of Change in Interna tional 
Organizations, University of California Press, Berkeley: 42. 
11 Relative state capacities or 'strength' play a large part in determining the ability of individual 
governments to put policy into practice - policy networks are potentially an important part of this 
process. See: Atkinson, M & Coleman, W (1989) 'Strong States and Weak States: Sectoral 
Policy Networks in Advanced Capitalist Economies', British Journal of Political Science, 19: 47-
67. For a more general overview of policy networks, see: Jordan, G & Schubert, K (1992) 'A 
preliminary ordering of policy network labels, European Journal of Political Research , 21: 7-27. 
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education sector to the demands of economic restructuring. It was suggested 
that this process was fraught with difficulty given that merely producing larger 
numbers of graduates alone was not likely to address deep-seated structural 
problems or overcome insufficient investment. The likelihood of this failing 
being redressed is lessened when it is recognised that the actual teaching 
process in the areas that predominantly determine the course of economic 
policy - the discipline of economics itself - reflects the dominance of a narrow, 
American-inspired orthodoxy that does little to encourage indigenous responses 
to specifically Australian circumstances.12 
However, the significant point to note here is that the education system in 
general and the production of economists in particular has worked to entrench a 
particular set of values and theoretical perspectives that have effectively 
excluded alternatives from mainstream debate.13 Jones argues that the 
ideational hegemony of nee-liberalism is maintained by a systematic training in 
mainstream economics, without which access to particular forms of expert 
positions is made more difficult.14 It is precisely the narrowness of university 
economics curricula which, Pusey argues, is responsible for the dominance of a 
specific, narrow, economically-rational policy paradigm in Canberra.15 In sum, 
Langmore and Quiggin claim that: 
Students in many Australian economics faculties are trained in the narrowest forms of the 
[economic] fundamentalist ideology. They are taught to have a strong faith in the 
supremacy of market solutions, and in the centrality of the narrow, neo-classical 
economic approach to solving policy dilemmas. The result is a naive and simplistic faith 
in the capacity of market solutions to achieve the efficient allocation of resources, and a 
consequent lack of attention to the role of public policy instruments in improving 
economic outcomes, let alone other goals such as equity, social cohesion and 
environmental security. The effects of this training are often intellectually and morally 
crippling. 16 
While there may be a polemical tone to the above, it reinforces the importance 
and impact of neoliberal discourse and illustrates how specific economic ideas 
may inform broader agendas of economic and social change. 
12 Groenwegen, P & McFarlane, B (1990) A History of A us tralian Economic Thought, 
Routledge, London. 
13 Stretton, H (1987) Political Essays, Georgian House, Melbourne: 202-9. 
14 Jones, E (1994) 'Economists and the State', Journal of A ustralian Political Economy, No 33: 
36-64; 'Liberalist Hegemony and the Reconstruction of the Social Order: The Marriage of 
Reaction and Ignorance in the Antipodes', unpublished conference paper delivered to: 
Conference of Economists, Queensland, 25-29 September, 1994. 
15 Pusey, M (1991) Economic Rationalism in Canberra: A Na tion building Sta te Changes Its 
Mind, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge:5/6. 
16 Lang more, J & Quiggin, J (1994) Work for All: Full Employment in the Nineties, Melbourne 
University Press, Carlton: 41/2. 
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This ideational influence was further promoted by expert practitioners located 
in influential positions within educational and policy-making structures. We 
have already seen that Garnaut had an especially powerful influence on the 
direction of economic policy, first as Hawke's principal economic adviser and 
subsequently as the author of the Garnaut Report which became the 
cornerstone of Australia's international economic relations. However, Peter 
Drysdale has also occupied positions which have permitted a good deal of 
influence over the direction of trade policy, particularly in the area of Australia­
Japan relations. Drysdale was Garnaut's PhD supervisor and, as the director of 
the Australia-Japan Research Centre (AJRS), was in a uniquely authoritative 
position to speak not only on Japan-specific questions, but on a wider 
international reform agenda. The AJRS is, therefore, an important source of 
expert advice, and thus instrumental in reinforcing the institutional and 
ideational hegemony that dominates not only Australia's trade policies, but 
increasingly through elite policy-makers, those of the region.17 The attempted 
transnationalisation of the free trade agenda within the region will be 
considered in greater detail in chapter 6. It is important to note here, however, 
that the AJRS housed the secretariats of the Pacific Trade and Development 
Conference (PAFTAD) series, the Australian Pacific Economic Cooperation 
Committee (AUSPECC), and the Pacific Economic Cooperation Council's 
(PECC) Minerals and Energy Forum.1B As Marsh notes, these centres based at 
the Australian National University played a similar role to Washington think 
tanks, fostering the development of an 'elite cadre of public policy specialists' 
who were instrumental in promoting neoliberal ideas.19 
In addition to having a central role in defining the contours of the Japan­
Australia relationship for over twenty years, Drysdale has also had an important 
impact on shaping the wider policy questions revolving around Australia's 
position in the Asia-Pacific. Although the first moves in the 1960s toward 
greater regional economic cooperation were instigated by the Japanese in 
response to the creation of the European Community (EC),20 Drysdale's co­
authored report to the US Congress in 1979 was instrumental in suggesting the 
development of an organisation in the Pacific area along the lines of the 
17 Harris, S (1994) 'Policy Networks and Economic Cooperation: Policy Coordination in the 
Asia Pacific', The Pacific Review, 7 (4):381-96. 
18 Australia-Japan Research Centre (1993) Annual Report, AJRS, Canberra:1. 
19 Marsh, I (1991) Globa/isa tion and Australian Think Tanks: An Evaluation of Their Role, and 
Contribution to Governance, Information Paper No 34, CEDA, Sydney:18. More specifically, 
Marsh notes that the AJRS staff were involved in the preparation of the Garnaut Report. 
20 Higgott, R., Cooper, A., & Bonnor, J (1991) 'Cooperation-Building in the Asia-Pacific region: 
APEC and the New Institutionalism', Pacific Economic Paper, No 199:7. 
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OECD.21 The rise of Japan and the newly industrialising economies of the 
region were seen as critical determinants of regional integration and definition. 
Significantly, the authors - writing before the emergence of the US trade deficit 
problem - considered the US trade balance with the region to be unimportant; in 
any event, Drysdale and Patrick were convinced that the proposed body - the 
Organisation for Pacific Trade and Development (OPT AD) - would be able to 
manage disputes, 'raise regional consciousness', and work toward realising 
'common interests'. These were themes that would culminate in the 
establishment of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum, the 
centre-piece of Australian trade diplomacy. This will be considered in greater 
detail below, in the context of Australia's regional trade position. At present, a 
closer examination of the theoretical basis of the Drysdale (and Garnaut) 
position is merited. 
The Drysdale Line 
Although Drysdale merits attention for the purposes of this thesis as arguably 
Australia's most authoritative expert commentator on Australia's relationship 
with Japan, it is impossible to consider such views in isolation from the 
theoretical and normative assumptions that inform them. The most significant 
consequence of these underpinning assumptions, as we shall see in the case 
of Drysdale in particular and neo-classical economics in general, is that all 
relationships between nations are implicitly measured against and referred to 
an idealised conceptual backdrop. What generally distinguishes economists 
who draw their theoretical inspiration and premises from neo-classical 
economics is not just this reliance on idealised abstractions to describe the way 
the world is, but a concomitant willingness to suggest how the world ought to 
be as a consequence. Multilateral, 'free' and 'open' trade is central to this 
conception, something that is not taken to be a value judgement, but as flowing 
naturally from fundamental precepts. 22 There are two immediate consequences 
of such an approach that are relevant here. Firstly, bilateralism is inherently a 
second-best option in such a view. Secondly, analysis of relationships between 
nations is informed by concepts that exert a normative bias, something that 
2 1 Drysdale, P & Patrick, H (1981) 'An Asian-Pacific Regional Economic Organisation: An 
Exploratory Concept Paper', in Crawford, J & Seow, G (eds) Pacific Economic Co-operation: 
Suggestions for Action, Heinemann, Singapore:63-82. 
22 The contingent nature of 'multilateralism' and its potential as a discursive determinant of 
international relations has been illuminated by Cox. See: Cox, R W (1992) 'Multilateralism and 
the world order', Review of International Studies, 18: 161-80. 
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both marginalises other interpretations and confines possible policy responses 
to those congruent with neo-classical maxims. 
There are several crucial concepts that inform Drysdale's view of both the 
Australia-Japan relationship and the international economic relations of which 
they are a part. 'Complementarity' refers to the degree of trade intensity 
between nations, or 'the extent to which one country's commodity export pattern 
matches another country's import pattern more closely than it matches the 
pattern of world imports'. 23 While this intensity may be exaggerated by 'country 
bias' (institutional or historical ties) it is a fundamental determinant of the extent 
of trade between nations. The assumption is, therefore, that countries will trade 
more with countries that produce different products, rather than with competitor 
countries that produce similar goods.24 As we saw in chapter 1, however, the 
greatest growth in trade in the post war period has been in intra-industry trade, 
or precisely those areas of trade where 'complementarity' is lowest. 
Recognition and explanation of this awkward development within the neo­
classical paradigm has been rendered more problematic by another key 
theoretical principle: comparative advantage. Initially developed by David 
Ricardo and subsequently elaborated within the neo-classical framework with 
the addition of factor endowment theory, comparative advantage is predicated 
upon the idea that nations should specialise in that which they have a 'natural' 
abundance. 25 For example, labour-rich nations specialise in labour-intensive 
production, while nations with large amounts of capital pursue capital-intensive 
production. However, contemporary developments in the organisation of trade 
and production - discussed below - have unequivocally demonstrated that 
comparative advantage is neither natural, nor specialisation in a particular 
product inevitable. 
The impact of assumed comparative advantage is apparent in Drysdale's 
depiction of the Australia-Japan relationship. In a relatively recent overview, 
The Australia-Japan Relationship: Toward the Year 2000, which Drysdale co­
authored, the different economic roles played by Australia and Japan are 
23 Drysdale, P (1988) International Economic Pluralism: Economic Policy in East Asia and the 
Pacific, Allen & Unwin, Sydney:86. 
24 Drysdale's position on trade questions essentially follows the neoclassical orthodoxy. See: 
Samuelson, P & Nordhaus, W (1989) Economics , Thirteenth Edition, McGraw-Hill Book 
Company, New York: chapter 38, passim. 
25 Rodan, G (1985) ' Industrialisation and the Singapore state in the context of the New 
International Division of Labour', in Southeast Asia: Essays in the Political Economy of 
Structural Change , Higgott, R & Robison, R (eds), Routledge & Kegan Paul, London:183-7. 
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attributed to an inherent regional specialisation in which Australia's 'underlying 
strength' is as a raw materials supplier, a position that underwrites the 
competitiveness of East Asia in the world economy.2e Australia's principal role 
in the relationship is, therefore, to produce bulk commodities which the 
resource-poor Japanese economy will transform into manufactured goods. 
However, the report acknowledges that in practice the conduct of the 
relationship deviates significantly from the idealised pattern: not only are the 
authors forced to concede that Japanese agriculture is 'highly protected', but 
they admit that Australia is 'under-represented' as an overseas base for 
Japanese manufacturing.27 So, not only are there tangible 'distortions' 
preventing the operation of market forces, but the historical fall of commodity 
prices relative to manufactures exacerbates Australia's relative decline. Despite 
this, the report specifically warns against 'misdirected intervention' by 
government in an effort to address this problem. 
The implication of the Drysdale line is clear: even though economic reality may 
not coincide with the idealised neo-classical, market-based model, policy ought 
to be constructed as if it did. Liberalisation and deregulation have become the 
dominant motifs of Australian trade diplomacy, culminating in the institutional 
consolidation and international promotion of such policies. Although it is should 
be observed that the promotion of regional free trade was initially a Japanese 
idea,2B Japan's championing of this position never involved the unilateral 
advocacy of reduced protection to achieve it. Japan - or to be more precise, 
influential Japanese economists - may have thought regional free trade a good 
idea, but it was not about to lead the way by unilaterally dismantling its own 
complex forms of protection. To put it in Ikenberry's terms, Japan had an 
'offensive' strategy of encouraging international trade liberalisation while 
simultaneously maintaining a 'defensive' strategy of domestic protection.29 
Australian policy, on the other hand, increasingly reflected the influence of the 
dominant neoliberal discourse, predicated upon neo-classical economics, a 
process that culminated in Garnaut's seminal report. 
26 Drysdale, P., Viviani, N., Watanabe, A & Yamazawa, I (1989) The A ustralia-Japan 
Rela tionship: Toward the Year 2000, AJRS, Canberra:22. 
27 Drysdale, P. et al (1989) The A ustralia-Japan Relationship: 56 & 65. 
2B Korhonen, P (1994) Japan and the Pacific Free Trade Area , Routledge, London: Chapter 3. 
29 Ikenberry, G J (1986) 'The State and Strategies of International Adjustment', World Politics, 
29 (1):53-77. 
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The Garnaut Report30 
The Garnaut Report was and is the theoretical inspiration for and centrepiece of 
Australia's economic (and by implication political) relations with its regional 
neighbours. Indeed, it is possible to suggest that the report's logic has also 
informed a good deal of domestic reform and led to a redefinition of more 
overtly political-strategic international relations. However, even at the more 
modest level of national structural adjustment, it is significant that Hawke 
specifically cited the Garnaut Report as the inspiration for the proposed further 
dismantling of tariffs outlined in Building a Competitive Australia. 31 
Garnaut's analysis and prescriptive advice to government draws on the same 
theoretical inspiration as his mentor Drysdale. Central to the logic that 
underpins the report is the notion of a complementarity between Australia and 
its Asian neighbours. There is an assumption that Australia has a natural 
comparative advantage in resource production. But as Webber points out, 
Garnaut's analysis ignores the hidden subsidies that Australian agriculture, for 
example, enjoys. The same logic causes Garnaut, Webber argues, to fail to 
consider the role played by the governments of many Asian states in actively 
developing a comparative advantage in manufacturing industries.32 It is, as we 
shall see, precisely this sort of intervention, however - which Garnaut only 
perfunctorily concedes33 - that has been central to Japan's postwar 
transformation. Significantly, Garnaut explicitly rejects government intervention 
of this sort, claiming that 'the level playing field has not been tried', and that 
dismantling protective barriers are a prerequisite of increased 
competitiveness. 34 
Garnaut attributes the high growth rates of Northeast Asia to high savings and 
investment ratios and 'cultural values'. 35 Alternative explanations, considered 
below, suggest that the rapid development of regional economies is a more 
complex phenomenon than Garnaut suggests, owing a good deal to historical 
imperatives and specific forms of government intervention. What is important to 
recognise, however, is that while a market-oriented policy approach might 
30 Garnaut, Ross (1990) A ustralia and the Northeast Asian Ascendancy , AGPS, Canberra. 
31 Hawke, B (1991) Building A Competitive A ustralia, Department of Prime Minister and 
Cabinet, AGPS: 1.7. 
32 Webber, Michael (1990) "Garnaut: The Implications of Northeast Asia for Australian 
Industry", A ustralian Journal of International Affairs, 44 (1 ):39-44. 
33 Garnaut, Ross (1990) A ustralia and the Northeast Asian Ascendancy : 61. 
34 Garnaut, Ross (1990) A ustralia and the Northeast Asian Ascendancy : 210. 
35 Garnaut, Ross (1990) A ustralia and the Northeast Asian Ascendancy : 42. 
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achieve a degree of what Ravenhill calls 'parsimonious elegance', in that 'there 
is a simple universal rule for all situations', this is achieved, he suggests, at 
some cost: 
The negative side of a single undifferentiated strategy is that there is no room for 
contingent responses dependent on the circumstances in which Australia might find 
itself at any particular time ... there is little recognition in the Garnaut Report of the 
unusual structure of Australian manufacturing, namely the predominance of subsidiaries 
of transnational corporations. Without the inducements of protective tariffs or of 
partnership agreements, will TNCs have an incentive to manufacture in Australia or will 
they rather service the Australian market from an overseas plant (especially if they are 
being coerced/seduced by a foreign government to locate their manufacturing activities 
there). 36 
One of the most striking qualities of the Garnaut Report is its failure to 
incorporate the insights of contemporary economic theory, or to adequately 
explain the basis of recent trade relations. The growth, noted above, of intra­
industry trade and the strategic nature of particular forms of economic activity 
that rebut the neo-classical nostrums of diminishing returns appear not to have 
been incorporated into the report. Garnaut's call for an international free trade 
regime based on a notion of comparative advantage seems somewhat 
anachronistic, and something which leaves, as Leaver notes, 'all the eggs of 
Australian commercial diplomacy . . .  in the one basket of continued 
liberalisation and internationally-oriented growth'. 37 As Matthews and Raven hill 
point out, by failing to recognise the importance of reciprocity in achieving trade 
outcomes, Garnaut's advocacy of unqualified cooperation risks condemning 
Australia to what is known in game theory as the 'suckers payoff'.38 Unilateral 
advocacy of free trade and the unforced concession of trade advantages to 
competing nations invites those nations to exploit the advantage offered without 
the necessity of reciprocal concessions. 
At a theoretical level there are important shortcomings implicit in the report. 
Leaver draws attention to Garnaut's perpetuation of the realist theme that has 
dominated Australian international relations theory: the report's analysis is 
concentrated on the nation as an actor in an international system of states. 
36 Ravenhill, (1991) "Government and the lnternationalisation of the Australian Economy", in 
Marsh, I (ed) lnterna tionalising A ustralia 's Economy, Public Policy Forum on the Garnaut & 
AMC Reports, ANU Graduate School of Management, ANU:1 05. 
37 Leaver, Richard (1991) "The Future of Northeast Asian Growth" The Regionalist Alternative", 
in Richardson, J L (ed) Northeast Asian Challenge: Debating The Garnaut Report ,  Research 
School of Pacific Studies, ANU: 51. 
38 Matthews, T & Ravenhill, J (1991) "The Economic Challenge: Is Unilateral Free Trade the 
Correct Response?', in Richardson, J L (ed) Northeast Asian Challenge: Debating The Garna ut 
Report , Research School of Pacific Studies, ANU: 74. 
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Garnaut, Leaver argues, retains a 'state centric' focus, which allows him to 
neglect internal, national processes which ultimately determine the shape of 
international policy. 39 Instead of a detailed examination of the domestic 
structures and the competing forces that determine outcomes, the notion of 
comparative advantage substitutes a 'rough and ready calculus of "national 
strengths and weaknesses"'. 4° This is the logic which helped undermine 
Australia's bilateral capacity: where nations are considered as largely 
undifferentiated, discrete entities responding to neutral market forces there is 
little necessity to maintain a sophisticated understanding of individual trading 
partners. 
Keeping the Faith 
The adoption of a neoliberal orthodoxy within Australia's policy-making elites is 
not confined to a few high profile economists. As we have already seen, such 
ideas permeated the most influential arms of the bureaucracy and exerted a 
pervasive ideational hegemony. This is clearly reflected in other reports to 
government, which maintain the Drysdale-Garnaut line and merit brief 
consideration. 
Given the Industry Commission's enthusiasm for neoliberal policies its 
examination of the high growth economies of East Asia drew fairly predictable 
conclusions. While conceding the role played by the state in overseeing 
regional economic development, the report, Strategic Trade Theory: The East 
Asian Experience, suggested that intervention was 'market conforming' and 
'normally withdrawn within a relatively short period of time'.41 Subsequent 
chapters will, however, demonstrate the important role protection played - and 
still plays - in the economic development of Japan. It is difficult to see, 
therefore, how the report's suggestion that Japan had a 'liberal trading 
environment' can be anything other than wishful thinking or a serious and 
possibly deliberate misreading of historical experience for tendentious 
purposes. 42 
39 Leaver, Richard (1990) " The Garnaut Report: The Quality of Realism", A ustralian Journal of 
International Affairs, 44 (1 ):21-8. 
40 Leaver, Richard (1990) " The Garnaut Report: The Quality of Realism": 24. 
4 1 Industry Commission (1990) Strategic Trade Theory: The East Asian Experience, 
Information Paper, AGPS: 1. 
42 Industry Commission (1990) Strategic Trade Theory : 40. 
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The consistency of the deregulatory, free-market thrust is apparent in the more 
recent Regional Trade Arrangements, 43 which attempts to articulate more fully 
the logic that informs Australia's trade position. Again there is an explicit 
rejection of both industry policy based on strategic government assistance, and 
an advocacy of unilateral tariff reduction: 
. . .  while the formation of free and other preferential trading areas abroad may tend to 
move some production processes with large economies of scale away from Australia, 
the reduction of Australia's own trade barriers will tend to offset this . . . the lowering of 
trade barriers in Australia in itself will make Australia a more attractive base than it has 
been for some of the global activities of multinational companies.44 
The assumption here seems to be that trade barriers are a disincentive to the 
establishment (or retention) of production, a conclusion that cannot be 
sustained with reference to the Australian experience as far as more desirable 
forms of inward investment are concerned. As we shall see, Japanese 
investment in Australia (and the US, for that matter) was initially motivated by a 
desire to circumvent protective tariff walls. Similarly, as the report itself 
concedes, without support local industry may find relocation an increasingly 
attractive option. More pertinently, as far as the trade question is concerned, 
there is an explicit suggestion that 'Australian' industries will benefit from the 
'highly competitive' import prices zero protection will produce. But such an 
analysis neglects the complexity of both the production process and the 
strategic basis of international production: Australian-based production may 
become dependent on foreign suppliers and difficult to sustain without mutually 
supportive manufacturing networks; foreign producers may prefer to service the 
Australian market from other locations in the absence of incentives to do 
otherwise. Adherence to abstract conceptions of trading relations that neglect 
the specific historical experiences and practices of both nations and firms 
cannot be expected to produce policies that reflect commercial reality. 
Despite an obvious normative commitment to neoliberal ideas, the difficulty of 
maintaining an unqualified free-market stance became more apparent in 
Australia and North-east Asia in the 1990s, designed as a follow-up report to 
Garnaut and intended to map the latter's progress. 45 Again the report is at 
pains to suggest that Japan is essentially an open market and,46 furthermore, a 
43 Snape, R H ., Adams, J . , & Morgan, D (1993) Regional Trade Agreements: Implica tions and 
Options for Australia, Canberra, AGPS. 
44 Snape, R H ., Adams, J ., & Morgan, D (1993} Regional Trade Agreements : 136 & 138. 
45 See, A sian Studies Re view (1992) Vol 16, No 2, for a special issue assessing the Report. 
46 East Asia Analytical Unit (1992} Australia and North-east Asia in the 1990s: A ccelerating 
Change, Dept of Foreign Affairs and Trade, AGPS:71 &178 
potential champion of liberalisation.47 Ravenhill attributes this position to the 
influence of the 'Japan lobby' in Canberra that stifles criticism of Japan's trading 
practices, with the notable exception of agr iculture.48 Also noteworthy in the 
report, however, is that while it predictably understates the role of state 
intervention in regional development, it concedes that there may be benefits in 
close Australian government-business cooperation when dealing with North­
east Asia and Japan in particular.49 Although this should not be taken as 
indicating support for some form of industry policy - this is dismissed as 
inappropriate for Australia on cultural, political and institutional grounds5o- it 
does represent a significant recognition of not only the manner in which other 
regional nations conduct economic relationships, but also of the possible 
benefits to be derived from them. 
These potential gains have been elaborated in alternative analyses of the 
historical experience of regional development, which have often been informed 
by important insights drawn from contemporary economic and trade theory. 
The second half of this chapter will explore these models in more detail as they 
not only refute the neo-classical model but suggest alternative models upon 
which economic relations might be predicated. 
Re-interpreting 'Asian' Development 
The comparatively sudden and somewhat unexpected emergence of 
widespread economic growth and development amongst Australia's northern 
neighbours has engendered distinctly different theoretical explanations. This is 
not simply an introspective or arcane academic debate with little relevance in 
the 'real world'. On the contrary, promoting economic integration an interaction 
with Asian economies has become a dominant theme in Labor policy, 
determining the course not just of international economic policy, but spilling 
over into domestic political, economic, and even social issues. 51 Therefore, the 
47 East Asia Analytical Unit (1992) Australia and North-east Asia in the 1990s: 36. 
48 Ravenhill, J (1992) "Australia and the Regional Economy: A Partial View", Asian Studies 
Review Vol 16, No 2: 31. 
49 East Asia Analytical Unit (1992) Australia and North-east Asia in the 1990s :71. 
50 East Asia Analytical Unit (1992) Australia and North-east Asia in the 1990s :84. 
51 The trade and investment implications of Labor's pursuit of Asian integration will be 
considered in more detail in subsequent chapters. There are, however, several other important 
aspects of this process which might be briefly indicated here. One of the most significant is the 
positing of an undifferentiated notion of 'Asian' competition as the unforgiving benchmark 
against which domestic adjustment strategies must be measured, something which Australian­
based employers have been quick to exploit by threatening to shift there if Australian unions 
fail to become more 'flexible', for example. See, respectively, Lafitte, G (1994) 'Re-
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theoretical assumptions that inform the Asian engagement project and the 
general conduct of bilateral relations have the potential to produce wide-ranging 
tangible and immediate effects. However, where policy-makers appear not to 
recognise the historic trajectories of regional development and the distinctive 
relationships that sustained it, there is little likelihood of policy either effectively 
addressing the specificity of contingent national circumstances, or of adopting 
the similar policies in the expectation or hope of achieving comparable 
outcomes . 
. Drysdale and Garnaut are again illustrative of the neoliberal interpretation of 
regional development. 52 East Asia's growth is, they suggest, attributable to a 
'certain style of relations with the international economy', principally a 
specialisation in labour intensive activity based on the notion of comparative 
advantage, and export-oriented production for world markets. 53 While there is 
little disagreement about the importance of external markets, especially that of 
the US, for the newly industrialising economies (NIEs), there is significant 
debate about the role of 'the state' in this process. In the idealised neoliberal 
abstraction the state is inherently inefficient and therefore something that 
should have a minimal role. However, as we shall see, the state has quite 
clearly played a significant part in the developmental trajectories of Australia's 
neighbours, something that appears to contradict and refute some fundamental 
assumptions of neo-classical theory. 
Garnaut, however, employs what has become one of the dominant and most 
innovative responses by neoliberal theorists to this apparent difficulty: he 
suggests that while the state might have intervened, it did so in a market­
conforming manner. 54 However, this type of analysis fails to take account of the 
actual historical pattern of state intervention in the region, especially in 
Northeast Asia: 
Orientations', Arena Magazine ,  August-September: 13-5; and Tingle, L (1995) 'ADI  tells 
business: 'move to Asia', The Weekend Australian ,  October 21-2: 4. 
52 However, it should be noted that they are but the Antipodean outpost of an international nee­
liberal consensus, of which some of the more influential texts are: Balassa, Bela (1981) The 
Newly Industrialising Countries in the World Economy, Pergamon Press, New York; Bhagwati, J 
(1978) Foreign Trade Regimes and Economic De velopment: Anatomy and Consequences of 
Exchange Control Regimes , Ballinger Press, Cambridge, Mass; Krueger, A (1978) Foreign 
Trade Regimes and Economic Development: Liberaliza tion A ttempts and Consequences , 
Ballinger Press, Cambridge, Mass. 
53 Drysdale, P & Garnaut, R (1989) 'A Pacific Free Trade Area?', Pacific Economic Paper, No 
171, Australia-Japan Research Centre, Canberra:5. 
54 Garnaut, R (1991) 'The Market and the State in Economic Development: Applications to the 
International Trading System', The Singapore Economic Review, XXXVI, No 2:13-26. 
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In all the late- industrializing countries - Japan, Korea, and Taiwan included - not only 
ha ve governments failed to get prices right, they ha ve deliberately got them 'wrong', in 
order to stimulate investment and trade. They have subsidised the price of capital and 
exports. The faster growth of the East Asian countries is therefore attributable less to 
freer markets than to institutions that have allowed subsidies to be allocated more 
effectively than elsewhere. 55 [Emphasis added.] 
Subsequent chapters will demonstrate the extent of state intervention in the 
Japanese case - the regional developmental exemplar - and the subsequent 
impact of this mode of capitalist organisation on production and trade networks 
within North and Southeast Asia. What is important to note here, however, is 
the nature of policy frameworks amongst Australia's regional neighbours, 
where the idealised market model was simply not the principal instrument of 
economic organisation. In the cases of Singapore ,56 Taiwan, 57 Korea , 58 and 
even Hong Kong59 there is an extensive and compelling literature that suggests 
that state intervention in 'governing the market • so was pervasive and central to 
the rapid development of the regional economies. Significantly, even an 
economically orthodox and pro-market body like the World Bank has been 
forced to concede in its extensive investigation of the 'Asian miracles' that state 
guidance made a significant contribution to the course and pace of their 
development. 61 
Despite the accumulation of evidence that apparently refutes both the analyses 
and prescriptions derived from the discursively dominant neoliberal model , 
Australian advocates of market-based policies predicated upon neo-classical 
economics have resolutely maintained their position. 52 Drysdale and Garnaut, 
55 Amsden, A (1990) 'Thi rd World Industrial ization: "Global Fordism" or a New Model?', New 
Left Re view, No 182: 6/7. 
56 Rodan, G (1989) The Political Economy of Singapore 's Industrialization: Nation State and 
Interna tional Capital, Macmillan, London. 
57 Gold, T (1986) State and Society in the Taiwan Miracle , M E Sharpe, Armonk. 
58 Amsden, A (1989) Asia 's Next Giant: South Korea and Late Industrialization, Oxford 
Universi ty Press, New York. 
59 Castells, M (1992) 'Four Asian Tigers With a Dragon Head: A Comparative Analysis of the 
State, Economy, and Society in the Asian Pacif ic Rim', in Appelbaum, R & Henderson, J (eds) 
States and Development in the Asian Pacific Rim, Sage. 
60 The phrase is taken from Wade, whose book provides one of the most powerful crit iques of 
and alternatives to neo-classically derived explanations of regional economic development: 
Wade, R (1990) Governing the Market: Economic Theory and the Role of Government in East 
Asian Industrialization, Princeton Universi ty Press, Princeton. For a useful, brief overview of 
what is a voluminous l iterature, see: Henderson, J (1993) 'Against the Economic Orthodoxy: On 
the making of the East Asian Miracle', Economy and Society, 22 (2):200-17 
61 The World Bank (1993) The East Asian Miracle: Economic Growth and Public Policy, Oxford 
Universi ty Press. 
62 Orthodox, high-prof i le economists l ike Kasper, for example, posi t  an implic it  developmental 
teleology in which Australia 's neighbours move inevitably toward greater democratisation and 
l iberalisation, a process Australia can promote by demonstrating the supposed benefits of non­
governmental involvement and deregulation. [See, Kasper, W (1994) 'The East Asian 
Challenge: What Can Australians Offer Their East Asian Neighbours?', in Hughes, H et al (eds) 
120 
for example, suggest that regional economic expansion has been predicated 
upon trade liberalisation, producing a 'prisoner's delight' in which nations enjoy 
reciprocal and mutually beneficial gains in welfare through the reduction of 
trade barriers. 63 Such an interpretation of regional development is doubly 
unfortunate: firstly, it introduces a normative bias that ignores or minimises the 
continuation of extensive forms of protection - particularly the non tariff 
barriers that have been so important in Japan's case. Secondly, it virtually bars 
a more detailed consideration of the specific policy innovations that have been 
central to the developmental strategies pursued in the region. Both of these 
·failings can be partly explained by the failure of the neo-classical model to 
embrace contemporary innovations in economic theory, the more important of 
which we shall now consider. 
Strategic Trade and Industry Policy. 
Ironically, it was the sudden emergence of the NIE's and Japan, which Drysdale 
and Garnaut continue to attribute to the efficacy of market forces, that was 
instrumental in revealing the limitations of existent orthodox theory. 'Strategic 
trade theory' emerged within mainstream American economic discourse as 
older, static economic models based upon notions of comparative advantage 
seemed increasingly less able to comprehend contemporary notions of 
'competitive advantage'. Rather than being a 'natural' endowment, it is 
increasingly recognised that comparative advantage can be and is created 
through the strategic intervention of governments on behalf of nationally­
based firms. Strategic trade theory stresses the importance of various 
'externalities' , such as key technologies, 'spillovers', increasing returns to 
scale and the crucial role played by research and development - factors that 
confer particular advantages upon individual firms, and by extension upon the 
countries where such activities occur; markets are increasingly seen as neither 
Australia's Asian Challenge, The Centre for Independent Studies, Sydney: 19-34.] Such ideas 
appear to have had an effect on government policy to judge by Gareth Evans's suggestion that 
their is a 'cultural convergence' occurring in the Asia Pacific. [Evans, G (1995) Australia in East 
Asia and the Asia Pacific: beyond the Looking Glass', Fourteenth Asia Lecture, Asia-Australia 
Institute, Sydney March 20: 9.] Sceptics suggest that Evans may be right, but only because 
Australia is becoming more 'Asian' and less democratic. See, for example, Wrigley, A (1995) 
'Stealth: the price we pay for Asia', The Australian, December 21: 11. 
63 Drysdale, P & Garnaut, R (1993) 'The Pacific: An Application of a General Theory of 
Economic Integration', in Bergsten, C F & Nolan, M (eds) Pacific Dynamism and the 
International Economic System, Institute for International Economics, Washington:187. 
1 21 
perfect, nor necessarily the best way to encourage the development of specific 
forms of productive activity.64 
Paul Krugman has been at the forefront of this new theorisation, attempting to 
address issues that fall outside the traditional concerns of orthodox 
economics. 65 Krugman explicitly acknowledged that traditional economic 
analysis had been forced to change by the altered patterns of U S  and 
international trade, as well as by the challenge of advocates of industrial policy. 
There has been a growing realisation that some areas of economic activity are 
more strategically important than others, not only because they generate 
greater returns on investment, but also because they produce 'external 
economies', or, less jargonistically, the wider benefits that accrue to other 
actors not directly involved in particular forms of productive activities. 6 6  A 
commonly cited example of these 'spillover' effects are sophisticated 
technological processes which by their very existence tend to generate other 
techniques and technologies, and, more importantly, the skills and knowledge 
that are associated with them. 
It is necessary to distinguish between two distinct but often conflated aspects of 
strategic trade policy.6 7 On the one there is the idea that some industries are 
'strategic' in that they confer specific benefits on the national economic spaces 
within which they occur, and therefore may merit specific policies to either 
encourage or retain their presence. On the other hand, strategic trade may refer 
to the tactical manner in which trade relations are conducted with other 
countries. Japan, for example, has been held up as the exemplar of non 
market-based trade strategies, practicing instead what Drucker calls 
'adversarial trade', or the systematic attempt to eliminate rival companies 
combined with an unwillingness to participate in reciprocal trade. 6 8 These 
policies and their effects will be explored in greater detail in subsequent 
chapters. It is important to recognise, however, that there is a widespread 
64 Milner, Helen V., & Yoffe, David B., "Between Free Trade and Protectionism: Strategic Trade 
Policy and a Theory of Corporate Trade Demands", International Organization, 43 (2) 239-272; 
Arthur, W B (1989) 'Competing Technologies, Increasing Returns, and Lock-in By Historical 
Events', The Economic Journal, 99:116-31; Grossman, G & Helpman, E (1994) 'Endogenous 
Innovation in the Theory of Growth', Journal of Economic Perspectives, 8 (1): 23-44. 
6 5 Krugman, Paul (1989) Strategic Trade Policy and the New International Economics, 
Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press. 
6 6  Krugman, Paul (1989) Strategic Trade Policy :12/3. 
67 Matthews, T & Ravenhill, J (1994) 'Strategic Trade Policy: the Northeast Asian Experience', 
in Macintyre, A (ed) Business and Government in Industrialising Asia, Allen & Unwin, Sydney: 
40. 
6 8 Drucker, P (1986) The Frontiers of Management, Harper & Row, New York 
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perception amongst critics of the free trade orthodoxy that if strategic trade 
policy is practiced by competitors based in other nations then to not do so is "an 
invitation to exploitation". 6 9 
There have been several major studies which have tended to confirm the idea 
that competitive advantage itself can be manufactured and improved. Michael 
Porter, for example, while not necessarily an advocate of activist industrial 
policy, suggests important explanations that go some way to explaining differing 
levels of economic competitiveness. Within national boundaries, Porter argued 
that competitiveness is determined by a 'diamond' of factors: factor conditions 
(ie the availability of skilled labour, the quality of infrastructure etc); demand 
conditions (domestic demand for industrial production); the existence of related 
and supporting industries; and the strategies, structure and rivalry between 
domestic firms. 7 0 One especially valuable insight of Porter's study was his 
elaboration of the key notion of 'clustering', that is, the tendency for industries to 
agglomerate and form mutually supportive links.and interdependencies. Where 
clusters exist, virtuous circles develop of increasing innovation and productivity 
gain; where they do not, there is a danger of a downward spiral toward de­
industrialisation. 7 1 The importance of many of these ideas - and the manner in 
which empirical evidence refutes the abstract idealisations of the neo-classical 
paradigm - will be demonstrated in an Australian context through a specific 
case study in chapter 8. 
The logic of comparative advantage theory suggests that for countries to 
develop particular productive specialities is inherently beneficial. However, as 
we saw in chapter 1, there has been an historical decline in the value of 
resource commodities in relation to manufactures. Moreover, Cohen and 
Zysman have persuasively argued that manufacturing has a greater strategic 
importance than other forms of production.7 2 They base their argument on an 
analysis of the different contributions various sectors of the economy make to 
the overall wealth producing potential of the economy. Their analysis shares 
some of Porter's observations, in particular regarding what they term the 
'linkages' that develop within an economy. Some productive processes 
6 9 Hamilton, Clive (1991) "Strategic Trade Policy and Its Relevance to Australia", in The 
Economic Dynamics of Australian Industry, Hamilton, C., (ed) Sydney: Allen & Unwin: 281. 
7 0 Porter, Michael E., (1990) The Competitive Advantage of Nations , Macmillan Press, 
London:71. 
71 Porter, Michael E., (1990) The Competitive Advantage of Nations :149-52. 
72 Cohen, Stephen & Zysman, John (1987) Manufacturing Matters: The Myth of the Post­
Industrial Economy, New York: Basic Books. 
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generate 'tight' linkages (for example, the link between food production and 
processing), whereas other sections of the economy- agriculture or banking, 
for example- are more weakly integrated. Cohen and Zysman argue that 50-75 
per cent of service jobs are tightly linked to the manufacturing sector, without 
which they might either cease to exist, or, at the least, wage levels within the 
service sector would decrease, as the manufacturing sector has the effect of 
propping them up. Manufacturing is capable of directly generating wealth, while 
the service sector can only 'complement' it and remains dependent. 
Three distinct 'market imperfections' have been identified that strategic trade 
policy can exploit: large economies of scale; steep learning curves; large R&D 
requirements. The classic, and oft cited example of the importance of 
economies of scale is the aircraft industry which, it is argued, has such 
prohibitive costs that it is dependent on state assistance to ensure a stable 
trading environment. The emergence of the European aircraft industry is a 
notable example of an enterprise that would not have developed under the 
logic of conventional economic theory in which the Europeans should have 
been deterred from entering an industry which already had sufficient 
producers. 73 
Industry Policy in Australia 
The emergence of strategic trade theory and the possible benefits to be derived 
from industry policy have fuelled an important debate in Australia, which has 
not been confined to academic theoretical discussions, but which has been 
manifest in government policy. This is too large a topic to treat adequately 
here, but it is worthwhile making a few observations that help to illustrate both 
the contested nature of policy formulation and the dominant position of nee­
liberal policies within those debates, especially in the areas of trade and 
investment. This debate is especially pertinent given (as chapter 5 illustrates) 
the historic importance of industry policy in Japan. 
Although the previous chapter suggested that the Labor Party in Australia 
moved toward a more market-oriented policy position during the 1980s, this 
was neither a wholesale shift nor uncontested by elements of the indigenous 
business class and 'traditionally-minded' Party stalwarts. It is significant, 
however, that the bureaucracy, once again played a significant role in 
7 3 Milner, Helen V., & Yaffe, David B., "Between Free Trade and Protectionism: Strategic Trade 
Policy and a Theory of Corporate Trade Demands", International Organization, 43 (2) 239-272. 
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determining the direction and tenor of policy. Indeed, as the history of the Tariff 
Board demonstrates, the bureaucracy provided a way of containing the possible 
costs of political decisions: the conflicting positions of various interest groups 
could be mediated under the auspices of an 'independent' body, allowing 
government to distance itself from unpopular policy.74 Governments are able to 
justify controversial or possibly unpopular initiatives by referring to supposedly 
independent and expert sources of advice. It is significant that one of Keating's 
first acts when Labor assumed office was to establish the Martin Committee 
with the intention of resurrecting the overtly pro-deregulatory Campbell Report, 
which had previously been rejected by Labor.75 
The bureaucracy itself was, of course, neither a seamless whole nor an 
apolitical instrument for the unproblematic application of power. Warhurst's 
detailed study of Industries Assistance Commission's (lAC) activities illustrates 
not only the manner in which the department 'jockeyed for position' with other 
departments in competition for influence over. government policy, but also 
indicates the increasingly dominant role played by professional economists in 
determining that advice.76 The Whitlam administration was the prime mover in 
actively recruiting mainstream economists to provide a more coherent basis for 
policy, an influence the subsequent Fraser administration was unable to resist, 
despite rhetorical flourishes to the contrary. The long-term effects were, argues 
Warhust, profound: 
The lAC ... influenced the conduct and style of the making of policy ... The issues not 
only became increasingly complex but the discussion of them was increasingly carried 
out by those with the ability to understand and converse about economic principles in a 
professional way ... the changes that took place [in general bureaucratic thinking] ... 
many of them instigated by the lAC, sank deep into the fabric of policy making.?? 
It was the ideational dominance of the neoliberal, lAC and PMC, and the 
expertly articulated consensus that flowed from it which effectively marginalised 
alternative sources of policy advice. Despite John Button's advocating a more 
interventionist government policy stance, and less reliance on 'a simple faith in 
the so-called free market' to make structural adjustments and increase 
competitiveness ,IS the Department of Industry, Technology and Commerce 
74 Glezer, L (1982) Tariff Politics: Australian Policy-making 1960-1980, Melbourne University 
Press, Carlton: 36/7. 
75 Kelly, P (1992) The End of Certainty: The Story of the 1980s, Allen & Unwin: Sydney: 81. 
76 Warhurst, John (1982) Jobs or Dogma? The Industries Assistance Commission and 
Australian Politics, University of Queensland Press: 3-5. 
7 7 Warhurst, John (1982) Jobs or Dogma? :229. 
78 Button, John (1985) "Australia's Industry Policy -Now and the Future", in Scott, J A (ed) 
Poor Nation of the Pacific" Australia's Future?", Allen & Unwin: 69. 
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(DITAC) over which he presided illustrates the nature of inter-departmental 
rivalry and the implicit conformist pressure exerted by adherents of the 
dominant paradigm. It is significant, therefore, that Keating chose to remove the 
lAC from under the possibly pernicious purview of DITAC and relocate it in 
Treasury, for as Wanna et al note, such moves may serve political purposes, 
and indicate a change of policy direction. 79 Clearly, such overtly political 
interventions help to entrench dominant ideas which are themselves further 
reinforced as potential oppositional voices are effectively silenced. 
These bureaucratic and Party machinations help to explain Labor's slightly 
schizophrenic approach to policy-making. Despite an obvious predilection for 
nee-liberal policies within the Labor leadership, it was necessary to 
accommodate pragmatically important domestic lobbies, particularly those 
sections of the domestic economy most threatened by the process of 
deregulation and their allies in the union movement. As a consequence, a 
series of 'industry plans' were instituted in various sectors of the economy.8o 
Surprisingly, given the less than fulsome support and a lack of an integrated, 
overarching policy framework within which to situate such policies, they have 
been remarkably successful. Sheehan et al's neglected, but important study 
demonstrates clearly the link between Australia's much discussed growth in 
elaborately transformed manufactures (ETMs) exports and industry policy: 
those areas in which exports have expanded have generally been the sectors 
that experienced some sort of government assistance.81 The point to recognise 
in this context, however, is that such interventions were largely piecemeal 
responses to specific interest groups - the overall and dominant commitment 
toward neoliberalism, especially in the all-important area of international 
economic relations, remained in place. 
Plainly, there is substantial empirical evidence to suggest that government 
intervention in the economy has been an important influence on the rate and 
direction of economic expansion not only in Australia's Asian neighbours, but 
also within Australia itself. Moreover, there have also been sophisticated 
79 Wanna, J., Faircheallaigh, C., & Weller, P (1992) Public Sector Management in Australia, 
Centre for Public Sector Management, Griffith University: 29/30. 
80 See Capling & Galligan for a useful overview of this process, although it should be noted that 
their accounts attributes too great a competence and influence to 'the state' in the Australian 
political economy: Capling, A & Galligan, B (1992) Beyond the protective State: The Political 
Economy of Australia's Manufacturing Industry Policy, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 
81 Sheehan, P., Pappas, N., & Cheng, E., (1994) The Rebirth of Australian Industry: Australian 
Trade in Elaborately Transformed Manufactures 1979-1993, Centre for Strategic Economic 
Studies, Victoria University, Melbourne. 
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blueprints both for more integrated and comprehensive forms of industry 
policy, 8 2  as well as analyses which stress the importance of industry policies in 
the region and their possible applicability for Australia. 83 The unwillingness of 
an influential epistemic community and key policy-making elites to accept or 
incorporate these ideas would seem to owe more to the dominant influence of 
the ideas themselves, rather than to their potential efficacy as the basis of 
alternative economic strategies. 84 To understand this reluctance to embrace 
theoretical innovation it is necessary to say something about the neo-classical 
model's lack of an historical dimension, and the intrinsically subversive nature ­
especially for the epistemic orthodoxy - of contemporary economic thought. 
The Neglect of History 
As far as orthodox economics is concerned, history is not so much coming to 
an end in the manner suggested in Fukuyama's implausible thesis, 85 as it is 
systematically neglected. We have already seen in chapter one that large 
corporations, especially as they have become transnational, have been the 
primary vehicle for restructuring the GPE. It is significant, therefore, that 
Drysdale's book-length analysis of economic development and integration in 
East Asia and the Pacific contains only two references to multinational 
corporations in its entirety. 8 6  Certainly, it is perfectly legitimate to privilege the 
political over the economic, but it is less credible to virtually ignore the principal 
imperative encouraging closer regional cooperation when the latter is the 
substantive concern of the text. The suspicion must be that a closer 
examination of the contingent historical specificity might reveal a complexity 
that neo-classical theory could not easily accommodate. 87 Contrary to what the 
8 2  Sicklen, D (1993) National Industry Policy: The Key to Job Growth and Industry Structure, 
Australian Economic Analysis, Sydney. 
83 Rodan G (1988) 'State, Capital and Industrialisation in the NICs: Implications for Industry 
Policy in Australia', Australian Outlook, 42 (1) :37-48. 
84 Also noteworthy here from a neoliberal perspective is the potential for domestic 
'interventions' to undermine international initiatives designed to promote more general trade 
liberalization. This is the sort of broader 'strategic' view that Garnaut invokes to justify rejecting 
activist industry policies. See: Garnaut, R (1991) 'Trade and Industry policy', Economic Papers, 
10 (2): 29. 
8 5  Fukuyama, F (1990) 'The "End of History?" Debate', Dialogue, 85 (3):2-7. 
8 6  Drysdale, P (1988) International Economic Pluralism: 104 & 17 4. 
87 Many of the assumptions upon which the neo-classical depiction of the firm is predicated are 
simply untenable under late capitalism. Imperfect competition and oligopolisation are integral 
parts of the contemporary GPE. Furthermore, Samuelson & Nordhaus' [(1989) Economics : 
472 ]bland assertions about the end 'fabulously wealthy captains of industry' not only may be a 
surprising suggestion to the likes of Rupert Murdoch, but they represent a misleading 
generalisation about Japanese capitalism as well. [See, Tokyo Business Today (1992) 'All in 
the Family: Nepotism in Japanese Corporate Management', 60 (11) November]. Similarly, the 
sort of abstract idealisations that characterises neo-classical depictions of firms leave policy-
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neo-classical model might imply, historical contingency and the accretion of 
local influences are crucial determinants of national developmental and 
adaptive variation. As Cornwall observes: 
As the economy grows and transforms itself, institutional changes also occur - some 
induced by macroeconomic events (including policies) and others largely exogenous to 
the economic transformation process. It is a recursive process . . .  But whatever the 
relative importance of economic or non-economic causes, at any point in time the 
institutional framework will act as a constraint on current and future policy options open to 
authorities. Macroperformance is always "path or history dependent" in this important 
sense. 88 
We saw in chapter 2 that orthodox economics is predicated upon particular 
assumptions about 'human nature', where individuals are considered to be fully­
informed, utility-maximising and capable of making rational choices. Nowhere, 
however, is the discursively constructed quality of these essentialist concepts 
acknowledged or considered. Yet this logic is unproblematically extended to 
nation states, the sovereignty of which is threatened less, according to 
Drysdale, by the type of inter-state agreements outlined in chapter 1 , than by 
the potential for 'bribery and corruption'. 8 9 On the one hand such a conclusion 
reveals an epistemological naivety in the light of contemporary international 
relations theory,9 o but at a more fundamental level, as far as this essay is 
concerned, it reveals the fixation orthodox economists have about the 
potential dangers of 'rent seeking'. This heightened sensitivity about lobby 
groups and the potential power of private capital may help to account for the 
dominant paradigm's most serious omission: its neglect of the role of the 
corporation in particular and of historical development in general. Such a 
neglect becomes more comprehensible, however, given the somewhat 
inconvenient emergence of oligopolistic businesses and the popularity of 
mercantilist economic practices - factors which simply cannot be incorporated 
into the abstract and idealised neo-classical theory. 
There is a presumed link in neo-classical economics between perfectly 
competitive market forces and 'efficiency', the latter being defined in terms of 
makers poorly equipped to comprehend the unpleasant reality of graft and corruption that 
characterises Japan's construction industry, for example. See, McGregor, R (1994) 'Bid-rigging 
haunts construction firms', The Australian, March 16: 6. 
88 Cornwall, J (1990} The Theory of Economic Breakdown: An Institutional-Analytic Approach, 
Basil Blackwell, Oxford: 24. 
89 Drysdale, P (1988} International Economic Pluralism: 46-8. 
9 0 George, J (1994) Discourses of Global Politics: A Critical (Re)lntroduction to International 
Relations , Lynne Rienner, Boulder; Walker, R (1993) Inside/Outside: International Relations as 
Political Theory, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 
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the maximisation of private want satisfaction.9 1 A major - and inherently 
implausible - assumption is made about the circumstances in which 'market 
forces' operate. It is assumed that in a perfectly competitive market there will be 
large numbers of both buyers and sellers, eliminating the possibility that either 
will be able to influence prices. Welfare will be maximised through individual 
and subjective choices, delivering a 'Pareto optimum' in which prices are 
determined by an agglomeration of individual preferences. There is, therefore, 
an inherent normative bias toward a pluralist conception of power and 
economic relations. However, even pluralist theoreticians have been forced to 
concede the uneven distribution of power within the political economy and the 
consequent power of the business sector.9 2 Indeed, careful historical analysis 
can reveal the circumstances that enhance or diminish the influence of the 
business class at specific historical conjunctures.93 Of greater concern here, 
however, is the historical trajectory of corporate organisational development 
itself, a subject about which the neo-classical tradition has little to say. 
Rather than the broadly similar abstractions orthodox economics implies, 
individual corporations display significant differences in both organisation and 
modes of operation; differences that significantly affect not only economic 
relations within nations, but which increasingly determine relations between 
nations. We have already seen how Australia's industrial structure has 
constrained the options available to policy-makers. Subsequent chapters will 
reveal different structural constraints in the Japanese case. What is important to 
recognise - which the neo-classical tradition conspicuously fails to do - is the 
evolutionary and historically contingent nature of those national structures. 
Alfred Chandler's monumental investigations into the emergence of large 
corporations clearly demonstrate the importance of an historical perspective.94 
Rather than being either a fiction or a source of inefficiency, Chandler 
persuasively argues that the shift toward oligopolistic forms of production was 
an essential step in the emergence of the modern corporation, providing 
competitive advantages of scope and scale that permitted economic expansion. 
Certain technologies and capital-intensive industries, of which the car industry 
9 1 Caporaso, J & Levine, D (1992) Theories of Political Economy, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge: Chapter 4. 
9 2 Lindblom, Charles E (1977) Politics and Markets: The World's Political-Economic Systems, 
Basic Books, New York. 
93 Vogel, D (1989) Fluctuating Fortunes: The Political Power of Business in America, Basic 
Books New York. 
94 Chandler, A (1990) Scale and Scope: The Dynamics of Industrial Capitalism, Harvard 
University Press, Cambridge, Mass. 
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is the most prominent example, necessitated the development of extremely 
large-scale forms of production. Furthermore, the increasing scale, complexity 
and expense of production conferred important 'first-mover' advantages; would­
be competitors were often unable to break into established industries - unless 
they had government assistance. 
Similarly, Lazonick illustrates the manner in which an historical perspective can 
illuminate the developmental trajectory of not only of firms but also nations. 
Drawing on Chandler's work, Lazonick distinguishes between three major 
historical forms of capitalist corporate development: the era of market 
coordination (entrepreneurial capitalism epitomised by nineteenth century 
laissez faire Britain); managerial capitalism (developed in the U S  and 
predicated upon greater organisational coordination ·and the more effective 
utilisation of productive resources); collective capitalism (planned coordination 
extended horizontally across groups of legally distinct firms, and vertically to 
include the shop floor).95 The implications of some of these points will be 
elaborated in subsequent discussion of the Japanese case. The point to 
emphasise here, however, is that in neo-classical analysis significant national 
differences, which help determine the structure of national economies and their 
subsequent articulation with the GPE, are submerged in the pursuit of 
theoretical elegance and parsimony. Moreover: 
In defining the economic problem as the allocation of scarce resources, neoclassical 
economics ignores the analysis of how individuals, firms and economies create more 
value with the same resources, and thereby overcome scarcity. In short, neoclassical 
economics has a theory of value allocation but it lacks a theory of value creation. 96 
[Emphasis in original] 
It is, as we shall see, precisely such a theory which an analysis of regional 
economic development in general and Japan in particular can provide. 
95 Lazonick, W (1993} Business Organization and the Myth of the market Economy, Cambridge 
University press, Cambridge: Introduction. 
9 6  Lazonick, W (1991) 'Organizations and markets in Capitalist Development', in Gustafsson, B 
(ed) Power and Economic Institutions: Reinterpretations of Economic History, Edward Elgar, 
Aldershot:260. 
130 
Conclusion 
Neoclassical economics has provided the theoretical basis upon which 
Australia's 'integration with Asia' in general and bi-lateral relationships, such as 
that with Japan in particular, have been conducted. The work of Drysdale and 
Garnaut has been especially influential in this regard. There are, however, two 
major shortcomings in the dominant economic discourse that should be 
emphasised. 
Firstly, the neo-classical model systematically misinterprets, or at least 
seriously understates the importance of government intervention in the 
developmental trajectories of Australia's regional neighbours. The idealised 
assumptions that advocates of the neo-classical model make about the way the 
economic activity is and should be organised mean that it is especially difficult 
to accommodate instances of behaviours that violate the model's fundamental 
principles. As a consequence, conclusions are drawn about the nature of other 
economies which either neglect or misrepresent important organisational 
principles and features. For example, Drysdale and Garnaut's claim that Japan 
has the 'cleanest import system for manufactured goods amongst OECD 
countries; official tariff barriers have almost no effect on trade,' 9 7  is  completely 
rejected by 'revisionist' critics. It is precisely the non- official barriers to trade 
that Drysdale and Garnaut ignore that are the source of contemporary trade 
frictions, and which have played a crucial role in Japan's comprehensive and 
integrated industrial development strategies. Where the principal sources of 
advice to the Australian government on possible trade policies are predicated 
on such restricted interpretations of neighbouring economies and articulated by 
an influential coterie of orthodox economists, unrea listic and narrowly 
constructed policy outcomes are the likely result. 
There are, furthermore, important theoretical limitations to the neo-classical 
model which have been further highlighted by contemporary developments 
within the economics discipline itself. Clearly, there is an important causal link 
here: 'real world' innovations and developments in economic activity are simply 
incapable of being incorporated into the restricted, static and idealised 
theoretical principles of neo-classical economics. As we have seen, the model 
cannot explain the creation of 'comparative advantage', the advantages of size 
97 Drysdale, P & Garnaut, R (1989) A Pacific Trade Area?, Pacific Economic Paper No 171, 
Australia-Japan Research Centre, ANU: 15. 
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and first-mover status, the ability of industry and trade policies to enhance the 
competitive advantage of nationally-based firms, the importance of increasing 
returns, or the general panoply of strategies associated with nee-mercantilism. 
It is worth emphasising that some of the most important innovations in 
contemporary economic theory have abandoned the static and essentially 
Newtonian predicates of the neo-classical model for theories that embrace the 
intrinsic uncertainty of quantum mechanics and dynamic models based on 
chaos and complexity. 9 8 
Whether national governments choose to embrace and encourage the new 
trade and productions strategies at pragmatic level, is a distinct question from 
whether such policies should at least be acknowledged in the construction of 
policy. It is obviously possible for individual governments to eschew trade and 
industry policies on substantive or normative grounds. It is, however, advisable 
that policy-makers are at least presented with a sufficiently detailed and 
nuanced picture of potential bilateral relationships that they are at least able to 
make decisions whilst in possession of all the relevant 'facts'. This attention to 
detail is particularly crucial in the case of Japan. 
9 8 While this is too large a topic to go into here, contemporary economic theory more 
accurately reflects both the actuality of economic activity, while simultaneously accepting the, 
often unsettling, implications of contemporary epistemological developments in both the 'hard' 
and 'soft' sciences. See: Ormerod, P (1995) The Death of Economics, Faber & Faber, London; 
Nochols, N (1993) "Efficient? Chaotic? What's the New Finance?", Harvard Business Review, 
vol 71, Arthur, B (1993) 'Pandora's Marketplace', New Scientist, No 1859, Feb.; Waldrop, M 
(1992) Complexity: The Emerging Science at the Edge of Order and Chaos, Viking, London. 
132 
Chapter 5: The Political Economy of Japan 
Describing as 'miraculous' Japan's rise from the devastation of World War II to 
its contemporary status as an economic super-power is at best a cliche. At 
worst, it is indicative of an approach to analysis that systematically neglects the 
specific historical circumstances that underpinned Japan's remarkable 
transformation. What the Japanese case demonstrates is that capitalism is not 
simply a universal essence or abstraction that manifests itself in the same way 
at all times. Rather, Japan's experience clearly shows that important variations 
on the general theme of market-oriented production are possible; the 
relationships between government, private enterprise and labour are critically 
important and variable determinants of the trajectory of development. This is an 
interesting enough story in itself. For Australian policy-makers, however, 
understanding the manner in which Australia's major trading partner has 
transformed itself in the space of 50 years from an irradiated wasteland to the 
dominant economic actor within its region is of critical importance. 
While this metamorphosis has by now been described many times, it merits 
brief review here for two reasons: Firstly, the Japanese case provides an 
important counterfactual for the Australian experience and a rebuttal of nee­
liberal theoretical models that neglect historical specificity and variation. 
Secondly, it is critical to distinguish those characteristics which continue to set 
Japanese capitalism apart: while they may be regarded as unfortunate 
deviations from idealised theoretical abstractions, they are clearly the reality 
with which the policy-makers and business people of other nations must deal. 
This chapter, therefore, will initially consider Japan's post-war development, 
and the political and economic relations that were critical to its success. 
Subsequently, a more detailed consideration of the structure of Japanese 
capitalism will be undertaken. As we have seen in previous chapters, the 
manner in which capital is organised within national economies, and its 
subsequent integration with the global economy exert crucial influences on 
national economic development and structures. It will be argued that not only 
has the distinctive organisation of corporate Japan conferred specific economic 
advantages upon the Japanese national economic space, but that this mode of 
organisation determines the manner in which external economic relations are 
conducted. Unless the distinctive organisational logic of Japanese capitalism is 
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comprehended it is unlikely that policies able to accommodate such practices 
will be successfully crafted by other nations. 
The Developmental State 
No adequate account of contemporary Japanese economic relations can 
neglect the legacy of the past. An historical perspective is an important aspect 
of attempts to explain any nation's policy initiatives and business practices; in 
the case of Japan it is indispensable. There are important qualities that 
distinguish Japan from the Anglo-American economies with which Australia is 
closely identified. While there is, as we shall see, a good deal of debate about 
the extent to which these distinctive practices continue in Japan and their ability 
to withstand the competitive pressures of increasing international economic 
interaction, there is greater agreement about their historical importance.1 
How, then, did Japan manage to transform itself from a virtual wasteland in 
1945 to the contemporary economic colossus that is variously regarded with 
awe, apprehension and incredulity? Plainly, it had no obvious 'comparative 
advantages' (the basis of the neo-classical explanation, it will be recalled) with 
which to begin the reconstruction process. A popular contention has it that 
distinctive Japanese 'cultural' qualities may help to account for its renaissance. 2 
Certainly, a predilection for group identity and consensus may have made the 
establishment of a national project based around a 'pro-growth policy' easier, 
especially if it both addressed the immediate concerns of reconstruction and 
survival, and helped expunge the humiliation of defeat from the national 
consciousness.3 There were, however, more prosaic and readily 
comprehended structures which were central to the re-construction of Japan's 
political economy. 
1 It should be noted, however, that this generalisation is not unproblematically extendable to 
observers operating in the neo-classical tradition: as the Japanese developmental experience 
amounts to a refutation of some of the central contentions of the paradigm, many of its 
adherents either understate or ignore those aspects of Japanese history and behaviour that are 
especially troubling. Yet without a recognition of the historically specific factors that determined 
Japanese development, no satisfactory explanation can be given of either the past or the 
present. 
2 Murakami, Yasusuke (1987) "The Japanese Model of Political Economy", in The Political 
Economy of Japan: Volume 1 -The Domestic Transformation, Yamamura, K., & Yasuba, Y., 
(eds) California, Stanford University Press: 33. 
3 Yamamura, Kozo (1986) "Caveat Emptor: The Industrial Policy of Japan", in Strategic Trade 
Policy and the New Economics, Paul Krugman (ed) Cambridge., Mass, M IT Press: 169. 
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distinguish Japan from the Anglo-American economies with which Australia is 
closely identified. While there is, as we shall see, a good deal of debate about 
the extent to which these distinctive practices continue in Japan and their ability 
to withstand the competitive pressures of increasing international economic 
interaction, there is greater agreement about their historical importance.1 
How, then, did Japan manage to transform itself from a virtual wasteland in 
1945 to the contemporary economic colossus that is variously regarded with 
awe, apprehension and incredulity? Plainly, it had no obvious 'comparative 
advantages' (the basis of the neo-classical explanation, it will be recalled) with 
which to begin the reconstruction process. A popular contention has it that 
distinctive Japanese 'cultural' qualities may help to account for its renaissance. 2 
Certainly, a predilection for group identity and consensus may have made the 
establishment of a national project based around a 'pro-growth policy' easier, 
especially if it both addressed the immediate concerns of reconstruction and 
survival, and helped expunge the humiliation of defeat from the national 
consciousness.3 There were, however, more prosaic and readily 
comprehended structures which were central to the re-construction of Japan's 
political economy. 
1 It should be noted, however, that this generalisation is not unproblematically extendable to 
observers operating in the neo-classical tradition: as the Japanese developmental experience 
amounts to a refutation of some of the central contentions of the paradigm, many of its 
adherents either understate or ignore those aspects of Japanese history and behaviour that are 
especially troubling. Yet without a recognition of the historically specific factors that determined 
Japanese development, no satisfactory explanation can be given of either the past or the 
present. 
2 Murakami, Yasusuke (1987) "The Japanese Model of Political Economy", in The Political 
Economy of Japan: Volume 1 - The Domestic Transformation, Yamamura, K., & Yasuba, Y., 
(eds) California, Stanford University Press: 33. 
3 Yamamura, Kozo (1986) "Caveat Emptor: The Industrial Policy of Japan", in Strategic Trade 
Policy and the New Economics, Paul Krugman (ed) Cambridge., Mass, MIT Press: 169. 
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The zaibatsu, or large, privately owned industrial empires, had been the 
backbone of Japan's pre-war industrialisation. Despite U S  attempts during the 
occupation to 'democratise the economy', principally by land reform and the 
dissolution of the industrial groups, the reforms did not greatly affect financial 
institutions associated with the zaibatsu, creating the basis for their subsequent 
revival. 4 Similarly, and equally importantly, the assumption informing U S  policy 
that the Japanese bureaucracy was apolitical and non-interventionist actually 
abetted the process of increased bureaucratic control over the economy by 
attempting to reduce the influence of the powerful families associated with the 
zaibatsu groups. 5 What US policy failed to recognise was that state 
involvement in the economy had been part of the Japanese political economy 
since the inception of the industrialisation process itself. The state developed 
institutions and mechanisms to facilitate its ability to implement policy which, 
while contested, led many Japanese to 'share a remarkably common view on 
the legitimacy of national government as guide and mentor'. 6 
Recognising that the political-economy of Japan operates in a manner 
significantly different to many western, and especially Anglo-Saxon economies 
is crucial, not only in comprehending its different development strategies, but 
also in formulating appropriate policy responses. In this regard, Chalmers 
Johnson's seminal contribution was important in drawing the attention of non­
Japanese to the manner in which the state-capital relationship was managed 
and development achieved. What Johnson called the 'developmental state' 
relied not upon the market mechanisms to allocate resources, but was 'plan 
rational': 
In the plan-rational state, the government will give greatest precedence to industrial 
policy, that is, to a concern with the structure of domestic industry and with promoting 
the structure that enhances the nation's international competitiveness. The very 
existence of an industrial policy implies a strategic, or goal-oriented approach to the 
economy.? 
The idea of state-business cooperation in pursuit of national goals has existed 
since the Meiji Restoration, but it has had a political, rather than an economic 
basis, Johnson contends. s Economic development underpinned and legitimated 
4 Seiyama, T (1989) "A Radical Interpretation of Postwar Economic Policies", in Japanese 
Capitalism Since 1 945, Morris-Suzuki, T & Seiyama, T (eds) New York, M E Sharpe Inc: 39. 
5 Johnson, Chalmers (1987) MIT/ and the Japanese Miracle: The Growth of Industry Policy 
1925- 1975, Tokyo, Charles E Tuttle: 44-5. 
6 Magaziner, Ira C., & Hout, Thomas M., (1980) Japanese Industrial Policy, Berkeley: Institute 
of International Affairs, University of California: 1/2. 
7 Johnson, Chalmers (1987) MIT/ and the Japanese Miracle :19. 
8 Johnson, Chalmers (1987) ibid :24. 
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the existent political order; contestation for power occurred within the ramified 
apparatuses of government. In retrospect, Johnson's analysis has had both 
positive and negative effects. On the one hand it demonstrated that Japan's 
post-war development owed a good deal more to state planning than it did to 
simple market forces. On the other, it has resulted in a continuing over­
emphasis on the role and importance of the Ministry of International Trade and 
Industry (MITI}, particularly in non-Japanese scholarship. 
Making a Miracle 
While there is no intention here to exhaustively detail the reconstruction 
process in Japan, indicating some of the more important innovations that were 
associated with it is helpful for two reasons. Firstly, the Japanese experience 
emphatically demonstrates that the course of economic development may be 
determined by specific forms of political and economic intervention which owe 
little to 'neutral' market mechanisms. Secondly, many of the distinctive qualities 
that distinguish Japanese capitalism continue to influence the conduct of 
business both within Japan itself and with Japan's economic partners. 
Not all the factors that fuelled Japan's resurgence can be attributed to the 
prescient expertise of interventionist bureaucrats, however. The outbreak of the 
Korean war was, from a Japanese point of view at least, rather fortunate, as it 
led to increased U S  investment and a general expansion of economic activity. 
As we shall see, Japan's initial role in U S  'grand strategy' as an anti-communist 
bulwark continues to have important long-term repercussions on Asia-Pacific 
trade relations. In the short-term Cold War context, traditional textile industries 
benefited and, more significantly, heavy and chemical industries received an 
important boost, producing the circumstances in which ' the basic structure of 
the postwar Japanese industrial policies . . . took definitive shape'.9 While 
Japan might not have created these fortuitous circumstances its leadership 
was able to take advantage of them through important strategic initiatives.10 
While MITI was neither the only, nor necessarily the most important of 
Japan's bureaucratic arms it, nevertheless, played a crucial role in Japan's 
development. MITI was central in controlling and directing the flow of capital 
9 ltoh, M., Kiyono, K., Okuno-Fujiwara, M. & Suzumura, K (1991) Economic Analysis of 
Industrial Policy, California, Academic Press Inc: 16-8. 
1 o The practice of amakudari, in which prominent bureaucrats 'retire' to positions in politics or 
industry enhances the relative influence of the bureaucracy and facilitates the implementation 
of policy. 
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through 'temporary' foreign exchange and trade laws. 11 Moreover, MIT! had the 
power to allocate foreign exchange to would-be importers of essential capital 
equipment, giving it crucial leverage in its desire to promote particular forms of 
industrialisation. Yamamura argues that the industrial policy of this period 
combined a policy of protecting the domestic market while promoting the 
'oligopolisation' of major industries, ensuring favoured companies a captive 
and potentially lucrative market, the latter being a crucial domestic 
development incentive. 12 Firms were encouraged to expand in proportion with 
existing market share. This ensured growth prior to internationalisation, as well 
as generating domestic competition without destabilisation, giving rise to what 
has been described as the 'compartmentalisation' of the Japanese economy. 13 
The problems of economic vulnerability and technological dependence 
experienced by the Japanese after the war meant that both the state's 
interventionist role and the powers the bureaucracy acquired were less 
contested in a period of national reconstruction .14 
The point to stress here is that, as Okimoto notes, the boundaries of 'market 
failure' were and are much wider in Japan. Consequently, unlike the reactive, 
ad hoc approach to economic policy-making that has characterised Anglo­
American economies, Japan's approach has been 'anticipatory, preventative, 
and aimed at positively structuring the market in ways that improve the 
likelihood that industry-specific goals will be achieved' .15 [Emphasis added.] 
Bureaucratic Politics 
It should also be recognised, however, that MITI's star has waned considerably. 
While it exercised enormous influence in Japan's high growth period, which 
11 Johnson, Chalmers (1987) MIT/ and the Japanese Miracle : 95. 
12 Yamamura, Kozo (1986) 'Caveat Emptor' :172/3 
13 Murakami, Yasusuke (1982) "Toward a Socio-institutional Explanation of Japan's Economic 
Performance", in Policy Trade Issues of the Japanese Economy, Yamamura, k (ed) Seattle, 
University of Washington Press. 
14 A cautionary note is in order here. Morris-Suzuki provides an important corrective to some 
of the more undifferentiated, historically un-specific accounts of Japan's rapid post-war 
development by pointing out that the emergence of its important technological capacity in 
particular was not simply state-led nor confined to the post-war period. Small scale centre of 
local government and private research and development were critical in allowing Japan to both 
adopt foreign technology and develop its own, both in the post-war period and before the 
Second World War. Japan's economic rise appears slightly the less 'miraculous' in the light of 
such considerations. See: Morris-Suzuki, T (1994) The Technological Transformation of Japan: 
From the Seventeenth to the Twenty-first Century, Cambridge University Press. 
15 Okimoto, D (1989) Between MIT! and the Market: Japanese Industrial Policy for High 
Technology, Stanford University Press, Stanford :11. 
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lasted from 1955 to 1973,16 in the contemporary era where the Japanese 
government is under relentless pressure to deregulate its economy further, 
MITI is no longer the force it was. The same cannot, however, be said of the 
Ministry of Finance (MoF), which was and remains arguably the single most 
important force within the Japanese political economy. Fingleton, for example, 
argues that the MoF amounts to a de facto government as it controls taxation, 
spending and defence.17 Other government agencies - including MITI - are 
dependent on the MoF for funding, reinforcing the latter's influence. 
Additionally, the MoF has virtual carte blanche from Japan's parliament, the 
Diet, to regulate and control Japan's financial sector as it sees fit. It is the MoF's 
role in drawing up the annual state budget that is the principle source of the 
MoF's power, allowing it to build 'an empire that is nearly unassailable'.18 
Like MITI, the MoF prefers to rely on 'guidance' rather than legal sanctions 
when attempting to implement policy. The Bank of Japan (BoJ) as the central 
bank is a major instrument of policy implementation, conducting monetary 
policy, intervening on the foreign exchange markets, and acting as a lender of 
last resort for the commercial banks. The 'window guidance' policy of the 
capital-scarce years up to the 1970s was effective in ensuring city bank 
compliance with MoF and industry policies: cooperation was ensured via the 
provision of cheap loans.19 The BoJ's power has diminished, however, as firms 
have either raised capital internally as profits expanded, or sought finance in 
the evermore powerful and accessible international markets. Despite this, the 
MoF's policies have fostered the development of 'national champions' (Nomura, 
Daiwa and the like) in the financial sector.2o 
This draws attention to one of the most fundamental challenges to the 
distinctive ways in which the Japanese political economy is organised: 
deregulation. Even though there would seem to be irrefutable evidence as to 
the efficacy of the Japanese developmental state and the benefits of 
'intervention', there is growing pressure for the influence of the bureaucracy to 
be lessened in the interests of purported efficiency gains and/or equity in 
16 For a review of government policies in this era, see: Seiyama, T (1989) "A Radical 
Interpretation of Postwar Economic Policies", in Japanese Capitalism Since 1 945, Morris­
Suzuki, T & Seiyama, T (eds) New York, M E Sharpe Inc: 49-67. 
17 Fingleton, E (1995) 'Japan's Invisible Leviathan', Foreign Affairs, 7 4 (2) : 72. 
18 Kakinuma, S & Fukunaga, H (1995) 'Break Up the Ministry of Finance!', Tokyo Business 
Today, 63 (1 ): 12. 
19 Suzuki, Y (1987) The Japanese Financial System, Clarendon Press, Oxford: 317. 
20 Nester, William R., (1991) Japanese Industrial Targeting: The Neo-Mercantilist Path to 
Economic Superpower, London, Macmillan, Chapter 7, passim. 
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international trade. There are international and domestic aspects to these 
deregulatory pressures. As Japan has become a more powerful and significant 
economic actor it has been increasingly drawn into attempts to manage 
international economic relations, particularly as they impact on currency 
relativities.21 There has been an inevitable diminution of the autonomy of 
Japan's policy-making elite as national policies are partly circumscribed and 
determined by international obligations. Furthermore, Japan's relationship with 
the U S  - which is considered in more detail below - helps explain and may 
exaggerate the 'reactive' nature of Japanese foreign policy in general.22 As we 
shall see, the U S  has enthusiastically tried to take advantage of Japanese 
equivocation to encourage deregulation in Japan - often at the direct urging of 
U S-based multi-nationals that consider themselves unfairly locked out of the 
Japanese market.23 
Even within Japan there is a growing domestic reform lobby.24 To a large extent 
this appears to be an inevitable consequence of even limited deregulatory 
initiatives: as the MoF relaxed its control over capital flows Japanese-based 
companies were able to access global financial centres and raise capital more 
cheaply outside Japan.25 Similarly, Japan's rapidly expanding financial and 
banking sector was keen to follow its clients overseas and establish a global 
presence to compete with U S  and European rivals. 26 Significantly, it was 
21 Funabashi, Y (1988) Managing the Dollar: From the Plaza to the Louvre, Institute for 
International Economics, Washington. 
22 Calder argues that Japan's external policy is characterised by 'hesitancy' and a 'deferential' 
attitude to the US in particular. Calder attributes this deference to a perception of economic 
vulnerability exacerbated by a fragmented state structure. Different branches of the state 
remain in 'perpetual domestic conflict', with the result that policy making is a site of intense 
contestation between the representatives of various domestic interests. The possibility exists, 
Calder argues, for 'crosscutting communities of interests' to be established between groups 
within Japan and external parties, where outside pressure is utilised to pursue a domestic 
agenda. See, Calder, Kent E., (1988) "Japanese Foreign Economic Policy Formation: 
Explaining the Reactive State", World Politics, 40 (4): 522. Furthermore, it has been argued, for 
example. that domestic pressure was more influential in ensuring the continued liberalisation of 
the Japanese financial sector, as indigenous oligopolists moved to protect overseas market 
access; foreign pressures were mediated by Japanese capitalists: Encarnation, Dennis J . ,  & 
Mason, Mark (1990) " Neither MIT I  nor America: The Political Economy of Capital Liberalization 
in Japan", International Organization, 44 (1 ): 25-54. 
23 Bremner, B et al (1995) 'Rougher trade: the US-Japan chasm widens', Business Week, July 
17th:16-8. 
24 Hartcher, P (1994) 'Central Bank Chief Slams ' Pack Mentality", Australian Financial Review, 
March 25th: 20. 
25 As Helleiner notes, members of 'Tokyo's financial community' have acquired significant 
external assets which they are keen to protect, and have therefore attempted to encourage a 
more 'internationalist' attitude on the part of government officials. Helleiner, E (1992) 'States 
and the Future of Global Finance', Review of International Studies, 18: 47. 
26 In Japan domestic banks were able to harness external pressures as a catalyst for change. 
See: Pauly, Louis W., (1988) Opening Financial Markets: Banking Politics on the Pacific Rim, 
Cornell University. At the same time the new financial markets meant that Japanese industry 
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domestic pressure from large exporters keen to protect overseas markets, 
rather than simply foreign pressure, that was crucial in encouraging the 
liberalisation process in Japan. However, as Encarnation and Mason observe, 
by that time Japanese oligopolies dominated the home market effectively 
excluding rivals and neutralising the possible negative effects of such 
liberalisation on the Japanese economic space. 27 
The deregulation process in Japan is an issue of critical importance not just for 
Japan itself, but also for those nations that wish to draw on Japan's huge 
capital surpluses. 28 While deregulation may be seen as part of a global trend, 
its effects in Japan have been particularly marked given its interventionist 
heritage. Although deregulation in Japan has been 'cautiously incremental' and 
predicated upon a desire to 'maintain balance' between institutions effected 
positively and adversely by change,29 it has been persuasively argued that the 
liberalisation process was an inevitable, if unanticipated, corollary of 
government policy: the government deficits that appeared in the wake of the 'oil 
shocks' were financed by bond issues that could not be absorbed within the 
local market, thus setting the stage for the latter's internationalisation.3o The 
first oil crisis caused an expansion of government fiscal policy as increased 
public debt was used to offset private spending caution, representing what 
Suzuki considers to be a major structural change in the economy.31 
Despite attention rightly having been drawn to the reactive nature of much 
Japanese policy-making, the domestic basis for change indicated above needs 
to be acknowledged. The Japanese experience has an important comparative 
function for the Australian case: clearly, if a larger, more structurally powerful 
economy like Japan's was unable to resist the pressures exerted by the 
was no longer reliant on the banking sector for capital: direct financing through equity related 
instruments became an attractive option. So significant did the 'financial engineering' (zaiteku) 
opened up by deregulation become for Japanese corporations that by 1987 50 per cent of 
profits were derived from financial rather than productive operations in 1987. See: Burstein, D 
(1990) Yen! Japan's New Financial Empire and Its Threat to America, Fawcett Columbine, New 
York: 44. 
27 Encarnation, D & Mason, M (1990) 'Neither MITI nor America: the political economy of 
capital liberalization in Japan', International Organization, 44 (1) Winter: 25-54. 
28 Shinkai, Yoichi (1992) "The Global Role of Japanese Finance", in Japanese Financial 
Markets and the Role of the Yen, McKenzie, C. & Stuchbury, M., (eds) Allen & Unwin, Sydney: 
75-86. 
29 Lincoln, Edward J. , (1988) Japan: Facing Economic Maturity, Washington, The Brookings 
Institute: 130. 
30 McKenzie, Colin (1992) "Recent Developments in Japan's Financial Markets", in Japanese 
Financial Markets and the Role of the Yen, McKenzie, C. & Stuchbury, M., (eds) Sydney, Allen 
& Unwin: 27. 
31 Suzuki, Yoshio (1987) The Japanese Financial System : 5/6. 
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internationalisation process, Australia could hardly have expected to maintain 
an autonomous economic posture. In this regard the Japanese government or, 
more accurately, the MoF faced a similar dilemma to Australian policy makers: 
ensuring Tokyo's place as a global financial centre without relinquishing control 
of the economy.32 Unlike Australia, however, in Japan there was less 
consensus - especially amongst Japan's still powerful bureaucratic elite - about 
the wisdom of full scale deregulation. Indeed, Argy's comparative analysis 
suggests that Japanese capital controls were relatively successful in stemming 
the volatility increased exposure to global financial markets brings until the 
beginning of the 'bubble economy'. 33 
Managing International Structural Adjustment 
Japan's efforts to accommodate the inevitable shocks increased exposure to 
and integration with the wider GPE merit examination for two major reasons: 
firstly, they provide an important insight into the operation of the contemporary 
Japanese political economy; secondly, they give some indication of the 
possible course of Japanese economic and political development with which 
economic partners, like Australia, will have to deal. The manner in which 
Japanese industry adjusted to new economic imperatives, especially its 
relocation to other countries, will be a major concern of the next chapter. At 
present, greater attention will be given to assessing the impact of the high Yen 
( endaka) and the bubble economy on the distinctive relationships that have 
distinguished the Japanese political economy. The intention here is not to 
present a detailed account of Japan's structural adjustment process - although 
the implications of this will be considered more fully in the next chapter - but to 
32 This discussion of Japanese deregulation draws heavily on: Higashi, Chikara & Lauter, 
Peter G., (1990) The Internationalization of the Japanese Economy, Boston, Kluwer Academic 
Publishers, Chapters 5 & 6 passim. 
33 Argy, V (1987) International Financial Liberalisation - The Australian and Japanese 
Experience Compared, Centre for Studies in Money, Banking and Finance, Macquarie 
University. Despite the MoF's attempts to manage the liberalisation of Japan's financial sector 
deregulation of interest rates has potentially serious implications for the MoF's ability to 
manage the macro-economic environment. Allowing banks more autonomy in setting interest 
rate levels may not only increase the cost of capital for Japanese business, but also threaten 
the competitive position of the postal savings system. The significance of the postal savings 
system in Japan should not be underestimated: in 1987 it was estimated to hold $US 2,300 
billion deposited at minimal rates of interest. Its attraction for depositors lies in its security, 
convenience and potential for tax evasion. These deposits have been re-routed through 
institutions like the 'Fiscal Investment and Loans Program' and into government 
instrumentalities like the Japan Development Bank, the Export-Import Bank, the Small 
business Finance Corporation and many others, providing a critical source of cheap capital with 
which the government could influence the development process. See: Reading, Brian (1992) 
Japan: The Coming Collapse, London, Weidefeld & Nicolson: 126/7 
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assess the impact of economic change on the theory and practice of Japanese 
economic management. 
That Japan currently has serious economic problems is not in doubt. Japan's 
banking sector is faced with the possibility of systemic collapse, 34 or the 
necessity of providing an estimated ¥30 trillion ($A500 billion) to forestall it. 35 In 
the event of the often volatile Nikkei stock average falling below 12,000 points 
there are concerns that even Japan's large 'city banks' may have trouble 
meeting their capital adequacy ratios. 36 The possibility of banks dramatically 
improving their short term positions has been lessened by a general collapse in 
property prices, 37 and the potential for a period of widespread deflation.3B In 
addition, as we shall see in greater detail in the next chapter, the appreciation 
of the Yen threatens the competitiveness, even the viability of large areas of 
Japanese industry. 39 
Critics of Japanese government-business relations have used the Japanese 
economy's current difficulties to promote market-oriented reforms. Reading, for 
example, considers the 'Japanese economic system' to be 'corrupt, 
paternalistic and nepotistic, a neo-feudal system operated for the benefit of 
powerful and wealthy political and industrial dynasties'.40 While Marxists might 
contend that these qualities, even if overstated, are not unique to Japan, their 
significance here is as an exemplar of one end the spectrum of analysis of 
Japan. At the other, is Vogel's altogether more approving review of the MoF's 
management of the deregulation process in Japan: not only does Vogel 
consider that the Mo F was able to maintain control of the pace and style of 
deregulation, but he contends that this avoided the 'incoherence' and 
34 Asai, H et al (1995) 'The End of the Post-war Banking System?', Tokyo Business Today, 63 
(11 ), November: 4-9. 
35 Hartcher, P (1995) ' Inaction as Banks Go Critical', Australian Financial Review, July 7th: 10. 
36 Japanese banks are allowed to count 45% of their unrealised capital gains derived from long 
term share-holdings as part of their reserve assets. However, with the decline of real estate 
values and stock market prices it has become apparent that Japanese assets are generally 
grossly over-valued. Bremner, B (1995) 'And now for the Really Bad News . . .  ', Business 
Week, July 1oth: 16/7; Boyd, A (1993) 'Japanese Banks Under Fire for Heavy Exposure to 
Stocks', Australian Financial Review, Dec 20th: 20. This not only has serious implications for 
Japan: in the event of the banks and others being forced to sell assets to meet obligations a 
general global capital shortage is possible as overseas holdings are liquidated. 
37 Friedland, J & do Rosario, L (1992) 'Financial Earthquake', Far Eastern Economic Review, 
November 26th: 55. 
38 Bremner, B (1995) 'That Sinking Feeling in Japan', Business Week, May 8th: 14-6. 
39 Treadwell, B (1994) 'Strong Yen Hampers Prosperity', The Australian, July 4th: 14. 
40 Reading, B (1992) Japan: The Coming Collapse, Orion, London: 5. For a more balanced and 
authoritative but, again, pro-market review of the bubble economy, see: Wood, C (1992) The 
Bubble Economy: The Japanese Economic Collapse, Sedgwick & Jackson, London. 
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'disruption' that characterised deregulation in the Anglo-American economies. 41 
Clearly, in the light of Japan's current difficulties, such a depiction is overly 
optimistic. What these contending perspectives illustrate is the notorious 
polarisation of theoretical interpretations in analyses of Japan and the need tor 
a more balanced picture. 
In this context, Calder's recent study is a noteworthy re-appraisal of 
governmental-business relations which draws attention to the role played by 
Japan's business class, and stresses the importance of the 'intense' dialogue 
between the public and private sector that is often neglected by statist 
accounts.42 Calder suggests that much of Japan's developmental direction and 
initiative came from the private sector in general and the long term credit banks 
in particular. The government, or the policy-making elites in the bureaucracy, 
were plagued by 'hesitancy' and 'clientelism', he claims. Certainly, the 
notoriously corrupt construction sector in Japan appears to confirm that a 
mutually rewarding nexus can develop around the allocation of government 
spending and exert a major influence on subsequent policy.43 Assessing the 
relative strength and influence of the parties is, however, a complex problem, 
and one best determined in specific circumstances. Samuels' study of Japan's 
energy markets is valuable in this regard, giving a more nuanced account of 
what he describes as 'reciprocal consent', or the 'transactional nature' of 
Japan's business-government relations 'in which firms give the state jurisdiction 
over markets in return tor their continuing control of those markets'. 44 
What such studies indicate is that the degree of control exercised by 'the state' 
is contingent and liable to vary in different sectors of the economy. Moreover, 
undifferentiated conceptions of a monolithic state unproblematically wielding 
power over and directing industry are no longer useful - if they ever were. 
Sheridan provides an example of this school of thought which considers that 
'the state's' planning is not only undiminished, but that its symbiotic relationship 
with private capital is necessarily beneficial and to be admired.45 The problem 
with this type of analysis is that it ignores the inevitable diminution of control 
41 Vogel, S (1994) 'The Bureaucratic Approach to the Financial Revolution: Japan's Ministry of 
Finance and Financial System Reform', Governance, 7 (3): 219-43. 
42 Calder, K (1993) Strategic Capitalism: Private Business and Public Purpose in Japanese 
Industrial Finance, Princeton University Press, Princeton: 12. 
43 McCormack, G (1994) 'Growth, Construction, and the Environment: Japan's Construction 
State', Paper Presented to Asian Studies Association of Australia Conference, Murdoch 
University, 14/7/94. 
44 Samuels, R J (1987) The Business of the Japanese State: Energy markets in Comparative 
and Historical Perspective, Cornell University Press, Ithaca: x. 
45 Sheridan, K (1993) Governing the Japanese Economy, Polity Press: 208/9. 
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over the economy and alterations in the relative balance of power that 
internationalisation brings, and makes unwarranted assumptions about 
economic development per se: it is one thing to recognise the effectiveness of 
government-business cooperation in Japan in promoting economic expansion, 
it is quite another to assume that this necessarily involves a component of 
social progress or redistribution. More usefully, however, Sheridan emphasises 
that government administrators and policy-makers in Japan have tended to be 
generalists, and that 'specialist knowledge and training of bureaucrats as 
economists has not been favoured as much as elsewhere in the world'. 46 
While it may be tempting to glibly conclude from this observation that narrowly 
trained economic experts may not be as effective as pragmatic generalists in 
developing a sense of national purpose and reacting flexibly to contingent 
circumstance, it is more useful to probe the wider ideational context that has 
produced such an approach and which is likely to influence the course of 
Japan's structural adjustment process. Plainly, bureaucratic involvement in the 
conduct of economic management is not seen as 'interference' in the otherwise 
efficient operation of market forces - as the dominant discourse in Australia 
would have it - but as a legitimate function of government. Certainly, the 
spectacular success of the Japanese economy, at least as measured in relative 
GOP increases, tends to further legitimise this role. But it is important to 
recognise that the inspiration for the techniques and strategies of economic 
management that policy-makers draw on is, especially in the domestic context, 
strikingly different from that which obtains in the Anglo-American economies. 
Although there has been little acknowledgment amongst orthodox economists 
about the potential impact of such ideational considerations on policy and the 
conduct of international economic relations, there has been greater recognition 
of this phenomenon amongst political-economists, especially in the US.47 As 
we shall see in the next chapter, many of these so-called 'revisionist' scholars 
currently occupy influential positions in the Clinton administration's economic 
policy-making apparatus - a reality that threatens to further undermine the 
46 Sheridan, K (1 993) Governing the Japanese Economy, : 207. 
47 For example, Thurow argues that the US, UK, Canada, New Zealand and Australia share a 
proclivity for more market-based economic policies which minimise government economic 
involvement. In contrast, Japan and Germany adopt a more 'communitarian' approach to the 
organisation of national economic activity. See: Thurow, L (1 992) Head to Head: The Coming 
Economic Battle Among Japan, Europe & America, Allen & Unwin, Sydney: 32-9. More 
immediately, the Prussian state was an important influence on post-Meiji Japan's administrative 
law, constitutional theory, military organization, and economic systems and thought - especially 
via Friedrich List. See: Williams, D (1 994) Japan: Beyond the End of History, Routledge, 
London: chapter 1 0. 
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idealised operation of market forces posited by the dominant Australian 
discourse. At present, however, it is important to recognise the influence of an 
alternative discourse, one not predicated upon the assumptions of neo-classical 
economics, which informs the conduct of economic policy in Japan. Friedrich 
List, rather than Adam Smith, has been a more significant theoretical influence 
in Japanese economic discourse.48 For List national well-being was dependent 
upon what a country could make, not what it could buy; an idea which helps to 
account for the enthusiasm shown by government and business in Japan for 
controlling key technologies and privileging market share over profitability, 
revisionists contend. 49 
There existed, therefore, a distinctively different political rationality and tradition 
of governmental involvement and intervention in the economy, one which drew 
its inspiration from an alternative stream of economic thought and which was 
legitimated by the overall success of the Japanese economy. However, this role 
has been subjected to increasing criticism in the recent past, as Japan's 
economic growth has slowed and its industry shown unaccustomed signs of 
vulnerability. 50 While much orthodox commentary predictably emphasises the 
supposedly negative influences of bureaucratic 'interference', 51 what is less 
often observed is that most of Japan's current difficulties are directly attributable 
to the relaxation of government controls over the economy. The excesses of 
the bubble economy in Japan have similar origins to those experienced in 
Australia. The opening up of the domestic financial sector certainly permitted 
greater competition amongst lenders, but this was not the unqualified boon its 
advocates predicted. On the contrary, left to their own devices Japanese banks 
demonstrated a similar incompetence and lack of caution to their Australian 
counterparts. 52 The difference was, of course, that an economy the size of 
48 Morris-Suzuki, T (1989} A History of Japanese Thought, Routledge, London: 58-60. 
49 Fallows, J (1993) Looking at the Sun: The Rise of the New East Asian Economic and 
Political Systems, Pantheon Books, New York: Chapter 4. 
50 Not only have sections of business expressed reservations about the competitiveness of 
Japan's regulated approach to economic management, but the bureaucracy itself is 
increasingly seen as both inflexible and corrupt. See, respectively: Hamilton, D (1994} 
'Reformers in Call For Shifts to Private Sector', The Asian Wall Street Journal, August 16: 1 & 5; 
Hartcher, P (1994) 'Japandemonium as insider buckets the bureaucracy', Australian Financial 
Review , September 20: 1 & 12; Baum, J et al (1995} 'Grease That Sticks', Far Eastern 
Economic Review, March 23: 54-/5. 
51 Mallaby provides a typical assessment of this type. He argues that not only is the Japanese 
bureaucracy inherently inefficient, but that a western-style 'intellectual revolution', supported by 
the individualising effects of technological development, will inevitably see Japan dispense with 
the qualities that distinguish its brand of capitalism in favour of those of the more efficient west. 
See: Mallaby, S (1994} 'Oriental Renaissance: A Survey of Japan', The Economist , July 9th. 
52 As the liberalisation of Japan's financial markets allowed Japanese borrowers to tap into 
global markets, local banks increasingly chased market share and lent money recklessly, 
especially to real estate developers. The inevitable crash threatens not only the viability of 
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Japan's experiencing rapid asset inflation , currency appreciation and a general 
relaxation of capital flows had significant impacts on other economies as well. 
These will be considered in more detail in subsequent chapters. 
It is Japan's sheer economic weight in the region that makes its domestic policy 
and its subsequent impact on capital flows of such importance to its 
neighbours, including Australia. We have seen that there is evidence to 
suggest that the ability of the bureaucracy to imprint its will unproblematically 
on corporate activities in Japan is diminishing. True , M IT I  continues to produce 
'visionary' statements about its preferred developmental course but , 53 as we 
shall see , it is unclear how closely business follows such injunctions in the 
post-growth era where the necessity for co-operatively engineered national 
development is less pressing. What is a lso of significance here is the degree to 
which changes in Japan's political system will effect not only the relative 
balance of power between the bureaucracy and the nation's political elite , but 
also - and more pertinently for our purposes - the manner in which policy is 
constructed and external economic relations are conducted. 
The Political Dimension 
Although the implications of Japan's model of politico-bureaucratic decision 
making are generally neglected by orthodox economic accounts , their possible 
impact has long been recognised by the revisionist camp. The primacy of the 
bureaucracy and the distributional coalitions that have coalesced around it 
place crucial constraints upon possible policies. A crucial distinguishing feature 
of the Japanese polity is the reduced influence of politicians in general and the 
prime minister in particular. Consequently , as van Wolferen suggests , despite 
intense competition within politics , business and the bureaucracy: 
... the relationships that count do not normally involve major problems, 
notwithstanding the great rivalries. The bureaucrats tinker with the economy, making 
adjustments to facilitate its growth. The politicians and almost everyone else keep out 
of their way. Parliamentary representatives, largely chosen for their pork-barrelling 
skills, attend mainly to the business of getting re-elected. Since this depends largely on 
their ability to spread the national wealth politicians are perpetually indebted to the 
bureaucratic guardians of the budget. The industrialists continue to expand their foreign 
market shares, and enter new markets with the help of the bureaucrats. They are kept 
in line by their peers; and they pay the politicians. Nobody is boss, but everybody, in 
some way or other, has leverage over somebody else, which helps ensure an orderly 
state of affairs ... Power in Japan is thus diffused over a number of semi-self-
individual banks but the integrity of the Japanese financial sector as a whole. Wood, C (1992) 
The Bubble Economy: The Japanese Economic Collapse, Sidgwick & Jackson, London, 
Chapter 2. 
53 "Miti's mission for the 1990s", (1990) Journal of Japanese Trade and Industry, No 5. 
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contained, semi-mutually dependent bodies which are neither responsible to an 
electorate nor, ultimately, subservient to one another. While all these bodies share 
aspects of government, it is impossible to find one among them that gives the others 
their mandate. 54 
It is not necessary to endorse all van Wolfren's thesis about the Japanese 
'system' and its supposedly all-embracing methods of elite directed social 
through enforced harmony, 55 to conceded that his depiction has a good deal of 
c redibility, especially about the pre-bubble polity.56 The important question is 
whether the contemporary difficulties experienced by Japan's economy will 
sufficiently de-legitimise the existent model to create the preconditions for a 
substantial transformation. Certainly, prominent politicians like lchiro Ozawa 
have received much attention for suggesting that Japan become a 'normal' 
nation, in which the political class enjoys a degree of influence and power 
comparable with its western counterparts, and the political system itself is 
subject to greater contestation, rather than the continued monopolisation by 
the Liberal Democratic Party ( LOP). 57 Even within the LOP itself, the recent 
election of Ryutaro Hashimoto as LOP leader and subsequently Prime Minister 
continues a trend toward more powerful, western-style political leaders. 58 
However, despite the rhetoric of reform it is possible that the LOP's continuing 
reliance on a powerful agricultural lobby and links with the bureaucracy will 
militate against dramatic change.59 
While such sentiments may be superficially attractive, and have received 
optimistic endorsement by western commentators, 60 it remains to be seen how 
significant any change will be. Ozawa's own consummate political skills 
54 Wolferen, Harel van (1989) The Enigma of Japanese Power: People and Politics in a 
Stateless Nation, London, Macmillan: 54/5. 
55 Wolferen, Harel van (1989) The Enigma of Japanese Power: 474. 
56 It should be noted, however, that there is convincing evidence that the bureaucracy's power 
in relation to their supposed political masters continues and has been demonstrated in the 
MoF's refusal to allow Hosokawa's proposed tax cuts without a corresponding increase in 
consumption tax and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' insistence that he cease making references 
to 'Japan's war of aggression' during World War II. McGregor, R (1994) 'Captive of Tokyo's 
Counter Terrorists', The Australian, February 22nd: 9. 
57 Ozawa, I (1994) Blueprint for a New Japan: The Rethinking of a Nation, Kodansha 
International, Tokyo. 
58 Bremner, B (1995) 'Here Comes Hashimoto', Business Week, September 11: 16/7. 
59 What may prove of greater significance is Hashimoto's more abrasive approach to US-Japan 
relations generally and trade talks in particular. See: Hartcher, P (1995) 'Japan's emerging 
leader has a "US revulsion'", Australian Financial Review, September 18: 11. 
60 Calder, for example thinks that Japanese politics is currently 'intensely dynamic' as the 
'economic and strategic' circumstances that underpinned LDP rule have been transformed. But 
even he concedes the importance of the networks of personal contacts that permeate Japan's 
political-bureaucratic establishment and which are central to decision making processes. See: 
Calder, K (1993) 'Japan's Changing Political Economy', in Unger, D & Blackburn, P (eds) 
Japan's Emerging Global Role, Lynne Rienner, Boulder:121-129. 
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garnered in the LOP and his ability to manipulate factional interests do not 
suggest more democratic processes are imminent. 61 Indeed, it remains to be 
seen how significant the proposed changes to the Japanese electoral system 
itself will prove in transforming Japanese money politics. 62 Japan is clearly in a 
period of major adjustment to external economic forces that are having complex 
effects within the domestic political-economy. It is both unrealistic and 
unprofitable, therefore, to attempt any definitive assessment of what the likely 
long-term impact of such forces will be. The important point to recognise here, 
however, is that the adjustment process will be mediated by identifiable 
domestic actors who will help to determine its course and the sorts of policies 
and strategies that accompany it. Japan has specific, historically-constituted 
social and political forces that will influence policy outcomes and with which 
trading partners will have to deal. While it might not be possible to determine in 
advance precisely what form Japan's adjustment policies will take, it is possible 
to identify some of the more significant actors that will determine them and the 
likely consequences of their relative influence. 
Of central importance here will be the position of corporate Japan. To reiterate 
a theme that has been central to this thesis: it is multi-national corporate capital 
that is the primary agent of global transformation and with which national policy­
makers must seek to deal. It is important, therefore, that the structure and 
operational logic of Japanese industry is clearly illustrated; as it will be 
corporate Japan that exerts a critical influence not only on domestic policies 
and adjustment but also upon the policies of its trading partners as they seek to 
position themselves to maximise the opportunities Japanese adjustment 
presents. 
61 It is noteworthy in this context that Ozawa has been accused of accepting cash 'donations' 
from the notoriously corrupt construction sector, which both confirms the continuing importance 
of money politics and raises doubts about the extent of any move to more transparent 
business practices that might be accessible to foreigners. See: McGregor, R (1993} 'Bribery 
Claim Hits Japan's New Kingpin', The Weekend Australian, 6-7 November: 11. 
62 Takeuchi, Y (1994) 'Old and New Coordinates of Japan's Political Forces', Japan Echo, Vol 
XXI (4), Winter: 38-45. The manner in which domestic political lobbies can constrain even the 
most 'progressive' politicians is illustrated by Japan's agricultural sector and the rice farmers in 
particular, who represent a crucial, if diminishing, bloc of votes and material resources. Smiley, 
R (1993) 'Something New Under the Sun: Electoral Reform in Japan', Current Affairs Bulletin, 
70 (5}: 26. For a more general overview of the policy-making process, see: Krauss, E (1989) 
'Politics and the Policymaking Process', in Ishida, T & Krauss, E (eds), Democracy in Japan, 
University of Pittsburgh: 39-63. For an indication of just how central and entrenched money 
politics, corruption and the nexus between politicians and business is in Japan, see: 
McCormack, G (1994) 'Growth, Construction, and the Environment: Japan's Construction 
State', Paper Presented to Asian Studies Association of Australia Conference, Murdoch 
University, 14/7/94. 
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Collective Capitalism 
Several key ideas have emerged from our general and comparative 
discussions of international economic transformation. Firstly, the course of 
national development, while heavily constrained and contingent, was not 
inevitable. Secondly, national policy-makers were and are able to exert varying 
degrees of influence upon the activities of domestically-based and international 
capital. Thirdly, the manner in which particular enterprises are organised 
depends not only on the industry sector and productive process with which it is 
engaged, but also upon the particular national and historical milieu from which it 
emerged. This is nowhere clearer than in the case of Japan. While it is 
important to acknowledge that there may have been an element of 
exceptionalism about Japan's historical developmental experience and the 
contingent social and political circumstances that informed it, the 'Japanese 
model' is no longer of simply parochial interest. On the contrary, not only have 
elements of the Japanese model been self-consciously emulated and 
transplanted in countries like Korea, Taiwan and to a lesser extent Malaysia, 
but Japan is becoming less self-effacing about the merits of its particular form 
of capitalist organisation. Rather, Japan appears to be self-consciously 
attempting to export its corporate style to its neighbours, in direct competition 
with the 'hegemonic' Anglo-American, laissez faire model. 63 
Therefore, as Japan is increasingly the dominant economic actor in Australia's 
region, comprehension of the specific operational logic that informs the 
companies that have developed there is essential, not only to facilitate 
interaction with the Japanese political-economy, but also to gain some insight 
into the operation of a more generalised model of 'Asian' capitalism. 54 Again, an 
historical perspective - something generally conspicuous by its absence in neo­
classical models - is an indispensable part of any explanation. 
In the last chapter Lazonick's valuable schemata, which distinguishes 
between three broad, historically sequential forms of capitalist enterprise 
63 The Economist (1995) 'The Struggle for Vietnam's Soul', June 24th: 27/8. 
64 Care needs to be taken here in distinguishing between those forms of capitalism in Asia that 
more closely follow the Japanese model, and those which resemble Chinese-style patterns of 
development. While these distinctions are important, the willingness to adopt a more pragmatic 
and interventionist role on the part of government is something that is relatively widespread and 
owes a good deal to the Japanese exemplar. See: Whitley, R (1991) 'The Social Construction 
of Business Systems in East Asia', Organization Studies, 12 (1 ):1-26. 
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organisation - proprietary, managerial, and collective - was briefly introduced. 65 
Proprietary capitalism was associated with the industrial revolution in Britain 
and characterised by the integration of asset ownership and managerial control. 
The crucial evolutionary distinction of managerial capitalism was the separation 
of ownership from control, allowing a greater degree of managerial 
specialisation and complexity, which in turn permitted the organisation and 
coordination of much larger scale production, including the physical, human 
and financial resources that underpinned such expansion. The emergence of 
publicly owned joint stock companies conferred a greater degree of control on 
the new class of corporate managers and created a vastly expanded pool of 
capital with which to further enterprise growth. An increasingly specialised 
division of labour and multi-divisional structure within individual companies 
allowed expansion of the scale and scope of corporate activities as well as 
their spatial dispersion. However, by end of the 1960s the limitations of what 
might be broadly characterised as a Fordist mode of accumulation were 
becoming apparent. Simultaneously, and especially since the 1970s, it was 
clear that Japanese capitalism was not only outperforming its western 
counterparts, but appeared to be organised on distinctly different organisational 
foundations. 
Notwithstanding the ideational dominance of a discourse predicated upon the 
nostrums of economic liberalism at the height of Britain and the US's greatest 
economic influence, Lazonick rightly observes that the state played a crucial 
role in reinforcing that economic paramountcy through discriminatory trade 
practices. In this regard Japan's rise has followed a similar path, although with 
notably less emphasis on ideological proselytisation. In the Japanese case the 
role of the state has been more comprehensive in attempting to coordinate the 
extent and direction of Japanese industrial development. This has encouraged 
the planned coordination of vertically related companies and more integrated 
forms of financial control. At the same time organisational integration extends 
throughout the corporate hierarchy to include the general labour force, creating 
a situation where: 
The combination of far-reaching organizational integration with private-sector 
manufacturing and the activist role of the state in creating an economic and social 
environment conducive to the emergence of innovative business enterprises represents 
a qualitatively new mode of business organization in the evolution of capitalism. 66 
[Emphasis added.] 
65 Lazonick, W (1993) Business Organization and the Myth of the Market Economy, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, chapter 1, passim. 
66 Lazonick, W (1993) ibid:  37/8. 
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Whether this means that other business organisations will be forced to emulate 
Japanese practices to compete, or whether Japanese capitalism is the 
inevitable and inescapable form of future global economic development are 
interest ing questions, but ones that are both impossible and unnecessary to 
answer here. The important point to recognise is that Japanese capitalism as it 
currently exists - and with which outsiders must contend - operates in particular 
ways which need to be understood and acknowledged. 
Production and the Japanese Firm 
Before considering the distinctive, overarching organisational structures within 
which many Japanese firms are located, it is worth briefly reviewing some of the 
distinctive qualities, 'flexible rigidities' to borrow Dare's evocative term, 67 that 
appeared to have conferred a competitive advantage on Japanese industry 
and to which competitor nations have attempted to respond. 
The production process in Japan displays distinctive characteristics. Japan has 
what has been described as a 'dual economy', in which the relatively small 
number of large manufacturing enterprises use sub-contract suppliers to 
provide them with productive inputs - to such an extent that only an average of 
25 per cent of the value added is generated internally by the company that sells 
the final product, compared with 50 per cent in the US or UK. 68 The large 
companies derive numerous benefits from this arrangement: the risks inherent 
in specialization are diversified; a core pool of life-time employees can be 
retained with fluctuations in labour demand being absorbed by the sub­
contractors; output levels can be adjusted easily and flexibly; parts inventories 
can be kept low, reducing costs and allowing just-in-time delivery and rigid 
quality control procedures to be practiced. 69 Sub-contractors also have an 
ability to act as 'shock absorbers' in cushioning the impact of external 
fluctuations in demand. Suppliers are systematically squeezed by the 
assemblers, especially in downturns - something that has enabled Japanese 
industry to make remarkable adjustments to the appreciation of the Yen, and 
the loss of competitiveness that implies. Additionally, suppliers are expected to 
67 Dare, R (1986) Flexible Rigidities: Industrial Policy and Structural Adjustment in the 
Japanese Economy 1970-80, Stanford University Press, Stanford. 
68 Eccleston, Bernard (1989) State and Society in Post-War Japan, Cambridge: Polity Press: 
31. 
69 For one of the most useful overviews of the distinctive organisation and commercial 
practices of Japanese firms, see: Abegglen, J & Stalk, G (1985) Kaisha, The Japanese 
Corporation, basic Books, New York. 
15 1 
provide productivity improvements and demonstrate total loyalty in what has 
been described as an almost feudal relationship. 70 
As we shall see, however, this system is under pressure; as is perhaps the 
most distinctive of all Japanese practices: life-time employment. There is a 
good deal of debate about the significance of labour's place in corporate Japan, 
much of which is germane to our discussion, as it is a potential source of 
competitive advantage and the possible template for domestic Australian labour 
reform, both within Japanese subsidiaries, but more broadly as a response to 
the imperatives of 'Asian competition'. Superficially the depiction of Japanese 
firms as 'coalitions of stakeholders'71 seems to refute the zero-sum, inherently 
exploitative conception of capitalist production presented by Marxists in 
particular. 72 Certainly, the idea that labour is not simply dispensed with in the 
event of economic downturn lends weight to this idea. However, critics contend 
that Japanese labour processes simply amount to more efficient methods of 
extracting surplus value from the labour force, in which individual workers are 
crucial components of enhanced productivity.73 A more measured assessment 
suggests that the achievement of life-time employment is a significant victory 
for the third of Japan's labour force to which such benefits apply, and an 
integral part of Japan's 'post- Fordist' mode of accumulation.74 
Clearly a cooperative workforce with company-based unions makes the task of 
Japanese corporate management simpler. 75 Ironically, however, when 
enterprise bargaining appears to be gaining ground in Australia, the basis of 
70 Sakai, Kuniyasu (1990) "The Feudal World of Japanese Manufacturing", Harvard Business 
Review, Nov-Dec: 38-51. 
71 Aoki, M (1988) Information, Incentives, and Bargaining in the Japanese Economy, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge: 4. 
72 According to the recently appointed and potentially influential director general of the 
International Finance Bureau at the MoF, Japan has succeeded in 'eradicating the capitalist 
class as a whole'. While Marxists might regard this as an inherently implausible and fanciful 
claim, it is revealing example of the thinking of senior bureaucrats and that continues to inform 
the policy-making process. See: Sakakibara, E (1992) 'Japan: Capitalism Without Capitalists', 
International Economic Insight, 3 (4): 45-7. 
73 Dohse, K., Jurgens, U & Maisch, T (1985) 'From 'Fordism' to 'Toyotism'? The Social 
Organization of the Labour Process in the Japanese Automobile Industry', Politics and Society, 
14 (2): 115-46. 
74 Kenney, M & Florida, R (1988) 'Beyond mass Production: Production and the Labour 
Process in Japan', Politics and Society, 16: 121-58. 
75 Lash and Urry contend that Japanese corporate organization represents one ideal-typical 
variant of post-organised capitalist 'reflexive accumulation', in which knowledge and information 
play an increasingly important role in determining profitability. In this context, the 'collective self­
monitoring' of the workforce allows the rapid transmission of information within the firm and 
becomes a crucial source of competitive advantage, permitting flatter production structures and 
more effective quality control. Lash, S & Urry, J (1994) Economies of Signs and Space, Sage 
Publications, London: 65-80. 
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this compromise between capital and labour in Japan - security of employment 
- is increasingly under threat. International competition and the hollowing out of 
Japanese manufacturing - described in more detail in the next chapter - are 
forcing Japanese companies to shed labour,76 What is of most significance 
here, however, is that one of the original sources of Japan's competitive 
advantage - stable employment relations and life-long skill acquisition with one 
employer - is simply not consistent with the model of a mobile labour force 
flexibly responding to the demands of market forces, as both orthodox theory 
and Australian business rhetoric might indicate.?? Conventional interpretations 
of the larger structures of Japanese corporate capital are similarly inadequate. 
Japanese lndu�riaiGroups 
The shortcomings of the neo-classical model and its assumptions of ideal­
typical economic actors and perfect competition are nowhere more apparent 
than in its conception of individual enterprises.?B As we have seen, the 
evolution of more extensive productive activities conferred specific advantages 
of scale and scope: oligopolisation was not necessarily a source of 'inefficiency' 
but the potential basis of significant competitive advantage for individual 
enterprises. In Japan these potential benefits were recognised and 
supplemented by a range of institutional and situational factors that conferred 
additional advantages on Japanese corporations. 
76 Asian Wall Street Journal, (1994) 'Powerhouse Yen May Cost Japan 3.56 Jobs, New Study 
Says', July, 16th: 4. 
77 On the other hand local industrial relations practices seem not to be a critical determinant of 
Japanese investment decisions, at least as far as imposing a Japanese style set of labour 
relations is concerned. Generally, Japan's distinctive pattern of labour relations is not 
transplanted overseas, following local practices instead. Levine, S & Ohtsu, M (1991) 
'Transplanting Japanese Labour Relations', ANNALS, AAPSS, 513, January:102-16. 
78 In neo-classical theory the activities of firms parallel those of utility maximising households. 
In Marshall's conception, for example, the 'law' of diminishing returns fulfilled the same purpose 
as marginal utility for households. Importantly, the neo-classical model rests on ideal-typical 
abstractions and assumptions, the most significant of which was that competition between firms 
would prevent any single enterprise from achieving an oligopolistic position and influencing or 
'distorting' market prices. Even Clark's subsequent and more sophisticated 'marginal 
productivity theory of distribution' is predicated upon 'natural laws' that efficiently and fairly 
allocate resources when unfettered; income is equal to the value of each productive factor's 
marginal product. It hardly needs to be said that the distribution of the surplus created in 
production is a more complex process that such a model suggests. More pertinent here, 
however, are the untenable assumptions the neo-classical model continues to make about both 
the firm and the individual utility maximising entrepreneur at the centre of such conceptions. 
See: Hunt, E (1979) History of Economic Thought: A Critical Perspective, Wadsworth, 
California, Chapter 12, passim. 
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Mention has already been made of the zaibatsu, the privately-owned industrial 
empires that dominated the Japanese economy before World War I I. Johnson 
suggests that US attempts to break-up the zaibatsu groups in the post-war 
period were instrumental in entrenching the influence and power of the 
bureaucracy and establishing the preconditions for the type of government­
business cooperation that characterised Japan's high-growth period.79 In 
addition, Aoki argues that the attempted dissolution of the zaibatsu amounted 
to a 'managerial revolution from above' which introduced a new cadre of 
'technocratic' managers who inaugurated many of the organisational 
innovations associated with the organisation of Japanese capitalism. 8o While 
Aoki's observations draw attention to significant aspects of post-war change, it 
is important not to neglect the political aspects of what might otherwise appear 
as simply neutral and 'technical' responses to the problem of post-war 
reconstruction: Japan's distinctive labour relations system, for example, 
emerged as an attempt to control an increasingly politicised and recalcitrant 
labour force. 81 Similarly, the extent of US attempts to reform Japan's corporate 
structures was constrained by nascent Cold War strategic imperatives.82 
Consequently, older zaibatsu groupings like Mitsubishi, Mitsui and Sumitomo, 
far from disappearing, became pillars of Japan's post-war political economy. 
The continued importance of the huge Japanese industrial groups is easily 
demonstrated: although there were over 1.5 million corporate enterprises 
registered in 1982, only 2,455 were classified as 'big businesses' (over ¥1 
billion capitalisation), while 'very big business' (over ¥ 10 billion capitalisation) 
represented a mere 322 firms. 83 In addition to Mitsubishi, Mitsui and Sumitomo, 
the Fuyo, Dai-lchi Kangyo and Sanwa Groups make up the 'big six' industrial 
groups that dominate Japan's economy. 
Deciding quite what to call the post-war industrial groups is itself slightly 
contentious. Odagiri argues that it is important to distinguish between 
79 Johnson, Chalmers (1987) MIT/ and the Japanese Miracle: 112-15. 
80 Aoki, M (1987) 'The Japanese Firm in Transition", in Yamamura, K & Yasuba, Y (eds) The 
Political Economy of Japan: Volume 1 - The Domestic Transformation, Stanford University 
Press, Stanford: 269. It should be noted, however, that Johnson stresses the continuity of 
personnel, especially but not exclusively in the bureaucracy, that carried forward the 
implementation of Japan's industry policies both before and after the war. Johnson, Chalmers 
(1987) MIT/ and the Japanese Miracle: 114. 
81 Gordon, A (1993) 'Contests for the Workplace', in Gordon, A (ed) Postwar Japan as History, 
University of California Press, Berkeley: 373-94. 
82 Sumiya, T (1989) 'The Structure and Operation of Monopoly Capital in Japan', in Morris­
Suzuki, T & Seiyama, T (eds) Japanese Capitalism Since 1945, Sharpe, New York: 114. 
83 Sumiya, Toshio (1989) "The Structure and Operation of Monopoly Capital in Japan": 105. 
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hierarchically organised groups (keiretsu), and horizontally organised, nominally 
independent firms (kigyo-shudan).84 This is an important distinction, but 1 shall 
follow Gerlach in utilising the term keiretsu as a general conceptual term, in 
which: 
The keiretsu is best seen . . .  not as a particular pattern among specific sets of firms but 
as an overall process in which arms'- length markets are replaced by intercorporate 
cooperation of varying degrees of intensity: by long-term relationships among legally  
independent enterprises; the linkage of  business ties across multiple market sectors 
(most commonly, although not exclusively. with equity ownership); and the setting of 
these relationships in a symbolic framework and in the context of broader networks each 
partner has with other firms. [Emphasis in original.]85 
In what follows, therefore, I shall use keiretsu as a generic term and specify the 
nature of particular group structures where necessary. 
Keiretsu Networks 
It is crucially important to recognise that relationships between firms in Japan 
simply do not follow the idealised pattern of arms-length relationships between 
distinct and inherently competitive enterprises that orthodox theory suggests. 
Rather, keiretsu networks are intercorporate alliances that represent 'coherent 
clusters of preferential exchange among traders often linked together over the 
course of decades'. 86 These mutually beneficial alliances are reinforced by the 
structure of keiretsu networks. Individual industrial groupings may have varying 
degrees of horizontally or vertically integrated operations, and greater or lesser 
degrees of hierarchical control. Horizontal keiretsu involve an affiliation of firms 
over a wide range of industries, such as Mitsubishi, within which the overall 
group of companies includes banking, heavy industries, brewing, chemicals, 
engineering, paper, food, petroleum, electronics, mining, textiles, shipping, and 
cars. 87 Vertical keiretsu have a more tightly defined production focus and 
rationale, and consist of one or more large industrial conglomerates and their 
subsidiaries, plus allied companies, major customers and subcontractors -
Toyota, for example.88 But even Toyota, although largely independent, is also a 
84 Odagiri, H (1994) Growth Through Competition, Competition Through Growth: Strategic 
Management and the Economy in Japan, Clarendon Press, Oxford: 161. 
85 Gerlach, M (1992) 'Twilight of the Keiretsu? A Critical Assessment', Journal of Japanese 
Studies, 18 (1) Winter: 82. 
86 Gerlach, M (1992) Alliance Capitalism: The Social Organization of Japanese Business, 
University of California Press, Berkeley: 4. 
87 Eli, M (1990) Japan Inc.: Global Strategies of Japanese Trading Corporations, McGraw-Hill,  
London: 21. 
88 Lawrence, R (1993) 'Japan's Different Trade Regime: An Analysis with particular Reference 
to Keiretsu', Journal of Economic Perspectives, 7 (3): 3-19. 
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member of the wider Tokai Group, which includes a range of companies 
involved in diverse activities from finance to construction and retailing. 
Generally, a keiretsu grouping consists of a main bank, a trading company 
(sogo shosha), and various manufacturing companies. Loyalty, identity and 
corporate cohesion are reinforced by participation in presidents' councils, in 
which the leaders of the various divisions meet to discuss group policy. Group 
companies have cross-holdings of infrequently traded shares in fellow keiretsu 
members which reinforce company loyalty and dependency, while 
simultaneously insulating individual companies from hostile takeovers - allowing 
Japanese companies to privilege market share over short-term profitability. 89 
As Gerlach notes, alliance patterns based on cross equity holdings are 
characteristic of Japan's industrial organization in general, and not confined to 
more formal inter-market groupings. 90 The structure of Japanese capitalism, 
then, predisposes companies to inter-act in particular ways and to cooperate 
over time for reasons that are not apparent in orthodox analyses that simply 
focus on profitability and immediate commercial gain. This is not to suggest 
that group members do not trade with outside companies. Rather, it is to 
suggest that, ceteris paribus, members of Japanese industrial groups will 
favour other members where possible, particularly where this does not interfere 
with commercial considerations. Japanese commercial relationships are not 
driven simply by market pressures - fostering long-term, mutually beneficial 
relationships may be more important than achieving short-term financial gain. 
Sogo Shosha 
Keiretsu networks, then, predispose Japanese companies toward long-term 
preferential business relationships that are not simply predicated upon short­
term commercial benefit. However, the maintenance of these relationships 
would be more problematic were it not for the activities of another distinctive 
feature of corporate Japan, the general trading companies or sogo shosha. The 
sogo shosha merit especial consideration not only because they illustrate the 
shortcomings of the neo-classical conception of the firm, but because they are 
often the principal instrument through which Japan's economic relations are 
mediated, and the initial point of contact with which trading partners must deal. 
89 This is something that revisionist scholars have suggested is responsible for Japan's rapid 
takeover of large shares of the US market in the electronic and automotive industries. See: 
Vogel, E (1987) Japan As No 1: Lessons for America, Tuttle, Tokyo: 133-8. 
90 Gerlach, M (1992) Alliance Capitalism: 18. 
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For this reason, the table reproduced above uses the trading companies as the 
major organisational focus, rather than the more conventional depictions of 
industrial groups centred around one of the 'big six', like Mitsubishi, for 
example. 91 
Table 2 
Major Business Groups Formed Around General Trading Companies (GTC) 
GTC Main Bank Business Group Main Members 
Mitsubishi Corporation Mitsubishi Bank Mitsubishi Group Mitsubishi Group 
Mitsui Bussan Fuji Bank (Mitsui Mitsui Group Mitsui Group 
Bank) 
Sumitomo Corporation Sumitomo Bank Sumitomo Group Sumitomo Group 
Marubeni Corporation Fuji Bank Fuyo Group Yasuda Group 
Shoden Group 
Nissan Group 
Hitachi Manufac. GroL 
C ltoh Sumitomo Bank Dai-ichi Kangin Group Furukawa 
Kawasaki Group 
Seibu Group 
Nissho-lwai Sanwa Bank Sanwa Group Obyashi Gumi 
Hitachi Shipbuilding 
Teijin 
Ube Kosan 
Han Kyu Group 
Sekisui Chemical 
Tomen Tokai Bank Tokai Group Toyota Group 
Meitetsu Group 
Chiyoda Group 
Kanematsu Gosho Tokyo Bank (Dai-ichi Kanematsu Gosho Group 
Kangyo Bank) Dai-ichi Kangin Group 
Source: McMillan, C (1984} The Japanese Industrial System, Walter de Gruyter, Berlin: 235. 
The trading companies emerged largely as a result of Japan's resource 
dependence. The process of national industrialisation inaugurated in the early 
Meiji period meant that Japan was necessarily forced into greater trade with the 
91 However, for particularly useful examples of this sort see: Eli, M (1990} Japan Inc.: passim. 
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rest of the world. The trading companies rapidly expanded and took over the 
organisation of Japan's export and imports, allowing them to play an important 
role in facilitating - even leading - national industr ialisation and economic 
development.92 Their role and operations have subsequently expanded but 
they continue to pe rform three primary functions: transaction intermediation; 
financial intermediation (quasi-banking);  and information gathering. 93 Even 
though some Japanese manufacturers have established independent 
distribution networks, the sago shosha continue to play a crucial role in 
securing the resource supplies upon which Japan's expanded manufacturing 
capacity depended. Less apparent, but equally significant, is the trading 
companies' role as a financial intermediary where they perform important credit 
provision and risk-sharing functions. In effect the trading companies act as 
'quasi-banks and quasi-insurance agencies', providing important potential 
competitive advantages for clients.94 Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the 
sago shosha provide an unparalleled information gathering and dissemination 
service for themselves and their clients. As we saw in chapter 1 ,  information 
has become a crucial source of profit and competitive advantage, something 
which ensures the sago shosha's ' continuing relevance. In addition, as we shall 
see in an Australian context, the sago shosha's group affiliations in 
combination with its intelligence gathering capacity allow it to significantly 
advantage its favoured clients when conducting trade negotiations - a 
development about which neo-classical theory and policy prescriptions flowing 
from it have little to say. 
Equally significant - and similarly neglected by more orthodox analysis - is the 
role played by the sago shosha as an instrument of government policy. We 
have already noted the distinctive connections between Japanese business 
and government agencies; not only did the sago shosha facilitate the pursuit 
of national resource security, but they were instrumental in furthering Japan's 
industry policies. For example, where large domestic producers imported new 
technologies to compete with overseas producers, the trading houses invariably 
ceased importing the foreign good and switched to the Japanese version. 95 As 
92 Yoshino, M & Lifson, T (1986) The Invisible Link: Japan 's Sago Shosha and the Organization 
of Trade, M IT Press, Cambridge, Mass: 23. 
93 Kojima, K & Ozawa, T (1984) Japan's General Trading Companies: Merchants of Economic 
Development, Development Centre of the OECD: 16. 
94 Sheard, P (1992) 'The Japanese General Trading Company as an Aspect of Inter-Firm Risk­
Sharing, in Sheard, P (ed) International Adjustment and the Japanese Firm, Allen & Unwin, 
Sydney: 72-82. 
95 Shao, A & Herbig, P (1993) 'The Future of the Sogo Shosha in a Global Economy, 
International Marketing Review, 10 (5): 42. 
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we shall see, industry policy is less influential (and, arguably, less necessary) 
than it once was. The role of the sogo shosha has been similarly reassessed 
in the light of Japan's structural adjustment experience. Certainly, individual 
trading company profitability has declined.96 It is also clear that the trading 
companies role as an intermediary is not as crucial as it once was, as Japanese 
companies have access to alternative lines of credit, and establish their own 
global distribution networks. 97 However, the sogo shosha are showing a 
striking capacity to re-invent themselves and move into new activities, dealing 
in their own right and moving into areas of potentially higher profitability like 
telecommunications. 98 Importantly for countries like Australia, they are also 
becoming major sources of venture capital as they actively pursue new sources 
of profit.99 The implications of this potential increase in investment will be 
considered in chapter 7 .  For now, it is necessary to consider another seeming 
anomaly in Japanese organisation: accounting for Japan's low levels of imports 
and investment. 
Japan's 'Peculiar' Import Profile 
Japan's trade surpluses are the focus of often acrimonious debate and 
international tension. The question arises as to whether Japan is simply so 
much better at producing manufactured goods that other nations cannot 
compete, or whether the Japanese economy has structural qualities that 
preclude 'fair' competition. 1 oo Lincoln's exhaustive study of Japan's trade 
relations demonstrates that Japan's trade pattern is 'peculiar' and unlike other 
industrialised nations, especially in its low levels of manufactured imports. 1 o1 
One of the most striking features of contemporary trade patterns between 
industrialised nations, as we saw in chapter 1 ,  has been the surge in intra­
industry trade - contrary to what comparative advantage theory might lead one 
to expect. However, Japan remains 'startlingly different', in that it has not 
96 Hirose, T (1994) 'High Yen, Slow recovery Hurt Trading Firms', Nikkei Weekly, 21 st Nov: 9.  
97 de Rosario, L (1993) 'Leaky Umbrellas: Japanese Trading House reassesses Its Role', Far 
Eastern Economic Review, 11 Feb: 48. 
98 The Economist (1995) 'Japan's Trading Companies: Sprightly Dinosaurs?', 11th Feb: 61. 
99 Yamazaki, T (1995) 'Sogo Shosha Take Over as Top Venture Capitalists', Tokyo Business 
Today, February: 22/3. 
1 00 I t  should also be noted that Japan is similarly atypical in its levels of  inward investment. 
This is partly accounted for by the difficulty of taking over Japanese firms given their defensive 
cross-share holding and the consequent necessity of developing 'greenfield' sites which have 
become prohibitively expensive in the wake of the Yen's rise. During the '70s when merger and 
acquisition activity increased in the west, the keiretsu actually expanded cross shareholdings to 
nullify hostile foreign takeovers. See: Lawrence, R (1992) 'Japan's Low Levels of Inward 
Investment: The Role of Inhibitions on Acquisitions', Transnational Corporations, 1 (3} : 47-75. 
1 01 Lincoln, Edward J (1990} Japan's Unequal Trade, The Brookings Institute. 
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followed the trend evident in other nations and increased intra-industry trade; in 
fact, argues Lincoln, it is actually lower now than in 1970.102 Even where intra­
industry trade does occur it is at the low-value end of production; a corollary of 
this is that where Japanese exports are highest, imports are lowest. Of 
particular significance for Australia is the fact that Australia-Japan intra-industry 
trade is especially low, even allowing for Japan1S atypical trading pattern.103 
Even those commentators who argue that Japanls market is more open than it 
was concede that imports remain �unusually small' and that 1intangible barriers� 
do play a role in restricting imports.104 Lincoln is less equivocal in his 
conclusions, suggesting that while official trade barriers have been reduced, 
informal barriers remain.1os Tyson also emphasises the importance of 
considering the substance of the Japanese trade position, rather than the 
rhetoric that accompanies 1Changel, arguing that the Japanese state preserves 
a �moving band of protectionism� which restricts meaningful foreign competition 
to those areas of the economy where Japanese companies are so dominant as 
to be unthreatened.106 Given that Tyson is now chairwoman of President 
Clintonls Council of Economic Advisers her continuing assertions that Japanls 
different trade pattern is the result of Ia host of structural impediments� assume 
greater importance.1o7 Even if her analysis were wrong the so-called 
lrevisionist1 position is now crucial in constructing US policy responses toward 
Japan.10B 
Significantly, however, the US perception of Japan as an 10Utlier1 that does not 
practice free trade is not shared in Australia, especially amongst the epistemic 
102 Lincoln, Edward J (1990) Japan's Unequal Trade : 48. 
103 Fukasaku, K (1992) Economic Regionalisation and Intra-Industry Trade: Pacific-Asian 
Perspectives, OECD Development Centre Technical Paper No 53: 30. 
104 See, for example, Lawrence, Robert, Z (1991)" How Open Is Japan?", in Krugman, P (ed) 
Trade With Japan: has the Door Opened Wider?, University of Chicago Press: 9-37. 
105 Lincoln, Edward J (1990) Japan's Unequal Trade : 15. Amongst the 'informal' barriers 
Lincoln cites are: variable product standards; difficulty obtaining certification for foreign 
subsidiaries; customs delays; inadequate intellectual property protection; biased government 
procurement practices; industry collusion to inhibit imports; informal government advice; 
product regulations that prohibit foreign goods. 
106 Tyson, L D & Zysman, J (1989) "Developmental Strategy and Production Innovation in 
Japan", in Johnson, C., Tyson, L D & Zysman, J (eds) Politics and Productivity: The Real Story 
of Why Japan Works, Ballinger Publishing: 111. 
107 Tyson, L D (1994) "Japan's Trade Surplus Matters", The Asian Wall Street Journal, 10/3/94: 
6 & (1992) Who's Bashing Whom? Trade Conflict in High-Technology Industries , Institute for 
International Economics, Washington. Importantly, Tyson provides a structural account of the 
US's trade deficit with Japan, providing a sophisticated policy blueprint for a subsequently more 
activist trade policy under the Clinton administration and championing the merits of managed 
trade that achieves measurable targets. 
108 Hamilton, D (1995) 'US Revisionists on Japan Are heard', Asian Wall Street Journal, June 
9th: 1. 
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community that helps shape policy. Rather than being seen as a 'free rider' 
Japan is seen as a maligned repository of free-trading virtue.1os Drysdale and 
Garnaut, for example suggest that Japan has the 'cleanest import system for 
manufactured goods amongst OECD countries; official tariff barriers have 
almost no effect on trade'.110 The point is, of course, that for 'revisionist' critics it 
is precisely the non official barriers to trade that are the problem.111 Crucial in 
this regard is the structure of corporate Japan. Lawrence found that where a 
keiretsu member enjoys high sales within an industry, that industry will tend to 
have lower levels of imports. At one level this may appear unsurprising: if a 
domestic company dominates a local market there will inevitably be reduced 
demand for imports. However, Lawrence argues that the existence of keiretsu 
affiliations reduces by half the likely level of import consumption in any industry, 
and that vertical keiretsu are associated with sectors where Japanese imports 
are 'unusually low'. 112 There is evidence, as we shall see in more detail in the 
next chapter, that competitive pressures and the relocation of Japanese 
manufacturing are threatening the basis of thekeiretsu system.113 However, it 
is also important to recognise that the deregulatory process is often glacial, and 
that there are powerful interests within the bureaucracy and elsewhere resisting 
109 It should be noted that the depiction of Japan as a free trading, liberal economy is not the 
exclusive preserve of Australian scholarship - this view has its champions in both Japan and 
America as well. See, for example: Komiya, R & ltoh, M (1988) "Japan's International Trade 
and Trade Policy, 1955-1984", in lnoguchi, T & Okimoto, D (eds) The Political Economy of 
Japan;: Volume 2, The Changing International Context, Stanford University Press: 173-224, in 
which the authors argue that the free trade position is now the dominant view in policy-making 
circles in Japan, and has had significant support since the early '70s. It's influence will be 
considered in greater detail in the next chapter. 
11 O Drysdale, P & Garnaut, R {1989) A Pacific Trade Area?, Pacific Economic Paper No 171, 
Australia-Japan Research Centre, ANU. 
111 The latest report from the body specifically charged with broadening Australia's 
understanding of the region and facilitating its 'integration' into it shows no sign of greatly 
deviating from the free market orthodoxy. The Japanese Market for Manufactures Imports is at 
pains to emphasise the growth in Japanese imports and the moves the Japanese government 
has made to liberalise and deregulate - the last point, of course, implicitly concedes the 
existence of prior problems - even if the Report minimises their current significance. See: 
Wickes, R & Graves, A (1993) The Japanese Market for Manufactures Imports: The Door 
Opens Wider, Working Paper No 1, East Asia Analytical Unit. The structure of Australia-Japan 
trade is concerned in greater detail in chapter 7. 
112 Lawrence, R (1993) 'Japan's Different Trade Regime: An Analysis with Particular Reference 
to Keiretsu', Journal of Economic Perspectives, 7 {3): 14. It should also be noted that Japan's 
distribution network, with tightly-connected and long established relations between 
manufacturers and retailers also makes market entry much more difficult for outsiders. See: 
Patrick, H & Rohlen, T {1987) 'Small-Scale Family Enterprises', in The Political Economy of 
Japan: Volume 1 -The Domestic Transformation, Yamamura, K., & Yasuba, Y., (eds) 
California, Stanford University Press: 331-84. 
113 Arakawa, T (1993) 'Keiretsu Walls Cracking as Auto Industry Feels the Squeeze', Tokyo 
Business Today, 61 (4) April: 14/5. 
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California, Stanford University Press: 331-84. 
113 Arakawa, T (1993) 'Keiretsu Walls Cracking as Auto Industry Feels the Squeeze', Tokyo 
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the diminution of collaborative arrangements that have produced palpable 
benefits for Japanese business.114 
Industry Policy 
The idea of 'Japan Inc', like many essentially journalistic constructions, has 
strengths and weaknesses. On the one hand, in admirably short-hand fashion, 
it draws attention to a style of governance and distinctive relationships between 
government and industry that distinguish the Japanese political economy. On 
the other, however, it loses sight of the important differences evident within 
individual sectors of the economy and the bureaucracy. More importantly, it fails 
to convey any sense of the intense competition and rivalry that has been 
evident, not only within the private sector, but also within the bureaucracy and 
the wider political system. Before attempting to assess whether the Japanese 
model of economic management and development is succumbing to the 
demands of intensified international pressure, political pressure, and the 
seemingly relentless rise of the Yen, it is important to acknowledge its tangible 
contribution, especially in the area of industry policy. 
This chapter has been principally concerned with delineating the factors that 
appear to distinguish the Japanese model from the idealised abstractions of the 
neo-classical model that informs so much of Australia's international economic 
policy. However, a brief review of the effectiveness and role of Japan's industry 
policy is in order for two reasons: firstly, the application of domestic industry 
policy will have potential effects on third parties, like Australia, and the conduct 
of bilateral relations; secondly, the Japanese experience may, once again, 
provide an important counterfactual to both the theoretical and pragmatic policy 
paradigm in Australia. 
The previous chapter demonstrated that the Australian industry policy 
experience had been at best mixed - partly as a result of the contradictory 
theoretical premises policy-makers sought to incorporate. In Japan, while there 
has been more consistent support for and application of such policies, critics 
have been quick to point to some conspicuous failures. MITI's inability to 
persuade the Japanese car industry of the necessity for 'cartelisation' in the 
domestic market in the 1950s and early '60s - predicated on the assumption 
that a country of Japan's size could not support more than one or two 
114 Oishi, N (1994) 'Deregulation Supporters Face Bureaucratic Foes', Nikkei Weekly, Nov 
28th: 17. 
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manufacturers- was clearly a misjudgment of monumental proportions. 115 
Similarly it is possible to cite more recent examples of policy failure in the areas 
of high definition television and the attempt to construct nuclear-powered 
merchant vessels.116 However, whether such apparent failures amount to a 
repudiation of the idea of government 'intervention' and the possibility of 
'picking winners' is less clear. 
As we saw in chapter 1, national economic welfare appears to be intimately 
linked to the control and presence of key technologies within national economic 
spaces. Without such critical technologies and the intellectual capacities that 
enable their utilisation, the domestic production of particular forms of wealth 
generating goods is constrained.117 At one level this has an immediate impact 
on a deteriorating balance of trade position. At a more fundamental level, the 
absence of a capacity to produce high value-added consumer and industrial 
goods threatens to undermine national living standards in the long term. The 
main thing to recognise here is that even if the. assumptions that national 
control of specific technologies is important and that the encouragement of 
specific wealth-producing industries is possible are wrong, this has not stopped 
Japanese government and industry from acting as if they were correct. 118 
Japanese policy clearly reveals a sustained pattern of 'intervention' and 
collaboration predicated on the assumption that technology is not only a critical 
determinant of national welfare, but that technological change is 'path 
dependent', cumulative and therefore susceptible to encouragement via 
appropriate policy . 119 
It is not necessary, therefore, to prove or disprove the efficacy of industry policy 
- although, as we have seen, in both the Japanese and Australian cases, the 
115 Ito, T (1993) The Japanese Economy, MIT Press, Cambridge Mass: 201. 
116 See: Horey, J (1994) 'Japan Moves to Dump its HDTV', The Australian, Feb 28th: 15; 
Hamilton, D (1994) 'Mutsu is But One Example of Japan's Policy Fiascos', The Asian Wall 
Street Journal, Mar 8th: 1. 
117 Dosi, G., Pavitt, K., & Soete, L (1990) The Economics of Technical Change and 
International Trade, Harvester Wheatsheaf, New York: 12. Dosi et al stress that export 
performance (and consequent national economic welfare) is reflected in international 
differences in 'innovative activities'. Without national policies to encourage a continued national 
presence (ie the application of such techniques by domestically-based MNCs) in key areas of 
science and technology living standards will experience relative, if not absolute decline. 
118 To judge from the increasing number of patents granted to Japanese firms there is 
evidence both that such policies are working and that Japanese companies are not simply 
reliant on copying the ideas of other more innovative societies like the US, . See: Mowery, D 
(1993) 'Japanese Technology and Global Influence', in Unger, D & Blackburn, P (eds) Japan's 
Emerging Global Role, Lynne Rienner Publishers: 171-93. 
119 Dosi, G.,  Tyson, D. , & Zysman, J (1989) 'Trade, Technologies, and Development: A 
framework for Discussing Japan', in Johnson, C., Tyson, D., & Zysman, J (eds) Politics and 
Productivity: The Real Story of Why Japan Works, Ballinger Publishing: 20. 
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weight of evidence suggests that it has been a critical variable in determining 
sectoral and national economic performance.120 What is significant here is that 
industry policy has been and continues to be central not only to Japanese 
economic organisation, but also to those nations that have self-consciously 
emulated the apparently successful Japanese model.121 Throughout the region 
with which Australia seeks increasing economic integration, therefore, its policy 
makers must confront the reality of economic practices and policies that do not 
conform to the idealised abstractions of neo-classical economics. 
Where nations are systematically attempting to advantage domestically-based 
companies or 'national champions' it is not possible to assume that the resultant 
trade patterns will be the 'positive sum game' orthodox economic analysis might 
suggest. On the contrary, what Drucker calls 'adversarial trade', or the 
systematic attempt to eliminate rival companies combined with an unwillingness 
to participate in reciprocal trade is the logical extension of policies which seek 
to increase national dominance in specific markets or production sectors. 122 
The manner in which Japanese companies systematically usurped the position 
of their American counterparts, even in the latter's home market, in products 
like televisions, semi-conductors and cars, 123 is not only testimony to the 
effectiveness of Japanese corporate organisation but, as we shall see in the 
next chapter, has created the preconditions for trade regimes that bear little 
resemblance to the idealisations of orthodox economic theory that inform the 
position of policy-makers in Australia. What the strategy of Japanese 
multinational capital in the U S  reveals is that it had little to do with orthodox 
conceptions of the primacy of market forces; market share, certainly. Similarly, 
it is crucial to recognise that U S  protectionism was the major motivation for 
Japanese direct investment124 - Japan's 'comparative' advantage lay in Japan, 
120 Two aspects of contemporary theory are relevant here. Firstly, the level of investment in 
new equipment continues to be a critical determinant of economic growth levels. Secondly, 
technological innovation is more likely to occur in some environments than others, and will 
generate important systemic 'spillover' effects where present. Both areas are ones in which 
government intervention may play a crucial role. See, respectively: De Long, J & Summers, L 
(1991) 'Equipment Investment and Economic Growth', The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol 
106: 445-502; Grossman, G M & Helpman, E (1994} 'Endogenous Innovation in the Theory of 
Growth', Journal of Economic Perspectives, 8 (1}: 23-44. 
121 Matthews, T & Ravenhill, J (1994) Strategic Trade Policy: the Northeast Asian Experience', 
in Macintyre, A (ed) Business and Government in Industrialising Asia, Allen & Unwin, Sydney: 
29-90. 
122 Drucker, P (1986} The Frontiers of Management, Harper & Row, New York: 98. 
123 For a slightly xenophobic review of this process, see: Prestowitz, C (1988} Trading Places: 
How America Allowed Japan to Take the Lead, Tuttle, Tokyo. 
124 Chernetsky, H I (1987) "The American Connection: Motives for Japanese Foreign Direct 
Investment", Columbia Journal of World Business, XXII, No 4. 
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where it had been created through the intersection of Japanese industry 
policies and the organisation of Japanese corporations. 
Conclusion 
The distinctive qualities that appear to have underpinned Japan's rapid 
economic rise are not easily explained by neo-classical economics. Market 
forces were not the primary driving force of Japanese development; free trade 
was neither practised nor especially admired.125 Rather, Japan pursued a nee­
mercantilist strategy that tightly bound government, business and even labour 
into mutually rewarding distributional coalitions, subsumed under the 
convenient rubric of the national interest. Whether this amounted to the co­
opting of labour, the regrettable dominance of oligopolistic capital in collusion 
with self-serving bureaucrats, or the general corrosion of democracy is less 
important, for our purposes, than is the recognition that it produced economic 
and social relationships that are distinctive and which bear little resemblance to 
the nostrums of orthodox western economic thought - with the notable 
exception of List. Indeed, it is noteworthy that orthodox western economic 
thought has had a limited impact on policy and its pragmatic application in 
Japan. 
What effect the increasingly powerful political and economic forces within the 
global economy will have on the 'Japanese model' of economic development 
and organisation is, of course, difficult to say. The next chapter will, however, 
give some indication of important emerging regional patterns of economic 
activity which will play a large part in determining its future style. What can be 
said, with some degree of confidence, is the following: firstly, bureaucrats are 
unlikely to willingly relinquish the source of their power and reward; secondly, 
where keiretsu members can continue to enjoy the benefits of close affiliation 
and interaction with others in their group without compromising commercial 
considerations, then it is clear that they will do so. It should also be 
remembered that the calculus of commercial advantage in Japan is more 
complex and strategic than the short-term, strictly profit-oriented rationale of 
their Anglo-American counterparts, precisely because the structure of Japanese 
corporate capital outlined above has allowed a longer-term perspective to be 
adopted. 
125 This remark requires some qualification for, as we shall see in the next chapter, a handful of 
Japanese economists did want to establish a free trade zone in the Pacific; an idea that would 
eventually be championed by Australia. 
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This latter long-term strategic focus has characterised both corporate capital 
and the bureaucracy in Japan. Increasingly, it is exerting a powerful influence 
on other economies as the regional - possibly the global - exemplar of 
successful economic development.126 This poses additional problems for 
Australia's predominantly neo-classically derived international economic 
policies: on the one hand Japan's style of economic organisation has been 
actively copied, multiplying the number of nations that clearly do not subscribe 
to free trade principles. On the other hand, Japan itself is entrenching these 
developmental patterns by establishing regional production networks to 
Australia's north, which not only threaten to lock productive capital based in 
Australia out of important regional circuits of capital and production, but which 
threaten to undermine and render redundant Australia's entire 'economic 
engagement' strategy. To see why this may be the case it is important to 
examine the interaction between Australia and Japan in its regional context. 
This will be the task of the next chapter, before finally turning to an examination 
of Japan's actual trade and investment in Australia itself in chapter 7. 
126 Here 'success' is taken to mean increases in GOP, the mobilisation of domestically-based 
factors of production and the provision of greater numbers of increasingly well-paid jobs. 
Clearly, other judgemental criteria will produce much less favourable interpretations of Japan's 
development. What matters here, however, is that other regional political elites are more 
concerned with development of a fairly narrowly conceived kind. 
1 6 6  
Chapter 6: The Reg ional Context 
The economic relationship between Australia and Japan occurs within an 
increasingly important regional context. Economic activity in general is not only 
becoming more internationalised, but this process has given rise to distinctive 
regional patterns of activity. Indeed, a regional intensification of trade and 
investment flows within, as well as between, the separate parts of the 'Triad' 
has been one of the more noteworthy developments associated with the 
globalisation of economic activity.1 This intensification of regional trade and 
investment flows has been reinforced and propelled by the establishment of 
TNC production networks within regions. Less obviously, an enhanced sense of 
regionalism has elicited particular political responses as individual nations seek 
to position themselves to take advantage of these emerging patterns of 
economic activity. Before considering the Australia-Japan bilateral relationship 
in detail, therefore, it is important to place this relationship in its wider 
international context. 
The intention of this chapter will be to consider Australia's foreign economic 
policy initiatives in the light of the shifting patterns of global, and especially 
regional economic activity. The central political and institutional focus here will 
be the APEC forum which, although generally considered to be an Australian­
inspired initiative has, as we shall see, more complex antecedents. The central 
question to be considered will be the effectiveness of Australian trade 
diplomacy and more general economic policies - of which APEC is both the 
culmination and embodiment of a specific ideational trajectory - as a response 
to changes in the GPE, especially as these are manifest at the regional level. 
Consequently, this chapter will initially sketch the evolution of the APEC 
initiative, before considering its rationale and possible efficacy in greater detail. 
APEC's potential usefulness will be more easily gauged when considered in 
situ. Again, Japan is especially useful in this regard. Japan is the dominant 
economic actor within the region and therefore a crucial litmus of the 
effectiveness of Australian policy. The manner in which Japanese companies 
have become involved in the region provides an important counterfactual for 
both comparable Australian integration with the region and, more importantly, 
an empirical template against which the economic idealisations and 
1 Fukasaku, K (1992) Economic Regionalisation and Intra-Industry Trade: Pacific-Asian 
Perspectives, OECD Development Centre, Technical paper No 53, OECD: Paris. 
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abstractions upon which much Australian policy is based may be measured. 
Consequently, the second part of this chapter will consider Japan's historical 
involvement in the region, paying particular attention to the contemporary 
restructuring of Japanese industry in response to the appreciation of the Yen 
and general increased international competition. 
The central contention of this chapter, which forms an important contextual 
backdrop for the subsequent chapter on Australia and Japan, is that current 
Australian policy settings are unlikely to deliver the sort of benefits their 
advocates hope. While there has been a significant relocation of Japanese 
manufacturing and concomitant investment flows, this has not necessarily 
been to Australia's advantage. Japan is establishing complex and integrated 
production networks throughout the region to Australia's north. Much of this 
investment is geared to servicing the emerging and potentially lucrative markets 
of which Australia's foreign economic policy is intended to take advantage. As 
we shall see, Japanese TNCs are unlikely to export from Australia to service 
these markets. Furthermore, the presence of tightly integrated Japanese TNCs 
throughout the region may make it more difficult for Australian-based 
companies to establish competing presences throughout the region. Not only, 
therefore, is there little possibility of Japan directing significant amounts of 
diverse manufacturing investment toward Australia as it restructures, but it is 
likely Australia may be effectively marginalised within the region as an 
important player, at least as far as the more lucrative trade in manufactures is 
concerned. 
Austral ia's Reg ional Economic Policy 
Rather than attempting to present a comprehensive overview of Australia's 
international trade diplomacy and economic policy in the region, I shall 
concentrate predominantly on APEC. This approach is justified for several 
reasons: firstly, APEC is clearly the centrepiece of Australia's contemporary 
economic policy agenda, particularly its external facets;2 it bears the burden of 
Australian attempts to manage the process of 'structural adjustment' and 
integration with the GPE, especially the regional considerations that are the 
2 The recent election of a Howard-led coalition government seems unlikely to change either the 
primacy of Asia in Australian policy or diminish APEC's role as the preferred instrument through 
which closer ties might be achieved. See, Howard, J (1995} 'Australia's Links With Asia: 
Realising Opportunities in our Region', Fifth Asialink Lecture, Melbourne, 12th April. 
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concern of this chapter. 3 As such, it is an appropriate body upon which to focus 
when attempting to assess the efficacy and appropriateness of Labor policy. 
Secondly, APEC represents the culmination of the neoliberal policy agenda, 
which I have suggested in previous chapters has been such a crucial part of 
and influence on economic policy in Australia during the 1980s and '90s. APEC 
is, then, the principal instrument with which Labor seeks to mediate its 
international economic relations, including those with fellow APEC member 
Japan, the region's most important economic actor. 
An examination of APEC's evolution illustrates, once again, the importance of 
ideas, especially when they are actively championed by an effective and 
influential epistemic community. However, it is also important to recognise that 
where political support is either absent or lacks coherence, particular ideas may 
play little part in national economic policy. Japan is again illustrative of this 
point. For although some Japanese economists played an important external 
role in developing a Pacific free trade area, their ideas had less domestic 
impact as they lacked support within Japan itself. 
Kiyoshi Kojima has been one of the most influential advocates pushing for 
economic integration and the creation of a free trade area within the east Asian 
region. From a Japanese perspective in the early 1960s, regional integration 
seemed an increasingly attractive proposition as a means of both replicating the 
European Union's (EU) experience and as a means of overcoming Japanese 
concerns about its possible isolation from emerging centres of global economic 
activity in Europe and North America. 4 There is a notable normative, even 
utopian aspect to these early attempts to re-think Japan's position, by Kojima 
and his contemporaries. Significantly, however, Akamatsu's ' flying geese' 
model of regional development, in which Japan leads its neighbours in an 
orderly progression through distinct stages of industrialisation has not only 
proved to be a somewhat simplistic model, but has failed to take account of the 
practices of the Japanese state and business which have systematically 
attempted to retain Japan's leading position.s 
3 Ex-Trade Minister Bob McMullan suggested that APEC is the 'cornerstone' of trade and 
economic relations, especially at the regional level. See: McMullan, B (1995) 'Australia's Future 
in the Asia-Pacific Region', Speech to the Evatt Foundation, Sydney, December 19:1. 
4 Korhonen, P (1994) Japan and the Pacific Free Trade Area, Routledge: London: 112. The 
following discussion of Japan's approach to the region in the 1960s and '70s draws heavily on 
Korhonen's valuable text. 
5 Bernard, M & Ravenhill, J (1995) 'Beyond product cycles and flying geese: Regionalization, 
hierarchy, and the Industrialization of East Asia', World Politics, 47. 
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Moreover, Japan's position as a potential regional leader, especially in a more 
overt political sense, is circumscribed by the legacy of the war. Many of those 
nations with which Japan sought to promote integration were the recent victims 
of Japanese colonisation and attempts to establish a co-prosperity sphere 
during World War II. Although Bob Hawke claims, 6 and is generally credited 
with, APEC's instigation, others have suggested that MITI was the driving force 
behind APEC - Australia providing a more acceptable surrogate for the 
implementation of their plans. 7 What is unambiguously clear, however, is the 
influence of Japanese economists like Kojima on some of their Australian 
contemporaries. At the Kojima-inspired PAFTAD conference in 1968, 8 Peter 
Drysdale enthusiastically took up Kojima's proposals for the creation of a free 
trade area. Importantly, this conference was instrumental in solidifying the idea 
of an 'Asia-Pacific region';9 a region in which Drysdale imagined Australia and 
Japan playing a 'mentor' role in guiding regional development. 10 
APEC's Precursors 
Although the economic preconditions for some sort of regional economic 
organisation may have been in place, it is not at all obvious that something like 
APEC should have appeared either when or in the form it did. Certainly, intra-
6 Personal interview. 
7 Nakame, H (1993) 'MITI claims behind the scenes role in group's founding', Nikkei Weekly, 
Nov 15th: 1 & 23. Higgott et al suggest that the ASEAN nations in particular were initially wary 
of the a regional trade grouping as they saw Australia's trade activism as merely a 'stalking 
horse' for Japanese economic expansionism. Higgott, R. , Cooper, A., & Bonnar, J (1990) 'Asia­
Pacific Cooperation: An Evolving Case-Study in Leadership and Co-operation Building', 
International Journal, XLV: 838. 
8 Pacific Trade and Development (PAFTAD) conferences have been held in most years since 
1968, and have, in the words of another influential Japanese economist, Saburo Okita, 'exerted 
considerable influence on the subsequent development of ideas about economic cooperation in 
the Pacific region'. Quoted in: Harris, S (1994) 'Policy networks and Economic Cooperation: 
policy Coordination in the Asia-pacific Region', The Pacific Review, 7 (4); 383. 
9 Not only do the ideas of the 'Asia pacific' of the 'Pacific Rim' impose an arbitrary unity on 
otherwise disparate and unconnected nations, but it may serve an important ideological 
function. Woodside persuasively argues that an 'Asia-pacific myth' has developed, which 
emphasises economic prosperity and obfuscates potentially troubling domestic and 
international political rivalries and helps legitimate existent elites. See: Woodside, A (1993) 'The 
Asia-Pacific idea as a Mobilzation Myth', in Dirlik, A (ed) What Is In A Rim? Critical 
Perspectives on the Pacific Region Idea, Westview Press: Boulder; 13-28. 
1 O Korhonen, P (1994) Japan and the Pacific Free Trade Area : 165. In this context it is 
noteworthy that one of the distinctive characteristics of Australian policy makers' international 
economic policy initiatives has been their ability to demonstrate what Young calls 'leadership' 
within regional fora, beyond what might have been expected of Australia's rather modest 
international status. Australia's central position in the development of the 'Cairns Group' is an 
important example of the potential of such initiatives. See, respectively: Young, 0 (1991) 
'Political leadership and regime formation: on the development of institutions in international 
society', International Organization, 45 (3) : 281-308; Higgott, R & Cooper, A (1990) 'Middle 
power leadership and coalition building: Australia, the Cairns Group, and the Uruguay Round of 
Trade Negotiations, International Organization, 44 (4): 589-632. 
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regional trade has expanded within East Asia, but at 38% of total trade in 1990 
(up from 32.8% in 1980) it is still significantly lower than the EC (59%). 11 What 
is more telling, especially given APEC's stress on trade liberalisation, is the role 
played by the various bodies that paved the way tor APEC. Although Ravenhill 
may be right when he acerbically observes that Australia's economic diplomacy 
under Labor amounted to an attempt to 'export the Industry Commission', 12 
such a strategy would have had little chance of international acceptance had it 
not been tor the pioneering work of an influential epistemic community in 
various international fora that actively championed the deregulatory agenda. 
In this regard, three bodies are especially noteworthy.13 The aforementioned 
PAFTAD continued its self-appointed task which aimed to 'complement the 
contributions of practitioners, in government and in the business world, in 
dealing with the challenges of Pacific development'; critical here was the 
assumption that the 'intelligent consideration of economic policy issues' would 
render specific 'problems' capable of expert resolution. 14 At its centre, as 
Woods observed, PAFTAD is 'dominated by liberal, market-oriented 
economists from Japan, Australia, New Zealand, Canada and the United States 
who claim to understand the political realities confronting economic policy­
makers'. 15 At almost the same moment of PAFTAD's inauguration, the Pacific 
Basin Economic Council (PBEC) was initiated. Japan, Australia and New 
Zealand were again central to PBEC's development; but where PAFTAD was 
dominated by academics, PBEC had a more commercial, business orientation. 
Despite PBEC's image as a 'rich-man's club', it has been instrumental in 
facilitating the establishment of important communication networks amongst the 
region's business community and entrenching the place of free enterprise as 
the central organising principle of the region's economies. 16 
11 Grant, R et al (1993) 'Global Trade Flows: Old Structures, New Issues, Empirical Evidence', 
in Bergsten, F & Noland, M (eds) Pacific Dynamism and the International System, Institute of 
International Economics: Washington: 52, Table 14. 
12 Ravenhill, J (1994) 'Australia and the Global Economy', in Bel!, S & Head, B (eds) State, 
Economy and Public Policy in Australia, Oxford University Press: Oxford: 87. 
13 For the definitive overview of the development and significance of these bodies, see: Woods, 
L (1993) Asia-Pacific Diplomacy: Nongovernmental Organizations and International Relations, 
UBC Press, Vancouver. 
14 Drysdale, P (1984) The Pacific Trade and Development Conference: A Brief History, 
Research Paper No 112, Australia-Japan Research Centre: Canberra: 3. 
15 Woods, L (1991) 'Non-Governmental Organizations and Pacific Cooperation: Back to the 
Future', The Pacific Review, 4 (4): 313. 
16 Woods, L (1991) 'A House Divided: The Pacific Basin Economic Council and Regional 
Diplomacy', Australian Journal of International Affairs, 45 (2): 267/8/ 
17 1 
Perhaps the single most important precursor to APEC, however, was the 
Pacific Economic Cooperation Conference (PECC). What distinguishes PECC 
from the academically-oriented PAFTAD and the business-dominated PBEC, is 
its novel tripartite representation of business, state officials, and academics. 17 
PECC took its theoretical inspiration from Drysdale and Patrick's influential 
proposal for an Organization for Pacific Trade and Development (OPT AD), 
which had argued for the establishment of an institution along the lines of the 
OECD in the Asia-Pacific region to oversee and promote trade and 
development. 1B PECC's 'consensus' style of decision making and its diverse 
membership (including both China and Taiwan) made it an important fore­
runner of APEC. More fundamentally, Crone claims, Australia's eventual active 
proselytising on behalf of APEC was undertaken in response to sustained 
PECC pressure. 19 What these different organisations provided, then, was a 
context within which particular ideas could be championed and transnational 
support generated for a specific economic policy agenda. But, as Higgott notes: 
The source of these ideas is to be found not simply in the interests identified by regional 
state policy making elites, but in the influences of an emerging regional community of like 
minded scholars and practitioners engaged in the definition of regional identities, 
problems and putative policy proposals for the resolution of these problems. 20 
Certainly there were broader strategic and political concerns which were 
important preconditions in making APEC more readily accepted within the 
region, but it was not inevitable that a nascent regional economic grouping 
should have had the promotion of free trade as its raison d 'etre . 21 What is most 
striking about the discourse that surrounds APEC is the way in which so many 
of its supporters consider its agenda to be above politics and concerned only 
with what Harris calls 'technical economic issues' that are susceptible to 'expert 
analyses and practical knowledge'.22 Given that APEC has been so 
conspicuously driven by ideas and the efforts of a regional epistemic 
17 It is worth emphasising that in all of these pioneering bodies organised labour - the 'normal' 
partner in tripartite relationships with business and government - was conspicuous by its 
absence. Consequently, there has been little opposition to the dominant free trade agenda, 
particularly as it may affect national workforces throughout the region. 
18 Drysdale, P & Patrick, H (1979) Evaluation of a Proposed Asian-Pacific Regional Economic 
Organization, Research Paper No 61, Australia-Japan Economic Relations Research Project, 
Canberra. 
19 Crone, D (1992) 'The Politics of Emerging Pacific Cooperation', Pacific Affairs, 65 (1 ): 74. 
20 Higgott, R (1995) 'Introduction: Ideas, Interests and Identity in the Asia-Pacific', The Pacific 
Review , 7 (4): 369. 
21 I explore the political and strategic conditions which underpinned APEC's general 
acceptance, as well as some of the obstacles to implementation in more detail in: Beeson, M 
(1995) 'Australia, APEC, and the Politics of Regional Economic Integration', Asia Pacific 
Business Review 2 (1): 1-19. 
22 Harris, S (11995) 'Policy networks and Economic Cooperation: Policy Coordination in the 
Asia-Pacific Region', The Pacific Review, 7 (4): 392. 
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community, therefore, the rationale that underpins it must bear an even greater 
legitimating burden than say in the EC, where a broader range of interests has 
ensured support. 
APEC's Rationale 
This section will briefly consider the theoretical rationale that underpins APEC's 
ambitious liberalisation agenda before reviewing some of the factors that may 
make its implementation problematic. Australia's role as one of APEC's 
principal advocates places it in a particularly difficult position: it is incumbent 
upon Australia to be in the vanguard of the reform process, as an exemplar of 
the supposedly beneficial effects of unilateral liberalisation, with no guarantee 
Table 3 
APEC Member Statistics, 1992 
Population GDP 
(millions) I (USD Billions) 
Australia 17.5 289.2 
Brunei 0.3 3.9 
Canada 27.4 569.7 
Chile 13.4 31.3 
China 1188 435.9 
Hong Kong 5.8 82.8 
Indonesia 186 126.4 
Korea 43.7 296.8 
Japan 124.3 3662.5 
Malaysia 18.8 57.6 
Mexico n/a 260 
New Zealand 3.4 43.6 
Philippines 64.3 52.5 
PNG* 4.1 4.3 
Singapore 2.8 46 
Thailand 57.8 110.6 
USA. 255 6038.5 
Chinese Taipei 20.6 175.4 
Source: Dept of Foreign Affairs and Trade (Various) 
*Papua New Guinea 
%of Exports Average growth 
to APEC rates 1989-93(%) 
74.4 2.2 
90.6 0 
87.7 1.7 
47.9 7.1 
77.5 8.6 
72.9 4.8 
79 6.9 
70.9 8.1 
67.5 3.1 
77.3 7.1 
n/a 8.8 
68.6 3 
77.6 6.3 
82.1 0.3 
72.7 2.2 
65.6 9.1 
58.5 1.7 
82.3 5.2 
that other nations will follow suit.23 As we shall see, this position is problematic 
enough if other nations are simply tardy in complying. More fundamentally, I 
shall suggest, the rationale for APEC's deregulatory initiatives fail to take 
23 One of the distinguishing characteristics of APEC is that all reform initiatives are non-binding. 
While this may reflect what Keating likes to call 'a new style of trade negotiation . . .  which fits the 
features of our region', there is simply no guarantee that other nations will eventually comply 
with their APEC obligations. Keating, P (1995) APEC - the Outlook for Osaka, Speech to the 
CEDA Conference - APEC and Australian Business, Sydney, Sept 26th: 5. 
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account of the structure and organization of corporate activity within the region. 
This raises important questions for nations like Australia about the relevance of 
trade liberalisation policies as a means of encouraging productive economic 
integration with the region. 
One oJ the central reasons for scepticism about APEC's practical application 
stems from its theoretical premises and concomitant interpretation of regional 
development. As we saw in chapter 4, the dominant neoliberal economic 
paradigm in Australia has systematically ignored or understated the specificity 
of regional development trajectories, attributing to market forces and the logic of 
comparative advantage what has clearly had much to do with various forms of 
government intervention. While this is an important theoretical oversight on the 
one hand, at another level it gives rise to policy prescriptions that are 
especially problematic. APEC is predicated on the idea that free trade is 
necessarily beneficial and has been the source of trade expansion and regional 
economic growth, culminating in what Drysdale and Garnaut call a 'prisoners 
delight' in which nations enjoy the advantages of unilateral trade liberalisation.24 
There are reasons to question this analysis on both empirical and prescriptive 
grounds. 
Firstly, there is a great deal of evidence to suggest that trade barriers remain 
significant obstacles to general trade, especially in those economic sectors in 
which Australia enjoys a 'comparative advantage'.25 Important as these overt 
tariffs are, they do not capture the range of 'invisible' barriers to trade which, 
as we saw in the previous chapter, are so critical in explaining the low levels of 
import penetration in nations like Japan. Furthermore, they fail to acknowledge 
the critical contribution made by various forms of industry policy that have been 
such important sources of national competitive advantage and catalysts for 
export expansion. Secondly, the policies that flow from analyses of the 
Drysdale/ Garnaut type seem fundamentally implausible: the suggestion that 
APEC members should unconditionally extend most favoured nation (MFN) 
status to all nations, whether APEC members or not, begs the question of 
24 Drysdale, P & Garnaut, R (1993) 'The Pacific: An Application of a General Theory of 
Economic Integration', in Bergsten, C F & Noland, M (eds) Pacific Dynamism and the 
International Economic System, Institute for International Economics, Washington: 187. 
25 For a general overview of regional tariff levels, see: Grant, R et al (1993) 'Global Trade 
Flows,: Old Structures, New Issues, Empirical Evidence', in Bergsten, C F & Noland, M (eds) 
Pacific Dynamism and the International Economic System, Institute for International Economics, 
Washington: 20/1. For evidence of the tariffs that effect Australian exporters in particular­
especially within APEC - see, Committee for Economic Development of A Australia (1995) 
APEC and Australian Business: Evaluating the Opportunities -Targeting Impediments to Trade, 
CEDA, Sydney. 
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precisely what benefits membership conveys. If APEC does not impose barriers 
to outsiders, then non-members have an incentive to 'free-ride', taking 
advantage of APEC's open economies while resolutely protecting their own. 
Although the market-oriented champions of Australia's free trade agenda tend 
to downplay the political complexities inherent in such a disparate body as 
APEC, as Table 3 above indicates, the variety of economic and political 
systems, coupled with diverse levels of development make consensus 
inherently problematic. This is recognised in the proposed 'two-speed' adoption 
of APEC's liberalisation agenda.26 Although there is no intention here to explore 
the range of possible impediments to APEC's implementation, it is necessary to 
say something briefly about the single most important bilateral relationship in 
APEC, and one which has particularly important ramifications for Australia: the 
US and Japan. 
The US and Japan 
Ultimately, APEC will stand or fall on its ability to manage the US-Japan 
relationship. Not only is the US-Japan trade and investment axis the most 
important bilateral economic relationship in the world, 27 but it encapsulates 
many of the political tensions and difficulties that threaten to undermine the 
liberalisation process.2B The sanguine view of Japan's trading practices held by 
Drysdale and Garnaut noted in chapter 4 is not one that is shared by their 
counterparts in the current Clinton administration. Indeed, the trade policies of 
the US are increasingly coming under the influence of 'revisionist' critics like 
James Fallows, Chalmers Johnson and Laura Tyson. 29 Central to the 
revisionists' position is that the Japanese economy operates in a manner that is 
distinctively different from that of the US and that it is necessary to construct 
policies that take this into account. In contradistinction to the Australian 
26 APEC Economic Leaders (1994) APEC Economic Leaders' Declaration of Common 
Resolve, APEC Secretariat, Bogor: 4. 
27 Bergsten, C F & Noland, M (1993) Reconcilable Differences? United States-Japan 
Economic Conflict, Institute for International Economics, Washington. 
28 For a more detailed exploration of these tensions and their implications for Australia, see: 
Beeson, M (1995) 'Trade in the Asia-Pacific: Implications of the US-Japan Dispute for Australia', 
Current Affairs Bulletin, 72 (3) 1995, OcVNov: 41-2. 
29 Hamilton, D (1995) 'US Revisionists on Japan are Heard', Asian Wall Street Journal, June 
1Oth: 1 & 8. The perception of that Japanese capitalism is organised along fundamentally 
different principles and poses a threat to the US as a result is one that is taken seriously in the 
US and has spawned its own literature. See, for example: Garten, J (1992) A Cold Peace: 
America, Japan, Germany and the Struggle tor Economic Supremacy, Times Books, New York, 
Thurow, L (1992) Head to Head: The Coming Economic Battle Among Japan, Europe and 
America, Allen & Unwin, St Leonard's. 
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approach advocated by the likes of Drysdale and Garnaut, U S  policy is 
premised on the assumption that 'traditional' approaches to trade like 
Australia's are increasingly irrelevant. As Tyson observes: 
. . .  we can no longer afford to ignore the efforts of Japan and Europe to promote their 
own high-technology producers. Nor . . . can we realistically expect our trading partners 
to adopt international rules that reflect our own ideological preferences. Confronted with 
these realities, we must devise macroeconomic, trade, and industry policies that promote 
our own high-technology industries while continuing to lobby for a more liberal trading 
system .30 
Whether such a pragmatic approach to trade issues is likely to deliver the 
results its advocates claim is less important, in the context of this discussion, 
than is the realisation that the attempt to implement such policies will have 
discernible effects on the conduct of international economic relations. The 
willingness of the U S  to pursue bilateral trade diplomacy in preference to the 
sort of multilateral approach that APEC is predicated upon and in which 
Australia continues to show such faith, has been demonstrated on numerous 
occasions. 31 Significantly, however, there is plausible evidence to suggest that 
the sort of 'managed trade' arrangements that are such an anathema to 
advocates of liberalisation have delivered important gains for the US. Tonelson 
argues that the U S  car, steel and machine tools industries were given sufficient 
'breathing space' to allow them to recover from the onslaught of Japanese 
competition. The Semiconductor Agreement in particular is cited by advocates 
of bilateral agreements as evidence of the potential benefits to be derived from 
specific numerical trade targets.32 
While there is some persuasive evidence to suggest that the Clinton 
administration's efforts to open up the Japanese market and protect its own 
have met with some success, what is of note here is that bilateralism - whether 
successful or not - continues to be a significant force within APEC. There is no 
reason to expect this situation to change dramatically, especially where 
30 Tyson, L (1993) Who's Bashing Whom? Trade Conflict in High Technology Industries, 
Institute for International Economics, Washington: 2/3. 
3 1 See, for example, Nakamoto, M (1995) 'Defiant leaders face tit-for-tat tariff battle', The 
Australian, May 18: 8. What is perhaps most significant from an Australian policy-making 
perspective here, however, is that Australia has conspicuously sided with Japan against the US 
during such trade disputes, despite the convincing evidence of Japan's restrictive trade 
practices. See: Stuchbury, M (1994) 'Our man in Washington blames US', Australian Financia l 
Review, February 16: 1&10. 
32 Tonelson, A (1994) 'Beating Back Predatory Trade', Foreign Affa irs, 73 (4): 123-35. It is 
worth noting that Japanese negotiators have shown a distinct reluctance to agree to specific 
numerical targets in subsequent trade negotiations (the recent dispute in the automotive trade, 
for example) - something that some observers attribute to the success of the semi-conductor 
agreement in turning around the US position. See: Hartcher, P (1995) 'Memories of a Bad Deal 
in '86 - Once Bitten, Twice Shy', Austra lian Financial Review, May 23rd: 14. 
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powerful domestic lobbies are able to influence the content and direction of 
policy. 33 Nor should it be supposed that compliance with the APEC rationale is 
a problem exclusive to a more 'pluralist' U S  political-economy. Powerful 
business lobbies have suggested that Japan might be better advised to 
support the proposed East Asia Economic Caucus (EAEC), particularly as a 
counterweight to US influence in APEC.34 1n addition, Japan faces the 
perennial problem of reconciling the interests of what is still a powerful domestic 
agricultural lobby with its commitment toward free trade under APEC. 35 
Clearly there are a range of international and domestic factors that threaten to 
undermine APEC's trade liberalisation agenda. Importantly, the long time frame 
in which liberalisation is expected to take place - the process is not expected to 
be completed until 2020 in the case of the 'developing' nations - and the lack of 
any mechanism for enforcing compliance, mean that the possibility individual 
nations failing to meet their APEC obligations must be high. However, even if 
there was significant progress toward liberalisation at the level of overt tariff 
barriers and investment facilitation, the question remains whether nations like 
Australia would necessarily benefit in the manner advocates of liberalisation 
suggest. Certainly, if deregulation were extended to the contentious agricultural 
sector Australia could expect to win greater market share. Yet if Australia is to 
achieve the sort of declaratory goals that form the bi-partisan political backbone 
and rationale of its pursuit of closer economic integration with Asia - maintaining 
living standards, increasing employment levels and redressing the balance of 
payments deficit - it will be necessary to boost manufacturing investment and 
exports. As the region's principle source of capital exports and productive 
investment, Japan is once again the benchmark against which Australia's 
policies may be usefully measured. If Australian policy-makers hope to gain the 
sort of productive investment needed to transform the manner in which 
Australian-based industries and companies are integrated into the region from 
that of raw material supplier to an economically-integrated source of high 
value-added products, then Japan is a potentially key actor in this process. The 
reality of Japan's regional economic role therefore merits closer scrutiny. 
33 Frieden usefully draws attention to the competing sectoral influences within national 
economic spaces and their potential impact on national policies - something generally 
neglected or dismissed as 'rent-seeking' by orthodox economic analysis. Frieden, J (1988) 
'Capital Politics: Creditors and the International Political Economy', Journal of Public Policy, 8 
(3/4): 265-86. 
34 Oishi, N (1994) 'Free Trade Zone to be Backed - Vaguely', The Nikkei Weekly, Nov 7th: 2.  
35 Garran, R (1995) 'Japan Resits Agriculture Free-Trade Deal', The Weekend Australian, Sept 
30: 2. 
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Japan and the Reg ion 36 
History, it cannot be emphasised too strongly, is once again a critically 
important explanatory variable in any attempt to comprehend the distinctive 
pattern of Japanese involvement in the region of which Australia is a part. In 
contrast to the abstract and contextually neutral conceptions of neo-classical 
economics, the specifics of politics, geography and contingent historical 
development are the essential backdrop against which the expansion of 
Japanese capitalism must be seen. This is not, however, to suggest that this 
development was in some way inevitable or pre-determined. Rather, it is to 
argue that Japan, or more particularly, the trans-national corporations that have 
developed there, have responded to a range of national and regional 
circumstances and opportunities which have helped to shape their individual 
developmental trajectories. While it is unwise to make blanket assertions or 
generalisations about this process there are, as we shall see, significant and 
distinctive patterns of regional involvement which reflect some of the dominant 
organisational characteristics of corporate Japan outlined in the previous 
chapter. It is the specificity of these recurring forms of regional integration -
rather than idealised abstractions - with which the policy-makers of other 
nations, including Australia, must deal. 
Unsurprisingly, the bilateral relationship between the US and Japan has been, 
especially in the post-World War II era, a crucial determinant of regional political 
and economic dynamics. Indeed, Stubbs argues that what he calls the 
'distinctive dynamism of the Asia Pacific region' can only be understood by 
considering the manner in which Japan's economic interests have combined 
with the US's Cold War strategy to 'fashion an increasingly coherent region'. 37 
While it may be possible to question the degree of 'coherence' Stubbs claims, 
he is undoubtedly correct in stressing the importance of powerful economic and 
political actors in establishing the parameters within which other less potent 
regional nations must operate. However, to gain a more complete picture of 
36 'The Region' in question is not the larger and somewhat arbitrary 'Asia-Pacific' with which 
APEC seeks to deal, but the more narrowly conceived area including, Japan, China, the NIEs 
and the ASEAN nations. The area, in fact, that Gareth Evans likes to call the East Asian 
Hemisphere. See: Hiebert,  M (1 995) 'Wizard of Oz: Austral ia's Evans redraws the map of Asia', 
Far Eastern Economic Review, August 17: 26. 
37 Stubbs, R (1994) 'The Political Economy of the Asia-Pacific Region', in Stubbs, R & 
Underhill, G (eds) Political Economy and the Changing Global Order, Macmillan, London: 366. 
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Japanese involvement, it is also necessary to consider the pattern of its 
involvement before the war. 
In this regard Petri suggests that three crucial 'accidents' of history furthered 
the process of regional integration (a process in which Australia was 
conspicuously uninvolved): the establishment of Asian treaty ports in the 
nineteenth century; Japanese imperialism; and recent East Asian growth.38 
Petri argues that, despite the disruption caused by the Second World War to 
Japan's imperial trade patterns, they remained strong, influencing subsequent 
patterns of post-War development. Japan's crucial role in both Taiwan's and 
Korea's pre-war development is also important, with what Cumings describes 
as the Japanese hegemonic system providing the basis for their later 
expansion, as well as the foundation of a more general regional dynamism.39 
There were, then, important pre-existing paths along which Japanese capital 
might flow when it eventually re-emerged as East Asia's dominant economic 
force. What is also worthy of note, as the previous chapter suggested, is 
Japan's role as an influential role model, increasing the number of Asian 
nations adhering to a form of collective capitalism, rather than the idealised 
form upon which Australian policy is based. 
In what follows, therefore, I shall detail Japan's increasing regional economic 
involvement since the Second World War. Initially, this will occur at the 
broadest level of aggregation: capital flows and sectoral investment patterns. 
Subsequently, I shall look in more detail at different forms of investment within 
industries. While Japan's outward (and inward, for that matter40) investment is 
typically atypical, and it is consequently tempting to generalise about 'Japanese 
capital', there are important differences in regional organisation and integration 
dependent upon firm and industry specific variables. The overall intention here 
is to firstly establish the broad pattern of Japanese economic expansion of 
which Australia is a part and, secondly, give some detail to specific 
opportunities and constraints which are inherent in that expansion. 
38 Petri, Peter A (1992) The East Asian Trading Bloc: An Analytical History, Department of 
Economics Paper No 315., Brandies University. 
39 Cumings, Bruce (1984) "The Origins and Development of the Northeast Asian Political 
Economy: Industrial Sectors, Product Cycles, and Political Consequences", International 
Organization , 38 ( 1): 1-40. 
40 A continuing source of friction with Japan's trading partners and a major cause of its 
structural trade imbalance are the atypically low levels of inward foreign investment to Japan -
the precise opposite of all other comparable countries. See: Lawrence, R Z (1992) "Japan's 
Low Levels of Inward Investment: The Role of Inhibitions on Acquisitions", Transnational 
Corporations, 1 (3): 47-75. 
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Japanese Economic Expansion 
The first, perhaps unsurprising, observation to be made about Japan's 
economic integration with the region is that it has reflected Japanese priorities. 
At one level this may be a truism, yet there have been notable characteristics of 
the Japanese experience - particularly the role of government, but also the 
organisational logic of Japanese TN Cs - that distinguish it from comparable 
developed economies. Such an observation has validity not only in the context 
of FD I, but also about the increasingly large and important flows of portfolio 
capital that have developed in the wake of financial deregulation. However, it 
will be the manufacturing sector that will be the principle focus of attention in 
this chapter: it is the most important investment flow within the region, and 
precisely the sort of job-creating, productive investment that all governments, 
including Australia's, are keen to attract. 
Japan 's early overseas investment strategy can be seen not only as a 
reflection of its economic needs and capacities, but also as a manifestation of 
its collective insecurities. The idea that Japan is vulnerable, resource-poor and 
over-populated has become a firmly established part of national identity, 
leading some commentators to suggest that the Japanese industry policy that 
marked the early high growth phase was an inevitable 'national necessity'.41 In 
any case, it rapidly became apparent that the success of Japan's industry 
policies meant that some of the labour intensive, traditional light ind ustries, like 
textiles, became uncompetitive as wage levels rose within Japan. Industry 
competitiveness might be maintained, however, by utilising the vast pool of 
cheap labour available in So utheast Asia in particular. Importantly, such policies 
fitted with a general desire on the part of the Japanese government in general 
and M I T I  in particular to upgrade continuo usly Japan's industrial structure;42 
government industry policy was integral to this adjustment process and was a 
significant determinant of the shape of outward expansion. As Dicken puts it: 
41 Ozawa, Terutomo (1979) Multinationalism Japanese Style: The Political Economy of 
Outward Dependency, Princeton University Press: xix. 
42 Okimoto, D (1989) Between MIT/ and the Market: Japanese Industrial Policy for High 
Technology, Stanford University Press: 8/9. 
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'overseas direct investment came to be seen as an integral part of Japanese 
industrial policy; it is not something which 'just happens'. 43 The twin desires of 
securing resource supplies and a concern to solve foreign exchange problems 
greatly influenced industry policy in the early postwar years. 44 Japanese foreign 
policy during the 1950s attempted to rebuild relations with its neighbours, many 
of whom had suffered at Japanese hands during the War. Access to raw 
materials was the primary motivation of this policy.4s The feeling of vulnerability 
engendered in Japan by its perceived lack of resources led to the development 
of a 'comprehensive security' policy which sought to diversify sources of labour, 
energy, raw materials, and markets. 46 It is particularly important to stress that 
the Japanese government was intimately involved in overseeing this process, 
both at the diplomatic level, but also more tangibly in the provision of supportive 
aid packages which integrated the private and public aspects of Japan's 
economic expansion. 47 This policy, it is argued, attempted to reduce Japanese 
dependence on any one source while simultaneously attempting to make that 
source dependent on Japanese goods, services, capital, and technology, 
leading Nester to conclude that: 
. . .  Tokyo's comprehensive security policy has been enormously successful. It has 
entangled the world in a web of products, investments and finance spun from Tokyo to 
the point where retaliation for Japanese unfair trade would inevitably cost much more 
than it was worth. 48 
However, it was not until the 1960s that Japanese investment overseas began 
to reach noteworthy proportions, laying the foundations for the sort of structural 
43 Dicken, P (1991) 'The Changing Geography of Japanese Foreign Direct Investment in 
Manufacturing Industry: A Global Perspective', in Morris, J (ed) Japan and the Global Economy: 
Issues and Trends in the 1990s, Routledge, London: 30. 
44 ltoh, M., & Kiyono, K (1988) "Foreign Trade and Direct Investment", in Industrial Policy of 
Japan, Komiya, 0., Okuno, M., & Suzumura, K., (eds) Tokyo: Academic Press Japan. 
45 Sadao, Fujiwara, (1989) 'Foreign Trade, Investment, and Industrial Imperialism in Postwar 
japan, in Morris-Suzuki, T & Seiyama, T eds), Japanese Capitalism Since 1945, Sharpe, New 
York: 167-170. 
46 Bobrow, D & Kudrle, R (1987) 'How Middle Powers Can Manage Resource Weakness: 
Japan and Energy', World Politics, 39 (4): 536-65. 
47 Ozawa, T (1980) 'Japan's New Resource Diplomacy: Government-Backed Group 
Investment', Journal of World Trade Law, 14 (1): 3-13. The importance of Japanese 
government sponsored aid in underpinning and guiding investment flows throughout the region 
cannot be overstated - Abegglen claims that aid flows are still larger than Japanese FDI in the 
region. Abegglen, J (1994) Sea Change: Pacific Asia as the New World Industrial Center, The 
Free Press, New York, p 66. For a more general discussion of the importance of aid 
disbursements in Japan's general foreign policy, see: lmai, Y (1994) Japan's Foreign Aid in the 
Changing Global Political Economy, unpublished MA thesis, Murdoch University. 
48 Nester, William R., (1992) Japan and the Third World: Patterns, Power, Prospects, New 
York: St Martin's Press: 22. 
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Chart 1: Trends of Japanese Direct Investment by Region 1986-94 
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power Nester implies. In the first twenty years after World War I I, accumulated 
foreign investment was only US$ 6.7 billion.49 Prior to this expansion overseas 
had been inhibited by a lack of domestic capital and by the relative cheapness 
of indigenous labour. Table 4 above gives some idea of the historical 
development of Japanese FD I. Several points are particularly noteworthy. 
Firstly, real estate investment in Oceania, of which Australia is the most 
significant part, is disproportionately high, while manufacturing is relatively 
modest compared to Europe, North America and Asia. Although the US also 
shows a high degree of real estate investment, this is balanced by large scale 
investment in manufacturing. Also significant is the scale of Japanese 
manufacturing investment in Asia. Table 5 gives an indication of the 
contemporary pattern of Japanese investment. While North America remains 
dominant, Asia is also important. What is especially important to note here, 
however, is that recent Japanese investment in Asia has been far more 
profitable than has similar investment by Japanese companies in either Europe 
or (especially) the US, 50 something which helps explain Japan's dominance of 
capital inflows to the region. 51 
Three broad phases of post-war Japanese regional trade and investment may 
be distinguished, although there are variations in emphasis and timing. 52 In the 
immediate post-war period Japan had an intermediate role in a three-way trade 
relationship between the US and the region, importing advanced industrial 
goods from the former and exporting simple manufactures to the latter. From 
approximately the mid 1960s to the mid '70s a combination of rising Japanese 
labour costs and regional protectionism saw the electronics and (especially) the 
textile industry move off-shore, in order to reduce production costs and protect 
markets. As Steven points out, the lower labour costs found in the rest of Asia 
were the main attraction for Japanese investors and an important means of 
combating declining profitability.53 
49 Higashi, Chikara & Lauter, Peter G., (1990) The Internationalization of the Japanese 
Economy, Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers: 324. 
50 Abegglen, J (1994) Sea Change : 65. 
51 Urata, S (1993) 'Changing Patterns of Direct Investment and the Implications for Trade and 
Development', in Bergsten, F & Noland, M (eds) Pacific Dynamism and the International 
Economic System, Institute for International Economics, Washington, Table 3: 282. 
52 See, for example: Steven, R (1990) Japan's New Imperialism, Macmillan, London, & Morris­
Suzuki, T (1991) "Reshaping the International Division of Labour", in Morris, J (ed) Japan and 
the Global Economy: Issues and Trends in the 1990s, Routledge. The accompanying 
discussion draws on both accounts. 
53 Steven, R (1990) Japan's New Imperialism : 71. 
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The first 'oil shock' at the end of 1973 inaugurated a second period of 
restructuring in Japanese industry. This phase, however, included the 
development of the comprehensive approach to resource security noted above. 
The scale of investment in this second phase was notably larger than the earlier 
one, reflecting the size of individual resource-linked projects. This enabled 
industries in Japan to secure not only resource supplies, but also to take 
advantage of lower local rates of pay to perform primary processing. In 
addition, it allowed the relocation of polluting industries that were becoming less 
acceptable in Japan itself.54 
From the late 1970s Japanese industry was continually restructured, principally 
in response to the relentless appreciation of the Yen, in an effort to lower costs 
and raise productivity, frequently resulting in the export of low value-added 
forms of production while retaining high value-added production in Japan: 
[As regional economies] moved first from agriculture to labour intensive light industry, 
and later to more capital- and technology-intensive forms of manufacturing, so the 
Japanese economy itself has shifted its own industrial and technological frontiers 
forward, thus maintaining its economic dominance of the region. 55 
Therefore, fears that Japanese FD I in manufacturing would produce a 
'boomerang effect' - promoting competitors that would ultimately export to 
Japan undermining its trade dominance - have proved unfounded, agues 
Morris-Suzuki; other less adaptive industrialised economies have borne the 
brunt of the new competition.56 What is especially distinctive about the third 
phase of Japanese outward investment is the particular role played by Japan's 
Asian neighbours. Investment in Asia offered a way of circumventing 
protectionist pressure in key European and American markets while 
simultaneously reducing the cost of components for final production. Overall, 
Steven concludes, the sort of integrated strategy that has emerged as a result 
of continuing industrial restructuring in Japan amounts to a form of 'trade 
imperialism' in which Japanese capital ensures the lowest possible price raw 
material inputs and comparatively cheap supplies of labour intensive 
manufactures, something the transnational and spatially dispersed production 
strategies of Japanese TN Cs permits. 57 
54 Steven, R (1990} Japan's New Imperialism : 80. 
55 Morris- Suzuki, T (1991) 'Reshaping the International Division of Labour': 149. 
56 Morris- Suzuki, T (1991) 'Reshaping the International Division of Labour': 151. 
57 Steven, R (1990} Japan's New Imperialism : 244-5. 
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Importantly for the purposes of this essay, there is evidence that as Japanese 
multinationals are moving into the region they are "creating de facto exclusive 
production networks, replicating keiretsu and other domestic structures 
abroad". 58 This enables Japanese multinationals to internalise transaction 
costs, opening up possibilities for transfer pricing, as well as reinforcing control 
through a greater reliance on Japanese management. Significantly, Japanese 
multi-national trade within the region remains predominantly inter- industry, 
rather than following the general trend toward intra-industry trade. 59 The 
manufactured exports to Japan that do occur are often unfinished, intermediate 
goods, which are insufficient to offset the increased imports of capital goods 
from Japan that underpin the industrialisation process in the rest of the 
region. 60 The increase of manufactures imports in Japan that has occurred 
may be partly explained, therefore, by the exports of Japanese affiliates - at 
least 21% of Japanese imports in 1986 were from of this type.61 
A significant development in the region has been the entrenchment of the 
triangular trade relationship between Japan, the US and the region as a 
whole. 62 The combination of foreign protection and the dramatic Yen 
appreciation during the 1980s in particular, not only caused Japanese industry 
to restructure and move elements of production offshore, but also altered the 
pattern of trade between the regions. While the N I E's exports gained an 
increasing share of the US market, Japanese capital goods exports to the N I Es 
also grew. Japanese multinationals are significant actors in this three way 
trade, with affiliated production aimed at third countries, circumventing 
protection barriers and taking advantage of lower labour costs.63 While all of the 
58 Dobson, Wendy (1993) Japan in East Asia: Trading and Investment Strategies, Institute of 
Southeast Asian Studies: 37. 
59 Dobson, Wendy (1993) Japan in East Asia : 27-35. 
60 Petri, Peter A (1992) "Platforms in the Pacific: The Trade Effects of Direct Investment in 
Thailand", Journal of Asian Economics, 3 (2): 173-195. There is some evidence, however, of 
this pattern beginning to change, with increased exports of finished goods from subsidiaries 
back to Japan. See: lshizawa, M (1995) 'Among imports from East Asia, finished goods grow', 
The Nikkei Weekly, May 22: 5. 
61 Park, Y & Park, W (1991) "Changing Japanese Trade Patterns and the East Asian NICs", in 
Krugman, P (ed) Trade With Japan: Has the Door Opened Wider?, University of Chicago Press: 
107. 
62 Significantly, this triangular relationship has not only allowed Japan to increase 
competitiveness and overcome protective barriers, it has also enhanced Japan's significant 
trade surplus with Asia, as the latter becomes increasingly dependent on Japanese capital 
goods to underpin indigenous industrialisation. Cohen, S & Guerrieri, P (1994) 'The Variable 
geometry of Asian Trade', in Doherty, E (ed) Japanese Investment in Asia: International 
Production Strategies in a Changing World, The Asia Foundation, San Francisco: 189. For a 
useful country-specific examination of these effects, see : Petri, P (1992) 'Platforms in the 
Pacific':173-96. 
63 Park, Y & Park, W (1991) "Changing Japanese Trade Patterns and the East Asian NICs". 
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above may loom large in the context of regional economies, it is worth 
repeating that it is of less significance to Japan - it is estimated that only 5% of 
total Japanese manufacturing occurs outside Japan;64 a statistic that further 
highlights the region's asymmetrical relationship with and dependence on 
Japan. 
The Structure of Japanese Capital in the Region 
Having provided a broad-brush sketch of Japan's historical involvement in the 
region, it remains to give greater specificity to this picture. A consideration of 
the experiences of specific industries and countries can help provide a more 
nuanced picture of both Japan's general economic integration and the specific 
attractions that caused Japanese companies to locate where and when they 
did. This not only has obvious implications for Australia's policies and their 
comparative attractiveness, but it may also indicate where Australia 'fits' into the 
region as far as Japanese corporate planners are concerned. Before any 
detailed consideration of Japanese operations is undertaken, however, an 
important and recurring theme of this thesis merits repetition: Japanese 
capitalism is different, although perhaps less so than it once was. 
One of the distinguishing characteristics of Japanese transnational ownership 
patterns, and an assumption that still pervades much of the literature, was that 
Japanese corporations preferred to take minority ownership positions in 
subsidiary plants. However, this picture has changed and Japanese 
transnationals are now more like their American and European rivals: In 1990 
85 per cent of foreign sales came from majority owned foreign subsidiaries, and 
90% of Japanese affiliates in Europe and the US were majority-owned.65 What 
continues to distinguish Japanese operations, however, is a preference where 
possible for establishing overseas distribution, rather than production networks, 
continued market access was the key here. For the US, see: Chernetsky, H I (1987) "The 
American Connection: Motives for Japanese Foreign Direct Investment", Columbia Journal of 
World Business, XXII, No 4. For Europe, see: Mason, M (1994) 'Historical Perspectives on 
Japanese Direct Investment in Europe', Mason, M & Encarnation, D (eds) , in Does Ownership 
Matter? Japanese Multinationals in Europe, Clarendon Press. 
64 Rowley, A & do Rosario, L (1991) "Empire of the Sun", in Holloway, N (ed) Japan in Asia: 
The Economic Impact on the Region, Far Eastern Economic Review: 12. This statistic needs to 
be qualified as it is changing rapidly due to the seemingly inexorably rising Yen. Some 
commentators estimate 10% of Japanese manufacturing will occur overseas by 1998, with 
potentially serious implications for employment in Japan. See: "Powerhouse Yen May Cost 
Japan 3.65 Million Jobs, New Study Says", Asian Wall Street Journal, 16/7/94: 4. 
65 Encarnation, D (1994) ' Investment and Trade by American, European, and Japanese 
Multinationals across the Triad', in Mason, M & Encarnation, D (eds) Does Ownership Matter? 
Japanese Multinationals in Europe, Clarendon Press, Oxford: 208/9. 
187 
with intra-industry shipments accounting for some 40% of Japanese exports 
worldwide. 66 For Japanese companies FD I has 'created the principal channel 
for two-way trade flows with other industrialised economies, granting Japanese 
multinationals unrivalled control over their country's trade . .. '67 
In Asia, the path of Japanese multinational expansion after the watershed 
liberalisation of capital controls in 1972 was smoothed by the established 
connections of the sogo shosha.68 Two factors in particular encouraged a rapid 
escalation of Japanese investment in the region: the second 'oil shock' in 1979, 
and the Plaza Accord, which initiated the massive appreciation of the Yen. 
While there may be a degree of convergence between Japanese 
multinational's behaviour and that of its Anglo-American rivals, important 
differences remain; differences that are especially noticeable in Asia. As 
Doherty observes, what she calls Japanese production network's 'traditional' 
pattern has not disappeared, but remains 
organised hierarchically to ensure that Tokyo retains the lion's share of decision-making 
authority, technological capability, and sourcing. This hierarchical organization has 
resulted in tight control over foreign affiliates as well as the creation of fairly 'closed' 
production networks that have tended not to develop business ties with non-affiliated 
local and foreign suppliers. 59 
Crucially, argues Doherty, it is the 'interplay between individual corporate 
strategies, and home- and host-country government regulations and polices' 
that determines the specific pattern of regional integration and interaction. 70 
Japanese TNCs were amongst the first to recognise the potential savings that 
the global reorganisation of production processes offered, something that was 
particularly apparent in the electronic industry where production could be 
disaggregated into 3 stages (conception and development; component 
production; testing and assembly). 71 It has been predominantly what Bernard 
66 Encarnation, D (1994) 'Investment and Trade': 219. 
67 Encarnation, D (1994) 'Investment and Trade': 224. 
68 The sogo shosha not only made the move into Asia easier for Japan's TNCs, they also 
allowed small and medium sized Japanese companies to move, something which Boyd argues 
their equivalent Anglo American rivals, including Australia rivals, were unable to do. Boyd, G 
(1990) 'Japan in the Environment for Strategic Planning', in Nemetz, P (ed) The Pacific Rim: 
Investment, Development, and Trade, University of British Columbia Press: 206. 
69 Doherty, E (1994) 'Introduction: Japanese Investment and Production-Oriented Regionalism', 
in Doherty, E (ed) Japanese Investment in Asia: International Production Strategies in a 
Changing World, The Asia Foundation, San Francisco: 14. 
70 Doherty, E (1994) 'Introduction: Japanese Investment and Production-Oriented Regionalism': 
20. 
71 Grimwade, N (1989) International Trade: New Patterns of Trade, Production and Investment, 
Routledge, New York: 236. 
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and Raven hill call the 'low-end', export-oriented aspects of production that have 
been shifted to Asia, however, while the more lucrative, knowledge intensive 
parts of the production process have tended to remain in Japan.72 Indeed, as 
Steven points out, the structure of Japanese corporate organisation leaves it 
especially well placed to maximise profits on Asia.73 Yet, as Doherty suggests 
above, the precise manner of this incorporation will be dependent on the 
specific arrangement negotiated between corporations and governments. Ernst 
suggests that although Japanese electronics firms predominantly used intra­
firm production networks throughout Asia, since the beginning of the 1990s 
there have been signs of decentralisation of control, partly as a result of Yen 
appreciation and the increasing attraction of local sourcing but also - and most 
significantly from a potential public policy perspective - as a result of pressure 
from home governments to open up networks to local suppliers. 74 
The car industry is, like electronics, one of the defining industrial processes of 
late capitalism; it is also illustrative of the emerging pattern of Japan's regional 
integration. It symbolises the transition from Japan's initial position as a 
'reluctant multinational', 75 to one where it presides over tightly integrated 
production networks that span the region. What Doner calls a 'pyramidlike 
structure' of production sites and processes has evolved in the less developed 
countries (LOGs) throughout an increasingly global industry.76 Korea is 
exceptional in having a nationally controlled industry, but generally the AS EAN 
nations are at the bottom of the pyramid, supplying less valuable, labour 
intensive inputs.77 Again, it is important to recognise that even this investment 
by Japanese TNCs and incorporation into productive networks was grudging 
and partly the result economic and political imperatives. Crucially, the LOGs 
72 Bernard, M & Ravenhill, J (1992) 'New Hierarchies in East Asia: The Post Plaza Division of 
Labour', Working Paper 1992/3, Research School of Pacific Studies, ANU, Canberra: 10. 
73 Steven, R (1994) 'New World Order: A New Imperialism', Journal of Contemporary Asia, 24 
(3): 271. 
74 Ernst, D (1994) 'Mobilizing the Region's Capabilities? The East Asian Production Networks 
of Japanese Electronic Firms', in Doherty, E (ed) Japanese Investment in Asia: International 
Production Strategies in a Changing World, The Asia Foundation, San Francisco: 39-42. 
75 Doner, R (1991) Driving a Bargain: Automobile Industrialization and Japanese Firms in 
Southeast Asia, University of California Press, Berkeley: 83. 
76 Doner, R (1991) Driving a Bargain : 70. 
77 This process is being reinforced by what Morris-Suzuki calls a 'new international division of 
knowledge' - the Industrialization process in Southeast Asia is increasingly internationally 
based, producing a pattern of local, functional roles dependent on productive and technological 
specialization generally dictated by Japanese TNCs. The important point here is that the 
transfer and national utilisation of technology is not the seamless and unproblematic affair that 
some advocates of economic development imply. See: Morris-Suzuki, T (1992) 'Japanese 
technology and the new International Division of Knowledge in Asia', in Tokunaga, S (ed) 
Japan's Foreign Investment and Asian Economic Interdependence: Production, Trade, and 
Financial Systems, University of Tokyo Press: 135-52. 
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have been able to exploit rivalry between famously competitive Japanese 
TNCs to encourage investment and local production. 
However, Malaysia's attempts to attract Japanese investment with which to 
initiate a domestic car industry is illustrative of the difficulty other nations may 
experience when dealing with Japanese multinationals, as well as the latter's 
ability to ensure that the export of manufacturing occurs on terms favourable to 
itself. Mitsubishi was able to manage its involvement in Malaysia in such a way 
as to ensure preferential access to a potentially lucrative market, while 
producing - despite supplying many components from Japan - a noticeably 
inferior car for domestic consumption.78 With Toyota's dominance of Indonesia, 
Mazda a significant player in the Philippines, and Nissan pre-eminent in 
Thailand, the Malaysian venture offered Mitsubishi an opportunity to extend 
domestic rivalry and position itself within AS EAN and any possible AS EAN free 
trade area.79 True, Malaysia has gained a manufacturing base it might not have 
otherwise had, but only at the cost of Mitsubishi dominating the management of 
the local subsidiary and accounting for 80% of the local car market. Moreover, 
there has been a notable reluctance on the part of Japanese TN Cs like 
Mitsubishi and Matsushita to transfer technology and encourage potential 
rivals.80 
Overall, Japanese investment is integrating its neighbouring economies into a 
regional production web with its apex in Japan. Importantly, Japanese 
bureaucratic guidance, while possibly less important than it once was, is still 
providing an important supportive policy framework within which the 
restructuring of Japanese capital may occur.81 The tendency for the fierce 
rivalry that characterises Japanese TN C competition to spill over into the 
78 Bartu, Friedemann (1992) The Ugly Japanese: Nippon's Economic Empire in Asia, 
Singapore: Longman: Chapter 6. 
79 It should be noted that Japanese TNCs have become increasingly active supporters of 
initiatives like the brand-to-brand complementation agreement within ASEAN as their regional 
production networks become more extensive. This highlights both the power of Japanese TNCs 
to influence local political and institutional structures and the possibilities further concentration 
of regional productive activities that may result. [For a more detailed discussion of such 
initiatives see: Machado, K (1992) 'ASEAN State Industrial Policies and Japanese Regional 
Production Strategies: The case of Malaysia's Motor Vehicle Industry', in Clark, C & Chan, S 
(eds) The Evolving Pacific Basin in the Global Political Economy: Domestic and International 
Linkages, Lynne Rienner, Boulder:169-202.] Significantly, the proposed ASEAN Free Trade 
Area is likely to further consolidate Southeast Asia's position a preferred location tor Japanese 
manufacturing capital as it relocates overseas and encourage the growth of intra -regional 
trade. [See: Earl, G (1996) 'ASEAN free trade marching on', Australian Financial Review, 
January 4.] 
80 Hirose, T (1994) 'Southeast Asia: From cheap labour to rich markets, The Nikkei Weekly, 
June 20: 24. 
81 Oishi, N (1994) 'MITI aims to boost parts industries in Asia', The Nikkei Weekly, July 25: 2. 
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international arena is creating distinct investment patterns. Japanese TNCs 
often display similar investment patterns, as individual companies position 
themselves in relation to domestic rivals as. much as other economic 
imperatives. 82 This leads to a sudden 'rush' of investment into particular 
locations - as with the rapid growth of investment in China - something which 
eventually pulls smaller Japanese investors along in its wake.83 Indeed, it is 
noteworthy that Japan's small and medium sized companies were responsible 
for an average 40-50 per cent of overall Japanese manufacturing investment 
during the 1980s. 84 
What recent Japanese investment has produced, then, is a complex system of 
connected and mutually dependent production processes and supplier 
networks that span the region. In the case of the automotive industry, for 
example, Toyota uses Thailand to supply diesel engines and electronics, the 
Philippines for transmissions, Malaysia for steering gears, and Indonesia for 
petrol engines. 85 Toyota not only gains from emergent local economies of 
scope and scale but is increasingly encouraged to cement this position by host 
government polices. Thailand, Malaysia, the Philippines and Indonesia have 
signed a brand-to-brand 'complementation pact' which halves the tariffs on 
imports from member countries.86 Clearly, this fusion of economic and political 
imperatives locks the region into a mutually rewarding symbiosis. 87 As 
Abegglen observes, these tightly integrated industries will make it increasingly 
difficult for even powerful competitors from the E U  and US to compete, 88 let 
alone Australian-based companies. Moreover, from an Australian perspective, 
serious doubts must be raised about existent Japanese investment in Australia 
if it is not closely integrated into such networks. The possibility of new 
investment that is not part of such a system must be even more remote. The 
82 I am indebted to Professor Yasutami Shimomura for bringing this phenomenon to my 
attention. 
83 Friedland, J (1994) 'Follow the leaders', The Far Eastern Economic Review, March 31: 54/5. 
A recent JETRO survey of Japanese TNC investment intentions revealed that 58 per cent of 
companies saw China as their preferred investment target. See: Sapsford, J (1994) 'Japanese 
seek new markets in Asia, Australian Financial Review, July 14: 54. 
84 Takeuchi, J (1993) 'Foreign Direct Investment in ASEAN by Small and Medium-sized 
Japanese Companies and Its Effects on Local Supporting Industries', RIM Pacific Business and 
Industries, Vol 1: 36-57. Takeuchi suggests that while established subcontracting relationships 
may be becoming strained as a result of increased competitive pressures, the smaller 
companies are developing greater self-reliance. Either way, they are likely to remain important 
sources of investment. 
85 Kubo, I (1992) 'Symbiotic Growth: Japanese Firms in Asia', Tokyo Business Today, 60 (6): 
32. 
86 'Automakers call for back-up', The Nikkei Weekly, January 1: 18. See also fn 74 above. 
87 See fn 77 above for an elaboration of this point. 
88 Abegglen, J (1994) Sea Change: 239. 
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specifics of these questions will be taken up in the next chapter. At present, it is 
important to assess Australia's multi-lateral, liberalising trade strategy in the 
light of the preceding discussion. 
Japan as a Regional Power 
I have focused on Japan's economic engagement with the region quite 
deliberately. Given the indecisive nature of Japan's foreign policy noted in the 
previous chapter, the unambiguous effects of Japanese FD I yield less 
equivocal outcomes upon which to focus. Moreover, it is precisely the economic 
aspects of regional integration with which Australia's foreign economic policy 
discourse seeks to deal, and about which a domestic epistemic community 
claims expert knowledge. It is legitimate, therefore, to concentrate the weight of 
any critique precisely on the areas which advocates of Australia's dominant 
neoliberal policy paradigm claim authority and wield greatest influence. 
However, notwithstanding the normative injunctions of many neo-classical 
economists, it is not possible to separate conveniently economic issues from a 
wider political context. As we have already seen in relation to AP E C, economic 
relationships are embedded in specific social and political structures that 
constrain and delimit possible outcomes. While it is not possible here to 
canvass exhaustively the possible trajectories of future Japanese involvement 
in either the narrowly defined region or the wider world stage, it is helpful to 
make a few brief observations to provide a contextual backdrop. 
The importance of introducing overtly political considerations, however briefly, 
can be seen with reference to the work of, arguably, Australia's most influential 
Japan scholar, Peter Drysdale. Drysdale is, as we have seen, a key member of 
the Australian epistemic community that has both promoted initiatives like 
AP E C  and helped establish the ideational framework that legitimates 
contemporary trade relations with Japan. We saw in chapter 4 how both 
Drysdale and Garnaut reject the idea that Japan's trade pattern is either notably 
different or that it has significant barriers to trade. 89 Implausible and misguided 
as this contention has subsequently been demonstrated to be, it is in keeping 
with a normative position that informs subsequent and equally contestable 
depictions of Japan. Not only does Drysdale claim that 'mercantilist thinking is 
in total retreat, if not entirely routed' in what he imprecisely describes as 
89 Drysdale, P & Garnaut, R (1989) A Pacific Trade Area?, Pacific Economic Paper No 171, 
Australia-Japan Research Centre, ANU: 15. 
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Japan's 'top policy councils', but he goes on to suggest Japan's interests are 
inherently served by and tied up with regional trade liberalisation. 90 Certainly, 
Japan may benefit if initiatives like A P E C  can discourage a move on the part of 
the US toward managed trade and keep markets open, but this does not mean 
that Japan itself will inevitably or willingly reduce trade barriers. Moreover, given 
that crucial barriers to trade liberalisation in Japan are structurally embodied in 
the organisation of Japanese corporations, it is not clear whether Japan's 'top 
policy councils' could do so even if they wished to; even supposing they were 
capable of the decisive action such initiatives imply. 
However, as we have seen, Japanese policy-making is an inherently more 
problematic and contested process than in many comparable western nations. 
It is hard to escape the conclusion that many Occidental interpretations of 
Japanese behaviour, or more specifically, interpretations inspired by neo­
classical economics, stem as much from wishful thinking as from serious 
analysis of the complexity of Japanese politics and corporate organisation: the 
abstract assumptions and idealisations that inform economic initiatives like 
A P E C  may be praiseworthy at a theoretical level, but would seem to have little 
connection with commercial reality. More fundamentally, they understate 
economic influence while exaggerating political capacity. 
Even where political influence has been effective and influential it has been 
geared to reinforcing the structural power of Japanese capital within the region, 
rather than encouraging wholesale deregulation and the unleashing of market 
forces. M IT I, for example, while something of a diminished force, nevertheless 
provided an important regional industrialisation plan within which the expansion 
and restructuring of Japanese capital might occur.91 In this way, not only was 
there an intention to compensate adversely-effected domestic producers, but 
aid disbursements were seen as integral in the development of a coherent 
package that included trade and investment. While the smooth implementation 
of this plan has been rendered more problematic by the rapidity of economic 
change, especially the relentless competitive pressure on individual 
corporations that reduced M IT I's influence, it has, nevertheless, suggests 
Unger, taught developing East Asian economies a good deal about the efficacy 
of industry policies in particular and the merits of government-business 
90 Drysdale, P (1989) Japan's Trade Diplomacy: Yesterday, Today, Tomorrow, Pacific 
Economic Paper, No 178, Australia-Japan Research Centre, ANU: 22. 
91 Unger, D (1993) 'Japan's Capital Exports: Molding East Asia', in Unger, D & Blackburn, P 
(eds) Japan's Emerging Global Role, Lynne Rienner Publishers:155-70. 
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cooperation in general.92 Japan, rather than the US, has become the economic 
exemplar within the region. 
However, it is important here to acknowledge another, less obvious, aspect of 
Japanese capital outflows, especially since the 1980: Japanese financial 
capital. Driven by deregulation, in combination with decreased domestic 
returns and investment opportunities, Japanese financial capital became an 
increasingly significant force within the global economy, most notably in the US, 
but also within Japan's immediate region. This gave Japan an enhanced 
'relational power', argues Helleiner, as it was able to influence other nations 
simply by lending or not lending, something he considers will have a more 
lasting impact than the growth of Japan's external assets.93 While there may be 
little evidence of a 'Yen bloc' emerging in the region, 94 there is a growing 
structural dependence on Japan amongst the AS EAN nations in particular as 
. measured in Yen denominated loans and aid disbursements. 95 
What distinguishes Japan's rise to economic pre-eminence, however, is the 
lack of a concomitant increase in its political influence. Whether Japan will be 
able to translate its undoubted economic power into an equivalent political 
influence is a moot point, which has generated a voluminous, if somewhat 
inconclusive literature. 96 There is no intention here to treat these arguments in 
great depth. However, it is important to observe that this sort of political 
complexity, which is conspicuous by its absence in much orthodox economic 
analysis, is likely to play a significant role in determining not only Japan's 
92 Unger, D (1993) 'Japan's Capital Exports': 163. 
93 Helleiner, E (1990) 'Money and Influence: Japanese Power in the International Monetary and 
Financial System', in Newland, K (ed) The International Relations of Japan, Macmillan, London: 
39. 
94 Frankel, J (1993) ' Is Japan Creating A Yen Bloc in East Asia and the Pacific?', in Frankel, J 
& Kahler, M (eds) Regionalism and Rivalry: Japan and the United States in Pacific Asia, 
University of Chicago Press: 53-85. 
95 Holloway, N & Rowley, A eds, (1991) Japan in Asia: The Economic Impact, Far Eastern 
Economic Review: Chapter 14. 
96 One of the most commonly cited difficulties of Japan's economic strength coupled with a 
perceived failure in political leadership, which undermines Japan's ability to play a hegemonic 
role, especially as far as providing an open market and a reserve currency are concerned. See: 
Murphy, R (1989) 'Power Without Purpose: The Crisis of Japan's Global Financial Dominance', 
Harvard Business Review, March-April: 71-83. Other noteworthy contributions on Japan's future 
international role, especially its political dimension, include: Cox, R W (1989) 
"Middlepowermanship, Japan, and Future World Order", International Journal, 44 (4); lnoguchi, 
T (1991) "Japan's Role in a Multipolar World", in Islam, S (ed) Yen for Development: Japanese 
Foreign Investment and the Politics of Burden-Sharing, NY: Council on Foreign Relations; 
Leaver, R (1989) "Restructuring in the Global Economy: From Pax Americana to Pax 
Nipponica?", Alternatives, XIV; Rapkin, David P (1990) "Japan and World Leadership", in 
Rapkin (ed) World Leadership and Hegemony, Lynne Reiner; Rix, A (1993) "Japan and the 
Region: Leading From Behind", in Higgott et al (eds) Pacific Economic Relations in the 1990s: 
Cooperation or Conflict?, Allen & Unwin, Sydney. 
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political relationships, but also in setting the parameters for its expanding 
economic role. As we have seen with aid disbursements, more explicitly 
political concerns can be an important determinant and facillitator of economic 
outcomes. 
Japan and the Politics of Regionalism 
Initially, it is important to note, as Pyle points out, that Japan's modest 
international political profile compared with its increased economic power is 
neither 'accidental' nor inevitable: 
Throughout the postwar decades, Japan's role in the world has been the product of the 
political order imposed on it by the victors and the shrewd and pragmatic polices of 
postwar Japanese leaders. While forging to the front rank of global economic power, 
Japan remained politically withdrawn, shunning initiatives and involvement in political­
strategic issues. This role as a commercial democracy, aloof from international politics, 
has been supported by a remarkably durable popular consensus . . .  the fundamental 
orientation toward economic growth and political passivity was also the product of 
carefully constructed and brilliantly implemented foreign policy. 97 
At first blush such a position may seem irreconcilable with the 'reactive state', 
mentioned in the preceding chapter, where policy outcomes are often 
influenced by external forces. However, the two need not be mutually 
exclusive: the 'Yoshida Doctrine' (named after what is often considered to be 
Japan's most influential post-war leader) , in which economic development 
under the auspices of a co-operative and strategically convenient US was given 
priority, is not incompatible with incremental, grudging shifts in foreign policy 
where necessary. Indeed, the perception of difference may have usefully 
obscured reluctance to take unpalatable decisions. 
However, Japan's rise has, as Gilpin suggests, occurred in and helped to foster 
an increasingly hostile environment as an 'adjustment burden' has been shifted 
to other advanced nations; Japan has not played a US-style hegemonic role in 
underpinning global development and a liberal trading order, preferring to 
strengthen its own financial position and power. 98 The latter observation needs 
qualification, however: exports of Japanese capital have been crucial in 
financing regional development; while they may have been motivated primarily 
by Japanese priorities they, nevertheless, provided an important stimulus for 
97 Pyle, K 8 (1988) "Japan, the World, and the Twenty-first Century", in lnoguchi, T & Okimoto, 
D (eds) The Political Economy of Japan: Volume 2, The Changing International Context, 
Stanford University Press: 452. 
98 Gilpin, R (1990) "Where Does Japan Fit In?" in Newland, K (ed) The International Relations 
of Japan, Macmillan: 13/4. 
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external growth.99 Given the current economic and political difficulties in Japan 
it is neither possible nor profitable to attempt definitive predictions about the 
manner in which competing national and international imperatives will work 
themselves out. Japan's emergent global role is clearly contestable and 
embryonic. 
Perhaps the most important question in the context of this discussion, however, 
is what Japan's role is likely to be within, what Gareth Evans likes to call, the 
' East Asian hemisphere'.10o Revisionist critics like Chalmers Johnson suggest 
that Japan's bureaucrats are systematically attempting to re-establish the 
abortive ' Co- Prosperity Sphere' that so alienated Japan's neighbours during 
World War 11.101 As we have seen, such a conception makes assumptions 
about Japan's governmental and bureaucratic effectiveness that are 
increasingly questionable and contested in practice. More fundamentally, a 
more overt regional leadership role for Japan - especially one involving a 
concomitant military status - is rendered more problematic by what Rapkin calls 
Japan's 'legitimacy deficit'.1 o2 What seems most likely is that initiatives like 
M IT I's New Aid Plan will simply reinforce an emerging dominance based 
principally on economic power rather than political influence, but one which has 
more scope for inter-dependence than the idea of a revivified Co- Prosperity 
Sphere implies.103 
The more general question of whether Japan's nee-mercantilist model is 
sustainable, an appropriate role model for other emerging economic powers, or 
whether it is as fundamentally damaging to the world economic order as some 
critics claim,104 is not central here. What matters is the realisation that other 
nations are behaving as if such claims were true. As we have seen, the US is 
99 Healy, Derek (1991) Japanese Capital Exports and Asian Economic Development,  
Development Centre Studies, Paris: OECD. 
100 Hiebert, M & Seri, 8 (1995) 'Wizard of Oz: Australia's Evans redraws the map of Asia', Far 
Eastern Economic Review, August 17: 26. 
101 Johnson, C (1993) 'History Restarted: Japanese-American Relations at the End of the 
Century', in Higgott, R et al (eds) Pacific Economic Relations in the 1990s: Cooperation or 
Conflict? , Allen & Unwin: 55. 
102 Rapkin, D (1990} 'Japan and World Leadership?', in Rapkin, D (ed) World Leadership and 
Hegemony, Lynne Rienner, Boulder: 195/6. Rapkin suggests that Japan suffers a legacy of 
militarism and colonialism; a reputation for mercantilism; and a suspicion that Japan is 
incapable of providing universalisable norms, values and principles, of the sort that underpinned 
US hegemony and the international liberal trading order. 
103 Katzenstein, P & Rouse, M (1993} 'Japan as a Regional Superpower in Asia', in Frankel, J 
& Kahler, M (eds) Regionalism and Rivalry: Japan and the United States in Pacific Asia, 
University of Chicago Press: 217-44. 
104 Gilpin, R (1990} 'Where Does Japan Fit In?', in Newland, K (ed} The International Relations 
of Japan, Macmillan: 5-22. 
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not only the world's most influential and powerful economic actor, it is 
increasingly willing to use its economic leverage to secure bilateral agreements 
with other nations. Moreover, sections of the Japanese public and its political 
class are also demonstrating a new found desire to say 'no' to the US in 
general, but particularly in their interminable bilateral trade negotiations.105 The 
rise of more combative politicians like ex-Trade Minister and current Prime 
Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto is indicative of a changing mood in Japan.106 
Moreover, the emergence of other influential political figures bent on major 
reform of the political, bureaucratic and electoral systems with a view to turning 
Japan into a 'normal' country may also presage significant change with 
unpredictable consequences.1 07 What is clear, however, is that in the event of 
any trade war with the US the amount of economic power Japan has 
accumulated would mean that the US may well be as, if not more, damaged 
than Japan.1oa 
However it is neither necessary nor useful to speculate about possible 
outcomes here. What is important to recognise is that political factors are 
crucial, contingently determined and inescapable aspects of economic 
outcomes. Quite simply, it is not possible unproblematically to remove or 
insulate economic ideas from their social and political contexts; a procedure 
that seems to inform much of Australia's trade policy. As I have tried to suggest 
in the last chapter, and more briefly here, Japan is a particularly glaring 
example of the impossibility of separating the political from the economic. 
Japan's difficulties in fulfilling its A P EC obligations without alienating the 
politically powerful domestic agricultural lobby is only the most obvious 
illustration of a more generalised phenomenon.109 In the meantime, however, 
from a Japanese perspective and despite these difficulties, A PE C  provides a 
vehicle for minimising aggressive bilateralism while keeping regional markets 
open.1 10 
105 This attitudinal shift was captured and fostered by Ishihara, S (1989) The Japan That Can 
Say No: Why Japan Will Be First Among Equals, Simon & Schuster, New York. 
106 Bremner, B (1995) 'Here Comes Hashimoto', Business Week, September 11: 16/7. 
107 Ozawa, I (1994) Blueprint tor a New Japan: The Rethinking of a Nation, Kodansha 
International, Tokyo. 
108 For a fuller discussion of this point, see: Meeks, P (1993) 'Japan and Global Economic 
Hegemony', in Akaha, T & Langdon, F (eds) Japan in the Posthegmonic World, Lynne Rienner, 
Boulder: 41-67. 
109 Garran, R (1995) 'Domestic strife rules out Tokyo aid in farm row', The Australian, 
September 15: 2. 
110 A senior Japanese diplomat has suggested that APEC should concentrate on building 
consensus, make sure that a handful of developed nations cannot 'dictate to the rest', and leave 
the question of tariff levels to the World Trade Organization. See: Akao, N (1995) 'Strategy for 
APEC: A Japanese View', Japan Review of International Affairs, 9 (3):169-77. 
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Conclusion 
What I have tried to demonstrate and stress in this chapter, then, is that 
international economic relations occur in a wider social and political context . 
Without reference to some wider frame of reference - in this case Japan's 
immediate region - it is impossible to comprehend the behaviour and 
motivations of the Japanese TN Cs that are the principal conduits through which 
Japanese capital flows. Japanese TNCs were attracted first and foremost by 
the region 's high rates of profitability. However, the possibility of securing 
access to burgeoning markets and establishing the same sort of networks that 
characterise corporate organisation in Japan were also major considerations. 
Where this process was facilitated by supportive Japanese and host 
government initiatives, relocation became - especially in aftermath of the Yen 
appreciation - even more attractive. 
Japan dominates the region by sheer economic weight. Not only is Japan by far 
the region's dominant investor, this powerful economic position is reinforced by 
the nature of Japanese investment. Integrated production networks are binding 
the region together more tightly, making it more difficult for 'outsiders', like the 
US and to a lesser extent Australia, to break in. This dominance is reinforced by 
aid and foreign loans that grant Japan increasing relational power over its 
smaller neighbours. The implication for Australia of these developments is that 
it risks being increasingly excluded from productive regional trade and 
invest ment patterns that have their apex in Japan . Their is a growing risk that 
Australia will be effectively marginalised from the regional channels of 
manufacturing activity, reinforcing Australia's subordinate position as a supplier 
of resources and primary products. The effect of this on Japanese bilateral 
trade and investment will be considered in the next chapter. 
A P E C, the centrepiece of A ustralia's regional economic diplo macy seems 
highly ambitious at best, and potentially damaging at worst in the light of the 
sort of developments outlined above. Not only is A P E C's further 
institutionalisation problematic given some of the political complexities touched 
on above, but it seems incapable of addressing the fundamental sources of 
trade tensions even if it were. Simply reducing or removing trade barriers -
always supposing it is possible to identify them in the first place - will do nothing 
to address the sources of Japan's competitive advantage that are intrinsic to 
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and dependent upon the organisation of its corporate activities. Moreover, 
where these patterns of corporate organisation are being reproduced and 
emulated throughout the region the problem is likely to become even more 
intractable and unresponsive to trade negotiations alone. Predicating foreign 
economic policy on the supposed benefits that exposure to market forces 
brings and pious invocations of 'level playing fields' is, as we shall see, unlikely 
to deliver the sort of investment Australia desires or leave it positioned to 
compete effectively with less doctrinaire competitors. 
Even within the narrow discursive purview of Australia's influential coterie of 
orthodox economists, therefore, there are substantial grounds on which to 
question the policy prescriptions that flow from such arbitrarily demarcated 
conceptions. The systematic neglect of political complexity, while a heuristic or 
theoretical technique of some limited utility, seems an inappropriate basis for 
policy formulation. As we have seen, the political and economic leadership of 
other nations in the region, with which 'Australia' finds itself in competition, take 
an altogether more pragmatic approach to the construction of economic and 
political policies. Where this involves systematically attempting to lure or cajole 
productive investment within national borders it is probable that flows of 
productive investment into Australia will decline as a result. The precise nature 
of Australia's trade and investment position in relation to the region's most 
powerful economic actor is the subject of the next chapter. 
199· 
Chapter 7: Australia and Japan 
Finally, then, it is appropriate to consider what effect the discourse of economic 
rationalism or neoliberalism - which, as we have seen, dominated Australia's 
foreign economic policy - has had on relations with Japan. This chapter, 
therefore, will give detailed consideration to recent patterns of economic 
interaction between Australia and Japan. The intention will be to compare the 
anticipated outcomes suggested by the neoliberal model with the actuality of 
Japanese trade and investment practices. Initially, consideration will be given to 
a number of important historical links, before giving greater attention to specific 
sectoral patterns of involvement. Manufacturing, banking and finance, 
resources and agriculture, as well as real estate will be the major foci of 
empirical attention. Before reviewing these sectors in detail, however, it is worth 
reminding ourselves of both the rationale and the expectation of the neoliberal, 
market conforming, deregulatory model. The government's own specialist 
advisory body - the East Asia Analytical Unit - provides an apposite summary. It 
suggests that: 
Reforms already set in train by the Australian Government should increasingly influence 
the direction of Japanese direct investment over the next five years [1992-97]. The 
benefits of lower inflation, reductions in tariffs, increased labour market flexibility and 
lower waterfront costs will help attract investment. Further reform designed to improve 
the efficiency of Australia's economy will similarly be the most important means by which 
the Australian Government can address the underlying impediments to stronger 
Japanese investment in Australia's manufacturing sector. Indications are that Japanese 
confidence in the prospects for certain segments of the manufacturing sector have 
improved. 1 [Emphasis added. ] 
This quotation usefully summarises the rationale that has underpinned not only 
the thinking of the government's expert advisers within the bureaucracy and 
academia, but that of the government itself, at least in the area of international 
economic policy: the 'correct' macro and micro-economic policy settings will 
inevitably make Australia a more attractive investment location, this logic 
suggests. The simple removal of impediments to the operation of market 
forces will ensure an inflow of productive investment into Australia's 
manufacturing sector. This will be most effectively achieved by implementing a 
range of micro-economic reforms intended to enhance the 'efficiency' and 
'competitiveness' of the 'Australian economy'. 2 
1 East Asia Analytical Unit (1992) Australia and North East Asia in the 1990s: Accelerating 
Change, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, AGPS, Canberra: 63. 
2 It should be stressed that domestic neoliberal reform has been considered as the principal 
mechanism for attracting Japanese capital as it restructures since the 1980s - allowing a 
sustained period for its potential efficacy to be demonstrated. See, for example, Department of 
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This is a policy paradigm that has been in place for more than a decade, and 
which might be expected to have displayed unequivocal gains already. As we 
have seen, however, a neoliberal, market-driven idealisation that repudiates 
government intervention, and which relies on 'efficiency' gains alone is unlikely 
in itself to alter the structure of economic activity. Indeed, simply enhancing 
market forces would seem likely merely to reinforce pre-existing forms of 
'comparative advantage' - a point Drysdale emphasises when explaining the 
high levels of Japanese investment in resources and real estate and the decline 
in manufacturing.3 An examination of the Australia-Japan economic relationship 
reinforces the need for a more wide-ranging theoretical perspective to explain 
some of the anomalies that characterise the bi-lateral relationship. 
This is especially apparent given that, as we have seen, the idea of a 'national 
economy' is an increasingly problematic one, and not necessarily the most 
useful point of departure when attempting to comprehend international 
economic activity. Moreover, nations as such are no longer considered to be 
the source of competitive advantage by more sophisticated observers from both 
orthodox and radical camps. 4 Individual firms competing in global marketplaces 
are more appropriate indicators of comparative competitiveness. The success 
of individual corporate strategies will be dependent on extracting any advantage 
that may be garnered at the national, regional or global level. As the earlier 
examination of corporate Japan suggested, the investment and production 
strategies of individual firms are dependent on a good deal more than simply 
the attractions of market-conforming, national macro policies. Indeed, as the 
consideration of the region indicated, Japanese capital may be encouraged to 
invest precisely where market forces are either constrained, or where 
contingent 'distortions' make such locations more attractive. 
In what follows it will become apparent that international economic activity is a 
good deal more complex than neo-classical economic models suggest. An 
explication of the pattern of economic activity between economic entities in 
Japan and Australia will allow us to consider the efficacy of Labor's policy 
settings during its term of office. Equally importantly, it will allow us to assess 
Foreign Affairs and Trade (1988} Japan's Changing Economic Role in the Region: A New 
Engine of Growth?, DFAT, AGPS, Canberra: iv. 
3 Drysdale, P (1993} 'Japanese Direct Investment in Australia in Comparative Perspective', 
Pacific Economic Paper, 223, Australia-Japan Research Centre, Canberra: 14. 
4 Krugman, P (1994) "Competitiveness: A Dangerous Obsession", Foreign Affairs, 73 (2}; 
Bryan, D (1995} ' International Competitiveness: National and Class Agendas', Journal of 
Australian Political Economy, No 35: 1-23. 
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the usefulness of the discourse of neoliberalism as a tool of theoretical analysis 
and as a prescriptive model for engendering the sort of changes envisaged by 
the East Asia Analytical Unit, quoted above. 
The sogo shosha in Australia 
In a manner similar to that occurring at present in the region to Australia's north, 
the early involvement of Japanese capital and corporate actors in Australia was 
pioneered by the sogo shosha. In the immediate postwar period the trading 
companies acted as 'procuring and marketing agents' for Japanese industry, 
linking both domestic and foreign suppliers through a complex network of 
agents.5 Initially, the sogo shosha were involved in the wool and wheat trade, 
establishing a strong and continuing presence in Sydney. During the 1960s as 
minerals and metals assumed a greater importance as a result of both the 
. expansion of the Australian mining sector and the gathering pace of Japanese 
industrialisation, the trading companies took on a more global , less Japan­
centric role, acting as intermediaries for 'Australian' exports to third countries. 6 
Individual companies' corporate links in Japan determined both the degree of 
involvement in particular commodities and the specialisation or diversification 
they subsequently developed. From 1964 direct involvement through equity 
purchase and joint ventures signified the desire to assure resource security; the 
trading companies associated with Japanese steel and chemical companies 
(Mitsubishi, Mitsui, and Sumitomo) were particularly prominent in this regard. 
The strategic investments of the sogo shosha confer particular advantages and 
forms of structural power in the conduct of trade relations with individual 
companies and sectors. This is most apparent with regard to Australia's single 
most important export - coal - the subject of a separate case study in the next 
chapter. However, it is worth briefly noting the scale and extent of the 
investments of some of Japan's leading corporations, of which the trading 
houses in Australia are an integral part. For example, the Mitsubishi trading 
company's major exports include coal, iron ore, beef, aluminium, wool and 
5 Edgington, D.W., (1990) Japanese Business Down-Under: Patterns of Japanese Investment 
in Australia, Routledge: Chapter 3, passim. The following discussion of Japanese corporate 
behaviour draws heavily on this text. 
6 The Japanese trading companies have built on this initial position and now are significant 
actors in 'Australia's' export trade. Indeed, the second and third largest exporters from Australia 
- after BHP - are Mitsui and Mitsubishi. The four largest trading companies account for 1 in 
every 6 dollars of Australia's total national export earnings. See: Hartcher, P (1994) 'Corporate 
Australia misses trade boat', Australian Financial Review, August 22: 15. 
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LNG. Major imports include machinery, textiles and chemicals.? The wider 
Mitsubishi group of which the trading company Mitsubishi Corporation is a 
member has extensive Australian investments in beef production, silicon sand, 
feedlots, tyres, automotive manufacturing, the North West shelf LNG project, 
coal, wool processing, manufacturing and importing electrical goods, as well as 
an extensive range of financial services through the Mitsubishi Bank and 
Mitsubishi Development. 8 Mitsui - the second largest Japanese exporter from 
Australia - shows a similar pattern. In addition to coal, iron ore, LNG, aluminium 
and beef, they are significant exporters of gold, woodchips, grain and salt. 
Mitsui also has extensive investments in coal production, iron ore, property 
development as well as banking and financial services. 9 
The range of Japanese investment is considered below in more detail. The 
point to note here is that Japanese export-oriented trade and investment 
patterns are dominated by primary products. The trading companies' crucial 
intermediary role gives them strategic leverage over Australian-based 
companies reliant on their services.1o Furthermore, as Kenichi Ohmae has 
argued, the inability of Australian exporters to penetrate the Japanese market 
stems, in part, from a dependence on Japanese trading companies to organise 
the export of Australian produce, a handicap he claims will be overcome only 
by Australia establishing its own trading company.11 As the examination of the 
sogo shosha's activities in chapter 5 indicated, there is little incentive for the 
trading companies to import manufactured goods of a sort that might compete 
with the products of fellow keiretsu members. Simply relying on market forces 
and enhanced competitiveness to gain market access and share wil l  not 
achieve the desired outcomes. 
Japanese Investment in Australia: An Overview 
Japanese FDI patterns reflect a combination of influences. Paramount here 
have been the demands of Japan's domestic economy and the constraints 
associated with potential external investment locations. Table 4 in the previous 
7 Austrade (1994} 'Japan's Top Trading Companies: Sago Shosha', unpublished paper. 
8 Australia-Japan Institute ( (1992} Japanese Business Activity in Australia, Sydney: 306-15. 
9 Australia-Japan Institute ( (1992} Japanese Business Activity in Australia: 316-35. 
10 Furthermore, the transnational organisational structure of the sago shosha means that they 
are able to minimise tax obligations through transfer pricing techniques, something that negates 
the potential benefits of foreign investment and undermines host government autonomy and 
revenues. See: Featherstone, T (1995} 'ATO shapes up to Japanese heavyweights', Australian 
Financial Review, October 25: 1 & 6. 
11 Hartcher, P (1994) 'One-to-one Selling Touted as the Answer', Australian Financial Review, 
September 5. 
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chapter indicates the notable diversity of investment locations of Japanese 
capital - testimony to an initial desire to secure resource security through 
widespread and potentially competing suppliers. What is also noteworthy is the 
importance of investment in the manufacturing sector. In this regard, the 
Oceania region of which Australia is the principal part displays some 
distinctive characteristics 
As Charts 2 and 3 indicate, Australia is an important investment location for 
Japanese capital, although the flows from Japan display a good deal of volatility 
- something exacerbated by a disparity in the size of the two economies (see 
Table 3). 
Chart 2 
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Source: Agnew, A (1995} 'Japanese Investment Into Australia', Australia-Japan Business 
Outlook Conference, Australia-Japan Economic Institute, Sydney:67. 
What is not apparent from these charts, however, is the relative importance of 
portfolio as opposed to direct investment. Chart 4 clearly demonstrates that with 
the exception of 1987, Japanese portfolio capital has been by far the most 
significant capital inflow into Australia. The implications of this will be 
considered in more detail below, but it is immediately apparent that Australia's 
principal significance is as a investment location for more liquid financial capital, 
rather than in productive investments of whatever kind. 
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Not only has Japanese investment been overwhelmingly of an indirect sort, but 
it is noticeably different from its British and US counterparts. Moreover, despite 
the rapid build-up of Japanese investment, the cumulative totals of British and 
the US FDI remain significantly larger.1 2 FDI represents only 15-20 per cent of 
Japan's total outward investment, a situation that is unlikely to change given 
that since 1987 Japanese insurance and pension funds have been allowed to 
place up to 30 per cent of their total assets in overseas securities.1 3 Bonds are 
the preferred investment vehicle for Japan's institutional investors, something 
which reflects the inherent conservatism of Japanese fund managers and their 
comparative lack of experience in assessing foreign risk. 
Before attempting any analysis of the sectoral implications and characteristics 
of these investment patterns, however, it is worth reinforcing the specific 
qualities that distinguish Japanese investment in Australia from other locations. 
Table 5 
Japanese Cumulative Investment by Industry 1951-89 (%) 
Australia's World Australia's 
Share Average Relative Imbalance 
Mining 20.9 7.5 +178 
Real Estate 23.1 11.4 +103 
Manufacturing 17.1 26.7 
Financial Services 12.3 22.5 
Other Industries 26.6 31.9 
Total 100 100 
Source: Committee for Economic Development m Australia & Ke1za1 Doyuka1 (1990} 
Encouraging Direct Investment Between Australia and Japan, C EDA, Sydney: 56. 
Table 5 clearly indicates the particular attraction of the mining and real estate 
sectors to Japanese investors compared to the rest of the world. Similarly, 
Japanese investment in the manufacturing sector - potentially the most valuable 
form of FDI given its job creating and import reducing potential - is 
conspicuously lower than the global average. This is especially noteworthy 
given that manufacturing investment in the region has been the most rapidly 
1 2 Whereas US FDI was 45% and British FDI 52% of their respective totals, Japanese F DI was 
only 30% of its total in 1989. See Access Economics (1991) Japanese Investment in Australia, 
Report Prepared for the Australia-Japan Foundation, Access Economics. 
1 3 Agnew, A (1992} 'Japanese Investment in Australia ', in Australia-Japan Business Outlook 
Conference: Conference Proceedings, Australia-Japan Economic Institute, Sydney: 94. 
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Table 6 
Japanese Direct Investment in Australia by Sector: 1 983-94 
(% share and $US millions) 
1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 
Manufacturing 9.03 27.6 2.8 14 20.8 8.7 3.7 9.8 13.4 10.4 37 
1 5 29 1 3 123 254 211 159 360 342 225 712 
Mining and 31.9 4.8 5 .3 22.1 9.5 7 .7 1 2.1 21 11.4 10.3 15.7 
Agricultural 5 3  5 25 195 116 186 5 1 6 769 291 223 302 
Banking and 1.2 8.6 52.1 10.4 17 1 5 12.8 5.5 2.8 2.9 2 
Insurance 2 9 244 92 208 363 545 zoo 72 6 3 3 8 
Real Estate 1.2 5.7 12 14.4 3 3.6 52.6 38.1 36.4 49.2 58 .6 28 . 1 
2 6 56 127 411 1270 1623 1333 1255 1271 540 
Commerce 53 25.7 12.4 8.7 8.9 3.8 7 8.9 8 8 . 6 9 
88 27 58 77 109 92 296 326 204 187 17 3 
Other services 3 .6 29 .5 15.6 30.1 10.3 1 2.1 26.2 18.5 1 5.1 9 .2 8.2 
6 31 73 265 126 292 11 17 679 385 200 157 
Total 166 105 468 881 1224 2414 4256 3667 2549 2169 1922 �----
Sources: Drysdale, P ( 1993) 'Japanese Direct Foreign Investment in Australia in Comparative 
Perspective', Pacific Economic Paper, No 22 3, AJRC, Canberra, & Australia-Japan Economic Institute 
Economic Bulle tin Nos 1 ( 6) & 3 ( 6). 
* Some figures unavailable 
1994 Cumu-lative 
1950-1994 
49.7 14.6 
629 3514 
9.7 16.9 
123 4066 
9.4 8.5 
120 2040 
1 1 . 3 33.5 
143 8049 
4.2 8.1 
54 1942 
15.4 18.1 
196* 4357 
1265 23968 
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expanding form of Japanese FDI overall.14 The other point to note is that 
despite Australia's apparent relative unimportance as a location for 
financial service investment, it has still had a notable impact in Australia: the 
sheer disparity of economic weight between Australia and Japan means that 
what are comparatively trivial flows by Japanese standards may have 
substantial effects in the smaller Australian economy. Table 6 illustrates the 
investment 'bulge' in both the banking and finance, as well as the 'other 
services' sectors, reflecting the impact of Australia's liberalisation of the 
financial sector during the latter part of the 1980s. Japanese banks moved to 
take advantage of the deregulation process, although, as we shall see, this had 
more to do with domestic imperatives and a desire to service existing Japanese 
clients than it did with any supposed benefits to be derived from strictly 
Australian factors. 
Overall, however, Japanese investment in Australia has been predominantly 
portfolio rather than direct and, as such, subject to possibly sudden and 
destabilising disinvestment should conditions in Australia or Japan make this 
necessary. The sudden retreat in 1992 of Japan's institutional investors in the 
wake of national recession and the collapse of the bubble economy are 
evidence of this possibility.15 The presence of Japanese financial institutions 
facilitates the flow of Japanese capital through Australia's domestic economic 
space, something that exacerbates the inherent volatility of the internationally 
exposed financial sector. Where FDI does occur, as Tables 5 and 6 indicate it 
appears to be driven by considerations that skew Japan's 'normal' pattern of 
investment toward mining and real estate. The following sections will consider 
in more detail why this pattern has emerged. Why is it, in fact, that Japanese 
investment has failed to develop in the way the government's expert advisers in 
particular and advocates of market forces in general had predicted? 
Manufacturing 
Domestic restrictions on Japanese capital outflows meant that manufacturing 
investment in Australia was negligible until the end of the 1960s. When it did 
occur the principal motivation was the same as has characterised the vast 
14 Japanese manufacturing investment in 'Asia' grew by 965% between 1992-1993. See, 
J ETRO (1995) JETRO White Paper on Foreign Direct Investment, Japan External Trade 
Organization, Tokyo:31. 
15 Agnew, A (1995) 'Japanese Investment in Australia', Australia-Japan Business Outlook 
Conference 1995: Business Opportunities Through Investment, Australia-Japan Economic 
Institute, Sydney: 73, Chart 18. 
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increases of investment in both the US and the EC: circumventing 
protectionism. Furthermore, the primary reason for Japanese manufacturers 
moving parts of their operations here was the same as had motivated their 
British and American predecessors: the desire to protect and expand market 
share.16 
Table 7 
Motives for Japanese FDI (Average Scores) 
To Supply Australian Market 3.9 
To Supply Japanese Market 2 
Promote exports from parent to 2.3 
Australia 
To supply other Japanese companies 1.3 
in Australia 
Supply other countries 2. 7 
To supply Japanese tourist market 
To supply non-Japanese tourist 
market 
To service other Japanese 
companies in Australia 
To establish a market presence 
To complete a global network 
Service Parent's Japanese client 
companies in Australia 
Service Japanese customers of 
business group in Australia 
Service Australian custome 
involved in trade with Japan 
Service Australian customers 
without Japanese connections 
Gain experience in securities 
markets 
Trade in securities markets 
Investment in property 
Facilitate inter-office treasury 
operations 
Involvement in Yen dollar trades 
3.7 
2.9 
3.1 2.4 
3.3 3.5 
3.8 2.7 
3.6 
3.4 
3 
2.8 
2.8 
2.8 
2.1 
2.3 
2.5 
Note: The scores are calculated by assigning 1 to no importance, 2 to low importance, 3 to 
medium importance and 4 to high importance. 
Source: Nicholas, S et al (1995) Japanese Foreign Direct Investment in Australia in the 1990s: 
Manufacturing, Financial Services and Tourism, International Business Working Papers, Paper 
No 1, Faculty of Economics and Commerce, The University of Melbourne: 9. 
1 6 Edgington, D.W., (1990} Japanese Business Down-Under: 122-161. 
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The pioneering Japanese companies tended to be light engineering firms, 
sewing machine manufacturers and the like, which required extensive customer 
contact for after-sales servicing and parts. During the 1970s large scale 
manufacturing entered Australia, either through takeovers of struggling 'local' 
operations ( Mitsubishi's acquisition of Chrysler, for example) or through joint 
ventures , particularly in the resources sector. However, Japanese investments 
Table 8 
Japanese Business in Australia: Date of Establishment, 
Type, Number 
<1970 1970- 1980- 1986-90 
79 85 
Automotive 10 12 6 5 
Banking & Finance 6 6 23 25 
Business Services 1 4 2 7 
Cement 1 0 0 0 
Communications 1 1 0 2 
Construction 2 0 1 3 
Education 0 0 1 6 
Electrical & Electronics 3 15 7 9 
Food & Catering 4 4 4 8 
Forestry 1 0 0 0 
Insurance 2 4 1 3 
Machinery 11 9 4 4 
Manufacturing 4 4 9 5 
Media 1 5 1 1 
Medical 1 0 1 3 
Mining & Energy 16 15 24 21 
Miscellaneous 1 1 0 0 
Pastoral 3 7 0 8 
Real Estate 0 3 4 17 
Tourism 2 3 2 18 
Trading Company 10 3 1 1 
Transport & Storage 6 2 4 7 
Wholesale & Retail 4 8 3 6 
Total 90 106 98 159 
Source: Australia-Japan Economic Institute (1996) Economic Bulletin 4 (2): 3. 
1991+ 
1 
2 
2 
0 
0 
1 
0 
3 
6 
1 
0 
3 
4 
1 
2 
8 
2 
1 
0 
5 
2 
2 
3 
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tended to be less diversified than their EC and US counterparts, reflecting 
particular Japanese priorities: the paramount desire for resource security and 
the need to ensure market access. The latter has been a ubiquitous motivation 
of Japanese FDI, Australia has been no exception, as Edgington notes: 
Apart from the cases where sago shosha or Japanese industrial end users have been 
willing to invest in processing Australian raw materials, it is generally only when 
government barriers to exports (eg. tariffs, 'voluntary' export restraints, and industry 
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plans) have been enforced that the Japanese corporations have established local 
manufacturing plants in a few selected industries. 17 
As Table 7 confirms, the primary investment motivation for Japanese 
manufacturers in Australia has been to supply the Australian market. True there 
is of late an increasing interest is servicing other countries from Australia, but it 
is important to recognise that this sort of development would have been unlikely 
were it not for the fact that the Japanese were already here and forced to make 
the most of their sunk investments. Significantly, even where manufacturing 
investment does occur, this may still be intended to promote further exports 
from Japan. Table 8 gives an indication of the way in which Japanese firms 
have established themselves in Australia. Noteworthy again is the 
preponderance of firms in the mining and energy sector, and the increasing 
importance of real estate and banking/finance. 
Other studies confirm these broad conclusions. A Japan External Trade 
Representative Organization (JETRO) report into Japanese companies' 
experiences in Australia found that a desire to increase market share was a 
critical motivation, and that this might most easily be achieved by producing 
behind tariff barriers.18 More recently, an EXIMBank survey of the overseas 
investment intentions of Japanese companies revealed that more than 60 per 
cent of companies nominated desire to capture local markets as their primary 
motivation.19 Although Japanese FDI remained significant, its general level was 
expected to decline as much of the investment necessary to circumvent 
protectionist pressures was already in place. Significantly, interest in Oceania 
as an investment location was 'not strong', with ASEAN and the East Asian 
NIEs greater returns on investment proving more attractive. Less than 30 per 
cent of Japanese companies in Australia intended to increase their investment 
levels; most cited local economic stagnation and the limited possibilities for 
market expansion as reasons. Australia's relative unattractiveness as a 
potential investment location has been compounded by an historical Japanese 
caution and preference for joint ventures on the one hand, with an established 
proclivity on the part of Australia's business class for alliances with 'traditional' 
British and American rather than Asian partners on the other. 2o 
17 Edgington, D.W., (1990) Japanese Business Down-Under:12 8. 
18 J ETRO, (1989) cited in "Pros and Cons of Japanese Investment", Australian Financial 
Review, July 4: 38. 
19 Tejima, Shigeki (1992) "Japanese Foreign Direct Investment in the 1980s and Its Prospects 
for the Early 1 990s", in Australia-Japan Business Outlook Conference: Conference 
Proceedings, Sydney: Australia-Japan Economic Institute: 54-77. 
20 The Centre for Technology and Social Change, University of Wollongong, (1 990) Strategic 
Alliances in the lnternationalisation of Australian Industry, Canberra: Dept of Industry, 
21 1  
Manufacturing: A Contemporary Overview 
Japanese manufacturing investment has been distinguished historically in 
Australia by its comparatively small scale and specificity. Given that investment 
has overwhelmingly been intended to secure local markets it is unsurprising 
that local production perpetuated the established inward-looking pattern that 
characterised Australian production in general.21 There are, however, other 
qualities :.. apart from its relatively modest size - that tend to set Japanese 
investment apart. Most significant in this regard from a host country perspective 
is that Japanese TNCs have been less willing to transfer technology or conduct 
local R&D operations than their British and Australian rivals.22 Furthermore, the 
subsidiaries of Japanese TNCs in Australia remained 'tightly controlled' by their 
parents, leaving the operations of local managers 'highly circumscribed'. 23 The 
most tangible effect of this pervasive control was to entrench preferential 
purchasing patterns. More than 80 per cent of subsidiaries' capital equipment 
purchases were sourced from Japan, something that was ensured by a lack of 
competitive tendering for such supplies. What Kreinin calls 'traditional loyalties', 
rather than market forces, explains the overwhelming reliance of Japanese 
sources for capital goods. 24 Furthermore, and caveats about the declining utility 
of nationality as a conceptual variable notwithstanding, Emmott's research 
suggests that a reluctance to cede control to subsidiaries and a tendency to 
conduct 'relatively little research overseas' are general characteristics of 
Japanese multinationals.25 
Technology and Commerce: 45. However, there is evidence to suggest that Japanese 
companies can be encouraged to take part in alliances that include sophisticated R&D activities 
given appropriate policy settings. Oki Electric, for example, took advantage of a government­
sponsored industry-specific development plan to transform its Australian partner, the IPL 
Group, from simply a distributor to become an innovator and ultimately an exporter. As Roberts 
notes, Oki Electric 'would simply have done it all elsewhere without encouragement to look at 
the Australian alternative'. Roberts, P (1993) '"New Protectionism" seems to be paying', 
Australian Financial Review, November 30: 2. 
21 Japanese manufacturing FD I in Australia intended to either promote exports or establish 
sales and distribution facilities was the least important reason cited in Hutchinson & Nicholas' 
study of Japanese manufacturers. Again, the most important were expanding existing product 
range and protecting market share. See: Hutchinson, D & Nicholas, S (1994) Japanese 
Multinationals in Australian Manufacturing, Pacific Economic Paper No 231, Australia-Japan 
Research Centre, Canberra: 11 & 13. 
22 Hutchinson, D & Nicholas, S (1994) Japanese Multinationals in Australian Manufacturing : 
passim. 
23 Kreinin, M (1988) 'How Closed is Japan's Market? Additional Evidence', World Economy, 
December: 534. 
24 Kreinin, M (1988) 'How Closed is Japan's Market?: 539. 
25 Emmott, B (1993) Japan's Global Reach: The Influences, Strategies and Weaknesses of 
Japan's Multinational Companies, Arrow, London: 133. 
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Contemporary Japanese investment in Australian manufacturing continues the 
pattern of sudden surges in particular sectors that has characterised the 
expansion of Japanese capital globally from its earliest phases. This 
phenomenon helps explain the anomalous growth of manufacturing investment 
in 1993-94. Several critical caveats need to be noted with regard to this 
apparent upsurge in manufacturing investment. Firstly, it is highly concentrated: 
Australia captured 70 per cent of Japan's global food investment in 1993.26 In 
both 1993 and 1994 investment in the food industry represented an average of 
approximately 90 per cent of Japan's total manufacturing investment in 
Australia.27 Secondly, the food processing industry has the sort of 'tight 
linkages' that mean processing must be performed close to the point of 
production.2B In other words, in the food industry Japanese companies have 
little choice other than to invest in the country in which the raw materials are 
produced. Thirdly, the percentage increase in manufacturing investment's share 
of overall capital flows in these two years is part of a greatly reduced total. 
Fourthly, the food industry is unlikely to provide many of the sorts of high-wage 
jobs in sophisticated value-adding processes that governments might hope to 
attract through increased foreign manufacturing investment. Finally, the latest 
figures available at the time of writing indicate that this most recent, tightly 
targeted investment 'bulge' may already be over: real estate was, once again, 
by far the largest target of investment in the first half of 1995.29 
Overall, then, there is little reason to suppose that in the long term future 
Japanese manufacturing investment will be anything other than comparatively 
small scale sectorally specific, and opportunistic. Although many Japanese 
manufacturers are being forced to restructure and transfer parts of their 
operations to the region, Australia is unlikely to benefit from this or become part 
of the regional production networks detailed in the previous chapter. Only 
where sunk costs or the nature of the productive process - as in the food 
industry - compel such investment is it likely to be forthcoming. In any case, as 
we have seen, Japanese manufacturers prefer to keep the more lucrative, skill­
intensive parts of the production process in Japan wherever possible. There 
are substantial grounds, therefore, for questioning the appropriateness of the 
26 Burrell, S (1994) ' Manufacturing lures Japanese investment', Australian Financial Review, 
July 5: 2. 
27 Australia-Japan Economic Institute (1995) Economic Bulletin, 3 (6): 9. 
28 For a discussion of this point, see: Cohen, S & Zysman, J (1987) Manufacturing Matters: The 
Myth of the Post-Industrial Economy, Basic Books, New York: 17-9. 
29 Hartcher, P (1996) 'Japanese are back with $2bn surge of investment', Australian Financial 
Review, February 8: 3. 
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Australian government's policy settings in relation to attracting productive 
manufacturing investment. The question remains, however: what effect has a 
predominant reliance on market mechanisms in the area of international 
investment had on other sectors of the economy? 
Banking and Finance. 
One of the principal justifications for opening up Australia's economic space to 
external economic forces was the supposition that this would somehow 
engender greater competition and a concomitant increase in economic 
'efficiency'. The banking and finance sector were, in many ways, the exemplars 
of this neoliberal rationale as the effects of deregulation and financial 
liberalisation were more immediately apparent. There is no intention here to 
revisit in detail the history of Australia's deregulatory experience. 30 However, it 
is important to note in passing that the rapid growth in credit during the 1980s 
(in excess of 20 per cent per year) was instrumental in creating an environment 
in which 'the road to riches was [considered to be] via asset appreciation rather 
than work or investment in income producing assets'. 31 Increasing inflation was 
the unsurprising result of this process, which in turn led to higher interest rates 
and greater capital inflows. While this latter development might not have been 
unwelcome in itself, much of this inflow was highly liquid portfolio investment 
attracted by the possibility of short term gains - something which helped fuel 
asset inflation. 32 
Even the Reserve Bank itself has retrospectively conceded that the growth of 
credit without concomitant 'real' economic growth had the potential to threaten 
the stability of the entire financial system. 33 The effect of increased competition, 
of which the Japanese banks were a part, had a greater impact on the 
traditionally conservative banking sector than had been expected. Competition 
for a share of corporate sector business led banks to suspend their customary 
caution, developing increasingly risky loan portfolios and favouring 
'entrepreneurial' customers over ordinary business. Not only was small 
business disadvantaged by the business culture of the 1980s, but the supposed 
30 For a useful overview of this period with particular emphasis on the financial sector, see: 
Pauly, L (1987) Foreign Banks in Australia: The Politics of Deregulation, Professional 
Publications. 
31 Davidson, K (1992) 'The Failures of Financial Deregulation in Australia', in Bell, S & Wanna, 
J (eds) Business-Government Relations in Australia, Harcourt Brace Jovanich: 223. 
32 Abbott, K (1991) ' Financial Deregulation in Retrospect', Journal of Political Economy, No 27. 
33 McFarlane, I J (1990) "Credit and Debt: Part I I", RBA Bulletin, May :27-34, & (1989)"Money, 
Credit and the Demand for Debt", RBA Bulletin, May:21-31. 
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benefits for customers failed to materialise, with the banks using the retail 
sector to cross-subsidise their corporate business. 34 
The deregulation strategy, therefore, largely failed to achieve its stated goals of 
encouraging productive capital inflows and creating a more 'efficient' financial 
sector. To see why this was the case it is helpful to look more closely at the 
behaviour of the Japanese financial sector in Australia. 
Japanese Banks and Security Houses in Australia 
The arrival of Japanese banks in Australia was the result of a range of 'push' 
and 'pull' factors. The close relationships that existed between the banks and 
the Ministry of Finance (MOF) and the Bank of Japan described in chapter 5 
provided an important framework within which the international expansion of 
Japan's financial sector occurred. Not until 1967 was a process of 'wary 
liberalisation' begun, even then it was not until the mid 1970s that Japanese 
banks began their overseas expansion in earnest. 35 This process was 
encouraged by the MOF's desire to reduce Japan's growing trade surpluses in 
the pre-'oil shock' years; allowing Japanese banks to establish limited numbers 
of overseas offices provided a conduit through which to export capital. MOF 
enthusiasm about foreign expansion in the 1970s and early '80s waxed and 
waned according to economic circumstances. Although 'administrative 
guidance' remained important in determining the extent and nature of overseas 
development, the banks themselves were keen to maintain the outward push. 
Significantly, the desire to maintain close links with Japanese overseas-based 
trading and manufacturing organisations was as important as competing with 
international competitors for profitable lending opportunities. As Table 6 
confirms, servicing existing Japanese clients was a crucially important 
motivation for the Japanese banks outward migration. In other words, it was 
domestic Japanese concerns, rather than the sudden competitiveness of the 
Australian economy, that encouraged investment. 
Japanese banks overseas followed a typical development path: firstly 
conducting trade and foreign exchange transactions with Japanese customers; 
then extending loans initially to Japanese and subsequently foreign customers; 
34 Hawtrey, K., Favotto, 1., & Gilchrist, D (1991) "The Impact of Bank Deregulation on 
Australian manufacturers", Economic Papers, 10 (4):10-29 
35 Pauly, Louis W., (1988) Opening Financial Markets: Banking Politics on the Pacific Rim, 
Cornel University: 158-61. 
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next they moved into non-banking financial services; finally they established a 
retail banking presence. The preponderance of outlets in Europe and North 
America reflected the attraction of proximity to international financial markets 
and relative ease of entry. The lack of outlets in Australia is testimony both to 
the difficulty of entry before deregulation and the more limited role - primarily 
facilitating trading and lending - that Australian subsidiaries subsequently 
played in the global hierarchy of Japanese banking.36 The three Japanese 
banks that were granted retail licenses - the Bank of Tokyo, Mitsubishi Bank 
and IBJ Bank - have shown little interest in establishing a comprehensive 
network or capturing a share of the retail market. Like the other banks without 
retail licenses - of which Dai-lchi Kangyo, Fuji, Sanwa, Tokai, Sumitomo are the 
most important - merchant banking and larger scale commercial operations 
have been their principal interest. 
The banks were followed into Australia by the 'Big Four' security houses -
Nomura, Nikko, Daiwai and Yamaichi - in the early 1980s. Again, the initial 
motivation for establishing representative offices was their desire to secure the 
business of other Japanese organisations in Australia. 37 They were to become 
increasingly important in facilitating Federal and state government deficit 
funding during the 1980s. 38 Additionally, the security houses have been 
instrumental in shifting the emphasis of Japanese investment from direct 
investment in corporate equity or long-term loans for resource or industrial 
projects, to long-term fixed interest bonds. The influence of these types of 
capital flow, although less obvious than FDI, should not be underestimated, for 
as Higgins points out, 'the sheer size of Japan's capital flows means that 
marginal changes in them may still be large enough to have a major influence 
in the financial markets of small, open economies'. 39 In the period since 
financial deregulation, nearly 20 per cent of Australia's foreign borrowings are 
Yen-denominated,40 a potentially problematic position given what had until 
recently been the seemingly inexorable rise of the Yen and the general volatility 
of foreign exchange markets. What is less generally recognised, however, is 
the preparedness of large Japanese institutional investors to sell abruptly 
36 Edgington, D.W., (1990) Japanese Business Down-Under:1 7 3. 
37 Edgington, D.W., (1990) Japanese Business Down-Under :182. 
38 Hogan R (199 5)  'Nomura now top manager of Aust international bond issues', Australian 
Financial Review, August 7: 2 5. 
39 Higgins, Christopher (1992) "Japanese Financial Deregulation and International Economic 
Policy Coordination: Some Small Country Observations", in McKenzie, C & Stuchbury, M (eds) 
Japanese Financial Markets and the Role of the Yen, Sydney: Allen & Unwin:136. 
40 Hogan, R (1994 )  ' Big increase in yen borrowing', Australian Financial Review, December 2: 
4. 
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Australian bonds if they fail to meet performance expectations,41 or to use 
deliberately their financial leverage to engineer currency fluctuations in order to 
generate short-term speculative gain.42 
Some idea of the scale of Japanese capital flows may be gained from Chart 4 
which details the manner in which the Japanese financial institutions invest their 
funds. Despite the significance of Japanese overseas investment, it represents 
a mere 13 per cent of total capital held by institutions in Japan. More than 80 
per cent of total Japanese savings remains in Japan. Of the portion that is 
exported, 60% goes to the US, with only about 4% going to Australia. 43 
Chart 5 
Japanese Institutional Distribution of Oustanding 
Assets: 1992 
Japanese 
Loans - 25% 
Japanese 
Cash - 20% 
Japanese 
Property - 5% 
Japanese 
Bonds - 17% 
Japanese Stocks -
20% 
Source: Agnew, A (1992) 'Japanese Investment Into Australia ', Australia-Japan Business 
Outlook Conference, Australia-Japan Institute, Sydney: 98. 
The investment strategies - and hence the subsequent capital flows - of the 
major Japanese financial institutions are in what a Agnew calls a 'transitional 
phase'. Since 1987 Japanese life insurance companies and pension funds have 
been able to invest 30% of their funds overseas, up from the previous ceiling of 
10%. Prior to 1975 capital outflow was restricted by government regulation. 
The Japanese institutions have shown a preference for bonds rather than stock 
because they are a convenient substitute for the long term loans that had 
41 Hartcher, P (1994) 'Japan ditches Aust bonds', Australian Financial Review, April 6: 26. 
42 Burell, S (1993) 'The Japanese sting that sunk the Australian dollar', Australian Financial 
Review , September 1: 1 & 37. 
43 Agnew, Andrew (1992) "Japanese Investment Into Australia", in Australia-Japan Business 
Outlook Conference: Conference Proceedings, Sydney: Australia-Japan Economic Institute: 
102. The following discussion draws heavily on Agnew's figures. 
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previously been their major investment vehicle. Japanese companies have 
increasingly tended to raise capital either through reinvested profits, share 
issues or borrowing in international markets, rather than exclusively utilising 
domestic sources of capital. The resultant decline in demand from traditional 
clients has forced the Japanese financial institutions to look elsewhere for 
income. Bonds are popular because they do not require specialist knowledge 
of local markets. However, as the Japanese institutional investors become 
more familiar with foreign markets greater investment in local equities is 
occurring, partly as a result of the greater returns available, but also as a way of 
off-setting the negative effects of currency fluctuations. 
This last point has significant implications. Agnew argues that fluctuations in the 
Australian dollar's value 'dominate Japanese responses' to potential 
investment.44 The depreciation of the $A in 1985 and '86 saw significant 
disinvestment by the Japanese, who remain 'wary'. The resulting caution has 
seen a preference develop for more liquid semi-government bonds issued by 
individual State Treasuries. Given that Japanese institutions have - until 
recently at least45 - had better credit ratings than Australian state governments 
it is possible for them to raise cheap funds in, say, the US and on-lend to 
Australian borrowers at an attractive profit. Of course, the general trend toward 
investing in short-term, liquid assets increases the potential for volatility and 
instability, simultaneously increasing Australia's dependence on and 
susceptibility to Japanese capital and its imperatives. 
Future levels of Japanese capital outflows, of which the Japanese financial 
institutions based in Australia are such crucial intermediaries, are unclear. 
Some observers suggest that Japanese portfolio investment flows may already 
have peaked. Kawai, for example, argues that Japan's large institutional 
investors may have satisfied their requirements as far as establishing a ratio of 
foreign securities in their portfolios is concerned. 46 However, in the wake of the 
continuing banking crisis in Japan and the consequent minimal interest rates in 
that country, there is a strong likelihood that these outflows will continue.47 
44 Agnew, Andrew (1992) 'Japanese Investment Into Australia':102. 
45 The massive debt accumulated by Japanese banks in particular during the years of the 
bubble economy mean that they are now forced to pay a premium relative to foreign rivals in 
order to raise moriey. See: The Economist (1995) 'A reflection on the state of Japan's biggest 
banks', October 14: 101/2. 
46 Kawai, Masahiro (1991) Japanese Investment in Foreign Securities in the 1980s, Pacific 
Economic Papers, No 201, Australia-Japan Research Centre, Canberra: 27-30. 
47 Hogan, R (1995) 'Australia's flood of Japanese money', Australian Financial Review, 
September 25: 1 & 37. 
From the perspective of Japanese fund managers Australia represents a small 
but useful location in which to 'hedge' their global position: the value of the 
Australian currency is still widely perceived to be commodity-driven, an ideal 
quality to offset potential over-exposure to inflation-sensitive assets in Japan.4B 
Assessment ' 
If the intention of deregulation and a greater reliance on market forces was to 
increase the competitiveness and attractiveness of Australia as a potential 
investment location, then there are substantial grounds for questioning the 
liberalisation strategy's efficacy. The primary motivation of the Japanese 
financial institutions' involvement in Australia has been to service existing 
Japanese clients and interests, be they corporations involved in some 
productive activity or as a mechanism through which savings might be 
channelled by the huge Japanese institutional investors. The primary effect of 
much of this activity has been to increase the dependency of Australian 
borrowers on Japanese capital, something that has reinforced the latter's 
structural power, giving it palpable economic leverage over the Australian 
economy and an implicit political influence should the Japanese government 
either want to or be capable of utilising it. Furthermore, increased exposure to 
the much larger Japanese economy and its associated capital flows has further 
eroded the ability of the Australian government to construct autonomous 
economic policy in a predictable economic framework. 
As an overall consequence of the financial traumas of the 1980s that 
deregulation caused, banks have become more cautious in their lending, to the 
extent that it is difficult for small to medium sized manufacturers to obtain 
capital at all. 49 Moreover, the idea that increased competition would reduce the 
power of the banks within Australia - an idea that had been promoted as an 
attempt to win over the Labor Party to foreign bank entryso - proved ill founded. 
As Reinecke argues: 
Far from having been brought to heel by the entry of foreign banks, the major Australian 
banks are now freer of government influence than they ever have been. In such 
circumstances, any expectations by the government that the banks can be steered 
48 Canu, S (1995} 'Pattern shows Japan 'here for long term', The Australian Financial Review, 
March 28. 
49 Hawtrey, K., Favotto, 1., & Gilchrist, D (1991} "The Impact of Bank Deregulation on 
Australian Manufacturers", Economic Papers, 10 (4):10-29. 
50 Kelly, Paul (1992) The End of Certainty: The Story of the 1980s, Allen & Unwin: 77. 
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towards investment that serves to regenerate sectors of the economy such as 
manufacturing appears to be illusory. 51 
As the government generally chose, as a matter of consciously pursued policy, 
not to intervene in the process of deciding investment priorities, capital was 
often employed in a speculative, short-term manner. Indeed, one of the most 
unambiguous effects of Labor's financial deregulation experiment has been a 
massive deterioration in Australia's external accounts, most obviously manifest 
in greatly increased levels of foreign debt. 52 
As far as the Japanese banks were- concerned, the possibility of obtaining a full 
banking licence in Australia meant they had access to the foreign exchange 
and general banking associated with Japanese-Australian trade; a trade that 
had previously been dominated by Australian banks. 53 It is not necessary to 
subscribe to some of the more xenophobic schools of thought, which tend to 
see all non-'Australian' and 'Asian' investment in particular as somehow 
alarming, to question how the oft-invoked 'national interest' has been served by 
Labor's deregulatory policies. If this has been the case in the financial sector, 
such questions have been even more central to debates over foreign 
investment in real estate. 
Real Estate and Tourism 
Real estate and tourism related developments have been the most 
controversial of Japan's investments in Australia. On the one hand, buildings 
have a visibility and immediacy that other, less tangible, forms of investment 
lack. On the other, doubts have been raised about the impact of such large 
scale investment in one sector of a comparatively smaller economy. Critics 
claim such investment may accentuate the 'uneven' development of the 
'Australian' economy, causing a growth of low-pay service jobs and 
exacerbating the decline of manufacturing within Australia. 54 What is 
indisputable, however, as Table 6 illustrates, is the rapid build up and 
subsequent decline of real estate investment - something that mirrors the rise 
and fall of the bubble economy in Japan. Clearly, deregulation of the Australian 
51 Reinecke, lan (1988) The Money Masters: Banks, Power and Economic Control, William 
Heinemann: 69. 
52 Heywood, K & Tamaschke, R (1991) "Australian Financial Deregulation and the Growth of 
the Foreign Debt", Journal of Australian Political Economy, No 28: 54-79. 
53 Edgington, D.W., (1990) Japanese Business Down-Under :192. 
54 See, for example, Abe, David & Wheelwright, Ted (1989) The Third Wave: Australia and 
Asian Capitalism, Left Book Club. 
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economy allowed the speculative character of real estate investment in Japan 
to be rapidly and easily transmitted to other economies where similar 
opportunities presented themselves. 
Within the space of a decade, real estate has grown from virtually nothing to 
50 per cent of all Japanese investment in some years (see Table 6). Farrell 
argues that the Japan's overseas investment boom in real estate has ended, 
however, the consequence of Ministry of Finance pronouncements in late 1989 
and early 1990. 55 As part of a concerted move to reduce the speculation 
associated with the bubble economy, Japanese officials instructed the banks to 
reduce lending for real estate. However, by that time Farrell estimates that 
banks had accumulated $475 billion in real estate based loans, or 28.5% of 
their total loan portfolios. 56 As a result of the Japanese banks' domestic 
difficulties, the consequent Australian investment picture is changing rapidly. 
For example, Japanese investment in the construction industry has slumped 
from US$115 million in 1991 to 14 and 12 million in 1992 and 1993 
respectively. 57 Similarly, real estate, as Table 6 indicates, has dropped from 
US$ 1 , 255 million in 1991 to US$ 143 million in 1994.58 Moreover, proposed 
tourism developments by Japanese companies registered with the Foreign 
Investment Review Board show a similar decline, falling from A$ 564 to 241 
million from 1991-92 to 1992-93. 59 
The Influence of Individual Companies 
Much of the volatility of investment levels can be explained by the importance of 
individual Japanese companies in Australia. The construction company 
Kumagai Gumi, for example, has been a crucial conduit for Japanese capital, 
its rise and subsequent impact upon Australia being determined by Japanese 
imperatives. 60 Kumagai Gumi's expansion demonstrates a correlation with 
Japan's changing foreign policy priorities, themselves reflecting shifts if the 
55 Farrell, Roger (1992) "Japanese Direct Investment in Overseas Property in the 1980s: 
Overview and Assessment", Japanese Direct Investment: unpublished workshop paper, 
Canberra: Australia-Japan Research Centre, pp 40-2. 
56 Farrell, Roger (1992) "Japanese Direct Investment in Overseas Property'. 
57 Australia-Japan Economic Institute (1995) Economic Bulletin, 1 (6): 12 & 3 (6): 9. 
58 The most recently available figures at the time of writing indicate that Japanese investment 
has resumed on a large scale. What is most noteworthy is that the general decline evident in 
real estate investment in Table 6 above, appears to have halted. More than 40% of new 
investment in the first half of 1995 was in real estate. See fn 29, above. 
59 Department of Treasury (1994) Foreign Investment Review Board: Report 1992-93, AGPS, 
Canberra: 24. 
60 Rimmer, P.J., (1990) "The lnternationalisation of the Japanese Construction Industry: The 
Rise and Rise of Kumagai Gumi", Environment and Planning A, Vol 22: 345-68. 
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factional strength of elements within the LOP. Additionally, argues Rimmer, the 
company was motivated by a desire to improve its position relative to Japan's 
own 'Big Five' construction companies that dominated the tightly controlled 
domestic market; overseas expansion offered the possibility of achieving this 
goal. 51 Kumagai Gumi's 'flatter' organisational structure gave greater autonomy 
to local operators who were able to generate business by offering a total 
package that included 'financial engineering' (zaiteku).62 By offering to provide 
the required capital - usually through loosely affiliated Japanese banks - to 
underwrite its own projects, Kumagai Gumi was able to circumvent the usual 
tendering process. Individual state's desire to 'get super-projects started at 
almost any cost' meant that overseas operators were able to play off one 
potential location against another in order to gain the most favourable terms for 
themselves. 63 
A large part of the capital channelled into Australia via Japanese construction 
and real estate companies was the speculative product of the bubble economy. 
Japanese 'investors' appear to have been influenced by the extraordinary rises 
in domestic real estate values and assumed Australia offered equally attractive 
possibilities. Farrell argues that the apparently inexorable rise of the Japanese 
stock market and land prices changed the psychology of investors. 54 
Consequently, even the inflated prices of Australian real estate during the 
1980s appeared comparatively cheap. Access to readily available capital from 
Japanese banks keen to replace traditional customers meant that little regard 
was paid to the intrinsic worth of some of these investments; capital gain was 
the predominant motivation. The folly of this policy has been demonstrated in 
serious losses incurred by Japanese investors in the Australian market - up to 
half of a possible $7 billion invested since the property boom of the 1980s. 65 
Kumagai Gumi in particular has been particularly hard hit, recording huge 
losses in Australia and having to accept its major bankers appointing 
executives to its board as a consequence of its financial problems. 66 
61 Rimmer, P.J., (1990} "Kumagai Gumi in Australia: The Second Phase of Development", 
James, P., (ed) Technocratic Dreaming: Of VeJY Fast Trains and Japanese Designer Cities, 
Melbourne: Left Book Club: 87-105 
62 Rimmer, P.J., (1990} "Kumagai Gumi in Australia:':91. 
63 Rimmer, P.J., (1988} "Japanese Construction Contractors and the Australian States: Another 
Round of Inter-state Rivalry", International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, 12 (3): 
404-24. 
64 Farrell, Roger (1992} "Japanese Direct Investment in Overseas Property': 62. 
65 Scott, Leisa & Eiszele, Heather (1993} "Financiers zero in on Japanese developers", The 
Weekend Australian ('Property'), 17-18/7/93: 1. 
66 McGregor, Richard (1993} "New chiefs to rebuild Kumagai", The Australian, 5/5/93: 33. 
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The sheer scale of Japanese capital flows during the 1980s in particular meant 
that individual Japanese companies could exert a significant influence on the 
economic well-being of host countries. This is problematic enough in the case 
of an essentially productive operation like Kumagai Gumi. However, where 
such companies are primarily interested in speculative activities and the 
acquisition of existing assets, there is an even greater potential for 
destabilisation. The EIE International Corp, and its flamboyant chief executive, 
Harunori Takahashi, were instrumental in fuelling a speculative surge of 
property investment, not only in Australia, but throughout the Pacific Rim.67 
EIE's credit was eventually withdrawn by its Japanese backers after it 
accumulated an estimated $9.8 billion in debts.68 Prior to this it had managed to 
acquire major assets in Australia, including the Bond University and the 
Sanctuary Cove resort. What is clear, however, is that individual corporations 
with access to seemingly unlimited credit in Japan can influence not only the 
value of assets within Australia, but also the type of infrastructure that is 
developed. 
Whatever the intrinsic merits of real estate investment, Australia will clearly be 
seen as a riskier proposition by foreign investors generally as a result of such 
episodes and the increased asset volatility they engender.69 Queensland is 
particularly vulnerable to this sort of sudden foreign capital withdrawal. Official 
figures from Queensland's Foreign Ownership and Land Register suggest that 
Japanese land holdings in the Gold Coast area amount to $1.85 billion. 
However, other estimates argue that this figure is at least $4 billion, the 
discrepancy arising because many deals are simply not reported to either the 
Queensland authorities or the Foreign Investment Review Board (FIRB)JO 
Many projects in Queensland remain undeveloped as capital from Japan dries 
up. Potentially the FIRB has the power to make foreigners disinvest who fail to 
develop sites within two years of purchase. In reality, however, as Chenoweth 
suggests, they have little influence as Australia is of only peripheral interest to 
large portfolio investors.71 
67 Rimmer, P (1993) 'Japan's "Bubble Economy" and the Pacific: The Case of the EIE Group', 
Pacific Viewpoint, 34 (1 ) : 25-44. 
68 Walker, J & McGregor, Richard (1993) "Bang, Bang - Bust", The Weekend Australian, July 
17-18: 22. Interestingly, the attempted bail-out of EIE the MOF and BOJ has undermined public 
confidence in the bureaucracy in Japan and revealed not only the fragility of Japan's financial 
sector but also widespread corruption associated with the bubble era. See: Sakurada, K 1995) 
'There Was a Crooked Man, He ran a Crooked Bank . .  .', Tokyo Business Today, 63 (5):4-8. 
69 Adrian, C & Stimson, R (1986) 'Asian Investment in Australian Capital City Property 
Markets', Environment & Planning A, Vol 18: 323-340. 
70 Chenoweth, Neil (1991) 'Hostage of Japan', Australian Business, 13/2/91: 13-22. 
71 Chenoweth, Neil (1991) 'Hostage of Japan': 22. 
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A relevant consideration neglected by broad brush policy settings are the 
nationally specific or non-commercial motivations potential investors may have. 
Japanese corporations are particularly heavily taxed, something that makes 
any form of foreign investment more attractive.72 Land ownership has a 
traditional association in Japan with 'tax minimisation'. Investment in Australian 
real estate has provided an attractive avenue for Japanese companies to avoid 
paying tax in Japan. 73 More sinisterly, it has been suggested that Japan's 
notorious criminal gangs - the Yakuza- are involved in land development and 
'tourism', particularly in Queensland. A suppressed Queensland Criminal 
Justice Commission report questions the value of Japanese investment if some 
of it is nothing more than a front for international money laundering. 74 
Tourism 
Data on tourism investment should be treated with caution. The Australian 
Bureau of Statistics (ABS) and the FIRB only provide information on 
investment in tourism occasionally, and even then there are no clear 
classificatory criteria. Nevertheless, the Japanese were estimated to have 
become by far the largest investor in the tourism industry by 1988/9, reaching a 
total of more than $9 billion, compared with less than $2 billion in 1985/6.75 
Investment in tourism is distinguished by a degree of vertical integration 
amongst Japanese operations, especially in Queensland.76 Although some 
observers have questioned the degree of integration that exists,?? this may be 
because it occurs at a subtle level through 'understandings'JB What is clearer 
72 lwamato, Yasushi (1991) "Japanese Corporate Tax Policy and Direct Investment Abroad", 
Pacific Economic Paper, No 196. Iwamoto argues that Japan's high rates of corporate tax need 
to be added to the more accepted rationales for Japanese investment - deregulation, the 
surplus and protection - although giving appropriate weight to this seems problematic. 
73 Farrell, Roger (1992) 'Japanese Direct Investment in Overseas Property': 52-55. 
74 King, Madonna (1993) 'Japan's Gangsters Here: Secret Report'" The Weekend Australian, 
August 7-8: 1 & 6. This is not as unlikely a development as it may sound at first blush. Part of 
the reason Japanese authorities are finding Japan's own banking crisis so intractable - of which 
real estate is such a central part - is due to the influence and involvement of the Yakuza in 
property speculation. See: Shirouzu, N (1995) 'Are Gangs Key to Japan's Loan Problem?', 
Asian Wall Street Journal, December 13: 1 & 1 0. 
75 Dwyer, L & Forsyth, C (1991) "Foreign Investment in Australian Tourism: Rationales and 
Consequences", Economic Papers, 10 (27) : 44. 
76 Roberts, Greg (1992) "Queenslanders Bending to the Rising Sun-Shine State, Sydney 
Morning Herald, Japan-Australia Business Review: 2. 
77 Smith, N & Forsyth, P (1988) 'Corporate Organization in the Tourism Industry', Unpublished 
conference paper for : Japanese Corporation Organization and International Adjustment, 
Australia-Japan Research Centre, ANU, Canberra September 19-20. 
78 Forsyth, P & Dwyer, L (1990) "Japanese Investment in Australian Tourism", Unpublished 
paper for Japanese Investment Abroad Workshop, ANU July: 11. 
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is the influence that major Japanese operators have in Queensland: Daikyo, for 
example, was able to force the Goss government to change its policy regarding 
future foreign ownership by freezing its existing development plans.79 
Of late, however, there is clear evidence that Japanese companies are 
attempting to disinvest. After having spent an estimated total of A$17 billion in 
the late 1980s on Australian property, Japanese investors have been 
attempting to cut their losses in the wake of the Japanese stock market crash 
and Australia's own property market collapse. 80 Significantly, Japanese capital 
is responsible for developing and running 50 of Australia's premier hotels worth 
some A$2.5 billion.81 While the physical assets will clearly remain in Australia 
and provide the backbone of Australia's largest export earner, the tourism 
industry remains under-financed and short of essential infrastructure.82 Given 
an historical reluctance on the part of Australian banks to lend to local 
developers for investment in tourism development, Australia remains 
dependent on foreign investment which otherWise seems unlikely to occur. 83 
Significantly, the Japanese have been replaced by Singaporean and Hong 
Kong interests as the most significant foreign investors in real estate, the latter 
accounting for 28% of sales compared to Japan's 4% in 1991-2.84 Unlike the 
Japanese, however, other Asian investors have shown more interest in 
acqDiring existing assets, rather than developing new projects. 
The significance of tourism tor Australia cannot be underestimated, having 
recently replaced coal as Australia's major foreign exchange earner. 85 Of the 
more than 3.36 million tourists visiting Australia in 1994, more than 700,000, or 
about 21% were from Japan; contributing to an industry that is now worth more 
than A$10 billion.86 From a Japanese perspective Australia was seventh most 
popular destination, capturing only a 5.1% share of the market.87 Because of 
tourism's potential impact on domestic living standards and job opportunities 
79 Roberts, Greg (1992) 'Queenslanders bending to the rising sun-shine state', Sydney Morning 
Herald, June 18: 2S. 
80 Smith, F (1995) 'Japan 'byes land of Oz with multi-billion-dollar wave', Australian Financial 
Review, June 5: 1 & 45. 
81 Smith, F (1995) 'For this Japanese backer it may be check-out time', ', Australian Financial 
Review, June 5: 45. 
82 Collins, C (1994) 'Lack of top-class resorts threatens Japanese tourism', The Australian, 
October 19: 3. 
83 Stewart, A (1992) 'Why banks won't invest', Business Review Weekly, February 14: 18-21. 
84 Smith, F (1993) 'Asian investors the big spenders', The Australian, December 22: 26. 
85 Colebatch, Tim (1992) "The Marriage Has Its Ups and Downs", Sydney Morning Herald, 
18/6/92, Supplement: 1. 
86 Australia-Japan Economic Institute (1993) "Australia's Inbound Tourism", 3 (4) : 2-7. 
87 Australia-Japan Economic Institute (1993) "Japanese Outbound Travel 1994", 3 (7): 2. 
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there are divergent opinions on this sort of investment. Garnaut confidently 
asserts that there is little to be concerned about as far as vertical integration by 
Japanese companies operating in this sector is concerned. sa On the other hand 
critics broadly associated with the politics of the Left fret that 'Australia would 
become a service economy in every sense of the word, serving Asian 
capitalism'. 89 
To judge from the activities of Japanese corporations in all other industries we 
have considered, Garnaut's assertions are clearly overly optimistic. Yet the 
tourism industry does provide many jobs that would otherwise not exist, not all 
of which are poorly paid and low skilled. The most notable point, as far as this 
discussion is concerned, is the lack of effective control by the Australian 
government of both the tourism industry in particular and real estate in general. 
Berry's exhaustive survey of Japanese property development in Australia 
concluded that: 
the current policy framework at all levels of government in Australia is weakly developed 
and unable to provide an exhaustive and coherent basis for the evaluation, monitoring 
and social control of major property development in areas like tourism, including those 
financed and/or managed by foreign interests. Hence, neither the policy context nor the 
conventional evaluative tools . . .  are currently adequate to inform or impose an 
appropriate national urban policy directing foreign controlled major property 
developments in Australia. In the vacuum created, outcomes are mediated by piecemeal 
market processes and political interventions. 90 
The other point to be made in this context is that this lack of government 
oversight and reliance on market forces has implications for other sectors of the 
economy, not just the real estate sector. Westpac not only had an $11  billion 
exposure to the domestic property market but has compounded its difficulties 
by lending a further $5.1 billion in Japan, for what is assumed to be further real 
estate speculation.91 Similarly the AMP Society's has been negatively effected 
by its 15% shareholding in Westpac, a problem exacerbated by its own $2.5 
billion write-down of property values.92 
Although the AMP may be puny by Japanese standards it remains central to 
the well-being of the Australian economy. The volatility in Australia's real estate 
88 Garnaut, Ross (1990} Australia and the Northeast Asian Ascendancy, Canberra: AGPS: 250. 
89 David, Abe & Wheelwright, Ted (1990} "The Sale of the Century?", in James, P (ed) 
Technocratic Dreaming: Of Vel}' Fast Trains and Japanese Cities, Sydney: Left Book Club: 84. 
90 Berry, M (1994} 'Japanese property Development in Australia', Progress in Planning, Vol 41: 
192. 
91 Westfield, Mark (1993} "Money in the Bank?", The Weekend Australian, August 7-8: 19. 
92 Ferguson, Adele (1993} "The AMP's Big Challenge", The Aust.�a!ian, 10/2: 31. 
226 
sector in the late 1980s, which government promotion of market mechanisms 
helped fuel, illustrates the danger that smaller economies face when they 
promote enhanced international economic interaction as a matter of policy. A 
reliance on market forces meant that the Australian economy was inevitably 
contaminated by the excesses that plagued the Japanese economy following its 
own deregulation, and which show no signs of being resolved. While a good 
deal of investment may have occurred in Australia's burgeoning tourism 
industry, it was often sporadic and volatile - something that will do little to 
promote future investment certainty. Moreover, the uncontrolled, speculative 
boom-bust mentality that has tended to characterise the industry has done little 
to promote job security or career development in the industry, nor done 
anything to underpin real estate values in the wider housing market. Clearly 
such inherent instability and uncertainty can hardly be claimed as helping to 
create a more attractive or competitive business environment. 
Resources, Mining and Agriculture 
Table 9 reveals that commodity trade between Australia and Japan is virtually 
a mirror-image. The dominance of commodities in Australia's exports to Japan 
is completely reversed in Japanese exports to Australia: sophisticated 
manufactures dominate Japanese goods flowing into Australia. As we shall see, 
coal is still Australia's largest export item, and as such the subject a separate 
case study in the following chapter. For now, it is important to recognise that 
although Australia still enjoys a trade surplus, Japanese imports from Australia 
remain dominated by primary products. While there has been encouraging 
growth in the volume of manufactured exports, they remain a relatively small 
part of overall trade. Given the importance of the bilateral trading relationship to 
both countries therefore, an examination of Japanese involvement in this area 
can illuminate the differing approaches of the two governments to what is a 
strategically important determinant of national welfare. 
Early trade in raw materials between Japan and Australia was dominated by 
wool. The sogo shosha that facilitated this trade were able to act in a similar 
capacity when iron ore grew in importance during the 1960s and subsequently 
dominate the marketing process. 93 State governments provided infrastructure 
and competed in offering inducements to attract capital and encourage the 
development of new mines with which to service the burgeoning Japanese 
93 Edgington, D.W., (1990) Japanese Business Down-Under : 50-64. 
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markets. The most noticeable characteristic of Japanese involvement in the raw 
materials sector has been a 'surprising' lack of vertical integration.94 Australian 
raw material supplies for Japan have been ensured via the sago shosha, which 
took small amounts of equity in various projects. Together with loans and long 
term contracts these investments secured long-term access to Australian 
resources without investing in downstream production facilities. 95 
Table 9 
Australia's Commodity Trade with Japan ($A millions) 
1983/4 1993/4 
Exports Imports Exports Imports 
Food and Live Animals 1156 36 3002 
Beverages and Tobacco 1.7 0.6 43 
Crude Materials Except 1997 34 3245 
Fuels 
Mineral Fuels, Lubricants 2074 3 4874 
and Related Materials 
Animal and Vegetable Oils, 6.5 0.6 13 
Fats and Waxes 
Chemical and Related 27 217 123 
Products 
38 
25 
59 
12 
-
445 
Manufactured Goods 127 866 1215 1196 
Machinery and Transport 36 3672 521 9133 
Equipment 
Miscellaneous Manufactured 17 415 103 829 
Articles 
Others 1083 90 2726 136 
Total Trade 6527 5337 15865 11873 
Source: Australian Bureau of Statistics Catalogue Nos 5422.0 & 5410.0 
Japanese industrial development determined the manner in which resources 
were exploited and developed in Australia. Thompson identifies three distinct 
phases of resource activity in Australia that correspond directly to the changing 
demands of the Japanese steel industry.96 Following the rapid construction and 
development of the late 1960s and early '70s that increasing Japanese 
94 Edgington, D.W. (1991) "Japanese Manufacturing Investment in Australia: Corporations, 
Governments and Bargaining", Pacific Affairs, Vol 64, Spring: 72. 
95 Edgington, D.W. (1991) "Japanese Direct Investment and Australian Economic 
Development", in Morris, J (ed) Japan and the Global Economy: Issues and Trends in the 
1990s, London: Routledge: 173-94. 
96 Thompson, Herb (1987) "The Pilbara Iron Ore Industry: Mining Cycles and Capital Labour 
Relations", Journal of Australian Political Economy, No 21, May: 66-82. 
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industry demand encouraged, there was a period of growth and consolidation 
before the recession and rationalisation that characterised the 1980s. Again it 
should be emphasised that development within Australia, and the nature of the 
activities that were undertaken were determined by Japanese rather than 
Australian priorities; even the changing power relationship within domestic 
industrial relations was largely the result of external economic forces. 
Securing Resources 
After the first oil shocks resource-dependent Japanese industry sought to 
diversify the sources and types of energy and raw material supplies. Liquefied 
natural gas (LNG) imports have become an increasingly important part of this 
strategy, and seem certain to grow given Japanese concerns with not only 
resource security but also environmental considerations.97 Australia is well 
placed to service this demand following the largest single resource 
development in Australian history - the North West Shelf Project. After an initial 
investment of $2.2 billion dollars during the early 1980s to satisfy domestic 
needs, LNG development was begun in 1985 to satisfy the requirements of 
Japanese electricity and gas utilities. At this stage the original venture partners 
- Woodside Petroleum, BP, Chevron, BHP and Shell - were joined by Japan 
Australia LNG who took a one-sixth interest. 98 The LNG development phase 
cost an estimated $9.8 billion. The investment by Japan Australia LNG - jointly 
owned by Mitsubishi Corporation and Mitsui & Co99 - represents a strategic 
stake and method of ensuring not only profitability but also security of supply. 
As with so many other areas of Australia's trading relations with Japan, more 
than the simple operation of market forces determine economic outcomes in the 
LNG export market. Two considerations are important here: Firstly, there are a 
limited number of players in the global industry - seven importers and eight 
importers. Secondly, in 1989 Japan alone accounted for 68 per cent of global 
LNG imports, 1oo giving it crucial leverage over other players, especially 
exporters. The significance of Japan's market dominance, especially when 
97 Thorpe, S., Dawson, B., Pugsley, S., & Wilkinson, B., (1991) "A Perspective on Japanese 
Energy Security and Greenhouse Policies", Agriculture and Resources Quarterly, 3 (4) : 543-
554. 
98 Economic Research Centre, (1991) "The Impact of the North West Shelf - Economic Impacts 
of Australia's Biggest Project", The Mining Review, 15 (5): 30-2. 
99 Australia-Japan Economic Institute, (1992} A Directory of Japanese Business Activity in 
Australia, Sydney: Australia-Japan Economic Institute. 
100 Clements, K & Greig, R (1991) The Economic Impact of Australia's North West Shelf 
Project: An Anatomy of One of the World's Largest Development Projects, Economic Research 
Centre, UWA, Perth: 99. 
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combined with the significant equity stake of Japan Australia LNG, was 
revealed when Japanese buyers suggested they would be 'most upset' if 
proposed LNG sales to Korea went ahead. Such sales would undermine 
Japanese dominance and place pressure on prices the Japanese had 
previously claimed were too high.1 o1 Australia's dependency and vulnerability in 
this regard was acknowledged by WA Minister for Resources and 
Development, Colin Barnett, when he complained that North West Shelf 
operators were unable to pursue markets outside Japan because of the 
project's management structure - something that did not inhibit rival suppliers 
Malaysia and Brunei when they secured new markets.1o2 
Given the potential long-term importance of LNG exports for Australia, it is 
clearly highly disadvantageous if the development of the industry and potential 
export markets are determined by the strategic interventions of externally­
based companies. Expecting market forces to achieve an optimum outcome in 
such a situation seems overly optimistic, if not naive. However, this is not the 
only primary product in which Japanese investment and buying strategies have 
played a crucially determinant role. 
The Agricultural Sector 
As far as the Australian agricultural sector is concerned Japan is significant 
primarily as an export destination, and is of less importance as a source of 
capital. As Table 9 indicates, primary products, particularly wool and beef, 
remain important sources of export revenue. The impact of the Japanese 
market and the health of its economy on primary producers in Australia has 
long been recognised.103 What is more pertinent in the context of this 
discussion is the influence and extent of Japanese investment in these areas. 
Despite Japan's textile industry shifting offshore as part of the industrial 
restructuring process outlined in Chapter 5, only a 'negligible' amount of the 
concomitant FDI found its way to Australia.104 Australian wool exports to Japan 
remain predominantly 'greasy' or unprocessed, further processing often 
occurring in third countries like Taiwan and Malaysia before their eventual 
101 Gill, M (1993) 'Japan to block NW Shelf gas sales', Australian Financial Review, October 
11: 1 & 8. 
102 Wilson, N (1994) 'WA gas project takes beating over its Japanese export ties', Australian 
Financial Review, August 11: 9. 
103 Sterland, B., Gilmour, K., & Toussaint, E (1991) "What Japan's Current Surplus Means for 
Australian Primary Industries", Agriculture and Resources Quarterly, 3 (3) : 383-91. 
104 Wittwer, G., & Connely, G (1992) "Declining Competitiveness of Japan's Wool Processing 
Industry", Agriculture and Resources Quarterly, 4 (1): 60. 
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arrival in Japan. As a result, Australia's share of the Japanese market for wool 
continues to decline. Ironically, Australian wool is now being exported to third 
countries for scouring or conversion into tops before on-selling into Japan.1os In 
a familiar pattern, the entire trade is dominated and controlled by the sogo 
shosha.106 
The proposed liberalisation of Japan's beef market has generated much 
optimism in Australia about expanding this already significant market. Again, 
however, it is important to recognise that the future pattern of trade in this 
industry will not be determined by market forces alone. It is particularly 
noteworthy that in the wake of Japan's proposed market opening Japanese 
companies have moved to secure control over supply and distribution by taking 
up strategic equity positions in beef production and processing industries in 
Australia.107 Rural land, feed-lots, abattoirs, and meat processing works have 
all become increasingly attractive targets for Japanese companies keen to 
ensure control over all aspects of the industry: Important considerations in this 
regard were maintaining product quality, but also a desire to exploit the market 
power conferred by increased ownership levels.1 08 Also important here, 
according to Morison's survey, was the potential to integrate Australian and 
Japanese operations and the possibilities opened up for transfer pricing. 
The extent of future trade in the beef industry will, therefore, not be determined 
by market mechanisms alone. Although Japan takes 45% of Australia's total 
beef exports and demand in that country continues to grow at approximately 4 
to 5% per year, Australian export volumes are static.109 Continuing meat 
contamination scares in Australia have meant that beef produced outside of 
vertically integrated Japanese operations has found it more difficult to gain 
105 Findlay, C & ltoh, M (1994) 'Introduction and Overview', in Findlay, C & ltoh, M (eds) Wool 
in Japan: Structural Change in the Textile and Clothing Market, Harper Educational: 6. 
106 ltoh, M (1994) 'The Japanese wool product industry', in Findlay, C & ltoh, M (eds) Wool in 
Japan: 20. Duncan Campbell, a director of Wooltech Europe, argues that the Australian 
government's failure to develop the sort of coordinated approach to the wool industry found in 
Japan and Korea - some of Australia's principal markets - means that different elements of the 
'Australian' industry compete against each other and work to reduce possible prices. Campbell, 
D (1995) 'Only teams win on level playing fields', The Australian, December 8: 23. 
107 Morison, J (1993) FDI and Other Contractual Arrangements in the Australian Beef Industry: 
The Japanese Response to Domestic Market Liberalisation, Pacific Economic paper No 225, 
Australia-Japan Research Centre, ANU, Canberra. The following discussion of Japanese 
involvement in the beet industry draws heavily on this text. 
108 Morison, J (1993) FDI and Other Contractual Arrangements in the Australian Beef Industry: 
13. 
109 Armitage, C (1995) 'Agriculture: the last post', The Australian, July 5: 17. 
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acceptance in Japan.11 o A more serious long-term obstacle to market 
expansion remains the difficulty of overcoming market barriers and government 
interventions, such as the Japanese Ministry of Agriculture's 'request' that beef 
importers curb the amount of foreign beef entering Japan.111 This is not 
something that is confined to the beef industry, of course. The recent optimism 
generated by Japan's apparent willingness to open its sensitive rice market to 
foreign suppliers was dented when the initial shipment of rice under the 
liberalisation program was 'postponed'. 112 
Trade and Investment with Japan: An Overview 
A few final observations may help consolidate the picture of Australia's 
economic relationship with Japan. As we have seen, it is a relationship that is 
primarily determined by Japanese interests and the structure of Japan's 
economy and corporate organisation. The distinctive structural qualities of the 
Japanese economy go a long way toward explaining another striking 
characteristic of the Japan-Australia relationship: the lack of reciprocal 
investment by Australian companies in Japan. True, the size of Japan's GOP 
(US$ 3,662 billion) compared to Australia's (US$289 billion) 113 would suggest 
that Japan's investment levels would easily outstrip Australia's, but what is 
noteworthy, as we saw in chapter 5, are the consistently low levels of all forms 
of foreign investment into Japan. In  Australia's case, investment in Japan has 
actually fallen from a peak of A$6,089 million in 1990-1 to A$5,564 million in 
1991-2.114 Equally noteworthy is the ratio of direct to portfolio investment - in 
1990 only A$286 million was direct compared to A$4,584 of portfolio.115 
Such a situation gives Australian producers - or foreign investors in general, for 
that matter - little ability to influence domestic policy construction within Japan. 
Certainly, as we have seen, outside pressure has been an important 
determinant of policy direction in Japan, but outsiders do not enjoy the same 
leverage over the national political class that Japanese auto manufacturers in 
11 O McGregor, R (1994) 'Meat industry faces uphill task in Tokyo stores', The Weekend 
Australian, November 26-27: 10. 
111 Hartcher, Peter (1993) "Japanese Threaten Beet Exports", Australian Financial Review, 
1August 10: 1 & 14. 
112 Hartcher, P (1995) 'Australian rice exports may lose in date switch', The Australian 
Financial Review, May 2: 14. 
113 Beeson, M (1995) 'Australia, APEC, and the Politics of Regional Economic Integration, Asia 
Pacific Business Review, 2 (1 ): 17. 
114 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (1993} The Apec Region: Trade and Investment, 
AGPS, Canberra: 167. 
115 East Asia Analytical Unit (1992) Australia and North-East Asia in the 1990s: 291. 
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Australia potentially do, for example. The economic position of Australia relative 
to Japan has been further diminished by parochial factors. Significantly, by 
1994 Australia's share of the Japanese import market had fallen to its lowest 
point in 15 years to less than 5%.116 This is disturbing enough at any time for a 
government bent on improving export performance, but even more unfortunate 
at a time when Japan's imports are unambiguously expanding. 
Much of this failure can be attributed to the structural dependence of exporters 
from Australia on the Japanese trading companies. In  effect, where Australian 
exporters lack the capacity to conduct their own exporting, they are entirely 
dependent on the sogo shosha. As chapter 5 demonstrated, the nature of 
Japan's corporate linkages and obligations means that only those products that 
either do not compete with Japanese rivals or which are especially desirable for 
some other reason are likely to be promoted by the trading houses, leading 
noted Japan-watcher, Peter Hartcher to conclude that: 'The combination of 
Australian corporate sloth and Japanese trading companies' selectivity has lent 
the whole trade the flavour of a giant Japanese shopping expedition.'117 The 
precise manner in which this structural dependence operates will be detailed in 
relation to the coal industry in the next chapter.118 However, Austrade head 
Ralph Evans' complaints about the inadequacy of Australian company efforts to 
penetrate the Japanese market suggest that Australia's problems may be 
compounded by a traditional aversion to the seeming difficulty of Asian trade in 
general, and a preference for the more familiar markets of Europe and North 
America.119 
116 Hartcher, P (1995) 'Shake-up overdue in trade deals with Japan', Australian Financial 
Review, May 22: 15. 
117 Hartcher, P 'Corporate Australia misses trade boat', Australian Financial Review, August 
22: 15. 
118 It is worth noting in passing, however, that Byrnes considers - in a manner similar to 
Ohmae, noted above - that the lack of an indigenous trade house is 'the biggest gap in 
Australia's commercial armoury in Asia', something he suggests leads to Australians 
consistently losing 'the Asia Game'. See: Byrnes, M (1994) Australia and the Asia Game, Allen 
& Unwin, St Leonard's: 211. 
119 Hiscock, G (1995) 'Austrade chief attacks big companies' reticence in Japan', The 
Australian, August 24: 25. The truth of this supposition appears to be borne out by a recently 
released report which confirms a preference for Europe and the US over Asia by Australian­
based TNCs. See: Bureau of Industry Economics (1995) Investment abroad by Australian 
companies, Report 95/19, AGPS, Canberra. 
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Conclusion 
The distance between the idealised abstractions that characterise much of the 
discourse of neoliberalism and the actuality of commercial practices and 
international economic activities has been evident throughout this chapter. The 
discursive dominance of the neoliberal model has meant that a more complex 
theoretical interpretation of the Australia-Japan relationship, which might have 
accounted for the failure of Japanese capital to invest in more productive 
activities in Australia, has generally been marginalised. Furthermore, it is 
apparent that the sort of policy prescriptions that emanate from the neoliberal 
model - the need for 'efficiency' increases, a more productive workforce and the 
like - while possibly worthy goals in themselves, do not seem capable of 
transforming the structural qualities of the relationship. There is no intention at 
this stage of attempting to suggest an alternative to the neoliberal model. 
Rather, the intention here is to draw attention to the manner in which a specific 
political rationality has informed the positions of Australian policy makers and 
influential elites. 
As we saw in chapter 5, there are a range of political-economic relations in 
Japan that underpin the particular trajectory and content of Japan's 
developmental history. While there may be grounds for supposing that these 
relationships are not as significant as they once were, they remain important 
determinants of Japanese structural adjustment. The opening of the rice 
market is but one example of the way changes in the economic order can spill­
over into the political, with the potential to destabilise the latter. It is precisely 
this sort of complexity that is generally neglected by advocates of economic 
policies predicated upon market mechanisms. Clearly, the accommodation 
Japanese policy-makers reach when attempting to mediate between domestic 
interests and international obligations will be dependent on a great deal more 
than relative commodity prices. 
Similarly, the activities of Japanese TNCs and investors in Australia have, as 
this chapter has demonstrated, been dependent on a range of predominantly 
Japanese concerns, and have generally not been influenced by the efforts of 
the Australian government to create a more competitive investment location. 
As we have seen, Japanese investment has largely occurred in areas of the 
economy which are unlikely to generate the sorts of highly skilled, export­
oriented manufacturing activities that appear to have been central to the 
economic rise of Japan itself. Even investment in the tourism industry, while an 
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increasingly important source of foreign currency does not generate either the 
sort of well paid jobs that contribute to national living standards, nor establish 
the complex linkages with the rest of the economy that might underpin an 
economic renaissance. Where investment has occurred in the manufacturing 
sector it has generally been highly specific and opportunistic. The spurt of 
investment in the food industry is evidence of this. The point to emphasise here 
is that investment has often been motivated by either a desire to gain more 
effective control over integrated production chains, or to overcome the sort of 
tariff barriers that Australian policy-makers are now assiduously dismantling. 
Financial deregulation in Australia may certainly have encouraged Japanese 
banks to establish operations here, but it is noteworthy that they have not fully 
integrated into the wider economy. That there has been little benefit to the rest 
of the Australian economy is unsurprising, given that the motivation of such 
institutions was principally to service existing Japanese clients. I n  retrospect the 
main impact of the type of increased financial interaction with Japan that 
deregulation promoted has been to subject the Australian economic space to 
large, volatile and potentially destabilising flows of Japanese capital. The 
negative effects of this were clearly demonstrated in the speculative real estate 
investment of the 1980s which, while it may have provided some important 
tourism infrastructure, did little to enhance Australia's reputation as a long-term 
investment location - the ostensible reason, it will be recalled, for deregulation. 
Overall, then, the dominant free market-oriented, deregulatory framework with 
which Australian policymakers hoped to transform its trading position and 
general economic relations has yet to fulfil unambiguously its advocates' 
expectations. Even if the contentious question of quantifying supposed gains in 
competitiveness is set aside, there has clearly not been the flood of productive 
investment some of neoliberalism's champions hoped for. Indeed, facilitating 
inflows of speculative Japanese capital and portfolio investment has actually 
lessened the chances of long-term productive investment occurring as the 
general climate for this type of investment has become less attractive. 
Increasing financial volatility and the possibility of realising quick profits in 
sophisticated financial investment vehicles has made the sorts of long-term 
commitment other forms of productive investment require, comparatively less 
attractive. 
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Chapter 8: Case Studies 
This penultimate chapter presents specific case studies in order to draw out 
the relevance of the more important themes that have run through this thesis. 
The intention here is to provide a more detailed examination of the 
predominantly neoliberal policy paradigm's impact on particular facets of 
Japanese economic activity in and with Australia. 
Four case studies are presented: the coal trade, the Multifunction polis project, 
the automotive industry, and the experience of Australia's new generation of 
ship builders in trying to penetrate the Japanese market. Taken together, these 
examples draw attention to the most important aspects of the Australia-Japan 
relationship as they affect the quotidian reality of international commerce, as 
well as the more rarefied spheres of policy making and international relations. I t  
will be suggested that in all three examples there are sufficient deviations from 
the abstracted idealisations of the neoliberal paradigm to render it 
inappropriate, if not irrelevant. This is not only a regrettable theoretical 
shortcoming, it is also, as we shall see, a major handicap in the conduct of 
international economic and diplomatic relations. 
1 The Coal Trade 1 
The coal trade is a crucially important determinant of economic well-being in 
Australia. Coal remains Australia's single largest commodity export, accounting 
for some A$ 7.6 billion in export earnings in 19932 - only the tourism industry 
is larger. The coal trade, therefore, has a major impact on Australia's overall 
balance of trade position and is an important benchmark of the effectiveness of 
contemporary policy settings. Given the scale of the coal trade between 
Australia and Japan, even relatively minor changes in price levels have the 
potential to exert powerful effects, especially on the smaller Australian 
economy. Despite the critical importance of this industry to Australia's overall 
economic position, in what follows I shall suggest that Australian policymakers' 
reliance on a largely neoliberal economic framework has caused coal exporters 
to be consistently out-manoeuvred by Japanese buyers and as a result to 
1 This case study draws extensively on a previously published article. See: Beeson, M (1995) 
'Australia-Japan Trade Relations: The Coal Industry as a Case in Point', Australian Quarterly, 
67 (3): 67-84. 
2 Taylor, R M (1994) Study of the Australian Black Goa/ Industry (Queensland and New South 
Wales), Report to the Australian Coal Industry Council, Canberra: 1. 
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receive lower prices than might otherwise have been obtained. Much of this 
disadvantageous economic outcome is attributable to the nature and structure 
of Japanese corporate activities - something which, as we have seen, is 
generally neglected by mainstream economists and policymakers in Australia. 
Corporate Japan and the Coal Trade 
I t  will be recalled from the discussion of Japan's distinctive forms of corporate 
organisation in chapter 5 that the keiretsu networks bear little resemblance to 
the stylised idealisations of arms-length trading relationships that characterise 
orthodox economic theory. On the contrary, at the heart of Japanese corporate 
arrangements are preferential trading relations and alliances that have been 
built up over years, and which are not predicated on short-term economic 
advantage. Indeed, it is crucial to remember that short-term profitability 
occupies a much less central place in corporate Japan than it does in 
comparable western firms. The significance of this becomes readily apparent in 
the coal trade. Without an understanding of the distinctive organisational logic 
that underpins the keiretsu relationships it is impossible to account for the 
activities of the critical intermediary in the coal trade: the sago shosha. 
The coal trade is another example of the effect that the lack of an indigenous 
trading house has in Australia: local companies are dependent upon the sago 
shosha to fulfil a role that Australian-based business does not have the 
capacity to perform.s However, the crucial role played by the sago shosha in 
the coal trade is not simply motivated by or a response to market forces. The 
trading houses have played a crucial role in facilitating the state-guided growth 
and international expansion of Japanese industry. Moreover, they have been an 
important extension of Japan's overall economic policies, especially in 
furthering Japan's resource security policy. This has meant that the activities of 
the sago shosha in Australia have not been driven by commercial 
considerations alone. Consequently, the sago shosha may be prepared to 
sacrifice short-term (or any) profit on some of these investments in order to 
3 It is worth noting that much of this analysis is applicable to another key Australian commodity 
export: the woodchip industry. Japanese companies use similar tactics of buyer cartels, 
strategic investments, and supplier diversification. In addition Japanese ships transport the 
wood chips, exacerbating Australia's services trade deficit. Australia is, therefore, doubly 
disadvantaged: not only is the woodchip trade politically controversial and environmentally 
unsustainable, it is also poorly recompensed. See: Streeting, M & Imber, D (1991) The Pricing 
of Australian Woodchip Exports, Research Assessment Commission, Paper No 4, AGPS, 
Canberra. 
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cement long-term trading relationships and ensure continuing control of high 
volume trade for a major client. 
The potential importance of these minimally profitable investments is 
particularly apparent and significant in the Australian coal industry. The sogo 
shosha 's principal profits in the coal industry are derived from commissions on 
coal sales, often from both buyers and sellers. 4 From the sogo shosha 's 
perspective, ensuring control of the high volume trade is of greater importance 
than securing a profit from a small stake in an Australian mine. The trading 
houses' strategic investments in Australian mines are, however, important for 
two reasons: they provide valuable information about possible conditions 
amongst Australian producers which may be used in price negotiations; they 
permit a systematically induced over-supply that may depress coal prices, 
something from which the trading houses' most important clients will benefitS 
In  the coal industry, where the trading companies' major profits are derived 
from their role as high-volume suppliers to Japanese steel mills and electricity 
utilities, securing these lucrative relationships - which in the case of the mills 
may be reinforced through keiretsu ties - is obviously of critical importance. 
Small investments in new mines may be a relatively cheap and effective 
manner in which to ensure this outcome. Significantly, by 1992 Japanese 
companies owned more than 20% of Australia's coal export capacity.6 
While this is obviously not enough to guarantee control of the industry or even 
individual companies, it is important to recognise that the ability of Japanese 
companies to dominate the Australian coal trade is not dependent on ownership 
levels alone. What Australian policy-makers and orthodox economic 
commentators generally fail to recognise is that there is a commonality of 
interest between the coal traders and commercial consumers in Japan -
encouraged and assisted by the Japanese government - which gives Japanese 
investors in Australia a greater collective influence than their individual stakes 
would suggest.? Moreover, this Japanese unity is in marked contrast to and 
actively encourages fragmentation and competition on the Australian side. 
4 Parker, Paul (1992} "Information Specialisation and Trade: Trading Companies and the Coal 
Trade of Europe and Japan", Pacific Economic Papers, No 207, Canberra: Australia-Japan 
Research Centre, Canberra: 15. 
5 Mcintosh Baring (1993} Australian Goa/ Industry Study, Mcintosh & Company Ltd, Melbourne: 
45. 
6 van Os, J (1992} 'Coal: What Price Foreign Investment?', Australian Business Monthly: ,  July: 
44/5 
7 Colley, P (1995} Fortunate for some: the implications of trading and investment practices in 
the Australia-Japan coal trade, unpublished MA Thesis, Department of Economics, University of 
Sydney: 54. 
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From a Japanese perspective, undermining Australia's position is a critical part 
of national policy, as the Australia-Japan trade is the world's largest and sets 
the benchmark for international prices: achieving a satisfactory price outcome 
with Australia is central to controlling global prices.a 
Not only do the sogo shosha take a long-term view of their trading relations, 
but the conception of the 'national interest' is not simply political rhetoric. Price 
is not the sole criterion by which decisions to purchase are made. Japanese 
resource buyers have been keen to ensure a diversity of supply, which not only 
increases supply security, but as Koerner suggests, allows buyers to 
minimise coal prices by playing off one supplier nation against another, to a 
point where Australian import volumes to Japan have declined as a matter of 
policy, despite being the lowest cost supplier. 9 Contrary to what orthodox 
economics might predict, price has not been the sole or even the most 
important influence on buyer preferences. On the contrary, Japanese buying 
practices have been informed by a long-term perspective in which the sogo 
shosha have played an important foreign policy role, mediating Japan's 
national resource security policies.1 o A government-sponsored research body in 
Japan has developed a specific long-term strategy for the Japanese 
government and buyers designed to encourage over-supply and price 
suppression .1 1  In such a context, no amount of productivity increases or more 
cooperative workplace relations could be expected to improve Australia's 
market share or mine profitability. 
Price Determination 
The coal price negotiating process is another important example of economic 
outcomes being determined by a more complex array of factors than simply 
supply and demand. The reality of the negotiation process bears little 
resemblance to the idealised abstraction of discrete groups of informed buyers 
and sellers responding to unimpeded market forces. Although there are a 
multitude of sellers, and theoretically no small number of potential customers, 
the sogo shosha's information gathering and organisational ability allows them 
8 Colley, P (1995} Fortunate for some : 63. 
9 Koerner, R (1993} 'The behaviour of Pacific metallurgical coal markets: the impact of Japan's 
acquisition strategy on market price', Resources Policy, March: 66-79. 
1 o Shao, A & Herbig, P (1993} 'The Future of Sogo Shosha in a Global Economy', International 
Marketing Review, 10 (5): 42. 
1 1  Marris, S & McGregor, R (1994) 'Japanese report Tells How to Squeeze Coal Price', The 
Australian, 4th February: 19. 
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to provide a crucial intermediary function which effectively limits the number of 
buyers.1 2 Actual negotiations are led by a principal mill or power utility which 
sets the standard for the other Japanese buyers. In contrast, Australian sellers 
usually negotiate individual contracts, allowing the Japanese buyers to pressure 
the weakest, least profitable mines into settling first, and thus setting a low 
bench-mark for subsequent negotiations. 
The net effect of the Japanese strategy is that they 'act in a monopsonistic 
fashion', according to Mcintosh Baring's study of the coal industry, which 
concluded that 'an improvement in real prices in the international coal market is 
unlikely while the current structure within the Australian coal industry is in 
place'.13 Importantly, 90% of the Australia-Japan trade is based on long-term 
contracts, a practice that has two noteworthy consequences. Firstly, as the 
'spot' market for coal is of such minimal importance it is clear that market forces 
have little opportunity to influence outcomes in a manner consistent with 
government policy or the nostrums of orthodox economics. Secondly, long-term 
contracts enhance the structural dominance of the Japanese buyers: over­
production is systematically encouraged by awarding new mines long-term 
contracts, placing greater competitive pressure on existing suppliers. 
Furthermore, the establishment of new mines - and hence oversupply - is 
promoted by a system of concessional financing overseen by a MITI  subsidiary, 
the New Energy and Industrial Technology Development Organisation (NEDO}, 
which provides funding for commercially non-viable investments. This 
comprehensive strategy, in which Japanese buyers, traders and the state 
collude to minimise prices in the national interest led Colley to conclude that: 
the use of investment practices on a coordinated basis by Japanese buyers and traders 
has managed to achieve, in conjunction with the use of specialised trading practices, a 
regime that is similar in effect to that of a vertically integrated industry. 14 
However, not all of Australia's disadvantage can be attributed to Japanese nee­
mercantilism. True, the representatives of Japanese buyers have superior 
negotiating tactics and skills, and the sogo shosha are often able to provide 
inside knowledge about the profitability of mines via their strategic investments 
in Australia. But , the difficulties experienced by 'Australian' companies in 
conducting price negotiations are exacerbated by a general lack of unity and a 
willingness to undercut other Australia competitors. Yet the possible efficacy of 
1 2 Parker, Paul (1992) ' Information Specialisation and Trade'. 
1 3 Mcintosh Baring (1993) Australian Goa/ Industry Study, : 4 & 41. 
14 Colley, P (1995} Fortunate for some : 93. 
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government intervention to overcome Australian disadvantage was 
demonstrated by Rex Connor in the 1970s, who managed to extract a dramatic 
price increase from the Japanese buyers without endangering the entire 
trade. 15 In  contrast, the Labor administration was keen to distance itself from 
the problematic legacy of the interventionist Whitlam era. In one of its few major 
pronouncements on policy toward the coal industry, price formation is barely 
mentioned, other than to state that the government does not want to become 
involved.16 
Overview 
The current policy of non-involvement on the part of government seems likely to 
continue. The recent Taylor report into Australia's coal industry endorsed the 
government's preference for market mechanisms in determining coal prices -
even though, as we have seen, market forces have little to do with such 
outcomes.17 Indeed, it is somewhat ironic that the Construction, Forestry, 
Mining & Energy Union's (CFMEU) submission to the Taylor inquiry argued that 
Australia should develop a 'countervailing ability' precisely because market 
forces are constrained.18 By contrast, the Australian Coal Association (ACA), 
representing the employers, was keen to stress the importance of not 
jeopardising Australia's 'dependability premium' through aggressive 
government intervention.19 Rather than the collective approach to negotiations 
advocated by the CFMEU, the ACA was concerned to ensure the autonomy of 
its members and 'management's ability to manage'. 
Significantly, the conclusion of the Taylor Report is much closer to the ACA's 
position. Taylor considers the CFMEU suggestion regarding the establishment 
of a countervailing marketing force to be 'a high risk strategy and not 
appropriate'.20 Investment decisions and production levels should be 
determined by 'market prices', with industry viability being underwritten by a 
series of measures designed to enhance productivity. These latter initiatives are 
a familiar part of wider governmental reform strategies, namely: industrial 
relations reform and enterprise bargaining, 'best practice' implementation, and 
15 Byrnes, M (1994) Australia and the Asia Game, Allen & Unwin, Sydney: 74-6. 
1 6 Crean, S & Cook, P (1992) Goa/ Industry Policy Statement, Dept. of Primary Industries and 
Energy, Canberra: 28. 
1 7 Taylor, R M (1994) Study of the Australian Black Goa/ Industry. 
1 8 CFMEU (1994) Out of the Red - Into the Black, CFMEU, Sydney. 
1 9 Australian Coal Association (1994) Winning Coal: Securing a Viable and Expanding Future 
tor Australia's Black Goa/ Industry, ACIL, Sydney: 11. 
20 Taylor, R M (1994) Study of the Australian Black Goa/ Industry :12. 
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infrastructure reform through increased competition in rail, ports and shipping. 
While such measures may have much to recommend them, they clearly fail to 
address the cause of Australia's structural disadvantage. The most recent 
round of coal negotiations generated only modest price increases for 
producers, despite a general tightening of world coal supplies and the 
estimated ¥200 billion ($3.3 billion) windfall profit enjoyed by the Japanese 
electric power companies as a result of the appreciating Yen.21 While the 
Australian representatives appeared to adopt a more unified and coherent 
position in the recent negotiations it is significant that Australian-based 
companies were 'punished' for even this modest rise with reduced tonnages. 
Until a strategy is adopted by Australian producers that is less reliant on market 
forces and pays greater attention to the specificity of this important relationship, 
a significant improvement in their relative position seems unlikely. 
2 The Car Industry 
As we have seen, the car industry is an example of a late capitalist, global 
production system par excellence. More fundamentally, however, car 
manufacture is what Drucker called the 'industry of industries'. 22 Car production 
remains the largest global manufacturing activity, and as such a crucial 
influence on national economic well-being and a major determinant of the 
structure of national economic activity. As we saw in chapter 1, successful 
manufacturing sectors need to develop sufficient critical mass to sustain a 
range of associated activities. 'Clusters' of industries, of the type described by 
Porter,23 seem an inescapable pre-requisite for generating the varied labour 
skills and supplier networks that permit existent firms to flourish and new 
entrants to emerge.24 The other initial point that needs to be made is that given 
the strategic importance of car production to the overall structure of 'national 
economies', the location of car production sites has been strongly influenced 
21 Hartcher, P (1995) 'Windfall is Coal Comfort', Australian Financial Review, April 20th: 1 & 5. 
22 Drucker, P (1946) The Concept of the Corporation, John Day, New York: 149. 
23 Porter, M (1990) The Competitive Advantage of Nations, MacMillan Press, London: 149. 
24 It should be noted that the much discussed emergence of a new generation of small scale 
manufacturing exporters in Australia would not have occurred without the existence of a wider 
manufacturing base in which they might develop. See: Argrous, G (1993) 'Emerging Exporters: 
An Evaluation', Journal of Australian Political Economy, No 32: 106-26. 
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by government trade policies. 25 Australia is no exception. Indeed, it has been 
suggested in an authoritative review of Australian-based manufacturing that 
Australia would not have a car industry without protection . . .  If an announcement were 
made today that automotive tariffs were to be eliminated, or even reduced drastically, by 
2000, the car companies would probably stop investing and progressively close their 
facilities as new investment became due .26 
While currency movements have reduced the significance and effectiveness of 
tariffs somewhat, they remain of great importance - not the least part of which 
is symbolic of governmental commitment - in determining the nature of 
'Australia's' car manufacturing industry; an industry, it should be noted, wholly 
owned by a combination of Japanese and American companies. The defining 
characteristic of the car industry in Australia has been - and in most cases still 
is - that it is 'market constrained'. I n  other words, as the schema outlined in 
chapter 1 indicated, production occurs primarily to service the local market, 
something which has engendered specific problems, foremost of which is a 
lack of integration with global or regional production structures and a general 
lack of international competitiveness. 
Toyota is both a significant and instructive example of the Japanese TNCs' 
experience in Australia. Australia represented Toyota's first excursion into an 
overseas market. I nitially operating through an Australian distributor in the early 
1960s, local production was gradually increased to avoid tariffs and comply with 
local content requirements. In  what has become a familiar pattern throughout 
the world, Toyota also encouraged one of its affiliate companies - Nippondenso 
- to establish a local parts manufacturing subsidiary in 1972.27 In  1974, in 
response to government proposals to phase-out low local content assembly 
plants, both Toyota and Nissan were forced to decide whether to extend their 
operations or withdraw completely. Toyota decided to establish its first offshore 
engine plant in Australia because it wanted to maintain its position in a small, 
but lucrative market - a possibility that government policy otherwise 
constrained.28 
25 Dicken, P (1992) Global Shift: The Internationalization of Economic Activity, 2nd Edition: 
268/9. 
26 Pappas Carter Evans and Koop!Telesis Study (1990) The Global Challenge: Australian 
Manufacturing in the 1990s, Australian Manufacturing Council, Melbourne: 
27 Edgington, D.W., (1990) Japanese Business Down-Under: 141. 
28 Edgington, D.W., (1990) Japanese Business Oown-Under :143. 
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The Australian government clearly had some ability to influence the investment 
decisions and organisational rationale of foreign multinationals. However, even 
where an avowedly activist government like the Whitlam administration 
attempted to rationalise the car industry it had great difficulty: by the mid- 1970s, 
following the entry of Toyota and Nissan, Australia had no less than five car 
manufacturers.29 Even though Japanese car manufacture in Australia has 
been of a smaller scale than those of Ford and General Motors, 30 there were 
obviously too many producers and too many models for the domestic market to 
accommodate. The takeover of the ailing Chrysler company by Mitsubishi 
Motors in 1979 did little to effect the basic dynamics of the industry, other than 
to entrench the importance of Japanese interests. 
Interventionism 
The Australian car industry suffered from an insufficiency of domestic demand 
and a 'lack of regional outlook'.31 I t  is against·this backdrop of foreign 
controlled over-capacity and a resolutely inward focus that the Labor 
administration's car industry plan emerged. A consideration of this plan is 
instructive for several reasons. Firstly, it reminds us that the neoliberal policy 
framework was not the only influence on the construction of government policy. 
Clearly there were important domestic influences - not the least of which were 
the trade union movement and the responsible minister, John Button - that were 
urging a more interventionist line be taken.32 However, this is not to say that the 
manner of this intervention was not broadly consistent with the overarching 
rationale that informed Labor's attempts to restructure the Australian economy. 
Indeed, even Labor's more overtly interventionist policies were predicated on 
the assumption that -ultimately - reduced protection and an increased exposure 
to market forces would achieve the sorts of industry rationalisation it desired. As 
Capling and Galligan observe, given the electoral importance of the car 
29 Glezer, L (1982) Tariff Politics: Australian Policy-making 1960- 1980, Melbourne University 
Press: 159-67. 
30 Three factors explain the small scale of Japanese operations , suggests Renwick: 
preference for the economies of scale generated by high volume production in Japan; 
Japanese investment is intended merely to safeguard market access and circumvent protective 
barriers; Japanese companies have been able to maintain a high level of import penetration: 
Renwick, N (1988) Australia and the Multinationals: A Study of Power and Bargaining in the 
1980s, Canberra Studies in World Affairs No 24, AN U, Canberra: 94. 
31 Womack, J et al (1990) The Machine That Changed the World, Maxwell Macmillan 
International, New York: 270. 
32 Bell suggests that Labor's industry policies were determined by the interaction of 'mildly 
interventionist forces' within the ALP, the bureaucracy and the manufacturing sector on the one 
hand and economic liberals within the major political parties, the federal bureaucracy and 
business on the other. See: Bell, S (1993) Australian manufacturing and the State: The Politics 
of Industry Policy in the Post-war Era, Cambridge University Press:142/3. 
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industry, it was also essential that the reduction in the numbers of 
manufacturers was achieved 'voluntarily'. 33 
While the interventionist Button Plan is generally regarded as having been 
successful, what is important to note for our purposes is the interaction between 
TNCs and Australian government in determining the direction and form of 
industry activity. Through a range of measures, particularly an export facilitation 
scheme and a gradual reduction of tariff levels, the Labor government was able 
to encourage the development of a more export-oriented sector.34 What an 
examination of the Australian automotive industry reveals is that throughout its 
history the character and extent of production in Australia has been influenced, 
not by the simple operation of international market forces, but by the policy 
initiatives - even when misguided or neglectful - of successive Australian 
governments. Even where new investment by Toyota35 and Mitsubishi36 has 
recently occurred or been proposed, it is important to recognise that his is not 
simply a response to new investment opportunities in market-oriented Australia, 
but a decision that reflects the necessity of factoring-in sunk costs that are 
themselves the legacy of previous government policy frameworks. In  the long­
term, however, the manner in which the Australian subsidiary is integrated into 
a global production networks may leave them dangerously reliant on a single 
model and increasingly expensive parts from its Japanese parent. 37 
Although Toyota and Mitsubishi have consolidated their positions for the 
immediate future, the Button plan was 'successful' in encouraging Nissan to 
cease Australian production in 1992. I ronically one of the main reasons cited 
as motivating Nissan's withdrawal from Australia - the lack of cost 
competitiveness of Australian-produced cars compared with those of Japan -
33 Capling, A & Galligan, B (1992) Beyond the Protective State: The Political Economy of 
Australia's Manufacturing Industry Policy, Cambridge University Press: 208. 
34 Sheehan, P et al (1994) The Rebirth of Australian Industry: Australian Trade in Elaborately 
Transformed Manufactures 1979-1993, Centre for Strategic Economic Studies, Victoria 
University: 92. 
35 Caruana, L (1 995) 'Toyota plant helps offset rising yen', The Australian, March 31: 25. 
36 Kable, M (1 993) 'Santa on way to Mitsubishi with $500m for plants', The Australian, 
November 22: 21. 
37 The new Toyota plant, for example will be largely dedicated to producing the Camry model 
for export markets. While this may be no bad thing in itself it is questionable whether such a 
model is likely to capture the emergent regional markets in which auto makers place such 
hopes. Moreover, there is little possibility of boosting local R&D when the models are developed 
in Japan as part of a Tokyo-based world production strategy. Furthermore, given that 
Australia's attraction as a potential investment location in comparison with the US and Japan is 
seen to be lower labour costs, local operations are therefore likely to be less capital intensive, 
and the resultant product less competitive as a result. (Based on personal interviews with John 
Hennesy, senior Toyota Australia executive.) 
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appears less plausible as a result of the Yen's inexorable rise.38 Fully-imported 
Japanese models cost more than locally produced models, highlighting the 
importance and volatility of exchange rate movements, and simultaneously 
undermining the rather simplistic neoclassical notion that tariff protection 
necessarily imposed an additional cost on local consumers.39 Moreover, the 
loss of control over the value of the Australian dollar that deregulation 
encouraged has made the position of the industry in Australia more uncertain. 
For example, where manufacturers remain dependent on high volumes of 
Japan-sourced components currency fluctuations may threaten local 
profitability. 40 In  the long term, the viability of local production sites will be 
dependent on their ability to develop export markets and link into the wider 
global strategies of their parents.41 
What is clear, however, is that if the Japanese manufacturers were establishing 
these sort of production networks now it is most unlikely that Australia would be 
part of their plans; especially if it were possible to service the Australian market 
from Japan or low-cost regional sites without fear of being penalised by the sort 
of protective trade barriers orthodox economists consider inherently harmful. 
The experience of the car industry is emblematic of the more generalised 
position of manufacturing in Australia. As an Australia Manufacturing Council 
(AMC) report concluded: 
Without special policies, Australia offers too little to the major companies, whatever their 
nationality, for it to be attractive for them to manufacture here, compared to 
manufacturing either within the giant markets of Europe, North America or Japan or in 
lower wage locations like Mexico, Brazil, Taiwan or Singapore. 42 
The Politics of Car Production 
The significance of the AMC's conclusion is reinforced when consideration is 
given to the politics of car production - something often conspicuous by its 
absence in orthodox accounts, and something that makes policy-making an 
inherently more complex process. There are two pertinent aspects to consider 
38 Significantly, senior Nissan executives now claim that the decision to cease Australian 
production might not have been taken if the Yen had achieved its current levels two or three 
years earlier. As it is, Japanese sourced imports are increasingly uncompetitive compared to 
locally manufactured ones and the increasingly important Korean rivals. Personal interview. 
39 Mackenzie, Angus "Nissan on Borrowed Time", The Bulletin, 3/12/91:1 08-11 0. & "Wheeler 
Dealer", The Bulletin, 3/11/92: 76. 
40 Kable, M (1995) 'Yen watching', The Australian, May 30: 63 . 
41 For example, Toyota has recently arranged to export Camrys from Australia to Saudi Arabia 
in order to generate greater economies of scale. See: Doak, A (1995) 'Toyota signs Middle East 
export deal', The Australian, March 30: 15. 
42 Pappas Carter Evans and Koop/Telesis Study (1990) The Global Challenge: 180. 
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here: the activities of other nations and domestic political pressures. The first 
point to recognise here is that the two areas are often interlinked. During the 
1993 Federal election, for example, tariff levels were an important political 
issue during the campaign. What is most noteworthy here is the willingness of 
Japanese manufacturers to make overtly partisan statements in pursuit of their 
own interests.43 Multinationals based in Australia continue to show a desire to 
influence domestic policy-making.44 Significantly, the negative impact of 
Australia's APEC-inspired deregulatory initiatives is seen as especially harmful 
to Australian-based producers vis-a-vis their heavily protected regional rivals in 
places like Indonesia and Malaysia. 45 Moreover, Australian-based Japanese 
manufacturers have been at the forefront of attempts to highlight what they 
consider to be the long-term threat to the local industry implicit in APEC's 
deregulatory agenda.46 While there may be much that is self-serving in these 
complaints, they also reflect Australia's marginal position in regional production 
strategies. 
As we saw in chapter 6, Japanese manufacturers have established tightly 
integrated production networks throughout Southeast Asia. I mportantly, they 
have been encouraged to do so not only by the Japanese government, but also 
by the policies of host governments. This may take the form of specific national 
initiatives or regional agreements like the brand-to-brand 'complementation 
pact' which halves the tariffs on specific imports from member countries.47 This 
is particularly significant when it is recognised that the same markets -
potentially crucial Australian export markets for any would-be investor - are 
effectively foreclosed to outsiders by extensive tariff protection.48 I ndeed, some 
43 See: Milne, G et al (1992) 'Toyota boss backs PM', The Australian, September 24: 1/2. 
44 Interestingly, Mitsubishi have tried to encourage the government to pursue its micro­
economic reform agenda more resolutely, especially in the wake of reduced tariff levels. 
Apparently, however, there is no intention of transferring any of the distinctive work practices 
and benefits that characterise car production in Japan. On the contrary, Mitsubishi's attitude 
resonates well with the Australian government's increasing emphasis on making the Australian 
workforce bear the burden of adjustment to 'international competitive pressures'. See: Lynch, M 
(1994) 'Japanese warn on reforms', Australian Financial Review, February 7: 5. 
45 Carruthers, F (1995) 'Toyota says car tariffs unfair', The Australian, February 17: 40. 
46 Managing director of Mitsubishi Motors Australia, Mike Quinn, claims APEC could 'render the 
local industry an uncompetitive investment within five years'. [Moody, E (1995) 'APEC tariff pact 
threatens car industry prospects', The Australian, April 18: 39.] Similarly, Toyota Australia 
chairman, John Conomos argues that Australian-based manufacturers would be severely 
disadvantaged by the dismantling of tariff barriers in Australia while other APEC nations 
followed APEC's two speed deregulatory timetable. [Britten, T (1995) 'Warning on equal APEC 
trade', The Australian, January 12: 15.] 
47 'Automakers call for back-up', The Nikkei Weekly, January 1, p 18. See chapter 6 for a fuller 
discussion of this point in a regional context. 
48 Korea, for example, has local content rules that virtually preclude imports. Tariffs in 
Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand range from 100-300%. See: Mellor, J (1993) 'FCAI seeks 
cuts to Asian tariffs', The Australian, November 25: 12. 
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observers have questioned whether, given Australia's comparative 
disadvantages, further investment will occur at all in the proposed 'negligible­
tariff situation' of 2000 and beyond - even if costs do fall significantly. 49 
Plainly, where Australia cannot offer comparable attractions it is likely to be 
excluded further from these increasingly important and highly integrated 
productive networks to its north - especially where they are undergirded by 
political agreements. I t  will be remembered that Australia, rather than 
attempting to emulate the industry specific policies favoured by some of its 
neighbours, has placed a good deal of faith in the ability of institutions like 
APEC to reduce tariff barriers and open up these markets to foreign 
competition. The recent experience of the car industry suggests that this faith 
may be misplaced. 
The recent trade dispute between the US and Japan demonstrates both the 
impossibility of attempting to isolate domestic production strategies from their 
wider regional context, and the inadequacy of theoretical models that fail to take 
account of such political complexities. 50 Chronic disputation has become a 
prominent feature of US-Japan relations. I t  is not necessary to prove or 
disprove American claims of 'unfair' protective practices in Japan's car industry 
- although much of the evidence of this thesis tends to substantiate such 
claims 51 - to recognise that recourse to aggressive bilateralism on the part of 
the US seriously undermines the logic and potential of policy based on regional 
free trade, or even attempts to establish such a regime. Moreover, even if there 
appears to be increasing support for deregulatory policies in Japan - although it 
is, as we have seen, quite another matter for such forces to influence policy -
there is an almost equal and opposite move away from internationalism in the 
US.52 Moreover, in Japan's case there are continuing doubts about both its 
willingness to submit to agreements which may disadvantage domestic 
49 Davison, R (1995) 'After the Button Plan: perspectives on the future of the automotive 
manufacturing industry in Australia', paper presented to the Australasian political Studies 
Association Conference, University of Melbourne, September 27-29: 35. 
50 This section draws on a more detailed consideration of this question, see: Beeson, M (1995) 
'Trade in the Asia-Pacific: Implications of the US-Japan Dispute for Australia', Current Affairs 
Bulletin, 72 (3) Oct/Nov: 41-2. 
51 There is no doubt that American policy-makers hold such views, however. One of the Clinton 
administration's most senior trade advisers - Laura Tyson -has established a reputation as a 
perceptive analyst and critic of Japan's nee-mercantilist trade strategies and the structural basis 
of Japan's trade surpluses. Multilateral trade fora like GATT are 'largely irrelevant' in remedying 
such imbalances, she claims. See: Tyson, L (1992) Who's Bashing Whom? Trade Conflict in 
High-Technology Industries, Institute for International Economics, Washington: 5. 
52 Frieden, J (1993) 'Domestic Politics and Regional Cooperation: The United States, Japan, 
and Pacific Money and Finance', in Frankel, J & Kahler, M (eds) Regionalism and Rivalry: 
Japan and the United States in Pacific Asia, University of Chicago Press: 423-44. 
248 
producers, or its political capacity to honour such agreements should it 
genuinely wish to do so. 53 
The point to recognise here is that such disputes have profound implications for 
third parties. Although Japan has been at pains to emphasise that Australia's 
increasingly important component export trade will not be adversely effected by 
any bilateral deal with the US, 54 such guarantees may be worth little if US 
preferences for 'managed' trade predominate. In the short term Australia may 
actually benefit from US trade aggression as it may eventually lead to a more 
generalised market opening in Japan.55 In  the longer term, however, Australian 
policy-makers may be faced with difficult questions about the importance they 
attach to economic and security issues, as well as the relative importance of 
Japan and the US. 56 
What all of these factors draw attention to is the impossibility of abstracting 
particular industries from a wider political and economic regional - or even 
global - setting. This is especially true of the car industry given its critical 
strategic role in undergirding national economic infrastructure. Where such an 
industry is wholly foreign owned, managing its development and direction in the 
'national interest' is an inherently more problematic proposition. Yet the Button 
plan demonstrates that governments retain a capacity to influence even the 
largest multinationals. Certainly, the international logic of multinational 
production strategies means that national governments may find it difficult to 
influence the overall position of individual subsidiaries. However, where 
government policy abdicates the possibility of such influence as a matter of 
policy and instead places greater reliance on market mechanisms to achieve 
desired outcomes, it is not clear whether this will encourage further growth in 
the local industry.57 Indeed, where other nations are actively working to 
53 Cowhey, P (1993} 'Domestic institutions and the Credibility of International Commitments: 
japan and the United States', International Organization, 47 (2}: 299-326. 
54 Taylor, L (1995} 'PM wins pledge: trade war won't hit our car parts', The Australian, May 29: 
2. 
55 Oxley, A (1995} ' Imports challenge to benefit Australia', The Weekend Australian, May 13-
14: 13. 
56 Sheridan G (1995) 'Conflict of Loyalty', The Weekend Australian, May 20-21: 23. 
57 It is worth noting that even where government has the opportunity to fairly unproblematically 
advantage domestic producers it is reluctant to do so - for example, winding back preferential 
government purchasing and supporting imports instead. In a small market like Australia's this 
would seem likely to do little to encourage further commitment to Australian production by 
foreign multinationals, especially in the face of competition from other nations that are less 
reticent about employing such policies. [See: Corne, A (1994} 'Government policy may leave 
Toyota out in the cold', The Australian, August 25: 15.] This would seem a potentially important 
political issue given that under the current policy of reducing tariff barriers import penetration 
has increased to the point where cars produced outside Australia account for more than 56% of 
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advantage domestically based producers through a range of interventionist 
strategies, Australia's attractiveness as a long-term production location must be 
in doubt. 
3 The New Generation of Shipbuilders 58 
One of the primary concerns of policy makers the world over has been to 
increase the amount of export-oriented manufacturing activity occurring within 
national borders. Even though the connection between manufacturing and the 
existence of highly paid jobs in other sectors of national economies has 
become increasingly contested, there are, nevertheless, immediate gains in 
increased employment opportunities and balance of payments contributions. 
Where new industries emerge that are not only export-oriented but at the 
leading edge of contemporary design and production techniques, such 
industries are potentially instructive as far as public policy issues are 
concerned. For this reason a more detailed examination of one of the most 
successful new industries in Australia is merited. Although the major interest as 
far as this thesis is concerned will be the question of market access to Japan ­
potentially the industry's most important export market - there are other 
important lessons to be drawn, particularly as far as the general 
appropriateness of the neoliberal economic model is concerned. 
The Emergence of a New Industry 
Over the last ten to fifteen years a new and potentially important industry has 
developed in Australia. I ronically, the predominantly aluminium-based ship 
building industry has emerged at the same time as Australia's long-established 
steel-based industry has gone into further decline; steel shipbuilding had 
become almost totally reliant on government defence purchases and offsets 
policies. 59 What is important to recognise, however, is that while the new ferry 
the domestic market. [See: Kable, M (1995) 'Tariffs back on the agenda as imports pose threat 
to jobs', The Weekend Australian, July 15-16: 4.] Ironically, one of the countries to benefit most 
from Australian trade liberalisation has been Korea - a country with a domestic car market so 
protected that even the Japanese cannot penetrate it. Such protection has, however, provided 
the basis for a rapidly expanding export industry which seems set to replicate the Japanese 
experience of the 1960s and '70s. 
58 This case study draws on an abridged early version which appeared as: Beeson, M (1995) 
'Why so many miss the boat in sales to Japan', Australian Financial Review, October 17: S 5. 
59 Sheean, P et al (1994) The Rebirth of Australian Industry: Australian Trade in Elaborately 
Transformed Manufactures 1979-1993, Centre for Strategic Economic Studies, Victoria 
University: 98. 
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and pleasure craft industry is precisely the sort of 'born global', high-tech 
industry that policy-makers are keen to encourage, it would probably not have 
developed at all were it not for a range of specific factors, uppermost amongst 
which were particular forms of government assistance. The point to emphasise 
at the outset is that the non-interventionist, neoliberal policy framework to which 
Australia's public policy seems increasingly aligned would not have provided 
the assistance which proved crucial to the industry's development. 
Before considering the specifics of government assistance, it is also necessary 
to acknowledge the importance of the attractions of specific locations as 
potential sites for the new industry. In both Queensland and Western Australia 
a skilled labour force already existed that could be easily introduced to the 
particular techniques and skills required to manufacture the types of luxury craft 
and high-speed ferries that would form the backbone of the new industry. 5o In  
Western Australia - the principal focus of this study - a skilled labour force had 
developed around the manufacture of rock lobster boats for the local fishing 
industry. Without this important attraction there would have been no obvious 
reason to locate the industry in the Fremantle area. 
As the industry developed, however, it became necessary to train additional 
workers to meet the rising demand for labour. Here the local industry was able 
to use its increasing political influence to lobby for changes in the provision of 
apprentices through the local Technical and Further Education (TAFE) 
scheme. 51 The peak representative body of the industry, the Australian 
Shipbuilders' Association, was able to pressure an initially reluctant local 
education system to gear its courses to the specific needs of the industry. 
Again, it is important to stress that market forces had little to do with this: the 
political leverage that a glamorous emergent industry was able to wield was 
responsible for putting in place long term strategies to secure future industry 
needs. This was true at both the Federal and State levels. 
At the Federal level, the industry was fortunate in having an activist Industry 
Minister- John Button- sympathetic to the needs and aware of the potential of 
a new industry. Perhaps the single most important aspect of an industry policy 
specifically geared to encourage the industry was the Bounty Assistance to 
60 John Farrell, Managing Director, Oceanfast Marine Group - personal interview. Much of the 
following discussion of the history and marketing experience of the West Australian industry 
draws on a series of personal interviews, of which John Farrell's was the most important. 
61 John Farrell - personal interview. 
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registered shipbuilders. 62 In 1984, when Labor took office, the Bounty payment 
was 27.5% and was payable to assist with construction costs. The level of 
assistance has gradually reduced and is intended to be only 5% by 1996.63 
Significantly, prior to 1984 the Bounty had not been available to exporters, 
being aimed at propping up the domestic market. Under Labor this was 
extended to exporters as part of the attempted general outward re-orientation of 
Australian industry. What the Bounty provided was the assistance necessary to 
allow the industry to become established and to generate sufficient critical mass 
to survive on its own. 
Without such assistance it is highly debateable whether the industry would have 
developed in the manner it has. Shipbuilding is inherently capital-intensive and 
risky. Without government backing it would have been much more difficult to 
undertake large scale ferry building of the type that has come to dominate the 
Australian industry and provide such an important source of export revenue. 64 
The importance of risk sharing and the difficulties of financing larger projects 
was a prime motivation behind the decision to form a joint venture between two 
of Western Australia's most successful manufacturers: the Oceanfast Marine 
Group and Austal Ships. Importantly, it was Oceanfast's sophisticated financial 
capacity and relationships that it had built up since its inception in 1984 that 
made it an especially attractive alliance partner to Austal. 65 Austal, on the other 
hand, had rapidly developed an extensive manufacturing capacity in a 
remarkably short space of time - demonstrating the growth potential and 
possible importance of this industry. From its beginning in 1988, with a 
workforce of 40, Austal alone had developed by 1995 to an employer of 550 
people. 
Again, however, it is important to note that this development would simply not 
have occurred as rapidly or on such a scale without government assistance. 
One of the most telling areas of failure in the market model has been the 
inadequacy of Australia's financial system - expected improvements in which, 
it will be remembered, was one of the principle justifications of the entire 
deregulatory project. Indeed, Farrell characterises Australia's banking sector as 
62 Department of Industry Science and Technology (1995} Australia Shipbuilding: 
Commonwealth Government Support Policies and Programs, unpublished mimeo. 
63 Sheean, P et al (1994} The Rebirth of Australian Industry: 95. 
64 Austal Ships, for example, is currently contracted by Germany's TT Line to build an 82 metre 
catamaran that will carry 600 passengers and 175 cars. Typically, these ferries cost in region of 
US$ 35 million. 
65 John Farrell - personal interview. 
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'hopelessly incompetent and disinterested'. 66 Certainly there may be a degree 
of overstatement in this assessment, but as we saw in chapter 3, there are 
plausible grounds for questioning the efficacy of the financial deregulation that 
occurred in Australia during the 1980s - especially as far as access to capital 
for smaller manufacturers is concerned. As a consequence, Australian interest 
rates are high by world standards and banks are unwilling to lend to 
manufacturers deemed 'risky'. Without the government established Export 
Finance and Insurance Corporation (EFIC), which provided finance to the 
shipbuilders at 'extremely attractive rates', it is unlikely large scale contracts 
could have been undertaken. 67 
The emergence of the new generation of shipbuilders clearly demonstrates the 
importance of government assistance and 'intervention' - especially in the case 
of infant industries. However, it is one thing to develop a product, it is quite 
another sell it on international markets. As the next section demonstrates, the 
neoliberal economic model provides an even niore inadequate basis for policy 
as far as capturing export markets is concerned. 
The Japanese Ferry Market 
Australian-based manufacturers, then, make some of the best and most 
competitive luxury craft and ferries in the world. This is clearly demonstrated by 
the range of sales made by companies like Austal, which has not only captured 
markets in countries like China and Hong Kong where little domestic 
competition exists, but also in more sophisticated markets like Germany, the 
UK and Singapore, where competition is intense. 58 Plainly, this is one area in 
which manufacturers based in Australia are world leaders in terms of price, 
design and quality. Yet the experience of the Australian builders in trying to 
break into the Japanese market demonstrates that price and quality alone - the 
fundamentals of the market-oriented paradigm - are not central explanatory 
variables when attempting to comprehend the pattern of economic interaction 
between Australia and Japan. 
66 John Farrell - personal interview. 
67 Pemberton, C (1995) 'The Development of Australian Fast Ferry Manufacturing', 
unpublished mimeo. 
68 Austal Ships Pty Ltd (1995) 'Vessels Built & Under Construction as of July 1995', in-house 
mimeo. 
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Until recently, only three boats - of which only one was a commercial ferry- had 
been sold to Japan. 69 This was not, however, something that could be 
attributed to lack of demand in Japan. There are well over two thousand ferries 
operated by 650 companies in Japan.7o Austrade estimates that there are 
1 , 200 ferries operating in the Sea of Japan alone. Furthermore in any given 
year, up to 10% of the Japanese fleet may need replacing - of this figure, a 
minimum of 10% will be precisely the sort of boats with which Australian 
exporters could effectively compete.71 It might be expected, therefore, that 
ceteris paribus, Australian exporters might have captured a significant share of 
the Japanese market. As we have seen, however, this has not been the case. 
Even the recent sale of a 43 metre catamaran to Diamond Ferry in Japan is a 
conspicuous exception to a more general rule.72 Indeed, John Farrell suggests 
that the recent sale is little more than a 'tokenistic' gesture, designed to 
convince foreign competitors in general and the US in particular that Japan is 
making genuine efforts to open its protected markets. Such a contention is 
difficult to verify and suggests a degree of seamless cooperation between 
business and government that is increasingly contested. Nevertheless, Japan's 
imports of sophisticated manufactures remain conspicuously low and are not 
easily explained with reference to market forces alone. 
The experience of Austal and Oceanfast tends to support a more complex 
explanation. Farrell suggests that despite numerous trips to Japan, Japanese 
buyers are simply not interested in buying foreign boats as a matter of principle. 
On the contrary, Japanese buyers - in what is a familiar pattern of preferential 
buying - are seemingly prepared to sacrifice price in the interest of cementing 
group ties in Japan. Ferry operators may be influenced by either keiretsu 
obligations or government prodding to support an uncompetitive domestic yard 
rather than buying a cheaper foreign product.73 Where sales have been 
achieved, Farrell believes a primary motive was to examine closely pioneering 
Australian construction techniques and replicate them in Japan. Ironically, this 
process may have been furthered by Australian government subsidised 
promotions that have conducted Japanese visitors around Australian yards. 
Again, there may be a degree of aggrieved self-interest in this analysis, but 
69 McGregor, R (1993) 'Stormy Waters', The Australian, February 9: 43. 
70 McGregor, R (1993) 'Stormy Waters'. 
71 Trevor Knowles, Austrade, Perth - personal interview. 
72  Worwood, D (1995) 'Ferry builders stand by for Japanese orders', Lloyd's List, July 10: 1 & 3. 
73 Austrade estimates that Australian boats are at least 30% cheaper than Japanese 
equivalents: Knowles, Austrade. 
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even with some government assistance, the Japanese market remains 
remarkably difficult to penetrate. 
The recent Austal sale in Japan demonstrates the importance of other non­
market considerations. The sale was only concluded after president-to­
president negotiations between Diamond and Austal. Even this, however, was 
not enough to overcome some of Japan's other 'invisible' trade barriers: in order 
to comply with extensive Japanese regulations and meet its stringent delivery 
deadline, Austal was forced to buy Japanese components - like life rafts, for 
example - or risk losing the entire sale.74 Furthermore, Austal was dependent 
on a Japanese trading company - Marubeni - to conduct much of the 
negotiation process in Japan on its behalf. The lack of an Australian trading 
house, once again left exporters dependent on the sago shosha. 
Although both Oceanfast and Austal were generally approving of Austrade's 
efforts to increase exports from Australia, they expressed reservations about its 
actual day-to-day effectiveness. Generally, Austrade was considered to be 
better than nothing, but doubts were raised about the quality of its staff in 
Japan.75 More tellingly, Austrade tended to institute competition between 
potential Australian exporters by attempting to maintain an even handed, 
market-conforming approach to Australian clients. 
Assessment 
One thing emerges clearly from this brief case study: without various forms of 
government 'intervention', of a type that the neoliberal paradigm decries, one of 
the most promising export-oriented industries in Australia would possibly not 
exist at all or, if it did, it would be on a much smaller basis. Without government 
support in its initial stages it is unlikely that the industry would have developed 
sufficient critical mass to take on larger projects. Without the EFIC scheme to 
help underwrite capital provision it is almost certain this large scale 
manufacturing would not have occurred. 
What is also apparent, with particular reference to Japan, is that 
competitiveness in the areas of price and quality is not sufficient to guarantee 
sales. The structure of corporate organisation in Japan means that price - as in 
the previous example of the coal industry - is simply not the principal 
7 4  Chris Pemberton Manager, Marketing and Sales, Austal - personal interview. 
75 Farrell suggested that Austrade had 'too many salespeople and not enough analysts'. 
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explanation for sales patterns. Japan's highly developed sense of keiretsu 
loyalty and 'national interest' mean that Japanese buyers are often prepared to 
sacrifice price advantage for the sake of long-term relationships. 
There is no intention here of attempting to map out alternative trade policies 
based on a different theoretical perspective to the neoliberal orthodoxy; 
although there is clearly some scope for specific interventions based on a more 
sophisticated bilateral reading of individual relationships should policy-makers 
deem this desirable. The point to emphasise, once again, is that the neoliberal 
model, both as a theoretical framework with which to comprehend particular 
economic relationships and, by implication, as a basis for policy seems less 
than satisfactory. On the one hand, many of the business practices and 
structural characteristics of contemporary capitalism, especially as practiced by 
Japanese-based corporations, are simply not captured by the idealised 
abstractions of the neoliberal paradigm. On the other, it would seem that 
without specific forms of 'intervention' or assistance by government, such 
industries will find it difficult to either develop, or win particular export markets if 
they do. If the intention is to promote strategically important manufacturing 
ventures and capture lucrative foreign markets, there is clearly a role for a more 
activist approach on the part of national governments. 
4 The Multifunction Polis Project 
Perhaps more than any other single project, Japan's Multifunction Polis (MFP) 
proposal to construct a futuristic city in Australia illustrates many of the 
shortcomings and difficulties of Australia's relationship with Japan. While there 
are, as we shall see, good reasons to question whether some of the more 
fanciful versions of the project could ever have been realised, the MFP stands 
as mute testimony to the inadequacy of Australia's overall bilateral policy 
capacity with regard to Japan. A better informed policy position - including a 
more active role on the part of the Australian government might have produced 
tangible, albeit relatively modest, benefits in the form of increased Japanese 
investment in Australia. 
The Genesis of the MFP 
The MFP concept first emerged unexpectedly at the Ninth Australia-Japan 
Ministerial Talks in early 1987. Less surprisingly, the MFP proposal - which 
Gavan McCormack considers 'the most complex and interesting single event in 
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the history of Australia-Japan relations'76 - was a reflection of Japanese political 
and economic priorities. Central in this regard was a desire on the part of 
Japanese policy-makers to entrench the emerging close relationship between 
the two countries. 77 There is an important sub-text here: Firstly, Japan has few 
close friends either regionally or globally, therefore Australia offers an important 
potential ally with which to bolster its international position.78 Secondly, as far 
as Japan is concerned, Australia is perceived as being a relatively 
undeveloped, resource-based economy, the inherent 'complementarity' of 
which is no threat to Japan's own economic position.79 
However, even given this underpinning rationale, the initial proposal came as a 
great surprise to the Australian side, something that was not lessened by 
consideration of Japan's subsequent more detailed blueprint. 80 The most 
noteworthy feature of the MITI's 'Basic Concept' was the language - not only 
vague, but excessively hyperbolic. From an Australian perspective the 
suggestion that the MFP could 'boost the restructuring of Australia [sic] industry' 
was clearly an attractive one81: the MFP held out the possibility of transforming 
the structural basis of the Australia-Japan relationship, from one of dependent 
commodity supply, to one in which the MFP acted as a conduit for 
manufacturing investment and technology transfer. Moreover, given that the 
MFP W€3-S intended to be at the cutting edge of both high tech (information 
industries, life sciences, new materials) and 'high touch' (leisure, 'conferencing', 
culture and travel) industries, 82 this might have been expected to catapult 
Australia to the front rank of sophisticated manufacturers. Such optimism was 
engendered, argues Morris-Suzuki, by a 'misreading and misapplication of the 
Japanese model of technological development', on the part of Australian 
officials.83 Such a failing is more comprehensible when it is recognised that 
'the knowledge resources which Australia has accumulated over the years 
76 McCormack, G (1991) 'Coping with Japan: The MFP Proposal and the Australian Response', 
in McCormack, G (ed) Bonsai Australia Banzai: Multifunctionpo/is and the Making of a Special 
Relationship with Japan, Pluto Press, Leichhardt: 34. 
77 Inkster, I (1991) The Clever City: Japan, Australia and the Multifunction Polis, Sydney 
University Press: 41. 
78 Sheridan, G (1993) 'Our new best friend', The Weekend Australian, March 13-14: 18. 
79 Kennedy, D (1989) The Multifunction Polis (1): The Background Issues, Background Paper, 
legislative Research Service, Department of the Parliamentary Library: 23. 
80 MFP Planning Committee (1987) A Multifunctionpolis Scheme for the 21st Century: Basic 
Concept, Ministry of Trade and Industry, Tokyo. 
81 MFP Planning Committee (1987) A Multifunctionpolis Scheme for the 21st Century: 5. 
82 Inkster, I (1991) The Clever City :27. 
83 Morris-Suzuki, T (1991) 'The MFP and the Japanese Development Model', in McCormack, G 
(ed) Bonsai Australia Banzai: Multifunctionpolis and the Making of a Special Relationship with 
Japan, Pluto Press, Leichhardt:125. 
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about Japanese society and culture apparently have been dismissed as 
irrelevant to the project'. 84 
A more measured and fully informed assessment of Japan's proposal would 
have revealed that technological utopianism is an established part of Japanese 
economic discourse. Furthermore, a comprehensive understanding of 
institutions like MITI  might have alerted Australian policy-makers to the 
dominance of MITI 's 'Leizure' division in overseeing the project's 
development.85 Such bureaucratic intricacies in Japan help explain both the 
imprecision of the original blueprint and its emphasis on leisure industries. The 
Basic Concept's suggestion that the human race was on the verge of an ill­
defined 'leap' by into the 'Fifth Sphere', 86 which would be fundamental to the 
MFP's success, should have induced caution on the part of Australian officials. 
I f  that was not sufficient, then the report's focus on resort and convention 
industries ought to have given pause for thought: these were hardly the sorts of 
initiatives that were likely to boost Australia's manufacturing capacity. I ndeed, 
an understanding of the extensive nature of Japanese visions regarding the 
development of regional 'techno-belts' might have suggested that in the event 
of the MFP being realised at all it would only be likely to play a modest role in 
promoting new 'life-styles' for Japanese business people, rather than as the 
sophisticated manufacturing hub of an emergent regional division of labour.87 
H owever, notwithstanding these caveats, there was a good deal of initial 
optimism about the proposal in Australia. Will Bailey, the Australian MFP group 
head described the initiative as 'the largest single investment opportunity this 
country has seen'. 88 Such enthusiasm is unsurprising: the MFP project seemed 
to offer the possibility of transforming Australi a's largest bilateral economic 
relationship, from one of simple commodity supplier, to a partnership in which 
Japan and Australia cooperated in developing leading edge industries and 
technologies. Despite the inherent implausibility of this vision, policy-makers 
84 Sugimoto, Y ( 1 990) 'High-Tech Cities for Lonely Technocrats', in James, P (ed) Technocratic 
Dreaming: Of Very fast Trains and Japanese Designer Cities, Left Book Club, Melbourne: 1 40. 
85 McCormack, G ( 1 989) 'Multi Function Polis: Japan-Australia Co-Prosperity?', Arena No 86: 
1 6. 
86 MFP Planning Committee ( 1 987) A Multifunction polis Scheme for the 21st Century. 8. 
According to the Basic Concept the human environment has evolved through four spheres so 
far, involving increasingly complex divisions of labour and an increased need for a leisure ­
oriented lifestyle in the wake of industrialisation. 
87 Rimmer, P ( 1 99 1 )  'Global Techno-Belts in the Twenty-first Century', in McCormack, G (ed) 
Bonsai Australia Banzai: Multifunctionpolis and the Making of a Special Relationship with 
Japan, Pluto Press, Leichhardt: 1 1 3. 
88 Quoted in: McCormack, G ( 1 99 1 )  'Coping with Japan': 34. 
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were clearly keen to try and realise it. Their response is, therefore, another 
useful measure of the efficacy of government policy settings under Labor. 
The Australian Response 
The inept and inconsistent response on the part of Australian policy-makers is 
illustrative of the shortcomings of Australia's economic diplomacy in general 
and that with Japan in particular. The protracted wrangling over the MFP's 
possible location was indicative of both the structural constraints imposed by 
the Federal system and the imperatives of parochial politics. The specifics of 
this process need not detain us here. 89 Suffice to say that the ultimate 
proposed location for the MFP - Adelaide - was very much a second-best 
compromise. True, it satisfied the Japanese preference for a single location, 
rather than the more diffuse concepts proposed by Sydney and Melbourne, but 
Queensland's bid was undermined by a combination of political expediency and 
an undercurrent of racism. Significant here was Andrew Peacock's willingness 
to make domestic political mileage out of a potentially significant inter-national 
development.90 The suggestion that the MFP might become a Japanese 
'enclave', separate from the wider Australian community played on deep­
seated, almost archetypal tears within Australia about the 'Yellow Peril'. An 
extraordinary and vitriolic outburst of this sort was Rex Connor's assertion that: 
Of all the con jobs that have been inflicted on our nation, nothing surpasses the 
Japanese proposal to build a futuristic city (MFP) on Australian soil. This proposal reeks 
of oriental deception and treachery ... It will be a Japanese enclave of surveillance over 
the domestic affairs of Australia. It will lead to the loss of our sovereignty. It will be a 
beachhead for the invasion and subjugation of Australia without a shot being fired. 91 
Plainly, such xenophobic domestic opposition, feeding on the lingering 
suspicions of older Australians who remembered Japan's war-time role, made 
the government's task of promoting the MFP more difficult. However, even the 
complexities of inter-state rivalry, domestic political contestation and an 
undercurrent of racism - serious as such handicaps were - might have been 
overcome if the Australian government had had a clearer idea of the 
motivations of the Japanese; a consistent policy position and goal; and a 
willingness to do whatever was necessary to ensure that any possible benefits 
89 For a more detailed consideration of the history of the project and the negotiations over its 
location, see: Inkster, I (1991) The Clever City : chapter 3. 
90 Inkster, I (1991) The Clever City: 122. 
91 Originally quoted in the Daily Telegraph, J une 8, 1990, cited in : Inkster, I (1991) The Clever 
City: 120, 
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for Australia, in the form of increased investment flows and the like, were 
actually achieved. 
It should not be imagined, however, that Australian policy-makers were totally 
bereft of informed advice on possible options. David Yencken's study in 1989 
was a thorough and potentially important source of policy guidance. That such 
advice was not heeded may owe much to domestic bureaucratic rivalries. As 
we saw in chapter 3, interventionist departments like the Department of 
Industry, Technology and Commerce, which sponsored the Yencken report, 
were unable to break the dominance of the pro-market, neoliberal policies that 
emanated from Treasury and the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet. 
Consequently key recommendations of the Yencken report were ignored. 
Perhaps Yencken's most significant conclusion was that: 
The success of the polis concept will depend upon the achievement of a satisfactory 
public-private partnership for its planning and dev�lopment. ... Government has a 
necessary and vital role to play in drawing up an imaginative plan for the polis site (or 
several sites), in assembling and allocating land, in providing infrastructure and other 
essential services, in promoting experiments in urban living, and in stimulating and co­
ordinating shared or co-operative schemes for a wide variety of purposes. 92 
As Yencken noted, attracting private investment from Japan was the project's 
chief attraction in the eyes of many decision-makers in Australia. However, the 
emphasis on private investment encouraged the 'neglect or underestimation of 
the role that public initiatives must play if the project is to be genuinely 
successful'. 93 The unambiguous conclusion of this broad-ranging and 
comprehensive report was that the MFP would not be successful 'without a high 
degree of political commitment by the federal government and any participating 
States'. 94 However, the dominance of the neoliberal policy framework meant 
that there was an inherent predisposition toward minimising the role of 
government and relying on market forces to encourage private sector 
investment from both Australian and Japanese sources. Ironically, however, it 
had been the failure of 'Australian' investment in manufacturing that had 
rendered the prospect of increased foreign investment both more attractive and, 
arguably, more necessary. 
As we have see throughout the course of this thesis, Japanese investment has 
not been motivated solely or even primarily by market forces. Furthermore, 
92 Yencken, D (1989) Multifunction Polis: Social Issues Study, Department of Industry, 
Technology and Commerce, AGPS, Canberra:268/9. 
93 Yencken, D (1989) Multifunction Polis: 268. 
94 Yencken, D (1989) Multifunction Polis: 271. 
260 
Japanese multinationals and private investors have been accustomed to 
operating within a framework of cooperative business-government relations 
which have underpinned investment strategies and given increased confidence 
about the long-term investment climate. The absence of such an environment in 
Australia and the lack of commitment to a potentially important project on the 
part of the Australian government was certain to diminish Japanese enthusiasm 
for the project. 
Not surprisingly, given Australian policy-makers reluctance to become directly 
involved, little progress has been made in actually developing the project. 
Another important government report attempted to document and account for 
this notable lack of progress. Again the conclusions are unambiguous. Most 
striking in this connection has been the 
... soul-searching that has occurred in Australia over the exact nature of the MFP, and 
over the role of government in its development, [which] contrasts with a well-developed 
view in Japan of both the scope of such projects and the way they should be supported 
and run .95 
The Japanese government and potential investors were 'exasperated' by the 
gap between Australian government rhetoric and actual commitment.96 The 
Report details a litany of 'false starts, uncertainty, and incoherence'. 97 Again, 
the central conclusion of the Bureau of Industry Economics (BIE) Report is that: 
Private investor support cannot be generated without substantial prior public-sector 
commitment. .. In particular it requires a substantial supply of long-term risk capital. The 
necessary commitment is most unlikely to be generated under the leadership of the 
private sector . . . 98 
Clearly, given the influence of the neoliberal model on Labor's attitude to 
government intervention, such an outcome was inherently implausible. 
Assessment 
Even a noted sceptic like Gavan McCormack acknowledged that the MFP ­
despite its initial bias in favour of Japanese interests - was capable of 
generating tangible economic and possibly even social benefits within Australia, 
given suitably sophisticated policy settings and an informed debate about its 
95 Bureau of Industry Economics (1994) Evaluation of Commonwealth Support for the 
Multifunction Polis, Research Report 58, AGPS, Canberra: 27. 
96 BIE (1994) Evaluation of Commonwealth Support for the MFP:37. 
97 BIE (1994) Evaluation of Commonwealth Support for the MFP: 84. 
98 BIE (1994) Evaluation of Commonwealth Support for the MFP: 144. 
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exact nature.99 True, much of the initial Japanese suggestion may have been 
imprecise and overblown, but this need not have precluded the possibility of 
placing the project on a more realistic footing given a sufficiently well-informed 
and active policy stance on the part of the Australian government. However, the 
dominance of the neoliberal model amongst Australian policy-makers, 
especially in the area of foreign economic relations, meant that such a 
response was rendered less likely on theoretical, or even ideological grounds. 
Consequently, the project has continued to languish and is unlikely to be 
realised in anything like its original form. 1 oo Nearly a decade after the original 
proposal nothing tangible has been achieved. The only realistic plans involve a 
'high tech housing estate', 1 o1 and a pipeline to re-cycle waste-water for market 
gardens. 1 o2 Gregory Clark considers that 'Japan has lost whatever small 
interest it had in the MFP', something he attributes to a Canberra policy-making 
establishment that 'holds rigidly to the view that decisions about Japan are best 
made by people who have no real knowledge of Japan'.103 Despite the clearly 
polemical tone, Clark has a point: confronted with an ambivalent and non­
committal Australian government the Japanese have withdrawn significant 
support for the project.1 04 While the project limps on, it is clearly nothing like the 
original conception and, more importantly for the purposes of this discussion, it 
is now a 'multinational' rather than a Japanese-sponsored project. 1 05 Even the 
newly appointed chairman of the newly re-named 'MFP Australia' - Llew 
Edwards - was forced to concede that 'there is no doubt that the MFP's 
international partners, particularly the Japanese and Koreans, have been 
disappointed with its performance to date'.1 06 
It is hard to escape the conclusion that Australia's policy-makers fumbled an 
opportunity to significantly increase the scale and nature of Japanese 
99 McCormack, G (1991) 'Austral-Asia: A Regional Future?', Occasional Papers No 2, Centre 
for Asian Studies, UWA, Perth: 16. 
1 00 At the time of writing it appears as though the recently elected Coalition government intends 
to withdraw funding for the MFP altogether, something that will further diminish whatever 
potential the project retains. Kerin, J (1996) 'Cloud on smart city's future', The Australian, April 
16:6. 101 Kelton, G et al (1995) 'High-tech MFP estate for 30,000', The Adelaide Advertiser, August 
19: 2. 102 Altmann, C (1995) 'Pipeline may double market garden crops', The Adelaide Advertiser, 
August 25: 4. 
1 03 Clark, G (1992) 'Canberra's lost innocents', The Australian, July 31: 11. 
104 Hills, B (1993) 'Japanese pullout puts MFP in doubt', The Sydney Morning Herald, 
October13: 1. 
105 Personal Interviews with senior MFP executives, especially: Ross Stockall (Director, 
International and Government) and Bill Galway (Director, Policy & Projects). 
1 06 Quoted in MFP Today: An Investment in the Future, August 1995: 6. 
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investment in Australia. While a degree of caution, even scepticism as to the 
exact nature of the project might have been advisable, there was clearly the 
possibility of taking advantage of a fortuitous combination of circumstances in 
the Japanese political economy to re-shape the structural basis of the 
relationship. That such an opportunity was not embraced is testimony to the 
reluctance of Australian policy-makers to take a more activist role in the 
conduct of bilateral relations, something that can be attributed to the dominance 
of the neoliberal policy paradigm in Canberra. The lack of a country-specific 
focus and a preference for market mechanisms means that a sophisticated 
capacity for recognising the constraints and opportunities that are associated 
with specific relationships is unlikely to develop under the current, dominant 
political rationality. 
Conclusion 
The four case studies presented here are indicative of the way in which the 
contemporary neoliberal paradigm in Australia has provided an inadequate 
basis for comprehending the interaction between economic entities in Australia 
and Japan. The neoliberal model is incapable of comprehending the specific 
content and context of Japanese business-government relations and corporate 
practices. These more detailed examinations of the political-economy of the 
Australia-Japan relationship reveal that the Australian government's preference 
for non-intervention and a reliance on market forces is not only of dubious value 
given the logic of Japanese corporate organization, but it may directly 
disadvantage Australian-based businesses that seek to deal with them. 
Japan's keiretsu networks are not only potentially important structural 
complements to Japanese business competitiveness, they may also act as de 
facto instruments of national governmental policy. Whether this is manifest as 
the manipulation of price structures, as in the coal trade, or the systematic 
exclusion of dangerous competitors, as in the case of Australia's highly efficient 
ship-builders, there is clearly a good deal more than the untrammelled 
operation of market forces determining such outcomes. The importance of such 
wider strategic realities is also manifest in the investment and organisational 
patterns that characterise the operations of Japanese car manufacturers in 
Australia. Again, the wider operational milieu - in this case regional production 
patterns and national trade policies - is clearly a significant determinant of 
production locations and strategies. The importance of considering the complex 
interactions of political and economic factors is also illustrated in the final case 
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study - the MFP. In this latter example, distinctively different attitudes as to the 
appropriate role of government in Australia and Japan produced a good deal of 
mutual incomprehension on the part of national policy-makers and prospective 
investors. 
These case studies demonstrate in different ways the constraints and 
opportunities that face policy-makers in the contemporary GPE. Clearly, the 
constraints are significantly greater in smaller economic spaces like Australia's. 
However, governments retain a capacity to influence both the domestic 
conditions under which the capital accumulation process occurs and, although 
to a more limited extent, the manner in which external economic relationships 
are structured and conducted. Plainly, where the production strategies of TNCs 
are increasingly determined by a global logic there is greater pressure on 
national governments to accommodate such realities, and less scope for them 
to influence their overall pattern. But as we have seen in this chapter and the 
discussion of Japan in the region, national states can encourage the location of 
particular productive activities through a range of incentives and strategies 
designed to attract mobile international capital. Whether such attempts to curry 
favour with international corporate capital is considered a worthy task of 
governments is less important, in the context of this discussion, than is the 
recognition that intensified competition between national economic spaces is a 
factor with which policy-makers must contend. 
Similarly, other nations with which 'Australia' is supposedly competing are 
clearly prepared to try and advantage 'national champions' by either 
discouraging competing imports or actively promoting their exports. In this 
regard Australian policy-makers may well claim to be no different. The question 
is, of course, whether the strategies pursued by Australia's policy-making elite 
are liable to generate the same sort of benefits, or be able to overcome the 
competing strategies of nations that adopt a more nee-mercantilist, less laissez 
faire -oriented approach. Again, it is apparent that there are both barriers to 
market entry - and possible remedies - that the neoliberal model either 
precludes or fails to consider. 
Finally, it is worth re-emphasising that the current policy framework is not a 
non-interventionist one. At one level this is obvious. The government's - albeit 
half-hearted - attempts to instigate some sort of industry policy under the 
various Button Plans is evidence of this. At a more fundamental level, however, 
the government is unavoidably involved in determining the political framework 
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that determines the sorts of economic relationships and mode of governance 
that predominates within any country. It is, therefore, not so much a question of 
whether or not to 'intervene' in 'the economy', but of the particular basis on 
which such involvement will occur. In Australia, the dominance of a political 
rationality informed by neo-classical economics has meant that policy-makers 
have placed a greater faith in the efficacy of market forces than was perhaps 
warranted. As this chapter has demonstrated, there are unambiguous grounds 
for questioning the appropriateness of the neoliberal model itself as an 
explanation of contemporary economic practices. 
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Chapter 9: Conclusion 
This thesis has explored the political-economy of Australia-Japan relations. 
More particularly, it has attempted to illuminate the influence and development 
of neoliberal ideas on Australian policy-makers' management of this 
relationship. During the course of this examination it was stressed that there is 
a degree of inherent artificiality in this process: changes in the GPE mean that 
thinking of national economies as discrete and readily identifiable entities is 
increasingly problematic. Much of the interaction between economic entities in 
Australia and Japan is conducted by the TNCs that dominate global trade and 
production patterns. Consequently, as we have seen, deciding what constitutes 
an 'import' or an 'export', or quite what might be in the 'national interest' is an 
increasingly difficult task. Robert Reich's celebrated question, 'Who is us?', 1 
highlighted a major dilemma for policymakers., especially those of countries like 
Australia that are extensively penetrated by 'foreign' multinationals. 
Kindleberger's equally famous observation about the future of the nation state 
notwithstanding, 2 however, national governments clearly retain the capacity to 
influence the conditions under which the capitalist accumulation process occurs 
within geographical areas over which they retain nominal authority. What is less 
clear is what sort of policies might be most efficacious. Even if the ambitions of 
government are confined to relatively uncontroversial desiderata, like the 
provision of well-paid jobs and general 'economic development', it is not 
obvious which policies might most effectively achieve such goals or, indeed, 
whether they are the unproblematic boons some of their advocates might claim. 
While there might be a good deal of agreement on the desirability of providing 
adequate job opportunities, for example, it has become clear that economic 
expansion is not - to borrow a fashionable, anodyne and revealing euphemism -
without its 'downside'. Indeed, it is increasingly apparent that a simple calculus 
of economic growth may indicate little about more substantial issues revolving 
around questions of 'quality of life', as a comparison between Japan and 
Australia reveals.3 
1 Reich. Robert. B., (1990) 'Who Is Us?', HaNard Business Review, Jan/Feb: 53-64. 
2 Writing in 1969, Kindleberger famously and prematurely observed that 'the nation state is just 
about through as an economic unit'. See: Kindleberger. C.P., (1969) American Business 
Abroad, Yale: 207. 
3 Castles, I (1992) 'Living Standards in Sydney and Japanese Cities - A Comparison', in 
Sheridan, K (ed) The Australian Economy in the Japanese Mirror, University of Queensland 
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More and more, however, national governments are judged by their ability to 
manage 'the national economy' - despite a diminution in the effectiveness of 
the traditional tools of macro-economic intervention and the difficulty of 
delimiting such an entity conceptually. As we have seen, governments do 
influence the conduct of economic life, even if their capacity for autonomous 
policy is compromised by the internationalisation of production and finance, and 
the simultaneous erosion of national sovereignty from above and below. While 
there may be a degree of convergence in the techniques and style of national 
economic management, a process furthered by institutions that promote 
economic cooperation and shared authority, there are still important differences 
in the approaches of individual governments. This thesis has illustrated the 
historically different approaches taken by Japanese and Australian policy­
makers. The degree of autonomy conferred by contingent circumstance - the 
comparative strength and independence of the polity, for example - is less 
important, in the context of this discussion, than is the recognition that such 
differences continue. 
Government policy continues to matter and remains an important determinant 
of broadly defined national economic well-being. Without wanting to rehearse 
again the states versus market debate that has occupied parts of this thesis, 
several points merit re-emphasis. Firstly, given that TNCs are, as we have 
seen, critically important actors and determinants of economic activities and 
outcomes in the contemporary GPE, their relationships with individual 
governments are increasingly important. There is a good deal of evidence to 
suggest that activist states can effect not only 'their' national champions, but 
may also influence the investment decisions of overseas multinationals.4 
Moreover, if Harvey's suggestion that spatial barriers are collapsing as a result 
of a 'time-space compression' characteristic of contemporary capitalism is a 
plausible one, then the location of productive activities becomes increasingly 
flexible. 5 Indeed, attractiveness to multinational capital may come to depend on 
the 'image' of a particular location and the facilities it can offer an increasingly 
Press: 92-121; Dowrick, S & Quiggin, J (1993) 'Australia, J apan and the OECD: GOP Rankings 
and Revealed Preference', The Australian Economic Review, 1st Quarter: 21-34. 
4 Encarnation, D J & Wells (1986) 'Competitive strategies in Global Industries: A View From 
Host Governments', in Porter, M (ed) Competition in Global Industries, Harvard Business 
School Press, Boston: 267 -90; Stopford, J & Strange, S (1991) Rival States, Rival Firms: 
Competition for World Market Shares, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 
5 Harvey, D (1990) The Condition of Postmodernity: An Enquiry Into the Origins of Cultural 
Change, Blackwell, Cambridge: chapter 17. 
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mobile workforce. 6 Thus wage levels alone, and narrowly conceived 
conceptions of 'economic efficiency' may not be such critical determinants of 
investment decisions, especially in leading edge manufacturing where cheap 
labour is not a significant consideration. The manner in which national 
economic spaces are linked to the wider GPE is clearly a potentially critical 
determinant of national economic welfare, and one in which governments are 
inescapably involved. As the developmental experiences of Japan and many 
of its East Asian neighbours demonstrate, comparative advantage can be 
created; the position of individual nations within global production hierarchies is 
not given or immutable. 
The policy-framework with which individual nations attempt to accommodate 
the relentless competitive pressures unleashed by the internationalisation of 
economic activity are determined by contingent economic and political 
circumstances: the inherited pattern of economic integration with the world 
economy, in combination with specific national patterns of political activity 
greatly influences and constrains possible policy responses. What is also of 
crucial importance, however, as this thesis has attempted to demonstrate, is the 
ideational framework within which policy is developed. At times of perceived 
crisis and adjustment to a rapidly evolving and changing GPE, policy-makers 
may be willing to experiment with new paradigms, especially where the 
exponents of such innovatory models claim expert and authoritative 
understanding of and solutions for perceived national economic decline. It was 
in such an environment, where 'traditional' policies of defensive protectionism 
and Keynesian-style macro-economic management appeared unable to halt 
'Australia's' marginalisation in the GPE that a new - or, to be more accurate - a 
different paradigm appeared attractive. In this regard, the enthusiasm of other 
Anglo-American economies provided not only instructive and influential 
exemplars, but reinforced the attraction of neoliberal ideas through international 
institutions and the structural power of financial and production networks. 
But what was equally distinctive and noteworthy in the Australian case, was the 
enthusiasm with which this model was taken up by key figures within the Labor 
Party; a party which previously had a history of opposition to such ideas, but 
which was largely transformed in order to accommodate them. Certainly the 
likes of Hawke and Keating were of central importance in, it not popularising, at 
least making neoliberal ideas acceptable. Electoral success provided 
6 Lash, S & Urry, J (1994) Economies of Sign and Space, Sage, London: 303. 
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legitimacy and authority, while the necessity of winning the confidence of the 
increasingly powerful financial markets provided an important incentive for such 
changes. At this juncture, however, it is also important to stress the role of an 
influential coterie of academic economists, public officials and advisers who 
were instrumental in popularising neoliberal ideas and bringing them to the 
attention of policy-makers. In the case of individuals like Ross Garnaut this 
process is readily apparent in his role as Hawke's principal economic adviser 
and as the author of the principal blueprint for Australia's 'integration with Asia'. 
Less obvious was the influence of academics and policy entrepreneurs, of 
whom Peter Drysdale is a significant example. Academic economists like 
Drysdale played an important role in promoting the neoliberal policy paradigm 
that largely determined the orientation of Australia's external economic 
relations. It was an orientation that ultimately culminated in APEC, and which 
helped to define the conduct of bilateral relationships with countries like Japan. 
Theoretical and Practical Implications 
The intention of this thesis has not been to offer an alternative to the neoliberal 
model, although the outline of such a model has necessarily been implicit in 
much that has gone before. However, given that much of this thesis has been 
taken up with a rigorous critique of the dominant neoliberal model it seems only 
reasonable to sketch an alternative approach briefly. It might be objected that 
given the given the attention I have drawn to the socially constructed and 
discursively contingent nature of knowledge, and the concomitant rejection of 
the idea that there is an 'objective' position from which to judge the 
epistemological claims of various theoretical paradigms, this is a somewhat 
inconsistent, not to say vainglorious undertaking. There is some merit in this 
argument. Nevertheless, such an attempt is worth hazarding for several 
reasons: firstly, policy will, epistemological niceties notwithstanding, continue to 
be made. Clearly, some policy initiatives will have more chance of successfully 
meeting their objectives than others. What this thesis has tried to illustrate is 
that policy desiderata that such policies are directed toward meeting are not 
value free, technically correct responses to the ubiquitous challenges of 
economic management in a global economy. On the contrary, the contours of 
policy are defined by complex coalitions of economic and political interests; 
interests that may, however, more powerfully resonate with and be articulated 
by particular discourses at specific historical junctures. 
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This brings me to my second justification for joining the debate about the most 
appropriate style and content of national economic and, by extension, social 
policy: although it is important to recognise the socially constructed and 
contested nature of policy, as well as the inevitably partisan and prejudicial 
nature of political outcomes, this does not mean that some outcomes are not 
more desirable than others. In this context it is possible to judge the Labor 
Party's embrace of neoliberalism by its own lights: did it promote investment, 
increase employment, and transform the position of 'Australia's' economy; or 
would some other policy mix have more efficaciously have delivered such 
results? If increasing general economic welfare (although defining this in itself 
may be contentious) within a delimited economic and political space is the end 
point of governmental activity, then we may legitimately ask whether the 
neoliberal policy initiatives instituted under the Hawke-Keating governments 
delivered optimal outcomes. Clearly, the evidence presented in this thesis, 
whether it is measured by the failure to attract more productive investment or 
the generally disadvantageous manner in which international trading relations 
with countries like Japan are conducted, suggests that the neoliberal model has 
had significant shortcomings in the past and is unlikely to prove any more 
successful in the future. 
Would an alternative policy paradigm have any greater chance of success? If 
'success' is taken to mean the consolidation of an export-oriented 
manufacturing sector, a reduced national dependence on sophisticated imports, 
and the integration of Australian economic entities with the region on more 
favourable terms, then there are clearly numerous policy initiatives that might 
reasonably be expected to encourage such developments. The insights derived 
from strategic trade theory, the growing recognition of the links between 
technology and growth, and various forms of industry policy all suggest that a 
panoply of possible strategies are available to policymakers and industrialists -
many of which have been successfully adopted by countries like Japan. One of 
the key difficulties associated with the neoliberal model, however, is that it has 
failed to recognise the importance of such interventionist policies. The 
theoretical primacy of and commitment to market mechanisms as both an 
organizational principle and a normative desiderata, has meant that 
theoreticians and policy-makers working within this framework have not only 
eschewed such interventions themselves, but they have failed to acknowledge 
or adequately take into account such measures o n  the part of o thers. 
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Consequently, where 'Australia's' competitors are attempting to promote 
national competitive advantage by assisting domestic producers, or actively 
trying to attract foreign multinationals, Australian policy-makers continue to 
place a greater reliance on market forces to achieve such results. Whether it is 
appropriate for taxpayers' resources to be employed by governments to 
underwrite the profitability of private capital is a less important question in the 
context of this discussion than is the potential utility of such policies. Clearly, 
the cooperative government-business relationship in Japan has been central to 
that country's rapid economic growth. It follows from such an analysis that an 
important component of any alternative policy framework in Australia would be 
a capacity for initially recognising the specific complexity of individual economic 
relationships. Reinvigorating a bilateral capacity and understanding within 
relevant bureaucratic departments would seem an essential prerequisite for 
changing the basis on which individual international relationships are 
conducted. Without a thorough understanding of the nationally-specific ways in 
which various countries and the transnational economic actors based in 
particular nations conduct their economic activities, it is unlikely that policies 
will be constructed that might deal with such specificities. 
While there are some signs of disenchantment with the multilateral approach 
that has characterised Australia's economic diplomacy, 7 the general, APEC-Ied 
policy direction has become the relatively uncontested bi-partisan political 
orthodoxy.a Certainly if Australia's political leadership was successful in 
persuading its neighbours, to say nothing of the rest of the world, to abandon 
overt and covert trade barriers, assistance to industry and the range of other 
government initiatives that characterise contemporary national political­
economies, it might well be of great benefit to Australian-based actors. As we 
have seen, however, there are substantial grounds for questioning the 
likelihood of this scenario. But even in the unlikely event of such a vision being 
realised, this would still not mean that the mythical 'level playing field' had been 
finally realised. The organisation of Japanese corporate capital confers specific 
competitive advantages that are not dependent on governments alone. Such 
advantages will not be easily countered, but understanding this sort of 
7 A potentially significant, and somewhat surprising example of this sort has been provided by 
the newly-elected Liberal-National Party coalition government, which has suggested attempting 
to pursue bilateral trade agreements as part of a broader multilateral approach to external 
relations. It remains to be seen, of course what form this will actually take or how effectively it 
will be pursued. See: Meeting the Challenges: The New Global Economy- Liberal and National 
Party Trade Strategies for the Future, Liberal and National Party, Canberra. 
8 See: Howard, J (1995) Australia's Links with Asia: Realising Opportunities in Our Region, 
Fifth Asialink Lecture, Melbourne, April 12. 
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corporate logic may allow the governments of other nations to create policies 
that at least address the reality of such practices, rather than abstract and 
ahistorical idealisations. 
Yet the ideational primacy of the neoliberal model has meant that Australian 
policy-makers have placed great reliance, not to say faith, in market 
mechanisms. Deregulation, it was supposed, would place 'Australia' on a more 
competitive international footing, opening up the 'Australian economy' to the 
beneficial influence of international market forces, and generally making the 
country a more attractive investment location. As we have seen in our central 
case study, limited productive Japan-based investment has been attracted as a 
result. Where capital inflows have increased they have often been associated 
with speculative and opportunistic activities or remained in a highly liquid 
portfolio form. A major shortcoming of the neoliberal model as a basis for 
explanation or policy is its lack of historical specificity and excessive recourse to 
idealised abstraction. A more detailed examination of the operational logic of 
corporations based in Japan, and the sorts of production strategies that have 
emerged in different regions and industry sectors reveals that a simple reliance 
on market forces is unlikely to render Australia a more attractive location. 
Moreover, the inculcation of more 'enterprising' attitudes in the populace or the 
promotion of 'efficiencies' through workplace reform are unlikely to alter the 
manner in which Australia-based economic entities are integrated into global 
production networks. 
However, these shortcomings, serious though they are, may not be the most 
significant aspect of neoliberalism's ideational dominance. As this thesis has 
emphasised, the way in which the objects of government are discursively 
articulated plays a crucially important role in determining what the targets of 
government intervention will be, as well as the overall approach of government 
to the business of governance itself. The techniques, strategies and objects of 
government are largely determined by the political rationality which underpins 
and informs a particular governmental approach. Indeed, the discourse that 
accompanies a particular political rationality not only demarcates 'appropriate' 
or legitimate areas of government action, but effectively marginalises 
alternatives as implausible or unthinkable. This is readily apparent in the case 
of industry policies which advocated a more interventionist role for government. 
As we saw in the case of the Button Plans, government commitment was half­
hearted and has been increasingly wound back as trade union opposition has 
diminished. Significantly, the union movement itself - or, more accurately, an 
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influential leadership group - has adopted the language of 'structural 
adjustment', embraced the necessity of improving 'efficiency', and accepted the 
disciplinary logic inherent in the discourse of 'globalisation' and the competitive 
imperative it embodies. The shift of government focus from macro-intervention 
strategies to an attempt to create a more enterprising citizenry becomes more 
comprehensible when the logic and assumptions of the neoliberal model are 
explicated. 
This draws attention to an important insight generated by a theoretical 
approach informed by the notion of neoliberalism as a political rationality: as 
economic policy-making is increasingly depicted as the preserve of technocratic 
experts, equipped with a specialist knowledge and a discourse that confers an 
almost unchallengeable authority on its practitioners, alternatives are silenced. 
This process is, as I have suggested, apparent in the market versus states or 
neoliberalism versus industry policy debate, and the marginalisation of the latter 
in Australia. However, what is even more striking is the ready acceptance -
even by ostensible opponents on 'the Left' - of the terrain upon which such 
debate will occur. Disagreement occurs not so much over the objects of policy 
and key issues like the desirability of growth, but over the best means to 
achieve it. This has led to a surprising degree of convergence as German and 
Japanese policy-makers and corporations embrace aspects of Anglo-American 
corporate structures and rationales, while American and even British policy­
makers flirt with ideas of stakeholder capitalism and trumpet the merits of life­
time employment and the like.s 
It is neither possible nor desirable to test exhaustively the merits of these 
conceptions here, although, it should be noted, much of the discussion of 
Japanese corporate practices indicated that they may confer significant 
commercial advantages over their Anglo-American rivals, especially where 
these distinctions remain unrecognised. What is worthy of re-emphasis here is 
the discursive power and authority of mainstream economic discourse, and the 
associated increasing reliance on particular forms of expertise. Mainstream 
debate over economic policy is predicated on the idea that capitalism is 
essentially the world economic system, and a sustainable one at that. Neither 
of these propositions is uncontestable; but while they are taken to be so they 
entrench the role of expert authorities and reduce 'debate' to technocratic 
discussions about technique - or formal rather than substantive rationality. 
9 The Economist (1996) 'Stakeholder Capitalism', February 10: 21-5. 
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It is worth remembering, however, that the economists that have made the 
most significant contributions to the general discourse of economics, be it Marx, 
Keynes, Schumpeter or even Smith, were all fundamentally pessimistic about 
the long-term prospects for capitalism.1 0 Moreover, of late the environment has 
placed new, potentially profound and inescapable limits on capitalist, to say 
nothing of human expansion, which are generally ignored, especially within 
mainstream economics. 1 1 This has led to some predictably gloomy 
prognostications about the future - and not just of capitalism. 1 2 Two points are 
important here. Firstly, it is clear that the framework within which capitalist 
accumulation occurs is an infinitely more complex one than the idealisations of 
the neoliberal model might suggest. Plainly, there are a range of political and 
other potential 'distortions' that threaten to render irrelevant neoliberalism's 
central assumptions and thereby nullify whatever theoretical utility the model 
might have. Secondly, while many of the environmental scenarios tend to be 
unrelentingly apocalyptic, some of the more sophisticated contain important 
critiques of the sorts of highly technical, political rationalities that are central to 
neoliberal discourse. In societies increasingly characterised by systemic risk of 
the most profound and pervasive sorts, there is the potential for 'a chronic 
devaluation of political and technological rationality claims', 1 3 something that 
threatens to undermine completely the existent ideational hegemony. 
So, while the discourse of neoliberalism has exerted a powerful ideational 
influence that has shaped Australia's external economic relations and 
effectively marginalised alternatives, there is no reason to suppose that its 
hegemony is permanent or likely to remain unchallenged. Even if the 
environment proves capable of supporting continued capitalist expansion for 
the foreseeable future, neoliberal ideas may contain the seeds of their own 
demise. As we have seen, there are substantial grounds for questioning 
whether the neoliberal model will achieve the sorts of goals its advocates 
expect, even when these objectives are narrowly conceived within a calculus of 
national economic advantage. Where many of the nations with which Australian 
1 O Heilbroner, R (1992) Twenty-First Century Capitalism, Allen & Unwin, St Leonard's: Part V. 
1 1  Even where the environment is specifically addressed, mainstream economic theorists 
simplistically attribute 'problems' to 'the absence of markets for most of nature's services'. See 
Anderson, K & Blackhurst, R (1992) 'Trade, the environment and public policy', in Anderson, K 
& Blackhurst, R (eds) The Greening of World Trade Issues, Harvester Wheatsheaf, New York: 
4. 
1 2 For an especially bleak and alarmingly persuasive view of this sort, See: Kaplan, R (1994) 
The Coming Anarchy', The Atlantic Monthly, 273 (2): 44-76. 
1 3 Beck, U (1995) Ecological Politics in an Age of Risk, Polity Press, Cambridge: 89. 
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policy-makers seek increased integration are clearly following differing 
rationales, and where foreign based companies follow an operational logic 
which is not solely determined by market forces, then the utility of the neoliberal 
model as a basis for policy must be in doubt. The comparative economic 
success of Australia's limited experiments with industry policy and the relative 
failure of the market model may generate calls for more a greater range of 
policy options. 
More importantly in the long term, neoliberal policies have had a profound 
impact on the social relations of the countries that have been most enthusiastic 
in applying them. The US, for example, is increasingly characterised by marked 
disparities of wealth, life-chances, and the emergence of a permanent 
'underclass' that threatens future stability of American society and some of its 
cherished values.1 4  More generally, critics of neoliberal policies claim that 
'opening up' national economic spaces to competitive market forces and 
instituting the sorts of policies that facilitate the movement of capital and 
productive activities, institutes a 'race to the bottom'. 1 5 Policy is predicated upon 
a competitive cheapening of national labour forces, usually via a reduction in 
the influence of organised labour. Clearly, this is something of a generalisation: 
many individuals - even in the industrialising countries - are capable of finding 
lucrative niches in the increasingly global economy which will continue to 
improve their living standards. But for those individuals in low skilled, routine 
occupations the future in an open economy is indeed bleak.1 6 
For Australia - and Japan, for that matter - the implications of less regulated 
international economic activities are significant, and threaten to destabilise, if 
not overturn their respective 'historic compromises' between domestic capital 
and labour. What needs to be remembered, however, as Pauly reminds us, is 
that the move toward increased deregulation was not the inescapable, technical 
necessity advocates of liberalisation might imply. On the contrary, national 
governments and financiers 'use the language of inevitability to obscure the 
1 4  For a thoughtful analysis of the impact of neoliberalism on America, see: Lind, M (1995) The 
Next American Nation: The New Nationalism and the Fourth American Revolution, The Free 
Press, New York. 
1 5 Brecher, J & Costello, T (1994) Global Village or Global Pillage: Economic reconstruction 
From the Bottom Up, South End Press, Boston: Chapter 1. 
1 6 In this context Kurzer's research on European economies suggests that there is a clear link 
between 'detachment' from international capital and the ability of national governments to 
effectively manage and protect domestic labour from 'international disturbances'. See: Kurzer, P 
(1991) 'Unemployment in Open Economies: The Impact of Trade, Finance, and European 
Integ ration', Comparative Political Studies, 24 ( 1): 24. 
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notion that other choices are available'; 17 a collective move toward re-regulation 
- or, more accurately - a different form of regulation, remains a possibility, 
albeit an unlikely one. Indeed, there are a number of interesting suggestions 
both for placing trade on a more 'rational' basis, 1 8 and for bringing global 
financial flows under transnational governance by limiting their volume and 
speed.1 9 
That such policies are unlikely to be adopted in the foreseeable future is 
testament to the current hegemony of the neoliberal ideational paradigm. What 
this thesis has attempted to draw attention to is the manner in which the 
discourse of neoliberalism has both depoliticised and constrained debate over 
important economic and social questions. What are essentially political 
initiatives and decisions are increasingly portrayed as the inevitable responses 
to the technical demands of expert economic management. Policy is, in fact, 
retrospectively 'naturalised' and thereby rendered less politically partisan. 
Indeed, the similarity of policy positions between the major political parties in 
Australia is confirmation of the power of this authoritative, expertly legitimated 
discourse. 
And yet, although less economically and politically powerful nations like 
Australia are clearly constrained by the 'discipline' of global financial markets in 
a way that the US, for example, is not,2o this does not mean that national 
governments are without options. As we have seen in the case of the two 
17 Pauly, L {1995) 'Capital Mobility, State Autonomy and political Legitimacy', Journal of 
International Affairs, 48 (2) : 383. 
1 8 The rationality of the current trade regime might be questioned from an environmental 
perspective. How 'rational', for example, is intra-industry trade, the fastest growing part of 
global trade, which is predicated upon the endless and environmentally costly exchange of 
virtually identical products? See: Lang, T & Hines, C {1993) The New Protectionism: Protecting 
the Future Against Free Trade, The New Press: chapter 1. 
1 9 One suggestion for limiting exchange rate volatility, speculation and therefore the size of 
overall flows is for a uniform tax on foreign exchange transaction. It would, however, require 
international cooperation and coordination and is probably unlikely without further systemic 
destabilisation given the influence of financial interests and the dominance of neoliberal ideas. 
See: Felix, D (1995) The Tobin Tax Proposal: Background, Issues, Prospects', Futures, 27 (2) : 
195-208. Furthermore, Helleiner makes the important observation that the dynamics of inter­
state interaction in the financial and trade sectors are fundamentally different, requiring 
cooperation to maintain openness in trade and closure in finance. Clearly a significant, even 
paradigmatic change of thinking would be required to alter existing norms and ideational 
frameworks. See: Helleiner, E {1992) 'States and the Future of Global Finance', Review of 
International Studies, 18: 35. 
20 Cerny goes so far as to suggest that financial markets, rather than states, are the nearest 
thing to a 'hegemonic force in the contemporary international system. While this may be 
something of an overstatement, it does remind us of the constraints on small states and the 
difficulty they face in attempting to act autonomously. See: Cerny, P {1994) 'The dynamics of 
financial globalization: Technology, market structure, and policy response', Policy Sciences, 27: 
339. 
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nations that formed the principal empirical focus of this thesis, major differences 
in policy style and content remain possible across nations. While the 
parameters within which policy is constructed may be increasingly 
circumscribed and demonstrate a degree of convergence, there is still scope for 
a good deal of national variation. Much depends on the sorts of coalitions of 
interest illustrated earlier and their attempt$ to influence the direction and 
substance of policy. Orthodox explanations within the political-economy 
tradition remind us that different actors will benefit from specific policies at 
particular times: holders of mobile financial capital or controllers of transnational 
corporate activities - be they manufacturing, or resource-oriented, as is often 
the case in Australia - may be expected to support and gain from policies that 
erode national border controls and facilitate the international movement of such 
assets. Yet the complexity and competing interests of such shifting alliances 
are demonstrated by a more detailed consideration of the specific manner in 
which individual companies, or their Australian subsidiaries are integrated into 
the GPE: the experience of car manufacturers in Australia demonstrates that 
protectionism may sometimes suit the interests of even the most 
comprehensively internationalised industries. 
There is, however, more to the dominance of neoliberal ideas and the 
subsequent direction of policy than such accounts - indispensable though they 
are - generally imply. What is often missing from such explanations, and what 
this thesis has attempted to illuminate, is the influence which particular ideas 
may come to exert over key policy makers as they come to be accepted as the 
most appropriate answers to what are taken to be the dominant questions of 
national economic management. At moments of perceived economic crisis or 
dislocation, a discourse claiming authoritative understanding about the causes 
of and remedies for such difficulties may hold great attractions for beleaguered 
policy-makers. Where this is reinforced by an expert chorus of elite academic 
and bureaucratic advisers such ideas may become even more compelling for 
a technocratically-minded political leadership eager to demonstrate its 
competence as economic managers. In this context, the increasingly 
hegemonic economic discourse associated with an overarching neoliberal 
political rationality offered a way of transcending and uniting diverse and 
potentially contending economic and political interests in response to what was 
portrayed as inescapable and unforgiving economic reality. 
This thesis has attempted to illustrate the way in which this ideational 
hegemony has effectively marginalised alternative policy initiatives. The 
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apparent inability of alternative paradigms, like Keynesianism, to successfully 
cope with the exigencies of increasingly internationalised economic activity 
created an opportunity for advocates of neoliberal policies to influence the 
direction and content of public policy. Where such policies were given the 
imprimatur and authority of acknowledged experts in the increasingly dominant 
discourse of economic rationalism, this had the great merit from the Labor 
leadership's point of view of effectively insulating them from potential criticism 
from within the Party and the trade union movement, while simultaneously 
winning the approval of the evermore powerful financial markets. Neoliberal 
ideas, then, provided an important focal point for a diverse range of interests, 
which were not confined to the sorts of economic actors central to more 
conventional political-economy accounts. True, such economic actors were 
important in creating the overarching conditioning framework which created a 
climate of opinion favourable to neoliberalism's rise, but it is important to 
acknowledge that this process was given additional impetus by an influential 
group of politicians, bureaucrats and academic economists convinced of the 
rectitude of the neoliberal paradigm. 
Indeed, a theoretical perspective that takes notions of discourse seriously can 
help to illuminate the manner in which policy frameworks maintain their 
authority despite the opposition of important economic interests (firms locked 
into nationally-oriented modes of production and accumulation, for example), 
or even their apparent failure to fulfil the expectations of their principal 
advocates. Certainly the power of global financial markets and the diminishing 
utility of national economic policy instruments may make market conforming 
policies more attractive. But what is striking about the contemporary GPE is the 
continuing degree of variation in policy settings across nations especially, but 
not only, between the Anglo-American economies and those within East and 
Southeast Asia. To understand this national variation, especially in the light of 
the comparative success of the divergent economic models that have 
underpinned these broadly defined but distinctive forms of capitalism, it is 
necessary to go beyond immediate structural factors and consider the manner 
in which particular policy frameworks gain their legitimacy and maintain their 
ideational authority. 
In this context, the neoliberal political rationality and the specific policy 
innovations it led to at both the macro and micro levels owed a good deal of its 
paramountcy to the support and active proselytisation of key members of the 
ALP, the bureaucracy and academia. Certainly these ideas may have enjoyed a 
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general ascendancy in the Anglo-American economies in the wake of 
Keynesianism's demise and the increasing influence of international financial 
and productive capital, but it is important to acknowledge and recognise the 
critical role played by influential groups in Australia as the bearers and 
articulators of an increasingly poweriul transnational discourse. It is equally 
crucial to recognise that this process was neither an inevitable nor universal 
international phenomenon. The Japanese case reminds us that a different 
political rationality is not only possible, but will produce distinctly different 
patterns of political and economic behaviour. This thesis has attempted to 
illuminate the area in which different political rationalities and forms of 
capitalism intersect, and to consider the efficacy of Australia's economic policy 
initiatives in the light of such interactions. 
What an examination of the Australia-Japan relationship demonstrates is the 
importance of appreciating such differences in the conduct of bilateral relations. 
Where policy is constructed by the lights of idealised theoretical abstractions 
that pay little heed to the mundane realities of commercial practices and 
specific national developmental trajectories, then it is highly probable that such 
policies will be unable to accommodate such realities adequately. Highlighting 
the theoretical weaknesses of the dominant neoliberal ideational framework, of 
course, is not the same as remedying them. However, attempting to draw 
attention to such shortcomings and attempting to create what admirers of 
Gramsci like to call a 'counter hegemonic discourse' is a useful place to start. It 
is to such a project that this thesis hopes to make a modest contribution. 
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